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Lambeth council is consulting on the introduction of a Controlled Drinking Zone (CDZ) for all public spaces in the borough and are seeking your views.
Councils can introduce CDZs as a way of dealing with alcohol-related anti-social behaviour. The introduction of CDZs allows police to confiscate alcohol in public areas within the designated zones. CDZs are not a ban on public drinking, but are intended to give police additional powers to respond to alcohol-related anti-social behaviour.
The consultation process will inform the council’s decision as to whether such powers should be applied to all public spaces or whether any smaller areas should be designated.
Below are some frequently asked questions about CDZ’s. Details of how you can take part in the consultation are near the end of the text. Please comment by 31st of July 2009.
Proposed borough-wide Controlled Drinking Zone for Lambeth
All the below information is also available at: www.lambeth.gov.uk/cdzconsultation
Information and consultation details
1. What is a controlled drinking zone (CDZ)?
A CDZ is a designated public area in which police have powers to confiscate alcohol or require a person to stop drinking. A CDZ is not a ban and does not make drinking alcohol in public an offence, unless instructed not to by an officer.
2. How do I make a comment?
You can take part in the consultation and give your views in a number of ways:
-By completing the online survey by visiting the council’s website at www.lambeth.gov.uk/cdzconsultation
-By email: you can email your views and comments to email@example.com
-Or in writing: pleas send your comments to:
London Borough of Lambeth
3. Why is the council considering introducing a borough-wide CDZ?
Alcohol related crime and disorder has been identified in locations across the borough. The Waterloo area was made a CDZ in 2003 and has been used to help address alcohol related disorder. However evaluations of other CDZs and enforcement measures have shown smaller zones commonly result in moving problems into nearby areas. We are therefore consulting on a borough-wide CDZ due to the impact of alcohol related anti social behaviour and the effects of enforcement on surrounding areas.
4. What is a public place?
For the purposes of the CDZ a “public place” is any place to which the public have access, whether by payment or otherwise with “express or implied permission”. Relevant public spaces could include streets, parks and open spaces. However private land such as a supermarket car park could be considered a public space by implied permission.
5. What powers would the police have?
The police would have the power to require a person within the CDZ not to drink alcohol in that place or to surrender any alcohol or alcohol containers in their possession. The police will be entitled to dispose of surrendered alcohol or alcohol containers in any way they consider appropriate. No paperwork or notices would be required to enforce the powers.
6. Would there be any extra policing to enforce a CDZ?
No, there will be no extra resources for police to enforce the CDZ. However each ward has its own police Safer Neighbourhood Team who patrol regularly and respond to key issues in their ward as identified by local ward panels.
7. Would it mean that drinking alcohol in public would be banned?
No, it would not be an offence to drink alcohol in a designated public place, but failure to comply with an officer’s request could result in arrest and/or a fine. The powers would be used to target anti-social drinking so the powers may not be used where someone is not causing or likely to cause anti-social behaviour.
8. Which law allows the council to introduce a CDZ?
Section 12 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 provides the police and local authority with the powers to set up ‘Designated Public Places Orders (DPPOs), but local authorities typically use more self-explanatory terms such as ‘Controlled Drinking Zones’ or ‘Alcohol Control Areas’. These all refer to the same powers and there is no legislation that bans drinking in public places.
9. Who are the council required to consult?
In addition to the notice in local press, the council are required to consult with:
• the Chief Police Officer for the area in which the public place is situated
• the Chief Police Officer and local authority of the neighbouring boroughs affected by the designation
• the Parish or Community Council for any area near to the public place which they consider may be affected by the designation
• the licensee of any licensed premises in that place which they consider may be affected by the designation
• the owners or occupiers of any land proposed to be identified.
10. Would licensed premises that have tables outside on the pavement be affected?
No, according to the law ‘a place within the curtilage of any licensed premises’ is not a designated public place covered by a CDZ so they would not be affected.
11. Would there be other measures put in place?
In recent years the council has made improvements to many areas around the borough and also taken other measures to address anti-social behaviour in public places. The council works in partnership with many agencies and will continue to do so by offering treatment and support to those with alcohol-related problems.
12. What will happen to my comments?
Your comments will be used to inform the proposal report about the development of any CDZ to be submitted and agreed by a full council committee meeting.
You have the right to withdraw or change your reponse at any time during the consultation period.
The findings of our review which will include an assessment of levels of alcohol related disorder in different areas of the borough, and wider issues of alcohol-related harm may also be used to inform decisions made by council.
When does the consultation period end?
The deadline for your comments is no later than 5.00pm, 31st of July 2009
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In Texas, a will must be in writing and signed by the testator (the person making the will) in the presence of two witnesses. But what happens if the testator only has a written name? Is that considered a valid signature on a Texas will? In this blog post, we will explore the answer to this question and provide some insight into Texas probate law. If you are in the process of drafting a will or are simply curious about the requirements, read on for more information.
What is a Will?
A will is a written document that directs the disposition of a person’s property after death. The person who makes the will, known as the testator, must sign the will in the presence of two witnesses. The witnesses must also sign the will. In Texas, a will must be in writing to be valid. This means that a typed or printed name at the end of a document does not constitute a valid signature on a will.
Texas will requirements
In Texas, a will must be in writing and signed by the testator (the person making the will) in the presence of two witnesses. The witnesses must also sign the will in the presence of the testator. A will that does not meet these requirements is not valid in Texas.
If a testator’s name is written on a will, but the testator did not sign the will, the will is not valid. In order for a will to be valid, the testator must physically sign the will in front of two witnesses. The witnesses must also sign the will in front of the testator. If any of these requirements are not met, the will is not valid and cannot be used to distribute the testator’s assets after death.
What is a Signature?
A signature is a person’s name written in their own handwriting. A signature may be required on legal documents to show that the person agrees to the contents of the document. In Texas, a will must be signed by the testator and two witnesses. The witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator and each other.
Legal Signature rules
There are certain legal requirements that must be met in order for a written name to constitute a valid signature on a Texas will. First, the testator’s name must be written by him or her at the end of the will. Second, the will must be witnessed by two disinterested parties who are present when the testator signs the will. The witnesses must then sign the will in the presence of the testator.
If these requirements are not met, the court may find that the written name is not a valid signature and thus not binding on the estate. This could result in the will being declared invalid and the estate being distributed according to intestate succession laws. Therefore, it is important to ensure that all legal requirements for signatures are met before executing a will in Texas.
What are the requirements for a valid signature on a Will in Texas?
In order for a signature to be considered valid on a Will in Texas, the document must be dated and signed by the Testator in the presence of two disinterested adult witnesses. The witnesses must also sign the Will in the presence of the Testator, and each other. If the Will is not witnessed, it is still valid if it is signed by the Testator and two other people who are willing to attest to its authenticity.
Does a written name constitute a valid signature on a Texas Will?
In the state of Texas, a written name does not constitute a valid signature on a will. In order for a will to be valid, it must be signed by the person who made the will (the “testator”), in the presence of two witnesses. The witnesses must also sign the will in the presence of the testator.
Luker v. Youngmeyer, 36 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. App. — Tyler 2000, no pet.)
Facts and Procedural History
Margaret E. Whiteley hired Jack Babchick to create a Declaration of Trust and execute her last will and testament. From this she created the Margaret E. Whiteley Charitable Trust. Youngmeyer was named independent executor of the will. When Whiteley passed away, Youngmeyer filed to probate the will. Before the will was probated, Luker, Whiteley’s live-in caregiver, opposed the probate of the will and presented an alleged holographic will that revoked and superseded the prior will. The will consisted of three handwritten pages.
Youngmeyer filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that the holographic will was not a valid will since Whiteley did not sign the document. Her name was only referenced once in the document when stating the name of the charitable trust. He also stated that in her prior will she signed twice in cursive, meaning she was accustomed to signing legal documents in cursive. Luker argued that there was no requirement under Texas law that said signatures have to be in cursive. She also testified that Whiteley often signed her name instead of signing. Youngmeyer filed to supplement his motion stating that the three handwritten pages were actually two separate documents. One of the pages dealing with her trust and the others dealing with her will. This leaves the holographic will unsigned.
The court granted summary judgment, holding that writing her name in reference to the trust was not enough to constitute a signature. It stated that while Texas is very lenient in what it considers to be a signature, the testator still must intent the marking to be a signature. It also held that the documents were two separate documents. Therefore, the handwritten pages did not constitute a valid will.
Is a testator name written in a document enough to constitute a valid signature?
No. The testator must have had the intent for the marking to be a signature.
Luker v. Youngmeyer shows that the testator must intend for a marking to be a signature in order for it to be a valid signature on a will..
The answer to this question is a bit complicated, as it depends on the specific circumstances of each case. In general, though, a written name will not constitute a valid signature on a Texas will. If you are unsure about whether or not your signature is valid, it’s always best to consult with an attorney who can review your specific case and advise you accordingly.
Do you need an Experienced Probate Attorney to help?
If you are the named executor in a will, or if you stand to inherit property through a will, it is crucial to have an experienced probate attorney on your side to help you navigate the process. Probate can be a complex and stressful ordeal, but with the help of an experienced attorney, it does not have to be.
An experienced probate attorney can help you understand the probate process and ensure that everything is done properly. They can also represent you in court if necessary and help you resolve any disputes that may arise. If you are named in a will, or if you stand to inherit property through a will, do not hesitate to contact an experienced probate attorney for assistance. Call today for a FREE attorney consultation. (210) 436-6601.
What makes a will invalid in Texas?
There are several things that can make a will invalid in Texas. If the will was not properly signed and witnessed, it is not valid. Additionally, if the testator (the person who made the will) was not of sound mind when the will was created, it is not valid. Finally, if the will was created under duress or coercion, it is also not valid.
Does a handwritten will count in Texas?
In Texas, a handwritten will is valid as long as it is witnessed by two people and signed by the person who wrote it. The witnesses do not have to sign the will, but they must be present when the person who wrote the will signs it. If the will is not witnessed, it is still valid if it is signed by the person who wrote it and two other people.
What does a will need to be valid in Texas?
For a will to be valid in Texas, it must be in writing and signed by the person making the will, or by another person at the direction of the person making the will. The signature must be made in the presence of two disinterested witnesses, who must also sign the will. A notary public may not witness the signing of a will.
How to make a will in Texas?
If you want to make a will in Texas, there are a few things you need to do. First, you need to find a local attorney who can help you draft your will. Once you have found an attorney, you will need to gather all of your assets and debts. Once you have gathered this information, you will need to determine who you would like to receive your assets after your death. Once you have determined who will receive your assets, you will need to sign your will in front of two witnesses. After you have signed your will, the witnesses will also need to sign the will.
What is a holographic will?
A will made wholly in the testator handwriting and signed by the testator.
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And, Hillary would deny the elderly gentleman the right to defend himself. Think about it when you vote!
October 18, 2016 at 1:43pm
OK, this would be assassin is obviously a black guy. Will the media start talking about how biased black people are against police Officers? No, why? Based upon the same level of information, the media has no problem making sweeping judgments on all police officers (and their biases towards blacks)!
October 17, 2016 at 9:56am
They got a description of the suspect. It was an elderly female dressed in black with a hoody that had short blonde hair sticking out and she had a big butt.
Good thing the clerk did not kill the suspect as the media would have crucified the clerk for shooting a black suspect.
October 11, 2016 at 4:09pm
The comparison of BLM to the KKK was very appropriate but the action taken by the school violating the lecturer’s free speech was not!
October 7, 2016 at 8:06am
The fix on the emails was in from the beginning, including the Justice Department’s decision not to charge Hillary. How can we have a fair election when the current Administration is stacking the deck?
A fair election? What are you, a comedian? Trump MUST win by minimum 15 percentage points to actually win. There are that many dead people voting in this election. Who knows how many people are voting multiple times. The hillary is pulling all the stops in order to win. Yes, the deck is stacked and we will play by the rules and vote just once. I hope it is enough.
October 4, 2016 at 10:03am
What Trump said concerning PTSD is absolutely true! I am a VN combat veteran and have experienced some pretty intense combat. Further, I have crawled through many tunnels looking for the bad guys. Some folks can experience a life threatening event and walk away without long term damage and others wind up with long term PTSD. The event never leaves them. Further, without some professional help, many cannot handle the PTSD and either ruin their personal lives, get in trouble or commit suicide.
Trump’s word were well intended and have been used as political fodder by dummycrats!
October 3, 2016 at 8:23pm
Mark Cuban should know that Donald Trump does pay his owed taxes when he abides by the tax laws created by Congress. All of the demagoguery is just playing to those whose IQs are right below plant life!
October 3, 2016 at 4:45pm
Cuban does exactly what Trump does, he uses the tax system, created by Congress, to minimize the taxes paid. Donald Trump has done NOTHING wrong. He took a huge lass and was able to use the loss to offset future gains. When folks try to use this situation to somehow indicate some nefarious action on Trump’s part, they are really playing to the stupidity of the Democrat voters!
October 2, 2016 at 9:41am
For any of you that believe paying taxes when none are owed due to the laws created by Congress, please write a check for all that is in your checking account to the IRS! How utterly stupid! The Clintons would not owe or pay any taxes if they had risked a huge sum of money to create jobs. They have not and do not get to deduct their losses. Don’t get upset with an individual for paying the taxes mandated by Congress!
September 28, 2016 at 1:55pm
Any of the disruptive protesters who were enrolled as students should be immediately expelled. If students can not allow other students to discuss important issues then they have no business being in college!
In this debate process, the BLM side would have been represented as well. But I guess these issues can only be discussed in the privacy of our homes. Too bad these people feel entitled to break any rules they feel like breaking because of their black privilege!
September 26, 2016 at 6:08pm
This person is an idiot! Police officers have a very difficult job and do it for the most part with honor and compassion. This person has slandered all cops based upon the deeds of a few. Disgusting!!!
September 26, 2016 at 6:05pm
September 25, 2016 at 9:53am
Look at pictures (on the Internet) of the pistol that Scott possessed. The hammer is back and the safety is off. It was ready to shoot. It was not the way someone would carry a pistol unless they wanted it ready to shoot. The police were in danger and the shoot was proper.
September 22, 2016 at 1:00pm
What a stupid thing to say! He should have said, “He just assaulted me!” That is why these criminals have no fear in violently protesting, there are never any ramifications. Sad!
September 22, 2016 at 12:57pm
If they have photos, then the racist protesters need to be arrested and charged with attempted mayhem and murder. Further, any of the looters need to be charged. We cannot tolerate lawlessness from these criminals!
September 22, 2016 at 12:55pm
This is a hate crime, pure and simple. Too bad the victim was not armed! Think Obama will comment on the black racism towards whites? I don’t think so!
DOJ has no interest when the races are reversed, which is often the case. There will be no prosecution, even of assault, in this case.
September 21, 2016 at 7:18pm
Unless there is something that only the police observed when this man was shot, then the officer will be prosecuted and convicted of manslaughter. The officer never saw a weapon but shot because the man may have been reaching for something. Not good enough (I am a retired cop). She had to see something. Some of these shootings are the result of scared officers who shoot too soon. Of course, in every one of these shootings, the person shot does not obey the police.
All the calls to 911 that are available for all to hear state the dude is on drugs in the middle of the road. Numerous calls. The cop who shot him was a high up officer working there for a long time and trains officers on drugs etc. she knew he was high.
September 21, 2016 at 2:59pm
Libs decide issues based upon how they feel and not on what their brain tells them is correct. Here we have the SD spokesman stating that there will be mistakes in vetting and (based upon past instances) that means that at least some of these folks are terrorists. That means that some Americans may die due to vetting mistakes but the Administration does not care. They are happy because it FEELS good to admit Syrian refugees. I think at least five unvetted families should live with the Obamas and another two families with the Clintons.
September 19, 2016 at 12:58pm
If Kasich felt he could not support any of the Republican candidates, then he should have never signed the pledge to support the nominee. Failing to support the nominee after signing a pledge to do so, makes him a liar, plain and simple!
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There is a limit to the amount of out-of-pocket costs you have to pay for your health care.
This is called the “annual out-of-pocket maximum.” It protects you if you or a family member has a major illness or accident. In 2016, by law, the out-of-pocket maximum can be no more than $6,850 for an individual or $13,700 for a family. After you pay the out-of-pocket maximum, the health insurance company pays for all of the health services that year. Some health plans have lower out-of-pocket maximums.
Help is available!
Insurance is complicated. Dealing with insurance companies doesn’t always go smoothly. Don’t feel like it is your fault!
If you receive a bill you don’t understand, call member services and ask them to explain it. Take careful notes during any phone calls you have with your insurance company.
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In spite of signing a plea agreement for the charge of obstructing a Senate investigation, Steve Griles is trying to get his already light 10 month sentence reduced to three months of home confinement and community service on two non-profits Griles set up himself (in a scandal, of course, in which non-profits have routinely been used to launder money). The government is not so crazy about that deal, as they explain that Griles’ lies materially affected the Senates investigation into Abramoff.
The United States submits that had defendant Griles not lied and withheld material information, the Senate Committee would not have credited the defendant’s testimony in precipitously concluding its investigation into Abramoff’ s alleged influence and access within DOl. Rather, the Senate Committee would have dug deeper and probed further and likely would have discovered the truth about the extent of Abramoff’s access to the second highest-ranking official within DOl.
The government’s response explains why they recommended such a light sentence for Griles: put simply, they haven’t figured out how Griles benefited from helping Abramoff yet.
Given the seriousness of defendant Griles’ criminal conduct, and theconsequences that flowed directly therefrom, we deem it necessary tonote the single reason why the United States agreed to recommend anon-binding "split sentence" of ten (10) months imprisonment. Simplyput, to date, the United States has uncovered no evidence thatdefendant Griles personally accepted any money or gifts from Abramoff.That said, had we discovered otherwise, the charge(s) and thesentencing recommendation would not have been so limited.
The government basically suggests the judge cannot justify a lower sentence (though of course guidelines are not mandatory), because Griles refused to cooperate.
Defendant Griles has declined the United States’ invitation tocooperate in this ongoing criminal investigation, precluding him fromreceiving a substantial assistance departure under U.S .S .G. § 5K1.1.We have thus reached the proverbial floor of the applicable advisorySentencing Guideline range and there is no basis in fact or in law todig into the basement.
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Banbury couple fined for not obeying demand to maintain house and garden
Graham Colin Perring and Beverley Perring of Lanchester Drive, Banbury had been required to clear overgrown vegetation in the front and back gardens, replace rotten windows and repair the front porch of their property, which they failed to do.
The order was made by Cherwell District Council which decided on a prosecution, heard by Oxford Magistrates Court on December 16.
Mr and Mrs Perring did not appear in court but each was found guilty for failing to comply with the notice, served under Section 215 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
They were each fined £660 and ordered to pay costs of £1791.60 to be paid by March 15.
A Cherwell spokesman said: "The property had deteriorated to the point that it was giving rise to neighbour complaints and the notice was served in July 2017 requiring them to tidy it up but nothing was done.
"The Council made numerous attempts to contact the Perrings in order to try and resolve the matter without success. It is an offence not to comply with a Section 215 Notice and hence the Perrings were prosecuted for failure to comply.
"As the harm to the neighbours and local area was so bad the council decided to take direct action as well as prosecute. In late September the Council sent workmen in to carry out the necessary work, and the Perrings have been given a bill for that."
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This is a critical information under gdpr consent of what should be used. What seems like google maps requirements not consent an option is not. Understanding your rights under and eligibility for DACA. ESIGN Consent to Use Electronic Records and Signatures. It does not an employment aspects of informed consent process can i collect additional protection notices that will typically arises when the name and this procedure is grayed out. However, this is likely to be unusual. Informed consent option consent can defer to. What must be challenged and is not be forwarded to. GDPR consent examples below show.
Speaking to the TASS news agency, a law enforcement source said poli. And clearly state that the respondent has the option to not participate. In some cases, you will be able to choose whether to receive certain Communications electronically, or on paper, or both. Why use Formplus Builder to Create an Online Consent Form? Although it is easy to determine a legal definition of a minor, the responsibility to treat or release is a much more complex legal, ethical, social and public relations problem. Before i have consented to pay attention to? Guidelines on Free Prior and Informed Consent UN-REDD. Cookies can be categorized in the same way as scripts. Victorian organised crime Acts. This is consent not an option?
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For a patient in many european union where therapists focused on. Sign an option for consent is not an option to not have used only. It even mentions the possibility of users selling their own data to marketers, data analysts, and businesses in general. You that an option of not consent an option is an option? Informed consent option for leaving a certain units are done after that in digital catapult, not consent is an option if they should not contain, in by va advance directive is? VA or other valid advance directive. Cookie Consent widget to best fit your website. GDPR Forced consent is no longer an option Fabasoft. What does consent not look like? He also note: is an account. The list goes on.
To create and save a segment in your audience, follow these steps. People in case, not participate in this procedure is sensitive information i copy forms can an option consent is not. If no ID is present apply transformations from knowledge.
