Daily Papers

Due to the cost of developing and training deep learning models from scratch, machine learning engineers have begun to reuse pre-trained models (PTMs) and fine-tune them for downstream tasks. PTM registries known as "model hubs" support engineers in distributing and reusing deep learning models. PTM packages include pre-trained weights, documentation, model architectures, datasets, and metadata. Mining the information in PTM packages will enable the discovery of engineering phenomena and tools to support software engineers. However, accessing this information is difficult - there are many PTM registries, and both the registries and the individual packages may have rate limiting for accessing the data. We present an open-source dataset, PTMTorrent, to facilitate the evaluation and understanding of PTM packages. This paper describes the creation, structure, usage, and limitations of the dataset. The dataset includes a snapshot of 5 model hubs and a total of 15,913 PTM packages. These packages are represented in a uniform data schema for cross-hub mining. We describe prior uses of this data and suggest research opportunities for mining using our dataset. The PTMTorrent dataset (v1) is available at: https://app.globus.org/file-manager?origin_id=55e17a6e-9d8f-11ed-a2a2-8383522b48d9&origin_path=%2F~%2F. Our dataset generation tools are available on GitHub: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7570357.

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly coordinate real workloads by selecting and chaining third-party tools based on text-visible metadata such as tool names, descriptions, and return messages. We show that this convenience creates a supply-chain attack surface: a malicious MCP tool server can be co-registered alongside normal tools and induce overthinking loops, where individually trivial or plausible tool calls compose into cyclic trajectories that inflate end-to-end tokens and latency without any single step looking abnormal. We formalize this as a structural overthinking attack, distinguishable from token-level verbosity, and implement 14 malicious tools across three servers that trigger repetition, forced refinement, and distraction. Across heterogeneous registries and multiple tool-capable models, the attack causes severe resource amplification (up to 142.4times tokens) and can degrade task outcomes. Finally, we find that decoding-time concision controls do not reliably prevent loop induction, suggesting defenses should reason about tool-call structure rather than tokens alone.

Background: Collaborative Software Package Registries (SPRs) are an integral part of the software supply chain. Much engineering work synthesizes SPR package into applications. Prior research has examined SPRs for traditional software, such as NPM (JavaScript) and PyPI (Python). Pre-Trained Model (PTM) Registries are an emerging class of SPR of increasing importance, because they support the deep learning supply chain. Aims: Recent empirical research has examined PTM registries in ways such as vulnerabilities, reuse processes, and evolution. However, no existing research synthesizes them to provide a systematic understanding of the current knowledge. Some of the existing research includes qualitative claims lacking quantitative analysis. Our research fills these gaps by providing a knowledge synthesis and quantitative analyses. Methods: We first conduct a systematic literature review (SLR). We then observe that some of the claims are qualitative. We identify quantifiable metrics associated with those claims, and measure in order to substantiate these claims. Results: From our SLR, we identify 12 claims about PTM reuse on the HuggingFace platform, 4 of which lack quantitative validation. We successfully test 3 of these claims through a quantitative analysis, and directly compare one with traditional software. Our findings corroborate qualitative claims with quantitative measurements. Our findings are: (1) PTMs have a much higher turnover rate than traditional software, indicating a dynamic and rapidly evolving reuse environment within the PTM ecosystem; and (2) There is a strong correlation between documentation quality and PTM popularity. Conclusions: We confirm qualitative research claims with concrete metrics, supporting prior qualitative and case study research. Our measures show further dynamics of PTM reuse, inspiring research infrastructure and new measures.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation), namely harmful skills. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of harmful skills in agent ecosystems, covering 98,440 skills across two major registries. Using an LLM-driven scoring system grounded in our harmful skill taxonomy, we find that 4.93% of skills (4,858) are harmful, with ClawHub exhibiting an 8.84% harmful rate compared to 3.49% on Skills.Rest. We then construct HarmfulSkillBench, the first benchmark for evaluating agent safety against harmful skills in realistic agent contexts, comprising 200 harmful skills across 20 categories and four evaluation conditions. By evaluating six LLMs on HarmfulSkillBench, we find that presenting a harmful task through a pre-installed skill substantially lowers refusal rates across all models, with the average harm score rising from 0.27 without the skill to 0.47 with it, and further to 0.76 when the harmful intent is implicit rather than stated as an explicit user request. We responsibly disclose our findings to the affected registries and release our benchmark to support future research (see https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/HarmfulSkillBench).