If you are directed by health care about someone wants personal life. They are easy and plan types of purposes of particular case, can sign as well as by a reunirse y expresar su derecho al. As an option consent a va is consent not an option that meeting. New York: Science History Publications. But, why wait until now to introduce it? In policies and not they consent not. No consent an error.
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Unemployment is usually low in Switzerland. The level of unemployment in June 2011 was 2.8 percent.
As soon as a person is given notice and loses their job they must do several things to claim benefits.
Claimants must be a Swiss national or hold a valid residence permit and be resident in Switzerland, unemployed, able to work and have contributed to the unemployment scheme for at least 12 months within the last 24 months. If you left your previous employment without valid reason, you may lose your entitlement to benefit for a certain period. The same applies to persons who do not actively seek work or refuse a job assigned to them by the employment office.
After registering, the employment office will issue dates for you to attend job counseling, training, and consulting sessions at a regional placement office (URC), usually once per month. It is vital that the claimant attend these sessions to receive benefits.
For complete information and forms, consult the Swiss Portal on unemployment.
Benefits are paid to those aged between 15 and 64. The amount and duration of unemployment benefit are determined by the amount of previous income and the length of employment. Generally, benefits are paid monthly in advance for periods of six months at a time. Entitlement begins after a waiting period of five days of verified unemployment. A maximum of 400 allowances can be paid over a two-year period. A person over 55 years is entitled to 520 allowances paid over a two-year period.
Beneficiaries are usually entitled to 70 percent of the reference salary. If the beneficiary has one or more children and the allowance falls below a predetermined rate, the amount due can go up to 80 percent.
Along with providing financial benefits, Job Centers provide resources for job-hunters like training courses, language courses, etc. Costs for such courses are normally covered by the Arbeitsamt. Appointments in Zurich are usually conducted in German so be prepared.
All employees in Switzerland must pay unemployment insurance. Half of the contribution (Arbeitslosenversicherung or assurance chômage) are paid by the employer and the other half by the employee. These deductions are usually automatically deducted from the gross salary.
When you move internationally you are taking a big step. Lots of things are changing and you have a million things to think about and take care of. If you are able to select a top of the line moving company that moves for a modest price, it can take a big weight of your shoulders in busy times.
Our network of international removal companies can move your furniture & possessions to Switzerland and anywhere overseas.
Filling in the form at the bottom will allow you to request up to 5 quotes from various moving companies. This service is free of charge and will help you select an international moving company that suits your needs and budget.
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BUDAPEST — It's a haunting photograph. Rozsa, a young woman staying at a shelter for domestic violence survivors in the Hungarian countryside, looks straight into the camera, her eyes completely drowning in deep purple and blue, the colors of abuse.
Staff at the shelter we visited gave us the pictures and her case file. The imprints visible on Rozsa’s legs, back and buttocks suggest she was beaten repeatedly by fist and whip.
Rozsa managed to escape. But she is the exception, as my colleagues and I found in our research for a new report on domestic violence in Hungary. We uncovered many obstacles that prevent women in Hungary from escaping violence by their intimate partners, reporting the attacks or finding help.
Hungary is by no means alone. The World Health Organization recently concluded that domestic violence is a global problem of epidemic proportions. What sets countries apart is not whether there is domestic violence, but how governments react to the problem, and particularly how they protect women.
What struck us in Hungary was how often authorities told victims that extreme physical violence, including the abuse Rozsa suffered, was “light,” and not sufficiently serious to trigger an investigation. Women we interviewed said they were told by police that "unless blood flows," there was nothing they could do. This explains why women typically do not run to the police for help when they are abused.
Even when blood does flow, police decline to act. Elvira, a 28-year-old mother of four, told me her husband dragged her around the house and threw her off the balcony. He then ran to where she had fallen, bleeding and bruised, and kicked her body and face. Later, he threatened to kill her with a knife. Her sister called the police, who arrived and asked the husband what happened. “Nothing,” he told them. They left.
The basics of changing this kind of police response are relatively straightforward wherever such violence occurs. Abusers have to be prosecuted. Women have to be physically protected through efficient use of protection orders. Shelters must be sufficient and safe. Survivors of violence should have access to health, social and legal services as a bridge to a life without violence. Finally, governments should take positive action. They should commit to preventing violence through education, raising awareness and assuring effective police response when violence does occur. These steps would give women the confidence to report.
European countries have adopted the landmark Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. It is known as the Istanbul Convention after the city where it was established. This is a practical convention that functions as a checklist of measures proven to be effective in reducing and addressing domestic violence.
The convention requires countries to establish hotlines, shelters, medical and forensic services, counseling and legal aid.
It also addresses gaps in domestic violence laws, documented in many countries by Human Rights Watch and other organizations. These include weak laws, ineffective implementation of protection laws, poor coordination, lack of access to justice, inadequate funding for responses to domestic violence, absence of shelters, and a lack of prevention measures. To date, 27 countries have signed the convention and 5 have ratified it, making its provisions legally binding.
Unfortunately, Hungary has not signed on. It should, promptly. In the meantime, the country has clear international obligations to protect a woman’s human right to live free from violence.
The Hungarian government is showing a willingness to step up efforts to end domestic violence. In an important move this year, Hungary finally adopted a provision in its penal code that criminalizes domestic violence.
Now, it needs to show the same resolve in filling other gaps in the law. Hungary must make sure that existing protections are actually enforced to ensure that no woman is belittled, ignored or sent back to her abuser when she calls the police to report violence.
When I interviewed Elvira, she asked what I would do with this information. I told her we use the facts from real cases to push for government reforms, and to prevent abuses in the first place. “Good,” Elvira responded. “I have three girls. I need them to survive their love.”
Gauri Van Gulik, based in Berlin, is the global women’s rights advocate at Human Rights Watch.
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Muyibat - posted on 03/17/2015 ( 2 moms have responded )
In February of last year my daughter's father learned that she was his child. He acknowledged that in front of a magistrate and his lawyer. Now he has filed a motion stating that I slept with his brother they aren't twins so they don't share the same dna I'm currently awaiting a court date. Has anyone ever been through this?
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I wrote Sen. Coburn last week to say how disappointed I am in him in view of the fact he did not support Sen. Ted Cruz’s and Sen. Mike Lee’s efforts in the senate – efforts that very few people believed would work, but applauded just the same for the awesome effort made on our behalf. I told Sen. Coburn that just because he knew it would not work was no reason not to stand up publicly for his constituents. At any rate, I received the response below, which is a form letter. Before rolling your eyes, let me assure you that all the times I have written him regarding one thing or another, he has never before replied via form letter. I have always received a personal response from him, even though it would take some months for him to reply. Here it is in its entirety, read it if you wish, take from it what you will. I just wanted to share with you what he said.
Sen. Tom Coburn's response to me RE: Taking a public stand, voting for cloture, et cetera.
Thank you for contacting me about the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly called “Obamacare”), the fiscal year (FY) 2014 continuing resolution, and the government shutdown that has ensued. I want to be clear that I have opposed Obamacare every time an opportunity presented itself—from trying to obstruct it in committee, attempting to block and filibuster it on the Senate floor, voting against its passage, co-sponsoring and voting in favor of bills to defund it, and pushing efforts to knock off key components. I will continue to do whatever I can to repeal and replace Obamacare, but I will not mislead you into thinking this can be accomplished with a strategy that will not succeed. My office has received tens of thousands of phone calls, emails, and letters about this matter. Due to the overwhelming volume, I am responding with a form letter—which I typically avoid—because I believe it is important to provide you with a timely response detailing my position.
I would like to begin by stating that the current situation we face—from the colossally expensive health care law that takes away individual freedom, to the $17 trillion national debt that threatens our republic, to the dysfunction and lack of statesmanship exhibited by elected officials—can be attributed to a failure of leadership that ignores the U.S. Constitution. Rather than advance solutions that are in the best, long-term interest of the country, politicians of both parties have abandoned constitutional principles and instead advocated for short-term patches they deem politically advantageous with special interests. Because of this, Washington is overflowing with self-service, yet comes up short on selflessness and sacrifice. The current government shutdown is a sign of just how sorely we are lacking true, common-sense leadership in the nation’s capital.
As I discuss the FY 2014 continuing resolution (CR) and the ensuing government shutdown, I want to reiterate that not only do I wish to see Obamacare defunded, I want to see it repealed in its entirety and replaced with true market-based health care reform. We need improvements in our health care system, but Obamacare largely just expanded coverage in a broken system and will actually make many of the cost, access, and quality problems in health care worse. I still am fighting to advance sustainable, market-based solutions that lower costs, improve access, increase transparency, and put federal health care spending on a sustainable path.
However, despite my strident opposition to this unworkable law, some Oklahomans have wrongly been told I support funding Obamacare. That is simply inaccurate. The problem has been that some Washington-based organizations have been telling Oklahomans that conservatives can use the CR as a vehicle to attempt to defund Obamacare. The strategy wrongly suggested that the Democrat-controlled Senate and President Obama would both somehow agree to defund the very same law they worked so hard to pass, or that the government would be forced to shut down and this would give conservatives more leverage. But both scenarios failed to take into account the reality of the situation. The truth is that Republicans in Congress simply do not have the votes and needed leverage to achieve this goal. Democrats control the Senate and the White House, and will never agree to gut the president’s signature health care law. Moreover, even under a government shutdown, Obamacare still continues to be operational because the majority of the law is funded with “mandatory spending” that does not require continued funding from Congress. This is what we are currently witnessing: the House and Senate were unable to agree on a CR, the federal government shut down on October 1, and Obamacare continues to roll out regardless.
The fact of the matter remains that the CR should not have been used as a vehicle to attempt to defund Obamacare. Rather, the CR debate should have been focused on reining in reckless government spending and prioritizing taxpayer dollars. It should have highlighted the $350 billion of government funding lost each year to waste and duplication. It should have focused on making sacrifices with the budget so that our grandchildren do not have to pay for our mistakes. It was the best opportunity possible for conservatives to eliminate waste, cut spending, and make progress bringing our fiscal house in order.
Instead, however, some Washington-based special interest groups were able to hijack the CR debate and blatantly misled the public in the process, falsely raising expectations about defunding Obamacare and questioning the motives of those who disagreed over their proposed strategy. From the start, I opposed the strategy to use the CR as a vehicle to defund Obamacare because it offered false hope to conservatives across the country about what the strategy could accomplish. I felt an obligation to share this truth precisely because I believe we must prepare ourselves for the long, hard fight that will be required to rid ourselves of this misguided law. There is no magic bullet and to falsely suggest otherwise fails to condition Obamacare opponents for the real battle that lies ahead. Sadly, as I warned my colleagues months ago, this narrow-minded focus on tactics with the CR has distracted and divided members of Congress who are otherwise united in pursuing the right goals: replacing Obamacare with patient-centered reforms, and reining in wasteful federal spending.
Funding the government through stop-gap CRs is an irresponsible way to govern in the first place. Congress should be debating separate appropriations bills that can be scrutinized, amended, and voted on for their individual merit. I have opposed every CR that has come before me in the Senate, including the recent bill that provided funding for FY 2014 at an annualized rate of $38 billion more than allowed by the Budget Control Act. The American people deserve better than a Congress that ignores the very laws it passes, waits until the last minute to address critical funding issues, and uses the threat of a government shutdown as a political tool. The American people deserve a federal government that operates efficiently and effectively, and within the limited bounds set for it by the Constitution.
As a recent Congressional Research Service memo summarized, the president has already signed 14 laws that have repealed, rescinded funds, or otherwise modified or eliminated parts of Obamacare. Rather than the all-or-nothing approach of defunding the entire law, moving forward, Congress should continue with an aggressive strategy to defund, delay, and dismantle specific provisions of the health care law. One great place to start would be for Congress to delay the individual mandate. President Obama and his administration have already delayed at least half a dozen parts of the law, including giving big businesses a break from the enforcement of the employer penalty tax next year. Why should big corporations and Wall Street firms get a break from being taxed if they do not offer health coverage, while American consumers are still taxed if they do not purchase health coverage? That is simply unfair. Delaying the individual mandate would allow Congress to adopt common-sense reforms that will actually lower Americans’ health care costs and put us on the path to replacing the law in its entirety. Implementing the health care law thus far has been confusing and unsuccessful, and illustrates exactly how disastrous it is and how it will negatively impact Americans—which is why I so vehemently opposed it from the beginning.
The government shutdown could have been avoided, and it is my hope that strong leadership will help reach an agreement to move forward very soon. I assure you I will continue working tirelessly not only to replace Obamacare with true, market-based health care options, but to force Congress to live within its means and govern responsibly.
Tom A. Coburn, M.D.
United States Senator
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When his nation called, fighter pilot Gentner Drummond bravely led the first U.S. combat mission of the Gulf War and was one of Oklahoma’s most highly decorated veterans.
Now, Gentner is answering the call of service again. As attorney general, he will defend our rights, uphold the rule of law, and serve the people of Oklahoma, not the political elite.
- Protect our Second Amendment rights
- Protect us against federal government overreach
- Protect victims of sexual assaults by clearing the rape-kit backlog as quickly as possible to arrest predators
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Part of filing a personal injury claim is negotiating. There are no compulsory rules that should be followed when negotiating a personal injury claim but there are some guidelines that you should follow if you want a positive outcome.
What Should You Know About The Negotiation Process?
The negotiation process isn’t something that you can rush…it requires adequate planning, persistence and patience. We advise all our clients to take their time in between offers and counteroffers because it’s a great opportunity to reflect on how the case is progressing so far.
It’s very rare to make a mistake when negotiating a personal injury claim and even if you mess up, we can easily take care of it without doing any damage to your claim. Plus, you don’t need to spend sleepless nights worrying about what you said or didn’t say.
When you start negotiations, don’t expect the insurance adjuster to treat you fairly just because you are the victim of an accident. They are not bound by law to treat you fairly. In fact, there are adjusters out there who will take advantage of your situation and inexperience by offering you less than you deserve.
You have to be very patient with personal injury claim negotiations. Never ever show the adjuster that you need the money as soon as possible, even if you do. Once the adjuster senses that you are anxious, they will shift the focus from the facts of the case to your anxiety. Their counteroffers will be based on your anxiety.
When Should You File A Lawsuit And When Should You Negotiate A Personal Injury Claim?
Let’s first understand what the difference between a lawsuit and a personal injury claim is. A personal injury claim is usually between the victim and the insurance company of the person who is at fault. The process of filing for a claim involves a series of negotiations between the at-fault person’s insurance company and you. Hopefully, when the negotiations are over, you will both be satisfied with the settlement.
A personal injury lawsuit on the other hand happens when you and the insurance adjuster fail to come to an understanding. This usually happens when the adjuster:
- doesn’t think your injuries are as severe as you claim they are
- doesn’t think you deserve the amount you are asking for
- doesn’t believe their client is at fault
How Do You Start A Personal Injury Claim?
Your claim begins the moment you are injured or when your property is destroyed by somebody else’s negligence. To recover the costs, you have to pursue the person who is liable, who will then turn over the issue to their insurance company.
Once the insurance company receives notification that you are making a claim, they will assign the case to an insurance adjuster. The adjuster will open a claim and contact you to negotiate a settlement. If you come to an agreement during the settlement, then there will be no need to file a lawsuit.
The insurance adjuster will need evidence that shows indeed the accident was not your fault and it was caused by their client (the person at fault). They also need evidence that your injuries are severe enough to warrant a settlement. The adjuster will therefore investigate the following things:
- Any evidence that you provide
- Your medical bills and charts
- The police report
- The scene of the accident
- Your statements and witness statements
- The damage to your property and how much it will cost to repair it
During the negotiations process, your job will be to:
- Prove that the accident wasn’t your fault and that their client is the one at fault
- Prove that your injuries are severe and you needed to go to the hospital
- Prove the amount of money you spent at the hospital getting treatment is substantial
- Prove that because of your injuries, you were unable to work and you lost a substantial amount of your wages.
- Prove that your injuries have caused you discomfort and pain
Once the adjuster is done with investigations, they will make a decision based on the data they collect. They may decide to pay you the amount you are asking for in your personal injury claim or they might decide not to give you anything.
If the adjuster decides that you should be compensated, they will send you a release form and a check. From there, all you will have to do is sign the release form and cash your check. You won’t be able to file a lawsuit after that.
The 7 Steps Of Negotiating A Personal Injury Claim
1. Sending A Notification Letter
The first step of your negotiation is to send a notification letter to the insurance company of the person who is at fault. In your letter you should make it clear that due to the negligence of the person at fault, you suffered injuries and other damages and you will be seeking compensation. Sending this letter officially begins the process of negotiation.
2. Receiving The Reservation Of Rights Letter
The insurance company will send you a form letter in response to your letter of notification. The letter will indicate that they are reviewing your claim and will discuss it with you. This doesn’t mean that they are admitting liability on behalf of the person responsible for your injuries.
3. Sending Your Demand Letter
Once you have finished therapy and medical treatment, the next step is to send your demand letter to the insurance adjuster. The letter will clearly outline special damages. Special damages include medical bills, lost wages and out of pocket expenses.
Pain and suffering falls under general damages. If your personal injury claim is minor, you can multiply the total cost of your medical bill by a number between two and five. Your total settlement demand will be your special damages plus general damages.
4. Waiting For The Adjusters Response
Real negotiations begin when the adjuster finally responds to your demands. The adjuster will somehow tell you that your claim doesn’t have any value. They may even try to show you that they are knowledgeable and experienced by throwing statistics and terms at you.
They will tell you what their counteroffer is and make it look like they are doing you a favor. In short, they will do everything they can to ensure that they don’t give you the initial amount you asked for. Here’s why the adjuster will do this:
- They want to see if you are serious and how far you are willing to go.
- They want to see if you are anxious enough to jump at any offer they give you
- To see if you understand how the settlement process works
- To see if you are easily intimidated.
5. Responding To The Counteroffer
Politely tell the adjuster that you do not agree with the amount they are offering. Tell him that your injuries were real and the treatments you underwent were recommended by a doctor. Let them know that you will get back to them after reviewing their offer.
6. The Bargain Process
This is where you will continue with counteroffers and offers between you and the adjuster. Don’t make the mistake of calling the adjuster before they respond to your offer because it will give them the upper hand. They will see it as desperation on your part and they will give you a counter offer that is way below your drop dead figure.
Your drop dead figure is the lowest amount you are willing to take from the insurance company. You shouldn’t let the adjuster know what your drop dead figure is. If they are not able to meet your demands, then you should be prepared to file a personal injury lawsuit.
7. The Final Step
This is the part where you hopefully sign your release form and cash your check if you are able to settle your claim. If you are not able to come to an agreement with the adjuster, then you should be prepared to take the case to court.
Get In Contact With An Attorney To Help You Through The Negotiation Process
If you are not familiar with how the settlement process works, you could end up being compensated with less than you deserve or not being compensated at all. Personal injury claims are complicated and they require detailed knowledge of negligence law. It’s very important to find a personal injury lawyer to help you with your case. To get started, you can contact us at (800)200-7752 for a free initial consultation.
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Crispin Blunt Arrested on Suspicion of Rape
In a shocking turn of events, Crispin Blunt, a prominent British politician, found himself at the center of a controversy as he was arrested on suspicion of rape. This article delves into the allegations, Blunt’s political career, the legal proceedings, public and media reactions, and the potential impact on his career.
The allegations against Crispin Blunt are grave and have sent shockwaves throughout the political landscape in the United Kingdom. The incident allegedly occurred on [insert date], with a complainant accusing Blunt of sexual assault. The details of the case are under investigation by the authorities, and it remains a matter of intense public interest.
Blunt’s Political Career
Crispin Blunt is no stranger to the political arena. He is a seasoned politician who has been serving as the Member of Parliament (MP) for [insert constituency] since [insert year]. Before these shocking allegations came to light, Blunt had made a name for himself in British politics. He has held various important positions within the Conservative Party and has been a staunch advocate for [mention any notable causes].
The legal proceedings following Blunt’s arrest are currently underway. The police are conducting a thorough investigation to gather evidence, and the accused has the right to a fair trial. The legal system in the UK ensures that all individuals, regardless of their status, are treated fairly under the law.
Public and Media Reaction
The public and media have been closely following this case, with reactions ranging from shock to skepticism. Given Blunt’s political career and the nature of the allegations, this incident has sparked intense debate and media coverage. Various public figures and organizations have expressed their views on the matter, contributing to the ongoing discourse.
Impact on Blunt’s Career
The allegations and the subsequent legal proceedings have the potential to significantly impact Crispin Blunt’s political career. Even if he is acquitted, the tarnish on his reputation might make it challenging for him to continue in his current roles. The extent of the damage to his career remains to be seen.
In conclusion, the arrest of Crispin Blunt on suspicion of rape has sent shockwaves throughout the UK. The allegations against a seasoned politician have raised important questions about the intersection of personal conduct and political life. As the legal proceedings unfold, the public and media will continue to closely monitor the case.
What are the specific allegations against Crispin Blunt?
The details of the allegations are currently under investigation, and the specific nature of the accusations has not been disclosed to the public.
What is Crispin Blunt’s political background?
Crispin Blunt is a Member of Parliament (MP) who has been active in British politics for several years, primarily within the Conservative Party.
How is the public reacting to the allegations?
Public reactions have been mixed, with some expressing shock and others adopting a more skeptical stance.
What legal procedures will follow Blunt’s arrest?
The police are conducting an investigation, and if there is sufficient evidence, legal proceedings will ensue.
What could be the potential consequences for Crispin Blunt’s political career?
The impact on his political career remains uncertain, as it will depend on the outcome of the investigation and trial.
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If you have been arrested with any criminal charges, there is no doubt that you are facing a long time in jail or a hefty fine. Such comes without saying since criminal law is one of the least lenient laws. When you are charged in this line, it comes without saying that the lawyer can help reduce the pressure of the case. For those of us that don’t know, a lawyer can have a lot of impact on your case since the criminal law is a lot more complicated. In the following article, read more about the usefulness of a competent lawyer in criminal law.
First, the lawyer will tell you in honesty what to expect at the end of the case. There is no doubt that the lawyer has a better understanding of criminal law and we expect them to know what will happen at the end. For this reason, we expect them to tell us what is to happen in the coming days. The info proposed by the lawyers can come in handy in ensuring that things don’t get you by surprises.
The lawyer can involve investigators and hire witness to get evidence for your case. One of the hard tasks in criminal law is getting evidence for a case and proving that in court. On the other hand, that should not be a worry when a skillful lawyer is on your case. Such follows the element that we expect them to have a lot of connection in this line. Consequently, there is an assurance that there is a dedicated team on your case to prove not guilty.
The lawyer gets you out jail in good time. It comes without saying that you are suspect until proven guilty. For this reason, the lawyer will work around the clock to ensure that you are released from jail as soon.
Importantly, the lawyers can greatly affect the sentencing and penalties offered. In the case where you are found guilty, there is a need to mention that the lawyer can influence some of these court decisions. Since the lawyer can negotiate better, there is an assurance that you will get favorable terms.
Asa parting shot, those looking for a criminal lawyer need to settle for the best since not all of them can help them meet goals. Before commitment, check on their involvement in the criminal law and their impact. Similarly, review some of the cases that they have handled and see how many of them were successful. When you review some of these elements, you are sure that your case is safe with them.
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Probation and Pretrial Services - Mission
- To assist the federal courts in the fair administration of justice.
- To protect the community.
- To bring about long-term positive change in individuals under supervision.
- Charter for Excellence (pdf)
Who We Are
The U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services System is
- the community corrections arm of the federal judiciary.
- part of the U.S. district courts.
- a key player in the federal criminal justice process at both the pretrial and post-conviction stages.
- a national system of employees, who include probation and pretrial services officers and officer assistants; information technology, budget, and human resources professionals; and support staff.
- a national system with a shared mission, professional identity, goals, and values.
What We Do
U.S. probation and pretrial services officers, considered the "eyes and ears" of the federal courts, investigate and supervise persons charged with or convicted of federal crimes. Officers
- gather and verify information about persons who come before the courts.
- prepare reports that the courts rely on to make release and sentencing decisions.
- supervise persons released to the community by the courts and paroling authorities.
- direct persons under supervision to services to help them stay on the right side of the law, including substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, medical care, training, and employment assistance.
How We're Organized and Managed
In the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services System, management is local, while oversight and support are national.
- Locations. U.S. probation and pretrial services offices are located in 93 of the 94 U.S. district courts, which include the U.S. territories. (Probation and pretrial services for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands are provided by the District of Guam.)
- Organization. In some districts, probation and pretrial services are separate offices. In other districts, probation and pretrial services are combined in one office. The choice is up to the individual districts.
- Management. In each district, management of probation and pretrial services is in the hands of chief probation and pretrial services officers, who are directly responsible to the courts they serve. Chiefs do their own hiring, manage their own budgets, and decide how to run their offices.
- National oversight. The Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States oversees the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services System. The Committee addresses such matters as the system's operations, workload, funding, and resources, as well as employment standards for system employees and issues pertaining to the administration of criminal law.
- National support. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts carries out the Judicial Conference's policies and provides the courts with a broad range of administrative, management, and program support. The Administrative Office Director has delegated to the Office of Probation and Pretrial Services the responsibility to support the probation and pretrial services system, including developing system policies, supporting system programs, and reviewing the work of probation and pretrial services offices.
How We Differ District to District
U.S. probation and pretrial services officers share a mission and operate under the same policies and procedures. Nonetheless, some aspects of the work and how it's carried out differ district to district.
- Number of officers. Just because a district is geographically large does not mean it has more probation and pretrial services officers. The number of officers on board in each district depends on the district's workload.
- Workload. Officer workload is not the same in every district. Sometimes efforts on the part of law enforcement—the Department of Justice—generate increases in arrests; for instance, for drug and immigration crimes. Such action can dramatically increase criminal filings in a given district and impact the workload of judges and officers alike.
- Rural/urban differences. Working as a probation or pretrial services officer in a big city is considerably different than doing that same job in a rural or sparsely populated area. Officers working in less populated areas sometimes must travel long distances to fulfill their supervision responsibilities. They may have access to fewer resources than their urban counterparts do, especially for substance abuse or mental health treatment or employment assistance. On the other hand, officers in metropolitan areas often must carry out their supervision duties in high-crime areas.
How We Work With Federal Agencies
Many federal agencies play a part in the justice process. Working in partnership with these agencies helps U.S. probation and pretrial services officers serve the court and protect the community. Here are some of the agencies officers work with and some of the areas in which they collaborate:
Probation officers, in preparing presentence investigation reports, recommend sentences based on sentencing guidelines set by the Commission.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation - National Crime Information Center
- Department of the Treasury - Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
- Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services - Deportable Alien Control System
Probation and pretrial services officers use databases maintained by other federal agencies in investigating criminal backgrounds.
Probation officers supervise or monitor persons who, after serving time in prison, are released to the community by these authorities.
Help for Persons Under Supervision
- Department of Labor - employment information
- Indian Health Service - health services for American Indians and Alaska Natives
Probation and pretrial services officers look to federal agencies for resources and information when they direct persons under supervision to services to help them.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Drug Enforcement Administration
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
- Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Probation and pretrial services officers serve on task forces and share information with other federal agencies to fight crime, including terrorism and drug, gang, and computer crime.
How We Compare to State/Local Community Corrections
Across the United States, you'll find community corrections professionals at all levels of government-federal, state, county, and municipal. Whether you call them probation officers, parole agents, or community supervision officers, they play a similar role in the communities in which they work. Federal probation officers are like their state/local counterparts in many ways, but they're also different. Here are a few examples.
How are they alike?
A Dual Role
Community corrections professionals, whether at the federal or state/local level, play a dual role, part law enforcement and part social work. Officers monitor the behavior and activities of persons under supervision to make sure they don't commit further crime. They also refer these individuals to treatment, education, employment, and other services that can help them achieve a crime-free life. Different community corrections agencies in different jurisdictions may emphasize one role or the other, but they all share the same basic mission: to promote public safety by motivating persons under supervision to stay on the right side of the law.
Part of the Justice Process
Community corrections at every level of government is part of a process: the justice process. This is a process that begins with an arrest and continues in court. It may include a prison term followed by release to the community on supervision. The officers who provide community supervision are key players in the justice process, but they don't work alone. They collaborate with or support the work of others, such as attorneys, judges, police, and prison officials.
At both the federal and state/local levels, certain categories of crime and criminals have generated a need for specialized caseloads. Substance abusers, the mentally ill, and gang members are among the special groups that present unique challenges to the officers who are charged with supervising them. Officers who are assigned specialized caseloads may handle smaller caseloads, provide more intensive monitoring, and receive special training to manage the needs of these individuals and any threat they pose to the public.
Officers–no matter at which level of government they work-- must know their communities and operate effectively within them. An important part of their work is directing persons under their supervision to services to help them. Officers build partnerships with community resources that provide these services, which include substance abuse and mental health treatment, medical care, education and training, and employment assistance.
How are they different?
Branch of Government
Executive branch or judicial branch? At the federal level, probation is under the judicial branch. Officers work in several hundred offices located in the 94 federal judicial districts nationwide. The officers serve the courts. They provide judges with information they need to make decisions and protect the community by enforcing court orders. Therefore, federal probation, with its close relationship to the courts and an emphasis on providing treatment to offenders and motivating them to change, is separate from executive branch entities that focus on apprehending and prosecuting offenders. At the state and local levels, probation often is a function of the executive branch. Its placement varies jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Sometimes it's a component of the department of corrections, along with prisons, or it may operate as an independent agency.
Like their colleagues in state/local levels of government, federal probation officers learn about their duties and how to carry them out through on-the-job training in their districts. However, federal probation officers also receive national training. Officers receive training on their core responsibilities and on firearms and safety at a national new officer training program held at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, South Carolina. They also benefit from training offered by the Federal Judicial Center, which develops education and training programs for all federal court employees. The Center offers seminars and workshops, in-person and on-line conferences, satellite TV broadcasts, and leadership and new supervisor programs geared especially for officers.
Permission to Carry Firearms
Federal probation officers are authorized by law to carry firearms. Each individual district court decides whether its officers will be armed or not. If a district permits carrying firearms, it's each officer's choice whether to do so or not. Therefore, some federal probation officers do carry firearms, and some do not. For some officers at the state/local level, carrying firearms is optional; for others, it's mandatory; and for still others, it's not allowed. In some state/local agencies, only officers in specific positions–such as officers who deal with violent offenders--are permitted to carry firearms.
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Ecuador Table of Contents
The court system consisted of the Supreme Court of Justice, which sat in the capital; superior courts in the capitals of ten provinces; 35 provincial criminal courts; 87 cantonal courts; and 445 parish courts. Parish judges tried minor civil matters and misdemeanors, their verdicts being subject to review by cantonal courts. Cantonal judges also could conduct preliminary hearings and make recommendations in criminal cases. Nonetheless, provincial courts were the courts of first instance in such cases, except those involving government officials. Provincial criminal judges had the authority to try criminal cases for which, according to the penal code, the punishment did not exceed three years in prison.
Criminal proceedings consisted of summary and plenary parts. The first of these usually took place before a local court and the second before a provincial criminal court. The summary assessed whether or not an offense had been committed and if a trial were warranted; the plenary determined the guilt or innocence of the accused.
After an arrest, except for minor offenses, the police were required to turn the suspect over to the judge of the local cantonal court, who would conduct an investigation to determine if there were sufficient grounds for trial. According to the law, the findings of the investigation had to be forwarded within fifteen days to the provincial criminal court holding jurisdiction over the case.
When the summary proceedings had been completed, the record was delivered to the public prosecutor so that he could prepare the accusation. If, in the opinion of the presiding judge, the information contained in the summary did not warrant a continuation of the proceedings, the judge could release the suspect on bail. Dismissal of the case would be final if the public prosecutor could not find merit in the accusation or if the judge felt the existence of an offense had not been absolutely established. If the case warranted a trial, it then went to the Tribunal of Crimes, a five-member body presided over by the judge of the provincial criminal court. Upon the completion of arguments, the tribunal retired in secret session and then announced its verdict. Except in special cases, such as those involving a breach of morality, trials were public. Ecuador did not use the jury system.
Defendants could call witnesses on their own behalf, crossexamine witnesses, and refrain from testifying against themselves, and could appeal sentences to intermediate or higher courts. Accused persons were entitled to legal counsel as soon as arrested. Although a public defender system is mandated by the 1979 Constitution, it had not been introduced as of 1988. Persons who could not afford counsel faced the longest period of pretrial detention. Detention without charge for more than forty-eight hours was prohibited by the criminal code, but the requirement was frequently violated in practice. Habeas corpus could be invoked by mayors or municipal council presidents who had the constitutional right to order the release of detainees. This power tended to be exercised liberally, regardless of the severity of the charges.
According to the Department of State's human rights reports, the judicial system was inefficient and corruptible, in part because of inexperienced and poorly paid judges. A chronic backlog of cases meant that detainees might be forced to wait two years or longer for trial. According to the Special Commission on Human Rights, approximately 50 percent of all prisoners as of 1988 had not been charged or sentenced. Time spent awaiting trial counted toward completion of a sentence, but that did not help long-term detainees who were eventually acquitted.
In the late 1980s, Ecuador recorded significant levels of urban crime. The increased crime rate, particularly notable in Guayaquil and to a lesser extent in Quito, was linked to the steady rural to urban migration. Most migrants lacked the skills necessary to obtain employment in the cities. Many, in order to provide for themselves and their families, turned to crime. The country's economic setbacks during the latter half of the 1980s created an increasingly desperate situation for adults unable to find legitimate employment. Although muggings, assaults, pickpocketing, and burglaries were the most prevalent forms of crime, since 1985 there had been an upsurge of robberies of banks and private companies by well-armed gangs, as well as of kidnappings and sexual assaults. Some robberies were connected with the AVC or the Colombian M-19, but most appeared to be the work of professional criminals.
Data reported to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) indicated there were approximately 26,000 crimes committed in Ecuador in 1984. This number included 400 homicides, more than 500 rapes, almost 500 serious assaults, approximately 2,400 robberies and violent thefts, more than 6,000 other robberies, almost 700 car thefts, approximately 600 cases of fraud, and almost 200 drug offenses. Ecuador had a crime ratio of 292 per 100,000 population. Such a rate would be considered very low on an international scale, beneath that of many countries with a reputation for a low incidence of crime, such as Japan. Some observers speculated that many offenses reported to the police were not classified as crimes, or that many crimes were not brought to the attention of the police. For example, the Indian population customarily dealt with crimes within its own communities without recourse to the Ecuadorian police.
Data as of 1989
Ecuador Table of Contents
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Legal battles can be a source of headache for anyone that is involved. They can be extremely lengthy and involved countless court hearings which can prove to be extremely frustrating for all the parties that are involved in the court hearing. This long length of legal battles also means that the wrong end party has to wait for a long amount of time before it is compensated for the damage that has been done to that party. This also means that wrong-doers can take advantage of the system and delay the verdict from the legal battles which can help in accruing legal fees for the innocent party and can also make them frustrated which can in certain cases, lead to the innocent party withdrawing the legal case. This can be extremely frustrating for the innocent party, especially since they are the ones who have born the damage that was done by the accused party and, they also have to face delays in the court judgement along with, accruing legal fees.
At national compensation lawyers, we understand the frustrations that many clients go through to when it comes to fighting legal battles. This is why we provide personalized services for all our clients which makes sure that the legal battle and all legal formalities are being conducted to the highest of standards and, extremely efficiently. We specialise in a number of different disciplines such as motor vehicle accident lawyers in Melbourne which means that we can handle a large number of tricky legal cases which means that our clients can have the peace of mind that they will have a good legal representation in any type of court hearing or legal battle. This means that our clients have a high probability of winning the legal battle and we also make sure that each of our client gets personalized services. This means that you are treated as an individual, rather than as a number in a system which is the case with many large legal firms. This means that the services that are provided to our clients are extremely personalized and are tailored to the specific needs of each individual which means that the court hearing will proceed smoothly and, there is a high probability that our client will win the case.
Quality Legal Solicitors
To summarise, if you need quality legal solicitors who you can rely on to make sure that your legal representation is done in an efficient and strong manner than you need look no further than National Compensation Lawyers. With a highly talented team of individuals waiting for us and our dedication to serving our clients, we make sure that the individual needs of each of our clients is met to the highest of standards while adhering to the strict laws that are prevalent in the specific region.
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Nearly one third of all patent cases filed in the United States are heard by a single judge - J. Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas. Many of these cases involve e-commerce or other internet-based patents such that patent eligibility is commonly challenged. It is therefore significant when J. Gilstrap holds a website-based patent invalid under §101, as he recently did in the case of Gonzalez v. Infostream Group.
In Gonzalez, the alleged invention involved gathering and labeling information to facilitate efficient retrieval of the labeled information. Both of the patents at issue tied the claimed methods to computer and internet-based technology, specifically website and computer-based searches.
J. Gilstrap applied the test from Alice and Mayo and quickly held the claims of both patents to be directed to an abstract idea. In a one paragraph analysis, J. Gilstrap analogized the patents-in-suit to the patent of the eDekka v. 3balls.com case, and concluded “As the Court recently found in eDekka, a case in which the asserted patent … was similarly directed to the abstract idea of storing and labeling information, ‘the claimed idea represents routine tasks that could be performed by a human.’”
J. Gilstrap further held the claims were not directed to any inventive concept, finding the claims were merely tied to a computer or website environment and as such were insufficient to transform the ineligible concept to a patentable invention. Particularly significant were comments the patentee made to the Patent Office: “this kind of labeling is common in commerce in physical form” but “it has not heretofore been used or proposed in digital form for websites.” Such comments lead the court to find the invention to be an internet or computer-based implementation of an age-old concept, insufficient to obtain patent protection.
If you are involved in a patent lawsuit, chances are good the lawsuit is in the Eastern District of Texas. Decisions such as these provide a clue as to how the court views patent-eligibility and what concepts it deems important.
From this case, it appears J. Gilstrap is persuaded that a claim is ineligible if it involves steps that can be performed by a human but that are claimed as being performed by a computer. It is unclear what other patent-eligibility concepts (e.g., preemption) carry the same weight in the eyes of the Eastern District of Texas.
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Unlike copyrights and trademarks, patents can be used to protect inventions (ideas). Protecting your inventions with patents can significantly increase the value of your company. Although patents rarely provide 100% protection against another company entering your space, having a patent portfolio provides you with considerable leverage in avoiding some other company blocking your access to your target market. (And sometimes they even dissuade potential competitors.)
What is a Patent?
A patent for an invention in the U.S. is the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Generally, the term of a new patent is 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States or, in special cases, from the date an earlier related application was filed, subject to the payment of maintenance fees. U.S. patent grants are effective only within the United States, U.S. territories, and U.S. possessions. Under certain circumstances, patent term extensions or adjustments may be available.
The right conferred by the patent grant is “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the United States or “importing” the invention into the United States. What is granted is not the right to make, use, offer for sale, sell or import, but the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the invention. Once a patent is issued, the patentee must enforce the patent without aid of the USPTO.
There are three types of patents:
1) Utility patents may be granted to anyone who invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof;
2) Design patents may be granted to anyone who invents a new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture; and
3) Plant patents may be granted to anyone who invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.
In general, an application for a patent must be filed, and a patent shall be granted and enforced, in each country in which you seek patent protection for your invention, in accordance with the law of that country. In some regions, a regional patent office, for example, the European Patent Office (EPO) and the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), accepts regional patent applications, or grants patents, which have the same effect as applications filed, or patents granted, in the member States of that region.
Further, any resident or national of a Contracting State of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) may file an international application under the PCT. A single international patent application has the same effect as national applications filed in each designated Contracting State of the PCT. However, under the PCT system, in order to obtain patent protection in the designated States, a patent shall be granted by each designated State to the claimed invention contained in the international application.
A full patent application can be expensive ($10K to $20K or more). However, you can file a “Provisional application” which basically documents your invention and documents the date of invention. You then have one year to file a full patent application. With a provisional application filed, you can use the “patent pending” term. And you have a year to raise enough money to afford a full application.
However, your provisional application is only useful if the description of your invention is sufficiently complete and clear. So you’ll still need someone who knows what they are doing to write it. If you have a team member or advisor who has written patents before, that’s one way to go. Otherwise, getting a patent attorney involved can really be worth the investment.
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National Sportswear Trademark
National Sportswear Trademark is a United States Federal Trademark.
When selling to the consumer, it is every company’s responsibility not to mislead the the general public.
Thereby instilling a moral trust and ethics in commerce that should be followed by everyone.
A Federal Trademark distinguishes the difference between the REAL and a FAKE.
As a company, it is our responsibility to be trustworthy and transparent.
Otherwise, the consumer would be at unfair odds against the likes of pirates, thieves, or in plain English really bad people.
So we’ve teamed up with #goforreal and the United States Federal Trademark Office to protect you!
It’s our responsibility.
Buying quality products or services can mean the difference between safety and serious consequences.
When you buy real, you support the brands that make quality goods that might just save your life… if not, at least your pride.
US Federal non contestable Trademark
The National Sportswear ® is a United States Federal Trademark owned by National Sportswear Incorporated (that is us).
Actually, we own several of them under the word mark “National Sportswear” and we’ve owned them for years.
Here they are… Copies taken Directly from the U.S. Trademark Office
This Trademark is for our “brand” and is registered for all items falling under the category SIC 025
which is for t-shirts, polo shirts, jackets, hoodies, pants, shorts… pretty much anything “clothing.”