Third-party agent skills extend LLM-based agents with instruction files and executable code that run on users' machines. Skills execute with user privileges and are distributed through community registries with minimal vetting, but no ground-truth dataset exists to characterize the resulting threats. We construct the first labeled dataset of malicious agent skills by behaviorally verifying 98,380 skills from two community registries, confirming 157 malicious skills with 632 vulnerabilities. These attacks are not incidental. Malicious skills average 4.03 vulnerabilities across a median of three kill chain phases, and the ecosystem has split into two archetypes: Data Thieves that exfiltrate credentials through supply chain techniques, and Agent Hijackers that subvert agent decision-making through instruction manipulation. A single actor accounts for 54.1\% of confirmed cases through templated brand impersonation. Shadow features, capabilities absent from public documentation, appear in 0\% of basic attacks but 100\% of advanced ones; several skills go further by exploiting the AI platform's own hook system and permission flags. Responsible disclosure led to 93.6\% removal within 30 days. We release the dataset and analysis pipeline to support future work on agent skill security.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Package confusion attacks such as typosquatting threaten software supply chains. Attackers make packages with names that syntactically or semantically resemble legitimate ones, tricking engineers into installing malware. While prior work has developed defenses against package confusions in some software package registries, notably NPM, PyPI, and RubyGems, gaps remain: high false-positive rates; generalization to more software package ecosystems; and insights from real-world deployment. In this work, we introduce ConfuGuard, a solution designed to address the challenges posed by package confusion threats. We begin by presenting the first empirical analysis of benign signals derived from prior package confusion data, uncovering their threat patterns, engineering practices, and measurable attributes. We observed that 13.3% of real package confusion attacks are initially stealthy, so we take that into consideration and refined the definitions. Building on state-of-the-art approaches, we extend support from three to six software package registries, and leverage package metadata to distinguish benign packages. Our approach significantly reduces 64% false-positive (from 77% to 13%), with acceptable additional overhead to filter out benign packages by analyzing the package metadata. ConfuGuard is in production at our industry partner, whose analysts have already confirmed 301 packages detected by ConfuGuard as real attacks. We share lessons learned from production and provide insights to researchers.

Large language models increasingly operate as autonomous agents that select and invoke tools from large registries. We identify a critical gap: when unauthorized tools are visible in an agent's context, models select them in adversarial scenarios -- even when explicitly instructed otherwise. We propose a governed MCP proxy that enforces attribute-based access control (ABAC) at two points: tool discovery, where unauthorized tools are removed from the model's context window, and tool invocation, where a second check blocks any unauthorized call. Across three models (Qwen 2.5 7B, Llama 3.1 8B, Claude Haiku 3.5) and 150 adversarial tasks spanning four attack categories, our proxy reduces unauthorized invocation rate (UIR) to 0% while adding under 50ms median latency. Prompt-based restrictions reduce UIR by only 11--18 percentage points, leaving substantial residual risk. Our results show that architectural enforcement -- not prompting -- is necessary for reliable tool access control in deployed agentic systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as human simulators, both for evaluating conversational systems and for generating fine-tuning data. However, naive "act-as-a-user" prompting often yields verbose, unrealistic utterances, underscoring the need for principled evaluation of so-called user proxy agents. We present MIRRORBENCH, a reproducible, extensible benchmarking framework that evaluates user proxies solely on their ability to produce human-like user utterances across diverse conversational tasks, explicitly decoupled from downstream task success. MIRRORBENCH features a modular execution engine with typed interfaces, metadata-driven registries, multi-backend support, caching, and robust observability. The system supports pluggable user proxies, datasets, tasks, and metrics, enabling researchers to evaluate arbitrary simulators under a uniform, variance-aware harness. We include three lexical-diversity metrics (MATTR, YULE'S K, and HD-D) and three LLM-judge-based metrics (GTEval, Pairwise Indistinguishability, and Rubric-and-Reason). Across four open datasets, MIRRORBENCH yields variance-aware results and reveals systematic gaps between user proxies and real human users. The framework is open source and includes a simple command-line interface for running experiments, managing configurations and caching, and generating reports. The framework can be accessed at https://github.com/SAP/mirrorbench.