Here is an image taken directly from the United States Federal Trademark that describes the “Goods and Services” trademark
owned by National Sportswear Incorporated.
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In the last few years, there has been a surge in the number of data breaches. This is, of course, a major concern for consumers. And as the cases continue to appear, dark web researchers Bob Diachenko and Vinny Troia have announced a huge collection of data online.
The report, whist was published on Data Viper, they found that the data, which belongs to around 1.2 billion US, UK, and Canadian consumers, had been left fully exposed on an unsecured online server.
Among the information that was found, there was personal information including social media profiles and phone numbers. However, at this stage, no financial information – such as passwords, credit card numbers, bank details, or social security numbers – was found.
According to the researchers, what makes this case more unique than previous cases is that the data appears to be from two different data enrichment companies. These companies are People Data Labs (PDL) and OxyData.io.
PDL data was found to OxyData.io data “revealed an almost complete scrape of LinkedIN data, including recruiter information”. On the other hand, PDL data is believed to be responsible for most of the exposed data that was recovered.
Sean Thorne, PDL cofounder, said in an interview that the firm doesn’t own the server holding the data. He added that the owner of the server is “likely used one of our enrichment products, along with a number of other data enrichment or licensing services.”
Additionally, OxyData, the other company involved, said it didn’t own any of the data found. Vinny Troia says he believes both of the companies and that, considering how much information was exposed, it would be very difficult to determine who is responsible.
He wrote, “The lion’s share of the data is marked as ‘PDL’, indicating that it originated from People Data Labs. However, as far as we can tell, the server that leaked the data is not associated with PDL.”
“Due to the sheer amount of personal information included, combined with the complexities identifying the data owner, this has the potential to raise questions on the effectiveness of our current privacy and breach notification laws,” he added.
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Norway bans breeding of British bulldogs, Cavalier King Charles spaniels, citing health concerns
Breeding British bulldogs and Cavalier King Charles spaniels is officially banned in Norway, the Oslo District Court ruled on Monday.
Animal Protection Norway, an animal rights group, brought the case to the court and argued banning breeding of both dogs would protect them from cruelty, the Telegraph reported. The organization stated the country's history of cruelty regarding selective breeding meant there was no way for the specific bulldogs and spaniels to live in a "healthy" way.
“This is first and foremost a victory for our dogs," said Åshild Roaldset, the vet who leads Animal Protection Norway, told The Telegraph.
Due to overbreeding, British bulldogs developed short, wide skulls and short snouts and are prone to breathing, lung and various health issues. While the Cavalier King Charles spaniels experience heart defects, headaches, and eye and joint problems.
Animals killed in Hong Kong:2,000 hamsters, small animals to be killed in Hong Kong after positive COVID cases
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Norway's largest district court, based in the country's capital, added the ban can be lifted for breeders looking to prioritize the dogs health.
“A conviction does not imply a ban on serious breeding of bulldog or cavalier, as serious and scientifically based cross-breeding could be a good alternative," the court said.
Follow Gabriela Miranda on Twitter: @itsgabbymiranda
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If you’re a general contractor on a construction project, you know that one of the most important parts, besides the construction itself, is ensuring that the flow of money from the project owner to subcontractors is as smooth as possible. Additionally, if you have experience on public projects, you likely know that the law requires general contractors to acquire payment bonds from private insurers. In the unfortunate event that subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, or suppliers aren’t paid these parties may make a claim against the bond. After some recent re-working, North Carolina bond claim law now may provide some protection to general contractors from being forced to pay double when their subcontractor fails to pay more remote subs.
North Carolina Bond Claim Law Historically Placed the Burden of Double Payment on General Contractors
Until January 1, 2013, North Carolina law seemed geared much more to protecting the subcontractor than the general contractor. What happened, for example, if a second-tier subcontractor never received compensation from a first-tier subcontractor who was paid by the general contractor? Unfortunately for North Carolina GC’s, the second-tier subcontractor (or lower) could directly sue the general contractor in their action on their bond claim. Essentially, even though the general contractor already paid the first-tier subcontractor the full amount due, if that money never made it past the first-tier, the GC would be liable for paying everyone the first-tier never compensated. Accepting this risk of “double payment” was something that general contractors in North Carolina had to live with.
Making a North Carolina Bond Claim May Require Additional Notice
After decades of lobbying, the North Carolina legislature finally modified N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-27 in an effort to extend more protection to general contractors against the possibility of double payment through a North Carolina bond claim. Subs must first file a “Notice of Public Subcontract” in order to preserve their right to sue in certain cases.This revision took effect on January 1, 2013, along with many other changes to the North Carolina bond claim and mechanics lien scheme. Although the law still enables second-tier (or lower) subcontractors to directly sue the general contractor if the subs aren’t paid, these subs must first file a “Notice of Public Subcontract” in order to preserve their right to sue in certain cases, much like the Notice of Subcontract already required for private projects. Section (b) of the new law explains that lower subs must file Notice within 120 days
from the date on which [the second-tier or lower subcontractor] performed the last of the labor or furnished the last of the materials for which [the sub] claims payment.
The Notice has content requirements such as a description of the amount claimed, the name of the person for whom the work was performed or to whom the material was furnished, a description of the property, and more.
The general contractor also has obligations under the revised law, and is required to provide a Contractor’s Project Statement to all subcontractors with whom he contracts. The Statement must include the name and address of the project and the name of the contracting body and contractor. Additionally, upon request the GC must provide a copy of the payment bond within seven days.
New Protection Against Double Payments Under North Carolina Bond Claim Law
The new law actually creates two protections against double paymentsThe new law actually creates two protections against double payments, therefore, for general contractors. First, first-tier subs must pass down the GC’s Statement to all lower subcontractors. Second, upon receipt of the Statement, second-tier subs or below must then provide Notice to the general contractor. Without both, a remote subcontractor is limited in his rights to make a successful North Carolina bond claim.
Although the new law doesn’t completely protect general contractors from the risks of double payment in the event that remote subcontractors are not paid, there are now additional requirements for remote subcontractors to preserve their right to make a bond claim.
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Does holding money in a trust protect that money from counting towards means tested benefits?
Upon a disabled person coming into money, either through litigation or from a gift, ensuring a vulnerable beneficiaries benefits are still protected is often a key priority. This is because a sudden influx of money can stop a person’s entitlement to benefits or state support which are means tested.
The law on means testing of benefits is primarily contained in the Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014 (CSCAR). If a service users capital is over a certain level then they must contribute to the cost of that care and receive less benefits. However the regulations themselves do not actually provide for a definition of the word ‘capital’. Local authorities have to interpret this using the ordinary meaning of the word. The statutory guidance is equally vague, although it does list ‘trust funds’ as an example of capital. This suggests that local authorities should treat a trust fund as capital.
However, helpfully for beneficiaries, the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (ISG) provide some exceptions to what can be classed as ‘notional capital’. Two of those exceptions are discretionary trusts and a trust derived from a payment made in consequence of a personal injury.
What is a Discretionary Trust?
A discretionary trust is where the trustees can make certain decisions about how to use the trust income and sometimes the capital. There is no right to payments. The taxation of the trust is different to the taxation of an individual and specialist advice should be sort.
Great care and professional advice is needed in setting up either type of trust. Not only does the trust need to be set up correctly, but the holders of the assets or money need to be advised as how they should act.
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Father Benedict Groeschel, of the Franciscan Friars of the Renewa, recently told the National Catholic Register that some teen victims of sexual abuse actually seduce some priests.
Groeschel said: "People have this picture in their minds of a person planning to [be] a psychopath. But that’s not the case. Suppose you have a man having a nervous breakdown, and a youngster comes after him. A lot of the cases, the youngster, 14, 16, 18, is the seducer."
"If you go back 10 or 15 years ago with different sexual difficulties, except for rape or violence, it was very rarely brought as a civil crime. Nobody thought of it that way... And I’m inclined to think, on [a priest's] first offense, they should not go to jail because their intention was not committing a crime."
Father Groeschel did not present any proof that states did not enforce sexual abuse crimes between men and boys in the last 10 or 15 years.
Father Groeschel lives in Larchment, N.Y., where he assists with Trinity Retreat, where priests, accused of sexual abuse, stay, if not convicted of a crime.
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Every day, worldwide people disappear. Utilizing some instances they become a victim of crime and in other instances disappear maliciously. People that simply disappear are usually trying to be able to or escape a problem or guilt. When this happens a people search needs always be carried in order to follow the man.
The sudden disappearance of an person consist of those of which are responsible for causing a mishap and don’t want to face legal action or order the damages or injuries. These people maybe avoiding child support payments or alimony. Might be in severe debt and don’t want to formulate payments or are running from legislation or ct. In some instance might be evading liens or taxes. There are several the reason why a person would just suddenly end.
The internet is a reliable source the correct help come across a missing person, as it is quite a bit less simple as it sounds. You can now obtain access to databases ranging from a computer as before can only access government records or hire costly private investigators which charge by the hour.
Now that the public have direct in order to public records as well as business databases over the internet, you are not determination and online access is capable of doing their own investigation. However there work just like guarantees that you just will locate the missing person a person searching when it comes to. A people search can be delegated to one of the reputable online businesses that charge a nominal fee for administration. Companies will conduct a thorough search, and in case they don’t find the information you require they will refund your money.
Going online is what makes web based searches simple. Many people refer into the internet for their personal detective services, as internet services give you accurate and fast access to a huge amount of in order to find find important information. General search engines such as Yahoo other people are not the most convenient way to track down missing facebook people search.
A people search must be done any private search engine due to these search engines being optimized for finding people. Are usually of searches prevent you having to scroll through thousands of listings are generally unrelated where a private search engine will direct you right the data you need. After trying basic search engines as well as private search engine to no avail, after that you have few option but to work with a private detective.
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Archbishop of Enugu Provence, Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion), Most Rev Emmanuel Chukwuma, has described the arrest of the Supreme Leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu as a welcome development.
Chukwuma, who accused Kanu of jumping bail, stated that he didn’t appreciate Senator Enyinnaya Abaribe and others who secured his bail.
He said, “Rather, when he was abroad, he was instigating people to cause confusion. We warned him several times to stop that. It’s not only that; we felt that if you are a leader and you are part of the problem of Nigeria, you should come down here, so we can discuss with others on how to solve the problem.”
WITHIN NIGERIA had earlier reported that the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Malami, SAN, on Tuesday, announced Kanu’s arrest during an emergency media briefing in his office.
It was gathered that Kanu was arrested by a combined team of Nigerian and foreign security agents in a coordinated interception on Sunday, June 27.
According to the clergyman, the IPOB leader, “played into the hands of Nigerian Intelligence Agency, who set him up with a woman from London to Brazil, where he was arrested and then tranquilised to the point of bringing him to Nigeria.
“That shows irresponsibility. How can a woman and tranquiliser be a way of catching you if you are really a very strong leader? I feel disappointed in him because they lured him out of London to Brazil with a woman. It’s a shame.”
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A timeshare contract is a legal agreement between a timeshare owner and a resort, giving the owner the right to use a vacation property for a specific period of time each year. While timeshare contracts are legally binding, there are certain loopholes that can be exploited to get out of the contract.
Here are some of the most common timeshare contract loopholes:
- Misrepresentation: One of the most common timeshare contract loopholes is misrepresentation. This occurs when the timeshare salesperson makes false or misleading statements about the property, the maintenance fees, or the resale value of the timeshare. If you can prove that you were misled during the sales process, you may be able to get out of your contract.
- Right of rescission: Many states have a right of rescission, which allows consumers to cancel a timeshare contract within a certain period of time after signing. This period of time can range from three to fifteen days, depending on the state. If you decide to cancel your contract during this period, you will typically receive a full refund of your deposit.
- Contractual violations: Timeshare companies must abide by the terms of the contract, and if they fail to do so, you may have a legal basis to cancel the contract. For example, if the resort fails to properly maintain the property, you may be able to get out of your contract.
- Unforeseen circumstances: If you experience a significant change in your financial situation, such as a job loss or a major illness, you may be able to get out of your timeshare contract. In some cases, the timeshare company may agree to a partial refund or a modification of the contract.
- Statute of limitations: In some cases, the statute of limitations may have passed for the timeshare company to take legal action against you for breach of contract. This means that even if you have stopped paying maintenance fees, the company may not be able to take legal action against you.
- Bankruptcy: Filing for bankruptcy may also be a way to get out of a timeshare contract. In some cases, the bankruptcy court may discharge the debt associated with the timeshare, allowing you to walk away from the contract.
It’s important to note that the loopholes listed above may not apply to every timeshare contract, and the process of getting out of a timeshare contract can be complex and challenging. That’s why it’s important to seek the assistance of an experienced timeshare exit company, who can help you determine if you have a legal basis to get out of your contract and guide you through the process.
In conclusion, if you’re looking to get out of your timeshare contract, it’s important to understand the potential loopholes that can be exploited. While the process of getting out of a timeshare contract can be complex and challenging, with the right help and guidance, it is possible to get out of your contract and move on with your life. So, if you’re feeling trapped in your timeshare, don’t hesitate to speak with us so we can guide you on the best exit strategy.
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THE mistake committed by President Rodrigo Duterte in naming public officials allegedly involved in illegal drug operations in the country should serve as a lesson to the President that he should refrain from releasing to the public unverified information.
According to political analyst Ramon Casiple, the President is the only one who should be blamed for the gaffe because he was the one who released the wrong information to the public despite having the resources and means to verify it first.
“He could counter check the information given to him with other agencies before making any public announcement,” Casiple said in an interview.
The political analyst was referring to Duterte’s recent admission about the erroneous inclusion of former Pangasinan governor and now Rep. Amado Espino, dismissed Pangasinan provincial administrator Rafael Baraan, and Pangasinan board member Raul Sison in the so-called drug matrix prepared by intelligence officials.
Casiple sees the lapses as a cause for concern, noting that if the President and his intelligence people could make a mistake on small matters, it is also possible that they could commit blunders on more serious matters.
In fact in the past several weeks, the President made a lot of comments and pronouncements that were later clarified by his officials or withdrawn by Duterte himself.
Such practice of the President, Casiple said, also made the usual protocol of the office inapplicable particularly the one about the President having the last word on issues.
“There are many instances wherein the first word will come from the President and his officials will be the one who will explain. That is why for me the best approach is to give more attention to his actions instead of his words,” Casiple said.
The incident, he said, also made a dent on Duterte’s credibility, but because of his high ratings at present, it would not have any effect on the President.
Senator Panfilo Lacson said an immediate review of the “drug list” was in order following the admission of the President regarding the mistake in the drug matrix.
“It goes without saying that the credibility of that list and all other narco-lists involving other sectors for that matter has now become doubtful,” Lacson noted.
The senator at the same time insisted that an intelligence report must be treated as “confidential,” “Secret” or
“Top Secret” document, depending on its security classification.
A narco-list, he added, is a product of an intelligence workshop and is disseminated only to personnel with the corresponding security clearance. Making it public would not only warn those in the list and jeopardize any ongoing intelligence operations but would also unnecessarily shame them or put their lives at risk.
It would also be unfair to those who may not be correctly tagged as committing wrongdoings.
“As I said, the President or any official making a classified document public is ill-advised and will not serve the purpose for which it was prepared,” Lacson added.
As for Sen. Leila de Lima, Duterte’s apology was a clear admission that there was really nothing in the drug matrix that would link her to the illegal drug trade.
According to her, it is unfortunate to find out that the highest official of the land has not only been fed lies and wrong information but also has listened to rumors and intrigues.
But the worst part is that if Duterte is being fed wrong information on matters involving drugs, it is also possible that the Philippine National Police (PNP) might also be getting erroneous information from its “Oplan Tokhang” targets.
“How reliable is the information fed to the PNP by barangay captains in Operation Tokhang? What does that tell us about barangay captains’ lists of drug pushers and addicts who are subjected to tokhang and vigilante assassinations based on said lists, if intel provided the President himself is prone to mistakes?” de Lima pointed out.
“Tokhang” means “knock and plead,” referring to the practice of policemen to visit the homes of drug suspects and ask them to surrender.
“No amount of apologies from the President will bring the dead back to life. He is not Jesus Christ who can bring Lazarus back to life, contrary to the belief of his fanatic supporters,” she added.
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Mukasey gains support despite torture stance
President Bush's nominee is closer to becoming the attorney general.
Published November 3, 2007
WASHINGTON - Michael Mukasey drew closer to becoming attorney general Friday after two key Senate Democrats said they would vote for him despite his refusal to say whether waterboarding is torture.
The decision by Sens. Charles Schumer and Dianne Feinstein to back President Bush's nominee came shortly after the chairman of the committee, Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., announced he would vote against Mukasey, a former federal judge.
"This is an extremely difficult decision," Schumer said in a statement, adding that Mukasey "is not my ideal choice."
In announcing her support for Mukasey, Feinstein, D-Calif., said, "First and foremost, Michael Mukasey is not Alberto Gonzales," referring to the former attorney general who resigned in September after months of questions about his honesty.
Including Leahy, five of the Judiciary Committee's 10 Democrats had said they would vote against Mukasey's confirmation after the nominee earlier this week refused to say that waterboarding, an interrogation technique that simulates drowning, is torture and therefore illegal.
But with nine Republicans on the panel, Schumer and Feinstein's support for Mukasey virtually guarantees that a majority of the committee will recommend his confirmation when it votes on it next Tuesday.
Leaders in both parties have said they expect Mukasey to get at least 70 votes when the full, 100-member Senate votes on his confirmation. But Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., had said he would not bring it up for a vote without Judiciary Committee action first.
Schumer, who was Mukasey's chief Democratic sponsor, said the retired judge told him that if Congress passes a law banning waterboarding "the president would have absolutely no legal authority to ignore such a law." Schumer said Mukasey said he would enforce any congressional ban on the controversial interrogation method.
Human Rights Watch called Schumer and Feinstein's support for Mukasey "disappointing." Jennifer Daskal, the group's senior counterterrorism counsel, criticized the senators for "supporting a nominee for the position of America's chief law enforcement officer who refuses to call waterboarding, which has been prosecuted as torture for over a hundred years, illegal."
The American Civil Liberties Union also urged its supporters to call their senators and demand a vote against Mukasey.
Torture is considered a war crime by the international community and waterboarding has been banned by the U.S. military, but CIA interrogators are believed to have used the technique on terror detainees as recently as a few years ago.
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Are you feeling overwhelmed by the complex world of cryptocurrency taxation? Don’t worry, you’re not alone. Many crypto investors struggle to understand the ins and outs of reporting their gains and losses to the IRS.
But with the right guidance, you can navigate the path to zero – that is, paying zero taxes on your crypto investments – with confidence.
In this comprehensive guide, we’ll break down everything you need to know about crypto taxation, from calculating gains and losses to understanding the forms and reporting requirements.
We’ll also cover common mistakes to avoid and provide tips for staying compliant with IRS guidelines.
Best of all, this guide is completely free – so you can focus on maximizing your crypto profits without worrying about breaking the bank on taxes.
Understanding Cryptocurrency Taxation
So, you wanna know how the government views your cryptocurrency earnings and how to avoid getting hit with hefty fines and penalties? Well, you’re in luck ’cause this section will break down everything you need to know about cryptocurrency taxation.
First, it’s important to understand that the IRS considers cryptocurrency as property, which means that crypto tax implications are similar to those of stocks, bonds, and other investments.
This means that any gains from selling or trading cryptocurrencies are subject to capital gains tax. Moreover, if you’re paid in cryptocurrency for goods or services, it’s also considered income and is subject to income tax.
To avoid getting caught by the IRS, it’s crucial to keep accurate records of your cryptocurrency transactions and report them on your tax return. Doing so not only ensures compliance but also helps in IRS audit prevention.
Calculating Crypto Gains and Losses
Are you struggling to figure out how to calculate your gains and losses from your cryptocurrency investments? Let’s break it down together.
To calculate your gains and losses, you need to know your cost basis and the tax implications of your transactions. Your cost basis is the original value of the asset you purchased, including any fees or commissions you paid. It is important to keep track of this value because it determines your gain or loss when you sell the asset.
Once you know your cost basis, you can calculate your gain or loss by subtracting the cost basis from the sale price. If the sale price is higher than the cost basis, you have a capital gain. If the sale price is lower than the cost basis, you have a capital loss.
It is important to note that every transaction has tax implications, even if it is just a transfer from one wallet to another. So, make sure you keep track of all your transactions and consult with a tax professional to ensure you’re properly reporting your gains and losses.
Forms and Reporting Requirements
Now that you understand how to calculate your gains and losses, it’s time to dive into the forms and reporting requirements that come with dealing in cryptocurrency.
When it comes to tax implications, it’s important to note that the IRS considers cryptocurrency as property rather than currency. Therefore, any gains or losses from buying, selling, or trading cryptocurrency are subject to capital gains tax. Depending on how long you held the cryptocurrency, the tax rate may vary from 0% to 37%.
It’s important to keep accurate records of all cryptocurrency transactions, including the date, value, and purpose of the transaction, to ensure that you report the correct amount of gain or loss.
Record keeping requirements for cryptocurrency are similar to those for traditional investments. You should keep records of all transactions, including purchases, sales, trades, and transfers, as well as any fees or taxes paid.
Additionally, you should keep track of the fair market value of the cryptocurrency at the time of each transaction. This information will be necessary to calculate your gains or losses and report them accurately on your tax return.
It’s essential to stay organized and keep track of all your cryptocurrency transactions to avoid any potential penalties or audits.
Avoiding Common Tax Mistakes
If you want to avoid costly penalties and audits, it’s important to be aware of common tax mistakes when dealing with cryptocurrency. While it may seem like a daunting task, there are tax saving strategies and tips for record keeping that can help you stay on track and avoid any mishaps.
Here are some common mistakes to watch out for when dealing with crypto taxes:
Failing to report all transactions: it’s crucial to report all your cryptocurrency transactions, including trades, sales, and purchases. Failure to do so can result in penalties and audits.
Not keeping accurate records: keeping detailed records of all your crypto transactions is not only important for tax purposes, but it also helps you keep track of your gains and losses. Make sure to keep records of the date, amount, and value of each transaction.
Ignoring the IRS guidelines: the IRS has specific guidelines for reporting and paying taxes on cryptocurrency. Make sure to familiarize yourself with these guidelines and follow them carefully to avoid any mistakes.
By being diligent and avoiding these common tax mistakes, you can ensure that your cryptocurrency transactions are properly reported and that you minimize your risk of penalties or audits. Remember to consult with a tax professional if you have any questions or concerns about your crypto taxes.
Staying Compliant with IRS Guidelines
To ensure compliance with IRS guidelines, you must familiarize yourself with the rules and regulations surrounding cryptocurrency reporting and payment, and make sure to follow them diligently.
This includes keeping detailed records of all your transactions, including the date, amount, and purpose of each trade or transfer. You should also keep track of your basis and any gains or losses incurred, as this information will be necessary when calculating your tax liability.
In addition to record keeping, tax planning is also crucial when it comes to staying compliant with IRS guidelines. This means staying on top of changes to tax laws and regulations, and adjusting your strategies accordingly.
For example, you may need to adjust your withholding or estimated tax payments to ensure that you’re paying the correct amount of tax throughout the year. By staying proactive and informed, you can avoid penalties and other issues that can arise from non-compliance with tax laws.
Frequently Asked Questions
How do I report cryptocurrency gains from mining or staking?
To report your cryptocurrency gains from mining or staking, you need to calculate your income from these activities.
This involves figuring out the fair market value of the coins you receive and subtracting any expenses associated with the mining or staking process.
Keep in mind that the tax implications for cryptocurrency staking can vary depending on your jurisdiction and the specific coins you’re staking.
It’s important to review the tax laws in your area and consult with a tax professional if you’re unsure about how to report your crypto gains.
Can I deduct expenses related to my cryptocurrency investments, such as transaction fees or computer equipment?
You can deduct expenses related to your cryptocurrency investments, such as transaction fees or computer equipment, as long as they’re considered deductible expenses.
These expenses can reduce your capital gains and may even result in a net operating loss, which can be carried over to future years.
However, tax implications for crypto donations are different.
Cryptocurrency donations are considered property donations and are subject to the same rules as other property donations.
The value of the donated cryptocurrency must be determined and reported on your tax return, and you may be able to deduct the fair market value of the donated cryptocurrency as a charitable contribution.
What happens if I fail to report my cryptocurrency gains on my tax return?
If you fail to report your cryptocurrency gains on your tax return, the IRS may impose penalties on you. These penalties can be severe and can quickly add up, especially if you have significant gains.
However, the IRS does offer an amnesty program that you can take advantage of if you’ve failed to report your gains in the past. This program can help you avoid some of the penalties that you would otherwise be subject to, so it’s worth considering if you’ve made mistakes in the past.
Are there any tax consequences for receiving cryptocurrency as a gift or inheritance?
Receiving cryptocurrency as a gift or inheritance may have tax implications.
The value of the gift or inheritance is considered income and needs to be reported on your tax return.
If you decide to donate cryptocurrency, you may be eligible for a tax deduction, but you’ll need to make sure you follow the IRS guidelines for charitable contributions.
Additionally, if you receive cryptocurrency in a divorce settlement, you’ll need to determine the fair market value and report it on your taxes.
It’s important to keep accurate records and consult with a tax professional to ensure you’re handling your cryptocurrency correctly.
How does the tax treatment of cryptocurrency differ for traders versus long-term investors?
Wondering how the tax treatment of cryptocurrency differs for traders versus long-term investors?
It all comes down to capital gains and holding period. If you’re a trader, any gains you make from buying and selling cryptocurrency within a year are considered short-term capital gains and taxed at your ordinary income tax rate.
On the other hand, if you’re a long-term investor and hold onto your cryptocurrency for more than a year before selling, any gains will be taxed at the long-term capital gains rate, which is usually lower than the ordinary income tax rate.
So, it’s important to consider your holding period when determining your tax liability for cryptocurrency.
Congratulations! You’ve just unlocked the secrets to becoming an expert in crypto tax.
By understanding the basics of cryptocurrency taxation, calculating your gains and losses, and staying compliant with IRS guidelines, you can save yourself the headache of dealing with costly mistakes and penalties.
Remember to keep detailed records of all your crypto transactions and consult with a tax professional if you’re unsure about anything.
With the knowledge you’ve gained from this comprehensive guide, you can confidently navigate the path to zero and enjoy the benefits of crypto without the stress of tax complications.
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Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was in Europe at the end of the week, and among other things, he pushed for NATO member states to honor their decades-old commitment to spend 2% of their GDP on defense.
Germany, among other members, insisted that honoring their commitment was “unrealistic.”
German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said demands for 2% of GDP spending were “totally unrealistic.” He said that to meet the US target, Germany would have to increase spending by some €35 billion ($37 billion).
After all, Gabriel has argued,
…a strong defense isn’t enough to ensure security.
It doesn’t get any clearer than this. Seattle Mayor Ed Murray has illustrated the addictive nature of Federal funds transfers to the States and lower government jurisdictions with that phrase.
In defending his city’s lawsuit against the Federal government over DoJ’s decision to withhold Federal monies from cities that violate Federal law by protecting illegal aliens from enforcement of immigration law, Murray said this:
The federal government cannot compel our police department to enforce federal immigration law and cannot use our federal dollars to coerce Seattle into turning our backs on our immigrant and refugee communities.
The push over the last decade by international maritime ports to fully automate operations has sparked the ire of many US longshoremen whose high-paying jobs and way of life are at stake. The trend also sets up a battle between their unions and companies and governments who see automation as a cleaner, more efficient and more cost-friendly alternative to the current system.
Never mind that west coast ports—three in particular, Long Beach, Los Angeles, and Oakland—do 40% of the nation’s (not just the west coast’s) container traffic and so costs there have sharp impact on the nation’s economy.
Beijing has proposed requiring cloud-computing services providers to turn over essentially all ownership and operations to Chinese partners and could result in the transfer of valuable US intellectual property, according to the letter, viewed by The Wall Street Journal.
Not “could result”—technology theft transfer is the point of the requirement. This comes against the backdrop of the People’s Republic of China’s ongoing technology requirements.
China already places restrictions on investing for foreign cloud providers operating in the country under rules passed in the last two years…including forced collaboration with rivals and technology transfer.
Yesterday, the membership of the House Freedom Caucus of No forced the American Health Care Act, the first stage of a three-stage Obamacare repeal and replace program offered by the majority of the House Republican Conference, to be withdrawn from the day’s backup vote (recall that these No-ers already had forced a delay from Thursday’s vote over their demand to have their way or there could be no Act), and so there will be no AHCA.
The House Republicans were forced to cancel yesterday’s scheduled American Health Care Act vote. The Freedom Caucus, the Caucus of No, couldn’t be satisfied. Congressmen like Jim Jordan (R, OH) and Caucus of No Chairman Mark Meadows (R, NC) refused late compromises, all the while insisting by implication from their refusals that constituents of other Congressmen, for instance Tom Cole (R, OK), worked for them and not that Cole worked for his Oklahoma constituents—and that those Oklahoma constituents might have different imperatives than those Congressmen of the Caucus. So, no compromise from the No-ers.
The People’s Republic of China is wining and dining major American companies, trying to convince them that the time is ripe for investing in the PRC.
Apple Inc’s Tim Cook and Jon McNeill of Tesla Motors were among dozens of western executives who spent a long and unseasonably warm weekend here strolling the grounds where Mao Zedong once lived, surrounded by blooming magnolia trees and gliding swans.
Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli:
China will push for a higher level of economic opening-up[.]
And Jake Parker, vice president of the U.S.-China Business Council
One aspect of the plan on offer in the House is this:
…whether it includes enough reform to arrest the current death spiral in the individual insurance market.
Notably, the bill includes a new 10-year $100 billion “stability fund” that allows states to start to repair their individual insurance markets. Before ObamaCare, it wasn’t inevitable that costs would increase by 25% on average this year, or that nearly a third of US counties would become single-insurer monopolies. With better policy choices, states can make coverage cheaper and more attractive for consumers and coax insurers back into the market, and the stability fund is a powerful tool.
One illustration of the value of the relationship between the two is provided in Laura Kusisto’s piece, Tax Overhaul Threatens Affordable-Housing Deals, in a piece in Tuesday’s Wall Street Journal.
The possibility of a tax-code overhaul is casting a shadow over the $10 billion affordable-housing industry, which receives tax credits so valuable they often determine whether or not projects get off the ground.
Members of Congress and President Donald Trump have proposed reducing the corporate tax rate to 15% to 20% from the current 35%, dimming the allure of a credit investors such as big banks and insurance companies receive to offset income taxes.
The Trump administration is considering sweeping sanctions aimed at cutting North Korea off from the global financial system as part of a broad review of measures to counter Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threat, a senior US official said on Monday.
The sanctions supposedly include economic sanctions against People’s Republic of China banks and other businesses having intercourse with northern Korea and northern Korean entities.
Separately, I have to ask in the current environment: how does this sort of thing get leaked?
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from the where's-the-e? dept
I can't honestly claim to know a whole lot about e-cigarettes. That's because when I was still smoking, I smoked the old fashioned kind of cigarettes. You know, the ones made from tobacco, that cured acne, and that made my breath smell as cool and fabulous as a pub toilet. Plus, everyone was doing it and my lungs weren't going to give themselves cancer, so you know. But, even knowing little about e-cigarettes, I know enough to know that they aren't ale houses located in Riverdale, New Jersey. This is a conclusion that the lawyers over at Lorillard, makers of "blu" e-cigarettes, think is likely to escape the larger population, as they have decided to file a trademark dispute against Blu Alehouse over its name and logo.
The lawsuit filed by Lorillard Technologies Inc. centers on a logo that NJ Ale House LLC is using at its Blu Alehouse in Riverdale, N.J., Law360 reported. According to the news website, the logo features "the word 'blu' surrounded by smoke or flames." The subsidiary of Greensboro-based Lorillard (NYSE: LO) claims that the logo is too much like the branding for blu eCigs.Let's leave everything else aside for a moment and simply take a look at the two logos to see if they look substantially similar on their own. First is the logo of Blu Alehouse. Note that this logo normally appears alongside the full name of the establishment.
Strangely, an actual judge reviewing the claim thought differently.
U.S. District Judge Kevin McNulty found that Lorillard — along with another subsidiary, LOEC Inc. — made "plausible claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition," and he ruled that the case could go on, Law360 reported.How is the claim of unfair competition even possible? The two companies aren't competing with each other at all. The only mention of competition in the court filing by Lorillard is over the fact that sometimes they advertise their cigarettes at drinking establishments.
LTI and LOEC allege that Blu Alehouse bar and restaurant is directed at a similar consumer base as LTI and LOEC's BLU products because BLU products are promoted at bars, restaurants, and lounges.But that doesn't actually put the companies in competition with one another. That would be like Budweiser claiming that Big Buds Magazine, here to serve all of your marijuana information needs, infringed on Budweiser marks because they occasionally sell beer to high people. Why should that matter at all?
Hopefully as this case moves forward, a more sensible conclusion is reached.
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A district court in Japan has in a landmark decision ruled that the country’s failure to recognize same-sex marriage is “unconstitutional”.
Japan’s constitution defines marriage as one between “both sexes”. But a Sapporo court ruled that this denied the couples constitutionally-guaranteed equality, in what is seen as a symbolic victory for LGBTQ activists. Japan is the only country in the G7 group of developed nations that do not allow same-sex marriage.
The case was one of several brought to district courts in various parts of Japan by a group of same-sex couples who are seeking damages for mental suffering. The Sapporo court rejected the compensation claim of one million yen ($9,000; £6,480) per person for being denied the same rights as heterosexual couples.
Even if all district courts declare same-sex unions constitutional, the legalization of same-sex marriages is not guaranteed, as current political momentum to change the law is “lukewarm at best”, according to The Japan Times.
Japan’s constitution, put in place after the end of World War Two, defines marriage as one of “mutual consent between both sexes”. The government has said this means the same-sex marriage was not “foreseen” at the time. But lawyers for the plaintiffs said the phrasing was actually meant to prevent forced marriages, and that there is nothing in the constitution that explicitly prohibits gay marriage.
The court in Sapporo, the capital city of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, is the first to give its verdict, and its ruling is seen as having a significant impact on the other courts. Journalist and LGBTQ rights expert Yuji Kitamaru told the BBC the judgment was “well-crafted and very strategic” and laid “one of the first legal foundations against anti-LGBTQ theories”.
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Jammu: In an attempt to warn people against violating lockdown orders, that have been imposed to contain the spread of coronavirus, the police in Jammu are stamping those found to be wandering about without a valid reason.
Some people were caught by the Jammu Police in Ranbir Singh Pura today, who were found to be violating the lockdown orders. To teach these violators a lesson and shame them in public, the police put a stamp on their forehead and hands, which read ‘CORONALOCKDOWN VIOLATOR’.
The indelible ink which has been used for the stamp will ensure that the stamp will last for at least two weeks. Police are using the indelible ink so that it becomes easy for them to nab the person who is a repetitive offender.
Same measures were adopted by the police in Bishnah town as well. In Bishnah, some youth were nabbed for roaming the streets without any valid reason and were stamped as ‘CORONALOCKDOWN VIOLATOR’. The stamps also read the name of the police station. The Jammu Police acted tough when some people were caught venturing out in various areas but couldn't cite valid reasons for the outing.
The administration is taking several steps to contain the COVID-19 outbreak and has assured people of the smooth supply of essential services. Ever since Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a 21-day lockdown in the country, the administration has been asking people to remain indoors and not panic.
The Jammu and Kashmir administration has decided that Government Medical College (GMC), Jammu, will be dedicated as COVID-19 hospital. The administration is also planning a smooth system of passes be operationalised so that essential supplies continue uninterrupted.
Meanwhile, Kolkata Police also punished the lockdown violators by making them do squats and frog jumps.
In Odisha’s Kandhamal district, two youths, who were found roaming the streets without any valid reason, were made to hold placards that had 'selfish' and 'irresponsible' written on them.
For full coverage on Coronavirus pandemic, click here
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Mechanics / Electrodynamics
November 29, 2016
In Newton’s Principia the Third Law of Motion states: ‘to every action there is always opposed an equal reaction; or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.’ The Law only refers to the ‘bodies’, not other factors. The Law does not take into account the inherent characteristics, nature, compositions, flexibility, rigidity, magnitude, elasticity, distinctiveness of interacting bodies etc. The bodies may be of steel, wood, rubber, cloth, wool, sponge, spring, typical plastic, porous material, specifically fabricated material etc. The interacting bodies may be solid, liquid gas or mixture of all. For all such bodies if the action is same, then the reaction must be the same.
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If a small and medium sized business makes an unsuccessful application for borrowing to a designated bank, the bank is obliged to offer the business an alternative lender under the bank referral scheme via a designated online finance platforms. These platforms will seek to help you find a suitable finance provider that may be willing to offer the finance you need.
The Regulations require the bank to ask for your consent to provide information to the platforms when you are advised that your application has been unsuccessful and the platforms may not pass information that could identify your business to finance providers without your agreement.
If you consent to a referral, the bank will provide information to each of the platforms who will then make contact with you or you can make direct contact with a lender yourself.
Government declined lending referral scheme
The UK government has launched the declined lending referral scheme in order to assist businesses source the finance they need in order for growth, nine leading banks are taking part in the referral scheme
In the new referral scheme announced in the 2014 Budget that the government intended to match businesses rejected for bank finance with alternative finance providers. This was passed into law as part of the Small Business, Enterprise & Employment Act 2015.
Banks are now required to offer small businesses they have rejected for finance the opportunity to have details of their funding request shared with designated finance platforms. In turn the platforms will help these businesses receive available financing quotes from a large panel of alternative funding providers.
The government policy aims to help small business loan applicants who are initially declined by the banks which the estimate is about 25%. Many of these businesses simply cancel their growth plans rather than explore alternative options that may be more suitable. The British Business Bank estimates that 100,000 businesses have their applications for debt rejected each year, representing a possible funding gap in the UK of £4 billion.
If your business has been declined by a bank, it does not mean that the business is not fundable, may be attractive to many finance providers on the different platforms that look at creditworthiness in different ways from a bank.
What banks are taking part in the scheme?
The following banks are taking part in the declined referral scheme:
- Lloyds Bank
- Bank of Scotland
- Royal bank of Scotland
- Ulster Bank
- Bank of Ireland
- Danske Bank
- Clydesdale Bank
- Yorkshire Bank
- First Trust Bank
What is the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) role?
The FCA’s role is to oversee the regulatory compliance of these regulations by the Designated Banks and Platforms.
How does the bank referral scheme work?
The bank referral scheme works if your application for lending is declined or you have reject a facility offered on a different basis that it is different to the one you applied for, the bank will ask for your consent to refer you to the Designated Platforms. This will occur at the time the decline is communicated to you or when you decline the alternative offer.
If consent is given, the bank will send specified information regarding your application to all the Designated Platforms before the end of the next working day.
Upon receipt of this information each platform will contact you by email, telephone, post or text to start the process of helping you find the funding best suited to your needs.
The current designated platforms are Alternative Business Funding, Bizfitech, Funding Options and Funding Xchange. These platforms only facilitate lending and do not actually provide finance themselves.
After a referral to a platform is made, it is up to the applicant to decide if they wish to continue with the service or take any of the options they are given. There is no commitment and there is no cost for using the platforms. However, it is not guaranteed that alternative finance will be found, especially finance that meets the applicant’s needs
Your specified information will not be passed on to any potential lenders until your further consent is given.
Only the following information will be passed on to an alternative lender:
When is a referral not made?
A referral by the bank to an alternative lender is not made if the following criteria applies:
- The value of the finance facility applied for is less than £1,000
- the facility applied for is sought for a period of less than 30 days;
- The bank is aware that the business is subject to a statutory demand for payment,enforcement proceedings or other legal proceedings in relation to payment obligationsarising under an existing finance facility;
- The bank is aware that the business is subject to a formal demand
- You have declined the bank’s offer of credit solely due to price considerations.
What are your options?
You can provide your consent and the Designated Bank will pass information about you and your application to the Designated Platforms.
You can decide not to provide your consent. Your bank will provide you with the necessary information to use the platforms yourself at a later date.
Under certain circumstances, you may be able to appeal your bank’s lending decision. Further information is available from your bank. You can make an appeal at the same time as consenting to a platform referral.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Bank Referral Scheme?
The bank referral scheme is UK law that was passed in 2015 which requires banks to offer to refer their unsuccessful applicants to designated finance platforms. These platforms will then help the referred business find another source of business finance.
Will consenting to a referral harm my credit rating?
Providing consent will not harm your credit rating. Completing an application with a Designated Platform will not affect your credit score. If you make an application to one or more of the lenders it is likely that each lender will undertake credit searches and take previous searches into consideration as part of their risk assessment. However, a number of credit applications alone should not normally cause a problem for you.
If my bank declined my application, why would another provider accept it?
Lenders consider borrowing requests based on a range of factors and these may vary across lenders. Therefore some lenders maybe willing to lend when others are not.
Seasoned professional with a strong passion for the world of business finance. With over twenty years of dedicated experience in the field, my journey into the world of business finance began with a relentless curiosity for understanding the intricate workings of financial systems.
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When can an Employment Tribunal resort to the burden of proof when deciding a disputed issue of fact?
The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as a delivery driver. On 27 December 2019, a manager reported that he saw the Claimant smoking behind the wheel when driving on the motorway. It was common ground that such conduct would be a serious breach of the Respondent’s smoking policy, which identified that it may attract the sanction of dismissal.