Small language models (SLMs; 1-12B params, sometimes up to 20B) are sufficient and often superior for agentic workloads where the objective is schema- and API-constrained accuracy rather than open-ended generation. We synthesize recent evidence across open and proprietary SLMs (Phi-4-Mini, Qwen-2.5-7B, Gemma-2-9B, Llama-3.2-1B/3B, Ministral-3B/8B, Apple on-device 3B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill) and connect it to modern evaluations (BFCL v3/v4, StableToolBench) and serving stacks (vLLM, SGLang, TensorRT-LLM) paired with guided decoding libraries (XGrammar, Outlines). We formalize SLM-default, LLM-fallback systems with uncertainty-aware routing and verifier cascades, and propose engineering metrics that reflect real production goals: cost per successful task (CPS), schema validity rate, executable call rate, p50/p95 latency, and energy per request. Guided decoding, strict JSON Schema outputs, and validator-first tool execution close much of the capability gap with larger models and often let SLMs match or surpass LLMs on tool use, function calling, and RAG at 10x-100x lower token cost with materially better latency and energy. We provide design patterns for agent stacks that prioritize SLMs: schema-first prompting, type-safe function registries, confidence scoring with verifier rollups, and lightweight adaptation via LoRA/QLoRA. We also delineate limits where fallback remains valuable (open-domain reasoning and some long-horizon planning). The result is a practical blueprint for building fast, inexpensive, and reliable agents that default to SLMs while preserving headroom with targeted LLM assistance. Keywords: small language models, agents, function calling, structured outputs, JSON Schema, guided decoding, LoRA/QLoRA, routing, energy efficiency, edge inference

Hallucinations, outputs that sound plausible but are factually incorrect, remain an open challenge for deployed LLMs. In code generation, models frequently hallucinate non-existent software packages, recommending imports and installation commands for fictional libraries. This creates a critical supply-chain vulnerability: an attacker can proactively register such packages on public registries with malicious payloads that are subsequently installed and executed by developers or autonomous agents, a class of package confusion attack known as slopsquatting. Once a model is deployed, mitigating this failure mode is difficult: full retraining is costly, and existing approaches either cause severe degradation of model utility or rely on a pre-specified forget-set, an assumption that does not apply to the unbounded space of hallucinations. To address this problem, we present Adaptive Unlearning (AU), a post-deployment framework that surgically suppresses hallucinations while preserving general model utility. AU introduces a hybrid token-level objective that simultaneously reinforces valid outputs and suppresses hallucinated ones. Combined with an adaptive discovery loop that continuously surfaces new hallucination-inducing contexts without human supervision, AU enables generalization to unseen prompts and hallucinations. We demonstrate that AU reduces package hallucination rates by 81%, corresponding to a substantial reduction in slopsquatting attack surface, while maintaining performance on standard coding benchmarks. Our analysis shows that distributional changes are concentrated on package-related generations, leaving general coding behavior largely unaffected and confirming that AU's effect is isolated to the targeted distribution. AU operates entirely on model-generated data, requires no human annotation, and generalizes across domains.

Legal NLP benchmarks overwhelmingly evaluate a single language or aggregate tasks that differ fundamentally across jurisdictions, making cross-lingual comparison impossible. We introduce Multi-Legal-Bench, the first cross-jurisdictional legal benchmark that evaluates identical tasks across six countries (Ukraine, France, Netherlands, Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania), four language families, and 134 million court decisions. The benchmark defines five tasks court-type classification, judgment form classification, case-outcome prediction, legal norm extraction, and cause category prediction mapped to structured metadata from national court registries, forming a deliberately sparse 5x6 task-jurisdiction matrix (20 of 30 cells filled). We evaluate 7 frontier LLMs under zero-shot and 3-shot prompting via AWS Bedrock, with 4 additional small/medium models (3-12B) for scaling analysis. Our results reveal that: (1) task-dependent few-shot effects discovered in Ukrainian replicate across all jurisdictions; (2) no single model dominates any language rankings shift with both task and jurisdiction; (3) cross-lingual few-shot transfer does not follow language proximity: UA->FR (Romance, -2.1 pp) transfers better than UA->PL (Slavic, -13.7 pp), with label-set alignment predicting transfer quality better than language family; and (4) tokenizer fertility, despite a 2.3x spread, does not significantly predict cross-lingual accuracy (r=-0.27, p=0.14), suggesting that model architecture and pretraining data dominate tokenizer efficiency. We release all data, prompts, and model predictions.