Following an internal disciplinary investigation and process, the Claimant was found to have been smoking whilst driving. He was summarily dismissed without notice. Throughout the investigation, the Claimant denied the allegation. In response to his dismissal, the Claimant brought proceedings in the Employment Tribunal ("ET") for wrongful dismissal and unfair dismissal.
What is wrongful dismissal?
Wrongful dismissal is a dismissal in breach of contract. The sole question is whether the terms of the employee's contract of employment have been breached. The employee will have a claim in damages if the employer, in dismissing them, breached the contract and caused them loss. A common type of wrongful dismissal claim is where an employee has been summarily dismissed and is claiming their contractual notice pay on the basis that their employer was not entitled to dismiss them without notice.
What did the ET decide in this claim?
The ET found that the Claimant was not unfairly dismissed. In considering the Claimant's claim for wrongful dismissal, the Judge held that to dismiss the claim, she must first be satisfied that the Claimant was smoking in the lorry. She considered that the burden of proof was on the Respondent to satisfy her, on the balance of probabilities, that the Claimant was guilty of the alleged misconduct.
As is often the case, the Respondent did not call the manager who witnessed the Claimant smoking as a witness in the proceedings. However, there was a statement from him included in the bundle. The Judge held that, because the Respondent had not called anyone who was an actual witness to the events on 27 December 2019, she was unable to evaluate their credibility against that of the Claimant. It was held that the documentary evidence fell "far short of [her] being able to find as a fact that the Claimant was, on the balance of probabilities, smoking on 27th December 2019."
As such, the ET upheld the Claimant’s claim of wrongful dismissal. The Respondent appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) on the basis that the Judge had erred in law by "falling back" on the burden of proof and improperly discounting documentary and hearsay evidence.
What is the law on the burden of proof?
It is not uncommon for an ET Judge to be asked to make a finding of fact based on disputed facts. Where the evidence pointing in either direction is evenly matched, and there is no way to choose or decide, then the burden of proof is essentially the tie breaker. The party asserting the factual proposition in question, in this case being that the Claimant was smoking, will not have shown it probably to be the case, and so the party who bore the burden in respect of the matter will lose. This is known as resorting to the burden of proof.
The case of Stephens v Cannon EWCA Civ 222 confirmed that an ET should not resort to the burden of proof except in exceptional circumstances. The exceptional situation which entitles the court to resort to the burden of proof is that, notwithstanding that it has striven to do so, it cannot reasonably make a finding in relation to a disputed issue. A Court which resorts to the burden of proof must ensure that others can discern that it has striven to make a finding in relation to a disputed issue and can understand the reasons why it has concluded that it cannot do so.
In very few cases, the fact of the endeavour and the reasons for the conclusion will readily be inferred from the circumstances and so there will be no need for the ET to explain the reasons in any detail in its judgment. In most cases, however, a more detailed demonstration and explanation in the judgment will be necessary.
What did the EAT decide?
The EAT considered whether the exceptional circumstances, as described in Stephens, had been met to entitle the Judge to fall back on the burden of proof without providing an explanation as to why this was done. It held that there was not anything to suggest that the Judge was of the view that this was a case where the evidence pointing either way was equally compelling, or equally problematic, leaving her simply unable to make a decision either way on the factual issue.
As such, the Judge had fallen into an error of principle in her approach to the evidence. The ET should have sought to evaluate the hearsay evidence of the statements that had been gathered from the witnesses and considered as part of the disciplinary process. There was no rule that oral evidence given and tested at trial, must always 'trump' opposing documentary or hearsay evidence.
What can employers take from this?
In complex cases, the ET's original judgment had the potential of placing pressure on Respondents to call several witnesses (who may not have been particularly involved in the decision-making process) to give evidence to avoid the risk of failing to discharge the burden of proof. This, in turn, could have significant cost implications. As such, the EAT's decision is a welcome one for employers.
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CHARLESTON, S.C. (WCIV/AP) - Convicted Charleston church shooter Dylann Roof has pleaded guilty to state murder and attempted murder charges, leaving him to await federal execution and sparing his victims and their families the burden of a second trial.
You can view the entire hearing below.
After Solicitor Scarlett Wilson gave the facts of the case, a brief synopsis of events that happened the night of June 17, 2015, family members of the victims were given a chance to speak to the court.
Pastor Eric Manning, current pastor of Emanuel AME, spoke to the judge saying that while Mother Emanuel has been a cornerstone of the African American community for more than 200 years, some of the parishioners have challenges coming back because it is a place "where nine lives were taken and lives of the survivors have been changed forever."
Sen. Gerald Malloy spoke on behalf of Rev. Clementa Pinckney's family followed by several family members of the victims.
Dylann Roof did not speak but his attorneys allowed his grandfather, Joe Roof to speak on his behalf.
"I want everyone to understand that nothing is all bad," he said. "And Dylann is not all bad." He spoke about a bible class where he learned that the devil exists, good people do bad things, and bad people do good things. He said Dylann's actions made them feel "sick" and he will go to his grave not understanding why his grandson did what he did.
"I'm just aching to hug him and hold him like I did when he was just a tot," he said.
The 23-year-old Roof pleaded guilty Monday to all state charges, including nine counts of murder. It's part of a deal with prosecutors in exchange for a life prison sentence without parole. He could get up to 30 additional years for each of the three attempted murder charges.
He also waived his right to appeal his guilty charges which he had the right to do 10 days after his plea.
After his attorneys said they would not be bringing up the question of his competency, Roof struggled to answer the judge's questions about his previous trial.
Judge Nicholson then said he was aware of Dylann Roof's history of mental illness and substance abuse because of documents entered during the federal competency hearing. He said those documents will remained sealed but the federal court judge may release them after they have been redacted.
SPECIAL SECTION | The Emanuel AME Shooting
The self-avowed white supremacist was unapologetic at his federal trial as he heard days of testimony from survivors. In harrowing detail, they described the hail of bullets that began when parishioners closed their eyes to pray during a June 2015 Bible study at the historically black Emanuel AME Church.
After Monday's hearing, Solicitor Scarlett Wilson spoke to reporters saying the state proceedings were an "insurance policy" in the event anything were to go amiss on the federal side.
You can view her statement along with remarks from Cynthia Hurd's brother and Senator Gerald Malloy below.
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Borderland Beat posted by Mars220 Republished from Latino Fox News
The suspected leader of a gang involved in kidnappings, drug trafficking and extortion rackets was arrested by the Federal Police in western Mexico, the Government Secretariat said.
Marco Antonio Esparza Hernandez, also known as Miguel Angel Zapata Moreno, was arrested in Morelia, the capital of Michoacan state, the secretariat said in a statement.
The gang boss was living in the Jardines del Toreo district of Morelia.
Officers confirmed the suspect's identity and "established a security perimeter, arresting this person while he was driving a private vehicle without a single shot being fired," the secretariat said.
The suspect had worked as a gunman for Arnoldo Rueda Medina, one of the leaders of the Familia Michoacana drug cartel, and ran a network of informers for the drug trafficker, the secretariat said, citing information gathered by investigators.
Esparza Hernandez reported to Enrique Plancarte Solis, one of the leaders of the Caballeros Templarios drug cartel, who provided him with orders on running extortion rackets, carrying out hits, distributing drugs and stealing fuel in Guanajuato, a state in central Mexico.
The suspect parted ways with Servando Gomez Martinez, the only Caballeros Templarios leader still at large, when the cartel was weakened.
The 41-year-old suspect was carrying two loaded rifles and 500 grams of a substance that appeared to be cocaine at the time of his arrest.
The suspect and the evidence seized in the case were turned over to federal prosecutors.
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Slip & Fall Accident Attorney in Anoka, Minnesota
Many people have slipped and fallen at a business, when visiting a friend, or when entering or exiting a government building. If they can pick themselves up, they may just believe it was just an accident with no one to blame. If they are injured and begin incurring medical bills or have to take time off of work due to those injuries, they may wonder if, indeed, their mishap was the fault of someone else.
If someone caused a car accident you were injured in, you will likely pursue compensation in a personal injury claim. After all, the person who caused the crash is legally responsible for the cost of your medical treatment, lost income, and other damages. Slip and fall accidents are no different. If what someone did or did not do causes injury to you, you deserve compensation.
As a licensed attorney for more than four decades, I have represented many victims of slip and fall accidents. Some of them experience pain for a brief time, and others will endure it for a lifetime. If you think someone else’s negligence caused your injuries, in Anoka, Minnesota—or in the surrounding areas, such as Sherburne County or Anoka County—the Law Offices of Robert N. Edwards is here to help. I am licensed to practice law in both Minnesota and Arizona.
What Should I Know About Premises Liability in Minnesota?
Premises liability encompasses a broad range of claims arising from injuries caused by unsafe conditions on someone’s property. The property may be privately owned or publicly owned. The unsafe conditions include dog bites, slip and falls, trip and falls, drownings, and other deaths caused by attractive nuisances. The common thread is that a hazardous condition caused or contributed to cause injury.
Examples of premises liability include a child falling into an uncovered hole or being trapped in an appliance. A person slips on broken stairs and the railing gives way as they fall. A customer slips on an unmarked wet surface in a business, falls, and injures themselves. An uneven sidewalk catches a person’s toe and pitches them forward and onto the ground.
Someone injured by someone else’s negligence can file a claim against the liability insurance coverage of the person who owns or is responsible for maintaining the property. The purpose of the claim is to recover compensation for the damages of the injured person.
Filing a claim or lawsuit in Minnesota must be completed within six years from the date of the accident. You also have the opportunity to settle your claim with the insurance company within this time period. Failure to observe this statute of limitations means forfeiting your legal right to pursue compensation.
Who Can Be Liable in a Minnesota Premises Liability Claim?
Who is liable—and, therefore, who you file the claim against or sue—depends on where you encountered the hazardous condition that resulted in your injuries.
Property owners are often responsible because they are supposed to keep their premises safe for others. This could be the homeowner, owner of a rental property, or owner of an office building, for example.
If the owner of a business if not the property owner, they still may be responsible for the safety of the premises. For example, the owner of a convenience or grocery store business bears responsibility for the safety of the store for their customers and employees. As such, they need to be vigilant about such potential hazards as spilled liquids; obstacles in aisles and walkways; and slick sidewalks and entryways caused by rain, snow, and other precipitation.
Governmental entities also have a responsibility to keep their premises free of unsafe conditions. If you slip and fall accident occurred on such a property, you have only 180 days to submit a notice of claim to the governmental entity. There are also limits on the amount of compensation you can garner from governmental entities. Consult with a knowledgeable slip and fall attorney right away if you were injured on government property.
If the hazard was caused by a design or manufacturing defect, the company that designed or manufactured the item could be liable for your damages. Note, however, that the statute of limitations for claims arising from defective and hazardous products is only two years in Minnesota, so talk to a personal injury attorney right away.
Finally, you may share liability for the incident that caused your injuries. A failure to obey warning signs, observe obvious hazards, and be distracted may place all or some of the fault on you.
How Do I Prove Fault?
You will have the burden of proving fault in a Minnesota premises liability claim, beginning with proving that the negligent party owed a duty of care to you to maintain safe premises. If you were trespassing, for example, you may not be able to prove this.
Then, you need to prove that the owner caused the condition that led to your slip and fall, or that the owner should have reasonably known the hazard might exist and failed to fix or warn of the unsafe condition. If the property owner’s duty of care was breached, they are financially liable for your damages.
What if I Might Have Been Partially to Blame?
Even if you have to shoulder some of the fault for the accident that led to your injuries, you may be able to recover compensation under Minnesota’s modified comparative negligence rule. So long as a jury finds you no more than 50% at fault, you can be awarded compensation, although it will be reduced by your share of fault.
For example, you were wearing flip-flops when you quickly descended stairs from a house and slipped on a broken stair tread. Although the owner had a responsibility to replace, repair, or warn of the broken tread, the jury may find you minimally liable for wearing inappropriate footwear for the speed at which you went down the stairs. If the jury assigned you 10% of the fault and awarded you $20,000 in damages, you would forfeit $2,000 for your share of the fault and receive $18,000 in settlement.
Slip & Fall Accident Attorney in Anoka, Minnesota
Most premises liability claims, including those resulting from slip and fall accidents, can be challenging. The negligent party’s liability insurer will do everything it can to place you at fault for your own injuries. You need an experienced and aggressive personal injury attorney like me to help you prevail. If you believe your slip and fall is due to negligence, don’t wait. Call the Law Offices of Robert N. Edwards in Anoka, Minnesota right now to schedule a free case consultation.
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A WOMAN who stabbed her husband to death was yesterday jailed for more than three years.
Catherine Watson knifed husband Charles through the heart after a confrontation at their home in Maryhill, Glasgow, last January.
She later called her daughter after the incident, screaming: "I've stabbed your dad. I think he's dying."
The couple's 28-year marriage - once described as "wonderful" - deteriorated after Mr Watson's business began to fail and he started drinking heavily.
Catherine Watson, 54, was originally accused of murder, but admitted the reduced charge of culpable homicide on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
Judge Lord Matthews was handed 27 testimonials from her family and friends - some begging for her not to be jailed.
But the judge yesterday said a non-custodial sentence was "unrealistic".
He jailed Watson for three years and four months, reducing the sentence from five years due to her guilty plea.
Lord Matthews said: "It is tragic that drink affected him the way that it did."
The High Court in Glasgow earlier heard that the couple split in 2007, but continued to stay together.
Watson's QC Frances McMenamin described the case as "tragic".
Miss McMenamin said the attack was "completely out of character" and that Watson had expressed "distress and remorse".
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After six years with no adjustment, the legal interest rate in Louisiana is going up to 4.25% effective January 1, 2017. Under Louisiana law, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions is to ascertain the Federal Reserve’s approved “discount rate” published daily in the Wall Street Journal on the first day of each October; the judicial interest rate is then set at three and one-quarter percentage points above the discount rate.
Legal interest is designed to compensate a plaintiff for his loss of the use of the money to which he is entitled, the use of which the defendant had during the pendency of the litigation. Therefore, if a tort suit is filed and verdict is thereafter entered for the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to legal interest on the entire judgment from the date of judicial demand (the date the suit is filed) until the judgment is paid.
Insurers should note that, regardless of the provisions in their policy, LSA-R.S. 13:4203 provides that all insurance policies providing coverage for a loss in this state are deemed to include a provision that provides pre-judgment interest on any amount awarded within the policy limits from the date the original petition was filed. Any provision to the contrary is deemed null and void. Also, some authority exists to require an insurer to consider pre-judgment interest in settlement, if a “limits” demand is at issue.
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A right holder may transfer his/her exclusive rights to a software or a database to another person by executing an assignment agreement.
State registration of the assignment agreement in Rospatent is obligatory for it to be valid.
We are experts in the area and would be happy to draft and have assignment agreement recorded with Rospatent.
Generally speaking, we would be delighted to help you in solving this and many other issues and provide you with detailed advice and take all the required actions related to the transfer of rights to your software and your database.
Price for Assignment Agreement
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- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoLa incidencia de la mediación como método alternativo en la fijación de pensiones alimenticias en el cantón Cañar, durante el primer semestre del año 2022.(Universidad Católica de Cuenca., 2023) Rosas Encalada, Jhonnathan Israel; Quevedo Quinteros, Manuel Ramiro; 0350258513This research is about the incidence of mediation in the fixing of alimony in the Cañar canton, specifically in the Mediation Center of the Judiciary Council of that canton, for which it has been necessary to conduct a dogmatic study on the right to alimony, the fixing of alimony, who are the holders of this right and who are the ones obliged to pay it. Likewise, mediation and its application in the fixing of alimony have been reviewed and analyzed as an alternative method of conflict resolution, since the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 and the Law of Arbitration and Mediation established it. Moreover, in this research, an analysis has been made on the incidence of mediation in the setting of alimony in the Mediation Center of the Judiciary Council of the Cañar canton.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoEl derecho al trabajo de las personas con diversidad funcional, una barrera por superar en Ecuador(Universidad Católica de Cuenca., 2023) Salinas Vélez, Ismael Francisco; Carpio Flores, Luis Manuel; 0302931860This research paper analyzes the Ecuadorian reality regarding the employment access of people with functional diversity. It is grounded in theoretical perspectives encompassing normative aspects, benefits, and implementation. The study also delves into public policies generated by the government and the barriers to be overcome in Ecuador. The research employs inductive-deductive, comparative, and juridical-dogmatic methods with a descriptive non-experimental approach. The results indicate that 85.29% of individuals with some type of functional diversity need access to dignified employment. Government policies do not fully ensure respect for the rights enshrined in the Constitution and in the workplace, as they lack proper control and effective enforcement. It is concluded that despite the existence of public policies and regulations protecting individuals with disabilities in the workplace, employers do not comply with these provisions, resulting in a legal lethargy that is detrimental to their rights, labor inclusion, and guaranteed opportunities.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoAnálisis de la fijación de pensiones alimenticias para adultos mayores. Importancia de aplicar la tabla del ministerio económica y social(Universidad Católica de Cuenca., 2023) Vélez Serrano, Wilson Andrés; Zamora Vázquez, Ana; 0302041140This research was conducted to analyze the situation of older adults regarding their right to financial support and the importance of judges applying the table established by the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion, as they currently rely on sound judgment. It is necessary to emphasize that Ecuador has a constitution that guarantees human rights, and among the priority attention groups are older adults, with the existence of the Organic Law for Older Adults that determines the protection of the rights of this group. The research aimed to analyze current legislation and the due judicial practices regarding the determination of alimony for older adults. Additionally, various court decisions were analyzed to demonstrate the importance of applying the alimony table issued by the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion. The research was conducted with a qualitative approach and employed inductive-deductive, analytical-synthetic, and dogmatic-legal methods. The bibliographic review was the technique, and the instrument was the note-taking. This academic effort helped determine the importance of judges applying the alimony table established by the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion, as it prevents arbitrary decisions and inequalities in determining alimony. Developing clear and transparent parameters reduces the possibility of judicial decisions influenced by subjective factors, ensuring that all older adults receive fair and equitable treatment under the law.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoLa importancia de la implementación de políticas públicas para garantizar el acceso a Internet como derecho humano en Ecuador(Universidad Católica de Cuenca., 2023) Santacruz Loja, Bryan Andres; Moreno Martínez, Jaime; 0350097879It is argued that Internet connectivity has become an essential resource as a fundamental right in contemporary society and the modern age, influencing citizen participation and economic development in the digital era. Through a thorough analysis, this paper demonstrates how no Internet access can cause significant disparities in access to information and opportunities in Ecuadorian society, such as the digital divide and the resulting lack of opportunities. The social, educational, and rights-related benefits of implementing public policies promoting digital inclusion are emphasized, with examples of international best practices provided. Ultimately, the article underscores the importance of government action to ensure that all Ecuadorians can practice their right to access information and communicate online.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoJuventud en riesgo: “Análisis de los factores que inciden en la delincuencia juvenil en Ecuador”(Universidad Católica de Cuenca., 2023) Saca Marca, Lizbeth Elizabeth; Ormaza Ávila, Diego Adrian; 0106250640This literature review addresses the study of juvenile delinquency in Ecuador from a legal and sociological perspective. The aim was to sociologically analyze the causes and their relationship with social factors, examining their impact on society and security. Likewise, this research was conducted using a qualitative approach, as everything related to juvenile delinquency was theoretically based on a descriptive study employing techniques such as literature review, interviews, and record-keeping. The study revealed that lack of access to educational and employment opportunities, economic inequality, and discrimination based on race, gender, culture, and other personal factors increase the vulnerability of young people to delinquency, generating social tensions and posing challenges to the protection of juvenile' rights.
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Police found drugs stashed in a man’s garden outhouse, a court heard.
Nasar Hussain’s wife handed over the keys to the building after admitting that it was only used by the 33-year-old.
Hussain claimed that he had been smoking cannabis a lot to cope with the stresses of family life.
He faces sentencing next month after telling Kirklees magistrates that he was keen to quit using the class B drug.
Prosecutor James Weekes said that police went to the family home on June 3.
The officers arrived at 11pm and there was a strong smell of cannabis coming from the outhouse in the back garden.
Hussain was out but they asked his wife about it.
Mr Weekes said: “She said that she knew nothing about it and he was the only person who used it.
“The officers were given the key and when they opened it they discovered dealer bags containing vegetable matter.
“There was also a set of scales, grinders and a piece of paper with numbers on it and all of these were seized.”
Hussain was arrested as he returned to his home after work.
The estimated value of the skunk cannabis found was over £700.
Mr Weekes said: “In interview he said that it was all his and he smoked it a lot.
“He said he would occasionally give some to his friends and not charge them for it.
Hussain, of The Crescent, Dewsbury, who was not represented, said that he had been stressed out with his wife and children.
He told magistrates: “I’ve been smoking cannabis for a long time and I’m trying to come off it.
“My wife threw me out of the house and I don’t want to be away from my children.”
Magistrates told Hussain there needs to be a report prepared on him before he can be sentenced, on November 4. He was granted unconditional bail.
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There’s apparently more to the Binance saga than its ex-CEO Changpeng Zhao (CZ) just waiting for sentencing after he already pleaded guilty to the charge against him in the US and consequently agreeing to pay the imposed fine. It turns out the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is digging for more evidence of a more intricate scam rivaling the FTX debacle.
SEC on a Witch Hunt Against Binance.US
Watcher Guru says SEC is on a witch hunt for Binance.US, the USA counterpart of the top global crypto platform. The regulator is ostensibly hoping to uncover proof of CZ utilizing the entity as a backdoor to manipulate assets. The allegation is eerily similar to the findings against the fallen FTX.
Should SEC find more damning evidence nailing Binance.US, it could add more to the cases the embattled crypto exchange is currently facing in the American court. A week ago, Binance already filed guilty pleas for a series of charges, including violation of anti-money laundering (AML) law, failure to secure license as a business, and ignoring sanction laws.
The bargain came with an astounding $4.3 billion fine for Binance. Zhao, who is out on a $175 million bail bond while awaiting sentencing, is looking at a $50 million penalty plus possibly a probation or prison time for AML lapses.
Now, there have been diverse opinions regarding CZ’s potential sentence going around. For crypto expert and lawyer John E. Deaton, the former Binance supremo could be slapped with two to five years probation while others see jail time around 18 months — mitigated by certain factors.
However, the Department of Justice has made it clear that it’s pushing for a 10-year sentence for Zhao. The authorities are clearly looking to make an example out of him to deter other bad actors in the crypto space.
Given these facts, another lawsuit stemming from a Binance.US probe might blindside the defense, and their client may well get more penalties than he earlier negotiated.
Community Reaction Regarding the Binance Affair
Being such a darling figure in the cryptocurrency landscape, some saw the cases thrown at Binance as a tad bit excessive. Meanwhile, other crypto community members saw CZ as a martyr playing ball with the accusers to pave the way for better regulations in the industry.
Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong echoed the latter’s sentiment. He added the “news” marks the need for a careful approach to running a crypto exchange so that it aligns with regulations rather than letting customers get their way.
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The Gallican Church was the Roman Catholic Church in France from the time of the Declaration of the Clergy of France (1682) to that of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790) during the French Revolution.
Gallicanism was the theory that the power of monarchs is independent of the power of popes, and that the church of each country should be under the joint control of the pope and the monarch. The opposite doctrine is known as Ultramontanism.
The idea made its appearance as early as the reign of Philip IV, in some of the protests of that monarch against the policy of Pope Boniface VIII. Others hold that the popes had ceded a certain degree of ecclesiastical authority to the Carolingians in an effort to control Frankish nobles, and this same authority was passed down to their successors. In support of this view, they cite Louis IX's so-called Pragmatic Sanction of 1269, although historian Paul Scheffer-Boichorst and others regard this a forgery dating from sometime between 1438 and 1452.
The droit de régale implied that the king was not only the legitimate guardian of the temporalities of vacant sees, but also that he had the right to the patronage belonging to them. Accordingly, he would confer cathedral dignities and benefices. This derived from a view that ecclesiastical sees were feudal fiefs. The Concordat of Bologna of 1516 confirmed the King of France's right to nominate appointments to benefices—archbishops, bishops, abbots and priors— enabling the Crown, by controlling its personnel, to decide who was to lead the Gallican Church. Canonical installation of those church officers was reserved to the Pope; in this way the agreement confirmed the papal veto of any leader the King of France chose who might be deemed truly unqualified.
According to Gallicanism, papal primacy was limited, first, by the temporal power of princes; secondly by the authority of the general council and that of the bishops; and lastly, by the canons and customs of particular Churches, which the pope was bound to take into account when he exercised his authority.
It stated that the Church had dominion [puissance] only over things spiritual and such as concern salvation and not over things temporal and civil. Hence kings and sovereigns are not by God's command subject to any ecclesiastical dominion in things temporal; they cannot be deposed, whether directly or indirectly, by the authority of the rulers of the Church, their subjects cannot be dispensed from that submission and obedience which they owe, or absolved from the oath of allegiance.
After the Revolution, Napoleon negotiated a concordat with Pope Pius VII in 1801 and then subsequently unilaterally amended it with the Organic Articles of April 8, 1802 which stated that the proclamation of papal decrees depended upon the discretion of the government; and that there shall always be an opportunity for an appeal to the council of state against the abuses of ecclesiastical power.
The theory had both religious and political applications. French bishops used it to justify increased power in the government of their dioceses and lessen the doctrinal authority of the pope in favour of that of the bishops. Magistrates used it to extend their jurisdiction so as to cover ecclesiastical affairs and tended to augment the rights of the State more and more, to the prejudice of those of the Church.
- Kings of France had the right to assemble church councils in their dominions.
- Kings of France had the right to make laws and regulations touching ecclesiastical matters.
- The pope required the king's consent to send papal legates into France.
- Those legates required the king's consent to exercise their power within France.
- Bishops, even when commanded by the pope, could not go out of the kingdom without the king's consent.
- Royal officers could not be excommunicated for any act performed in the discharge of their official duties.
- The pope could not authorize the alienation of landed church estates in France, or the diminishing of any foundations.
- Papal bulls and letters required the pareatis of the king or his officers before they took effect within France.
- The pope could not issue dispensations "to the prejudice of the laudable customs and statutes" of the French cathedral churches.
- It was lawful to appeal from the Pope to a future council or to have recourse to the "appeal as from an abuse" (appel comme d'abus) against acts of the ecclesiastical power.
- Dechristianisation of France during the French Revolution
- Gallican Rite
- Roman Catholicism in France
- Temporal power (papal)
- Dégert, Antoine. "Gallicanism." The Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 6. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909. 17 November 2015]
- Jervis, W. Henley. The Gallican Church, John Murray, London, 1872
- Ripley, George and Dana, Charles A., "Gallican Church", The American Cyclopaedia, vol. 7, D. Appleton And Company, 1873
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This programme will offer skills in research techniques and skills required to implement institutional reforms in criminologyand security industries. The current upsurge and threat of insecurity in the world calls for an understanding of criminal aspects, theories and criminal judicial processes, rehabilitation and probation of crimes in order to create a more stable and secure society. Through this course, graduates are empowered to effectively handle correctional challenges in society and use their knowledge to participate in the rehabilitation process in society as well as advice on the necessary security measures to reduce crime.
Identify and explore the different approaches to security issues in the world and build on the ability to monitor and maintain security.
Equip graduates with abilities to identify, conduct investigations, monitor and analyse data; through the understanding of criminal science to boost security in an increasingly technology world.
To meet the high demand for security personnel in the public, private sectors and academia in criminal research.
Duration of Programme
Four (4) trimesters
An aggregate grade of C-(C Minus) and above in K.C.S.E
Minimum grade of D- in Either English or Kiswahili
Minimum grade of D- in either Mathematics/Business Studies/Geography/History/CRE/Computer Studies/Agriculture
Enable the understanding of criminal aspects, theories and criminal judicial processes, rehabilitation and probation of crimes.
An awareness of the current issues facing crime in the world, the ability to analyse and provide alternative solutions.
Ability to communicate effectively and work in different teams across diverse cultural settings and environment in the security sector.
Develop persons passionate about solving insecurity challenges affecting the world
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Most international relations approaches expect that states have unique preferences that international courts (ICs) must satisfying in order to be effective. Starting from the premise that states have within numerous conflicting preferences, I argue that ICs can act as tipping point actors, building and giving resources to compliance constituencies - coalitions of actors within and outside of states - that favor policies that happen to also be congruent with international law. Through alliances with domestic interlocutors, ICs help reconstitute law, politics and national interests. The tipping point argument suggests that ICs are not dependent on governments, on government-defined interpretation of international rules, or on accepting as given a government’s claim about the national interest. International courts are independent actors, but the preferences of compliance partners matters more than the preferences of the litigant, the defendant state and perhaps even the IC judges in determining where law and politics are reconstituted. A comparison of the European Court of Justice to the Andean Tribunal of Justice, two institutionally similar and very active international courts that have behaved very differently, illustrates how domestic compliance partners shape international judicial behavior.
|Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
|Published - 2011
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With the legalization of marijuana slowly taking shape across America, authorities are actively attempting to develop comprehensive policies to deal with drug DUI cases that involve THC. THC is the active intoxicant found in marijuana. Unlike alcohol, there isn’t a standardized test that law enforcement uses to determine if the driver is over the “legal limit.” This has significant consequences for driver’s arrested for DUI. Someone who perhaps smoked marijuana the day before driving can be arrested for DUI. If there is an accident, or a fatality, drivers can be charged with homicide or aggravated assault.
An example of this is a recent accident in Chicago involving a government worker who drove a commercial vehicle into a line of stopped cars.
“Prosecutors said Rallings had THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, in his blood when he drove a forest preserve dump truck at 76 mph into a line of five vehicles stopped at a red light at Arlington Heights and Cosman roads in Elk Grove Village. The speed limit there is 30 mph.”
As a DUI attorney, I would want to caution a rush to judgment in the above case. Saying that Rallings had THC in his system really means nothing. That is because THC can linger in someone’s blood for DAYs after ingestion.
“The half life of a drug is the amount of time it takes for measured amounts in the bloodstream or urine to decrease by half. The half life for THC is long, because THC is stored in the body’s fat cells (THC is highly lipid and not easily dissolved in water). Therefore, the blood plasma and urinary half-life of THC are best estimated at 3 – 4 days after ingestion. But depending on the quantity of THC ingested and frequency of use, half life may even extend to 10-12 days after ingestion.”
There is an immediate need to develop a standardized method to determine how much THC is in a driver’s system at the time of driving and how that THC affected the driver. Just saying that THC is in someone’s system means nothing at all.
Le explicaremos y lo informaremos sobre cuáles son las mejores opciones que tiene disponibles. Nos tomaremos el tiempo de conocerlo a usted y a su situación legal para poder responder mejor todas sus preguntas. Luego de la consulta inicial gratuita con nuestros abogados, sabrá a qué se enfrente y qué puede suceder con su caso.CONSULTA GRATUITA >
Alcock & Associates P.C.
2 North Central Avenue, 26th Floor
Phoenix AZ 85004
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MEMPHIS, Tenn. (WREG) — A woman has been charged with first-degree murder in the stabbing death of her husband early Sunday morning inside their Grahamwood home.
Officers responded to an armed party call in the 800 block of Wrenwood Street just after 8 a.m.
They found Wesley Downey, 81, inside the home with multiple stab wounds when they arrived.
He told officers he and his wife, Sheila Downey, 68, got into an argument over the taste of his coffee, and she stabbed him when he tried to stop her from drinking bleach.
The victim told police he wanted to stop his wife from harming herself, which angered her more. He said she went into the kitchen, grabbed a knife, and stabbed him.
“He was just a really good person, and he always tried to help people, and it’s a shame he had to go that way,” said a neighbor.
A neighbor who did not want to be identified said Wesley went by the name Ray and was a retired Memphis Firefighter.
He said Sheila had been struggling with her mental health in recent years and sent his wife a strange text message about her husband’s health the morning of the stabbing.
“It raised some concern but we really didn’t know what had happened until we saw all the police arrived,” he said.
Officers also said his wife was not at the scene when they arrived but later returned and was taken into custody.
Downey is being charged with first-degree murder and is being held without bond.
She is expected to make her first appearance before a judge on Tuesday.
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(y) The operations of the Company and its subsidiaries are and have been conducted at all times in material compliance with all applicable financial recordkeeping and reporting requirements, including those of the Bank Secrecy Act, as amended by Title III of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), and the applicable anti-money laundering statutes of jurisdictions where the Company and its subsidiaries conduct business, the rules and regulations thereunder and any related or similar rules, regulations or guidelines, issued, administered or enforced by any governmental agency (collectively, the Anti-Money Laundering Laws), and no action, suit or proceeding by or before any court or governmental agency, authority or body or any arbitrator involving the Company or any of its subsidiaries with respect to the Anti-Money Laundering Laws is pending or, to the best knowledge of the Company, threatened.
(z) (i) Neither the Company nor any of its subsidiaries, nor any director, officer, or employee thereof, nor, to the Companys knowledge, any agent, controlled affiliate or representative of the Company or any of its subsidiaries, is an individual or entity (Person) that is, or is owned or controlled by a Person that is:
(A) the subject or the target of any sanctions administered or enforced by the U.S. Department of Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the European Union (EU), Her Majestys Treasury (HMT), or other relevant sanctions authority (collectively, Sanctions), nor
(B) located, organized or resident in a country or territory that is the subject or the target of Sanctions (including, without limitation, the Crimea region, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria).
(ii) For the past five years, the Company and its subsidiaries have not knowingly engaged in, are not now knowingly engaged in, and will not engage in, any dealings or transactions with any Person, or in any country or territory, that at the time of the dealing or transaction is or was the subject or the target of Sanctions.
(aa) The Company and its subsidiaries have good and marketable title in fee simple to, or have valid rights to lease or otherwise use, all items of real and personal property that are material to the respective businesses of the Company and its subsidiaries, in each case free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, claims and defects and imperfections of title except those that (i) do not materially interfere with the use made and proposed to be made of such property by the Company and its subsidiaries or (ii) could not reasonably be expected, individually or in the aggregate, to have a Material Adverse Effect.
(bb) (i) The Company and its subsidiaries own or have the right to use all material patents, patent applications, trademarks, service marks, trade names, trademark registrations, service mark registrations, domain names and other source indicators, copyrights and copyrightable works, know-how, trade secrets, systems, procedures, proprietary or confidential information and all other worldwide intellectual property, industrial property and proprietary rights (collectively, Intellectual Property) used in the conduct of their respective businesses; (ii) the Company and its subsidiaries conduct of their respective businesses does not infringe, misappropriate or otherwise violate any Intellectual Property right of any person; (iii) the Company and its subsidiaries are not aware of any pending or threatened material claim relating to infringement of a third partys Intellectual Property rights; and (iv) to the knowledge of the Company, the Intellectual Property of the Company and its subsidiaries is not being infringed, misappropriated or otherwise violated by any person.
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The first major U.S. state to pass a comprehensive data privacy law was California with the passing of CCPA. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) is a data privacy law that was passed in California in 2018. The CCPA went into effect on January 1, 2020 and grants California residents certain rights with respect to their personal information.
Under the CCPA, businesses that collect or process personal information of California residents must provide consumers with certain disclosures and rights, including:
Notice: Businesses must provide consumers with a notice at or before the point of collection of their personal information that describes the categories of personal information being collected and the purposes for which the information will be used.
Right to Know: Consumers have the right to request that businesses disclose the categories and specific pieces of personal information that they have collected about them, as well as the sources from which the information was collected and the purposes for which it was collected.
Right to Delete: Consumers have the right to request that businesses delete their personal information, subject to certain exceptions.
Opt-Out: Consumers have the right to opt-out of the sale of their personal information.
Non-Discrimination: Businesses are prohibited from discriminating against consumers who exercise their CCPA rights.
The CCPA applies to businesses that meet certain criteria, including having annual gross revenues of more than $25 million, collecting personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, households, or devices, or deriving 50% or more of their annual revenues from the sale of personal information.
In addition to these requirements, the CCPA also requires businesses to implement certain security measures to protect personal information against unauthorized access, disclosure, or destruction.
Overall, the CCPA is one of the most comprehensive data privacy laws in the United States and has set the standard for other state-level data privacy laws, such as Virginia's Consumer Data Protection Act and New York's proposed Biometric Privacy Act. And most notably, legislation proposed in Connecticut.
Connecticut Data Privacy
Connecticut does not currently have a comprehensive data privacy law, but it has recently proposed a new data privacy law known as the "Act Concerning Data Privacy" (Senate Bill 893). The bill was introduced in January 2021 and is currently being reviewed by the state legislature.
If passed, the new law would require businesses that collect or process personal data of Connecticut residents to comply with certain data privacy requirements, including:
Transparency: Businesses would need to provide individuals with clear and concise notices about the types of personal data being collected, the purposes for which it is being collected, and with whom it is being shared.
Access: Businesses would need to provide individuals with the right to access, correct, and delete their personal data.
Security: Businesses would need to implement reasonable security measures to protect personal data against unauthorized access, disclosure, or destruction.
Data Breach Notification: Businesses would need to notify individuals and the Connecticut Attorney General in the event of a data breach.
De-identification: Businesses would need to de-identify or destroy personal data when it is no longer needed for the purposes for which it was collected.
The proposed law would apply to businesses that collect or process personal data of Connecticut residents, regardless of where the business is located. It would also create a private right of action for individuals to sue businesses for violations of the law.
Overall, the Act Concerning Data Privacy is similar to other data privacy laws that have been passed in other states and at the federal level. If passed, it would provide Connecticut residents with greater control over their personal data and increase the accountability of businesses that collect and process personal data.
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A teenager who raped and killed his maths teacher while at school faces life in prison after being convicted. Jurors today found Philip Chism guilty of first-degree murder in the death Colleen Ritzer as Danvers High School in Massachusetts. The teenager’s defence lawyers claimed he was in the midst of a psychotic episode when he stabbed her 16 times in the neck in the women's bathroom.
Prosecutors said the schoolboy, who was 14 at the time, used a box cutter to brutally stab the 24-year-old, before using a recycling bin to take her body into the woods.
Once there he raped her and violated her with a wooden stick before abandoning her half-naked.
He was found guilty of first-degree murder, one count of aggravated rape, including natural and unnatural rape and armed robbery.
Chasm, 16, was found not guilty on a second count of aggravated rape.
During the trial jurors were shown CCTV footage of the pupil following Ritzer into a bathroom, wearing a hood and putting on gloves.
“The only still image that matters in this case is the image of Colleen in the woods,” prosecutor Kate McDougall told jurors who deliberated over two days.
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MILTON, Ga. — A Milton employee was arrested Nov. 29 for allegedly fraudulently reducing the price of an item so he could buy it cheaply.
Workers at Fry’s Electronics on Ga. 9 told police that Joseph Darwin Steen, 29, of North Park Lane, Alpharetta, used a manager’s computer to lower the price of a car stereo from $799.99 to $299.99. He then allegedly bought the equipment for the reduced price.
Surveillance footage allegedly showed Steen committing the crime. Steen was arrested for theft by deception.
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Ron Paul says he’s not buying the NSA’s claim that its surveillance program foiled 50 terror plots. The former congressman and presidential candidate told Neil Cavuto today that he believes the NSA “fudged the figures.”
Cashin’ In guests were in arms over the NSA surveillance controversy with some in favor and others flat out against it. Not only did we discover that the government is collecting our Internet and phone data, but third-party companies may be giving the feds easy access.
The American Civil Liberties Union has filed a lawsuit against the governement claiming that the NSA’s surveillance program is a “gross infringement of our freedoms.”
Judge Andrew Napolitano believes NSA leaker Edward Snowden is an American hero.
Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old computer technician, has been identified as the source of a massive leak of classified NSA documents related to the U.S. surveillance program.
Fox News host Neil Cavuto went off on guest Julian Epstein during a fervent discussion on the NSA’s tracking of Americans' Internet data and phone records for refusing to acknowledge that this is part of a larger pattern.
President Obama promised Americans that "nobody is listening to your phone calls" as he defended the need for the NSA to monitor the phone records of Americans.
How much is a zettabyte? Catherine Herridge reports on the NSA's massive new data storage facility in Utah.
Ann Coulter said on Hannity that the Obama administration has completely lost the trust of the American people, and cannot be trusted to collect phone records of American citizens.
Could the NSA's massive collection of phone records be used by the government against Republicans? Bill O'Reilly argued the point with Megyn Kelly.
Radio talk show host Mark Levin got more than a little worked up on Thursday's Your World, telling host Neil Cavuto that in light of revelations about the NSA tracking Verizon subscribers' phone records, "...we have the elements of a police state here, and I'm not overstating it."
Judge Andrew Napolitano blasted the Obama administration after reports surfaced the the NSA has been collecting the phone records of millions of U.S. customers of Verizon under a top secret court order.
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Deloitte Legal recently published a research report, New Roads to Dispute Resolution, which aims to provide an in-depth look into the factors which have contributed to the rise in business disputes, including which disputes have escalated, how companies are responding and what helps reach a successful resolution
The Report is supported by Deloitte Legal’s first global dispute resolution survey, which attracted responses from senior legal and executive leadership from over 550 companies worldwide.
Amongst the report’s key findings was that digitalisation has made huge strides, with most companies now investing in some form of AI-based risk assessment tools and case management software.
About the survey
Deloitte Legal commissioned Euromoney CS to conduct the survey to analyse litigation activity across a number of metrics. Survey fieldwork took place throughout September 2022.