Large language model (LLM) agents face a structural tension: cloud agents provide strong reasoning but expose user data, while on-device agents preserve privacy at the cost of overall capability. Existing device-cloud designs treat this boundary as a compute split rather than a trust boundary suited to agentic workloads, and existing sanitizers force a choice between policy flexibility and the structural fidelity tool calls require. In this work, we develop PAAC, a privacy-aware agentic framework that aligns planner--executor decomposition with the device-cloud boundary so that role specialization itself becomes the privacy mechanism. The cloud agent reasons over typed placeholder tokens that preserve each sensitive value's reasoning role while discarding its content, while the on-device agent identifies sensitive spans and distills each step's execution outcome into compact key findings. Sanitization confines the on-device LLM to proposing which spans to mask, while a deterministic registry performs all substitution and reversal, keeping actions directly executable on device. On three agentic benchmarks under strict privacy settings, PAAC dominates the Pareto frontier of privacy and accuracy, improving average accuracy by 15-36\% and reducing average leakage by 2-6times over state-of-the-art device-cloud baselines, with the largest margins on privacy targets outside fixed entity taxonomies. We find consistent improvements on 17 additional benchmarks spanning 10 domains, including math, science, and finance.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that think with images can interactively use tools to reason about visual inputs, but current approaches often rely on a narrow set of tools with limited real-world necessity and scalability. In this work, we first reveal a critical and previously overlooked weakness: even state-of-the-art MLLMs are surprisingly brittle, showing significant performance degradation on images with simple orientation changes or natural corruptions, underscoring the need for more robust tool-based reasoning. To address this, we propose CodeVision, a flexible and scalable code-as-tool framework where the model generates code as a universal interface to invoke any image operation, moving beyond fixed tool registries. We train our model using a two-stage methodology, beginning with Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on a high-quality dataset curated for complex, multi-turn tool composition and error recovery, followed by Reinforcement Learning (RL) with a novel and dense process reward function to encourage strategic and efficient tool use. To facilitate this research, we construct new SFT and RL datasets and introduce a challenging new benchmark suite designed to rigorously evaluate robustness to orientation changes and multi-tool reasoning. Experiments on Qwen2.5-VL and Qwen3-VL series show that our approach significantly improves model performance and fosters emergent capabilities such as flexible tool composition, efficient chained execution, and robust error recovery from runtime feedback. Code is available at https://github.com/ByteDance-BandAI/CodeVision.

Systematic literature review is essential for evidence-based medicine, requiring comprehensive analysis of clinical trial publications. However, the application of artificial intelligence (AI) models for medical literature mining has been limited by insufficient training and evaluation across broad therapeutic areas and diverse tasks. Here, we present LEADS, an AI foundation model for study search, screening, and data extraction from medical literature. The model is trained on 633,759 instruction data points in LEADSInstruct, curated from 21,335 systematic reviews, 453,625 clinical trial publications, and 27,015 clinical trial registries. We showed that LEADS demonstrates consistent improvements over four cutting-edge generic large language models (LLMs) on six tasks. Furthermore, LEADS enhances expert workflows by providing supportive references following expert requests, streamlining processes while maintaining high-quality results. A study with 16 clinicians and medical researchers from 14 different institutions revealed that experts collaborating with LEADS achieved a recall of 0.81 compared to 0.77 experts working alone in study selection, with a time savings of 22.6%. In data extraction tasks, experts using LEADS achieved an accuracy of 0.85 versus 0.80 without using LEADS, alongside a 26.9% time savings. These findings highlight the potential of specialized medical literature foundation models to outperform generic models, delivering significant quality and efficiency benefits when integrated into expert workflows for medical literature mining.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are being adopted as components in software systems. Creating and specializing DNNs from scratch has grown increasingly difficult as state-of-the-art architectures grow more complex. Following the path of traditional software engineering, machine learning engineers have begun to reuse large-scale pre-trained models (PTMs) and fine-tune these models for downstream tasks. Prior works have studied reuse practices for traditional software packages to guide software engineers towards better package maintenance and dependency management. We lack a similar foundation of knowledge to guide behaviors in pre-trained model ecosystems. In this work, we present the first empirical investigation of PTM reuse. We interviewed 12 practitioners from the most popular PTM ecosystem, Hugging Face, to learn the practices and challenges of PTM reuse. From this data, we model the decision-making process for PTM reuse. Based on the identified practices, we describe useful attributes for model reuse, including provenance, reproducibility, and portability. Three challenges for PTM reuse are missing attributes, discrepancies between claimed and actual performance, and model risks. We substantiate these identified challenges with systematic measurements in the Hugging Face ecosystem. Our work informs future directions on optimizing deep learning ecosystems by automated measuring useful attributes and potential attacks, and envision future research on infrastructure and standardization for model registries.

Agentic AI denotes an architectural transition from stateless, prompt-driven generative models toward goal-directed systems capable of autonomous perception, planning, action, and adaptation through iterative control loops. This paper examines this transition by connecting foundational intelligent agent theories, including reactive, deliberative, and Belief-Desire-Intention models, with contemporary LLM-centric approaches such as tool invocation, memory-augmented reasoning, and multi-agent coordination. The paper presents three primary contributions: (i) a reference architecture for production-grade LLM agents that separates cognitive reasoning from execution using typed tool interfaces; (ii) a taxonomy of multi-agent topologies, together with their associated failure modes and mitigation approaches; and (iii) an enterprise hardening checklist that incorporates governance, observability, and reproducibility considerations. Through an analysis of emerging industry platforms, including Kore.ai, Salesforce Agentforce, TrueFoundry, ZenML, and LangChain, the study identifies a convergence toward standardized agent loops, registries, and auditable control mechanisms. It is argued that the subsequent phase of agentic AI development will parallel the maturation of web services, relying on shared protocols, typed contracts, and layered governance structures to support scalable and composable autonomy. The persistent challenges related to verifiability, interoperability, and safe autonomy remain key areas for future research and practical deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) produce a controllability gap in safety-critical engineering: even low rates of undetected constraint violations render a system undeployable. Current orchestration paradigms suffer from sycophantic compliance, context attention decay [Liu et al., 2024], and stochastic oscillation during self-correction [Huang et al., 2024]. We introduce the Convergent AI Agent Framework (CAAF), which transitions agentic workflows from open-loop generation to closed-loop Fail-Safe Determinism via three pillars: (1) Recursive Atomic Decomposition with physical context firewalls; (2) Harness as an Asset, formalizing domain invariants into machine-readable registries enforced by a deterministic Unified Assertion Interface (UAI); and (3) Structured Semantic Gradients with State Locking for monotonic convergence. Empirical evaluation across two domains -- SAE Level 3 (L3) autonomous driving (AD) (n=30, 7 conditions) and pharmaceutical continuous flow reactor design (n=20, 4 conditions including a Mono+UAI ablation) -- shows that CAAF-all-GPT-4o-mini achieves 100% paradox detection while monolithic GPT-4o achieves 0% (even at temperature=0). The pharmaceutical benchmark features 7 simultaneous constraints with nonlinear Arrhenius interactions and a 3-way minimal unsatisfiable subset, representing a structurally harder challenge than the 2-constraint AD paradox. Alternative multi-agent architectures (debate, sequential checking) also achieve 0% across 80 trials, confirming that CAAF's reliability derives from its deterministic UAI, not from multi-agent orchestration per se. A Mono+UAI ablation (95%) isolates UAI as the core contribution. CAAF's reliability is invariant to prompt hints; all components use a single commodity model, enabling fully offline deployment.