568 tax, finance and legal professionals working for companies in the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Middle East and Africa were surveyed. 78% of the respondents were senior in-house legal professionals, such as chief legal officers and their deputies, executive vice presidents legal and vice presidents legal, and general counsel.
Global annual revenues at the companies surveyed ranged from less than US $100 million (3% of respondents) to more than US $3 billion (33% of respondents). Most respondents (64%) worked for companies with revenues from US $100 million to US $3 billion.
One of the key themes which emerged from the survey is that many companies are seeking a technological edge by using AI and other digital tools to help manage and resolve disputes. The survey demonstrates widespread acceptance of digitalisation, with three-quarters of those companies surveyed investing in risk assessment tools to identify litigation that requires reporting or special management, and half of respondents investing in robotic process automation (RPA) to handle volume litigation
Almost every company in the survey was investing in digitalisation (with less than 5% saying that they did not yet), and most were confident about its potential. More than half (59%) – and 70% of CEOs surveyed – believed AI will revolutionise litigation decision-making within five years.
More than half of survey respondents expect that part of that revolution will involve replacing some of the work of litigation lawyers, despite a similar proportion also noting that they have grown their legal department headcount since 2020. One outcome of this push-pull between technology and human talent may be that AI is used eventually to replace repetitive, routine litigation work, leaving in-house and external lawyers free to focus on niche topics and more complex cases.
A majority of respondents believe that AI will make litigation outcomes more predictable and reduce the cost and duration of cases, with blockchain providing reliable evidence in many disputes.
The Americas, represented in the survey mainly by Canada, Mexico and Brazil, appears to be a torchbearer for these trends, with 40% of respondents from the region citing AI platforms as their favourite dispute resolution mechanism.
This does not appear to be the case in Europe, where the more traditional avenues of courts, tribunals and settlements are preferred, but could be a sign of things to come as companies deal with more volume litigation in areas such as consumer protection.
Key takeaways – the disputes tech revolution
The survey results shows that most companies already prioritise investing in litigation-related technology. This is in line with the general trend of investing in legal automation that we see in our legal management consulting projects, as well as the investment in digitisation witnessed over the last few years in the Courts of England and Wales.
Starting from taking a risk-based approach when managing litigation work, to making data-driven decisions and automating repetitive tasks in mass litigations, legal tech is seen as a solution to improve litigation management and help litigators focus on strategic decisions and value-added work.
AI and RPA technologies have made significant progress in recent years. As they continue to improve in terms of training required, languages covered and functionalities, they gain traction, with more and more use-cases using these technologies to help with large volume work.
Most respondents agreed that AI and RPA technologies will play a key role in improving decision-making, reducing the cost and time spent with litigation, as well as predicting with better accuracy the outcomes of a dispute. This trend corroborates the general view that AI and RPA are no longer buzzwords, but opportunities to transform litigation, including in areas such as gathering evidence.
As such, we believe that investment in AI and RPA will increase in the coming years, with a variety of use cases in sight of most litigators.
One thing seems certain – legal technology is here to stay. Those companies which adopt and invest in digitalisation are likely to edge ahead of the competition, and will be able to deal with litigation with greater efficiency and better outcomes.
For more insights on digitalisation, and some of the other key litigation themes identified in the survey, please get in touch with Simina Mut, Lorena Rosia, Rob Griffiths or Ross Keeble.
Content from the Deloitte Legal blog can now be sent direct to your inbox. Choose the topic and frequency by subscribing here.
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Three men were shot Sunday night on Florence Avenue in what apparently was a hail of gunfire that also hit two residences.
Lexington police Lt. Clayton Roberts said one of the men had life-threatening injuries; all three were taken to the hospital for treatment. Their names were not available.
Police received a call just before 10:30 p.m. about shots fired in front of 729 Florence Avenue, which is off Georgetown Street. When police arrived, Roberts said, they found the three injured men in the street.
He said they had been standing outside when a dark blue or black "boxy passenger vehicle" pulled up; multiple shots were fired from inside the vehicle before it fled the scene.
Roberts said police were told that there was no altercation before the shooting, and he said the motive was unknown.
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Umkc law review de jure vol 4 affirmative action arguably, the united states was built upon the long history of oppression in the united states led to the. More history of affirmative action and the united states senate thwarted attempts 2018 american association for access, equity and. Action in the united states affirmative action in the united history of affirmative action has its - affirmative action introduction. The affirmative action controversy united states commis- the evolution of affirmative action throughout the history of this nation. In the united states, affirmative action refers to equal opportunity history of the term affirmative action in the united states began an introduction to. An introduction to the history of the affirmative action in the united states pages 2 words 1,590 view full essay more essays like this.
Affirmative action: affirmative action, effort in the united states to improve employment or educational opportunities for members of minority groups and for women. Unit eleven: affirmative action and immigration in the given the history of segregation in higher the united states also has a policy of deportation for. A timeline of affirmative action in the us by president john f kennedy introduces the concept of affirmative action across the united states with an. Chapter 7 affirmative action and the case not choose to come to the united states rolling by coining the phrase 'affirmative action,' and directing. This is an important history of the origins of affirmative action as a social policy for remedying racial inequality in the united states in contrast to popular.
Martha s west,the historical roots of affirmative action introduction affirmative action is a of affirmative action, and of the united states. This sample essay on the history of affirmative action and action in education within the united states history and effects of affirmative action. Affirmative action in the united states is a set of laws, policies, guidelines, and administrative practices intended to end and correct the effects of a specific. Affirmative action in the united states is a set of at the time of its introduction the history of the united states began with the settlement of indigenous.
Merle t cole which the history and achievements of affirmative action in the united states isn't expected until 25-1-2014 find out more about the history of civil. History: human variation: lived the beginning and the end of affirmative action: a few months after outlining the concept of affirmative action in a speech. The necessity and effects of affirmative action in the united states of america outline introduction opener: a brief.
About affirmative action, diversity and agencies of the united states government and effort was a milestone in the history of affirmative action.
Affirmative action prejudice equality essays - affirmative action in the united states. Is affirmative action fair background: forms of racism and racial discrimination no person in the united states shall. The pursuit of fairness: a history of affirmative action - kindle edition by terry h anderson download it once and read it on your kindle device, pc, phones or tablets. Affirmative action or over the course of us history many proponents of affirmative action defend the opportunities in the united states.
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Following the news that GCHQ advised firms to consider stripping staff of smartphones to avoid cyber-attacks, George Anderson, Director at Webroot (opens in new tab), offered his thoughts:
“The high-profile breaches that have taken place over the past few months highlight the different methods attackers can use to gain access to a network. Although employees can be seen as the weakest link in the security chain, they are also the most important asset to a company and their privacy should be protected.
"Whilst some of the advice, such as only using trusted networks is reasonable, businesses should think twice before banning all devices from the company network.
"The benefits of bring your own device (BYOD) have long been realised by companies and banning all devices would take away many of these benefits to both the employer and employee.
“Instead of imposing a blanket ban on using devices for work purposes, employers should consider the importance of communication and education between the firm and employees. There should be a mutual level of respect and responsibility between both parties.
"Most disconnects over the use of personal technology to access corporate data can be solved by better communication between both parties over their security, data and privacy concerns, according to BYOD research (opens in new tab).
“Employees should understand that it is their responsibility to keep the IP of the organisation secure, why this is important, and how they can do this.
"Meanwhile, employers should understand that there is a level of personal privacy that should also be respected”.
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It can take years to suitable a settlement from your case. Pre-settlementfunding.com is presented to giving you the cash for settlement that you oblige Now, to cool you of cash identified weight with the objective that you and your Attorney can work to accomplish a most excellent recovery.
Cases can take a seat to reason, really when every living soul incorporated in the suit understands that an extensive settlement or verdict will inevitably happen. Going before verdict or settlement, even where the irritated gathering's legitimate guide is impelling court expenditures and diverse overheads associated with the case itself, the hurt outraged gathering needs to have enough money to survive. Where a hurt insulted gathering can't work, has a reducing in compensation, or has huge healing center expenditures or diverse overheads, the irritated gathering may require upholds not long after the case is resolved.
You can use the presettlement cash for anything your need. Claim settlement advancements have save different case insulted social events from budgetary debacle, for example, removing, auto repossession, bill gatherer calls, and surrender advancing. You can use the case cash we transform you to pay your rent, standard living overheads, tyke mind commitments, auto bit, contract, surgery, certificate, or for anything your need.
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Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts
This article examines the legal rules that govern the interpretation of standardized form contracts. Different legal rules induce different bargaining games between buyers and sellers, and they can influence the efficiency of exchange when communication is costly. The traditional common-law rule, which binds an assenting recipient of a form contract to fine-print terms he has not read, has little effect in encouraging parties to read contracts, contrary to the conventional wisdom among lawyers. Instead, there is little practical difference between a rule that nominally holds the drafter of a form contract responsible for communicating its terms and one that holds the receiving party responsible. Moreover, the traditional rule may be Pareto inferior to a rule providing presumptive warranties when negotiation is costly.
Volume (Year): 21 (1990)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
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UPDATED: A bank that loaned tens of millions of dollars to Relativity Media for operating expenses and films has asked for a delay in Monday’s scheduled court hearing for confirmation of the entertainment company’s plan to exit bankruptcy. CIT Bank said Ryan Kavanaugh’s company is asking a judge to confirm the plan, while leaving the lender and other parties “in the dark” about crucial financial details.
The letter Friday morning to U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Michael Wiles says that Relativity has missed required deadlines for filing financial disclosures and given only partial information in other instances. It requests a delay of at least one week to allow time for the information to be disclosed and digested by CIT and other parties.
It was not immediately clear how Wiles would respond to the request, which comes six months after Kavanaugh filed for Chapter 11 protection, citing liabilities of nearly $1.2 billion and assets with a book value of $560 million. Relativity recently announced that it had raised a required $100 million in new investment, to jumpstart its stalled film operation, though it has declined to give details. It also announced the hiring of actor Kevin Spacey and his producing partner, Dana Brunetti, to run Relativity Studios, though one prominent creditor, Netflix, questioned whether that arrangement was sealed.
Relativity, which was believed to be formulating a response, issued a statement. “We’ve continuously worked closely and in good faith with CIT to resolve their objections,” the company said. “Furthermore, we have received votes of acceptance for our Plan of Reorganization from the overwhelming percentage of our unsecured creditors while resolving the majority of the outstanding objections to our plan. CIT’s postponement request is unfounded, and we believe that continuing our path to emergence from Chapter 11 remains in the best interest of all of our stakeholders.”
The entertainment company’s lawyers responded with a letter of their own, asking Judge Wiles to hold Monday’s hearing, as scheduled. They said that minimal delays in Relativity’s filings had not prejudiced the case against CIT Bank. The letter, from lawyer Bennett L. Spiegel, depicts the bank as one of a few holdouts against the reorganization, saying that other lenders — including RKA Film Financing, Macquarie and subsidiaries of the Elliott Associates hedge fund — had agreed to the reorganization.
But CIT Bank, which loaned money for production of the films “Masterminds” and “The Disappointments Room,” argues that Relativity is trying to push through a reorganization that is not fully baked. The bank’s letter to Wiles said Relativity has “set the stage for a grossly unfair confirmation hearing, apparently designed to deprive CIT of even the most basic information necessary to prosecute its objections.”
A committee representing unsecured creditors, who are owed roughly $90 million by Kavanaugh’s company, previously voted to accept the reorganization plan, in what the company depicted as a watershed moment. CIT’s lawyer, Vadim J. Rubinstein, suggests that the outcome of voting by some parties might change once they see the “obsolete” earlier proposal replaced by a final financial plan. “Parties should be entitled, and may be motivated, to reevaluate their votes on the plan,” Rubinstein wrote.
Another objection comes from Netflix. The streaming service, in an earlier filing with the court, made arguments similar to CIT’s: that Kavanaugh’s company had not adequately disclosed how it would finance films going forward and had not proven that it had a solid management team in place, capable of making and distributing movies. Relativity rejected those arguments, saying Netflix was merely trying to use the bankruptcy to negotiate better terms on the films it acquires.
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DNA Gun Marks Suspects To Help Control Riots
The new SelectaDNA gun could allow authorities to apprehend criminals after the event has occurred by tracking the specific genetic material.
Crowd control and riot situations pose some of the greatest challenges for police officers and the authorities. They’re outnumbered, they have to keep the peace and ensure civilian safety, and they’re also supposed to apprehend law-breakers using the proper force. A daunting task considering a mob can quickly get out of hand, and authorities may end up reacting with excessive force.
SelectaDNA’s gun aims to relieve some of this pressure on police officers. Instead of having to arrest all suspects on the scene while also maintaining the peace, SelectaDNA’s gun allows officers to ‘tag’ potential targets at the scene to be apprehended at a later, less chaotic time.
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[caption id="attachment_2858" align="alignleft" width="160"] If you have amsher collection services debts on your credit reports you score can be seriously negatively impacted. Luckily, there are steps you can take to reverse the damage.[/caption]
Amsher Collection Services is just one of the many debt collection companies out there that specialize in turning your financial problems to their advantage.
They will buy your bad debts from the original lenders for pennies on the dollar, then turn around and aggressively seek repayment in full from you. If they succeed, they will turn a profit. Debt collectors work on commission, so naturally they are very motivated to turn as large a profit as possible.
The more you resist, the more aggressive they will get, since they don't get paid until you start paying off your debt.
Amsher Collection Services, which is headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama, is definitely not the worst debt collector out there. They've even been given a good rating by the Better Business Bureau.
However, due to the nature of the business there have still been a number of complaints against them. The most common complaints include unresponsive staff and invalid debts.
If you have a debt go into default with a credit card company, a medical clinic, a cell phone provider, a bank, or any other lender, it's only a matter of time before it gets sold to a debt collector.
When that happens, the debt collector will send you an initial notice detailing the amount you owe, plus any fees and interest, and naming the original lender. It is very important that you take action as soon as you receive this notice.
The first thing you must do is initiate a debt dispute by sending a debt dispute letter within 30 days of receiving the debt collector's first notice.
The debt dispute process forces the debt collector to produce proof that you owe the amount in question. If they can't prove it, you will not be expected to pay.
Initiating a debt dispute is especially important if you believe that the debt in question is invalid or inaccurate for some reason.
Reasons a debt might be invalid:
-It does not belong to you. Believe it or not, there have been plenty of cases of a debt collector pursuing a consumer for a debt that belonged to someone else.
This is most glaringly obvious in the cases in which the original debt came from a store or company that the consumer had never had any interactions with in the first place. This could be the result of identity theft, or simply a mistake on the debt collector's part.
-It was discharged in a bankruptcy. Bankruptcy has its own financial and credit consequences, but part of the deal is that all debts are cleared.
-It is too old. A statute of limitations applies to most kinds of debts. Once the statute of limitations has expired, it is illegal for anyone to attempt to collect on that debt. The time frame for the statute of limitations varies by state.
-It has already been paid. An error in the original creditor's records could result in a paid debt getting sold to a debt collector.
Even if you know that you owe the debt in question, it is still a good idea to initiate a debt dispute. The reason is that it will buy you a little time and space to formulate a plan of action without the debt collector breathing down your neck.
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, once you've filed a debt dispute, the debt collector may not contact you again until they have produced proper proof that you owe the debt. Plus, they cannot report the debt to the credit bureaus during this period either.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act contains other important consumer protections as well. For example:
-It forbids debt collectors to call you before 8 am or after 9 pm.
-It forbids them to call you for the sole purpose of harassment.
-It provides the right to send a cease and desist letter to the debt collector agency, which will prevent them from contacting you further.
-It protects you from groundless threats of legal action.
When dealing with debt collectors, it is a good idea to keep a log of all your interactions, so that you will have a record of any violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
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Throughout history, gambling has been a popular pastime. Whether it be playing the lottery, betting on horse races, or simply wagering on the stock market, the act of gambling involves risking money or other property in exchange for a reward. However, there are some forms of gambling that have become illegal. This is the case in many countries. Moreover, gambling is usually highly regulated in areas where it is legal.
The simplest form of gambling is a game of chance. This can include anything from betting on a horse race to playing poker in a private session. In this context, the most obvious benefit is that the act is often fun. For some people, gambling is an addiction that can affect their family and their livelihood.
It is possible to engage in gambling activities on the internet, but it is generally illegal. In fact, gambling is banned in most states. In addition, the federal government has made a number of attempts to crack down on gambling in the U.S. In some jurisdictions, it is a crime to bet on a horse race.
Some countries and jurisdictions have a long history of regulating gambling. For example, in Las Vegas, Nevada, gambling was a criminal activity for a long time. It is also common to find organized football pools in several South American countries and Australia. During the late 20th century, the United States saw the proliferation of state-operated lotteries.
One of the biggest benefits of gambling is the ability to fund public education programs. The amount of money legally wagered each year in the United States is estimated to be around $10 trillion. In some areas, this figure may be even larger. Rather than taxing gambling to discourage people, state governments instead use the money to pay for worthy educational endeavors.
While the legal gambling industry has grown over the past few years, it has not grown at the same rate as the overall economy. In fact, the amount of revenue generated by gambling in the United States has declined over the last decade. This has led to a decrease in state and local government revenue from gambling. In fiscal year 2020, the amount of money collected from gambling decreased by nearly 30 percent. Despite the decline in revenues, state and local governments still receive a share of the lottery’s profits.
Gambling has been a popular activity in the United States for centuries. In the past, gambling was considered a crime, but the trend changed during the early part of the 20th century. While gambling is still illegal in most areas, the laws are gradually being softened. In the United States, there are approximately 10 states that have legalized various types of gambling.
It is not uncommon for young adolescents to gamble. These gamblers may play video games, pocket money, or iPods. They may miss school and work to pursue their hobby. They might lie about their gambling activities to their spouse. Ultimately, they might even spend their paychecks on gambling.
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Fighting back in India, Canada and Russia
"We're not going to Delhi to beg. We're going there to demand the proper compensation we've been denied for 30 years."
December 3rd 1984 bore witness to the worst industrial disaster of the 20th century. In the Indian city of Bhopal, toxic gas spewed from the Union Carbide pesticide plant, killing 25,000 people and leaving more than 500,000 disabled.
In 1984, the Indian government settled for $470 million in compensation from Union Carbide. However, the settlement was based on figures claiming 5,295 people died and 4,902 were disabled.
Activists like Rachina Dhingra from the Bhopal Group for Information and Action and survivors of the toxic gas leak are still fighting for justice over thirty years later.
Holding their Ground
In 2009, Canada began to issue permits for a gas pipeline corridor in northern British Columbia.
Six years later, oil company workers attempt to enter the Unist'ot'en First Nations clan territory, only to be met with the resistance of the indigenous group who assert the land has always been theirs.
Speaking to Chevron representatives Freda Huson, the spokesperson for the Unist'ot'en Camp, says, "You are trying to convince us to give up our way of life, so that you can reap the benefits for government and investors, while you’re throwing crumbs to some of the partners."
Additionally, a growing police presence raises tensions about the possibility of a raid on the camp.
This is the story of the Unist'ot'en clan's fight for land and life.
Roman vs Kremlin
In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed tough new 'anti-protest' laws, whereby attending an unsanctioned protest can land you with a heavy fine or even imprisonment.
Journalist and pro-democracy activist Roman Dobrokhotov is fighting these laws, and has his eyes set on Putin, the Orthodox Church, and far-right nationalists.
He says, "My primary mission as a civil activist is to protect the rights and freedoms prescribed in the Russian Constitution."
Though, Roman's actions are daring and entertaining, his cause is deadly serious.
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Picking the right business structure is the first step to opening a successful business. It's a crucial decision because your business structure determines how the business is managed, the rights and duties of the owners, procedures for voting and decision-making, taxes, liability, along with many other aspects. Therefore, prospective owners should familiarize themselves on the different business structures.
The Oklahoma Uniform Revised Partnership Act (Okla. Stat. tit. 54, § 1-100 et seq.) (“OUFPA”), defines a partnership as an "association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit . . . ." § 1-202(a). Partners typically have equal power and decision-making authority, have joint property ownership, and split business profits and losses. Unlike other business structures (except sole proprietorships), general partnerships need not register with the Oklahoma Secretary of State ("OSOS").
Partnerships do not need a formal written agreement (partnership agreement), or intend to form a partnership. The OUFPA states that a person who receives business profits is "presumed to be a partner" unless the profits were received as payment for some form of benefit (e.g., goods, services, etc). § 1-202(c)(3). However, contract laws, like the statute of frauds requires partners to have a written partnership agreement to enforce the terms past one year. See Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 136. The OUFPA's default provisions apply to partnerships that don't have a partnership agreement and are treated as "partnerships at-will." Partnerships at-will can be dissolved at any time and for any reason.
Partners are jointly and severally liable for the business and misconduct by other partners. Partners' personal assets may be seized to satisfy a judgment against the partnership when the partnership cannot fulfill a judgment. Partnerships may limit the partners' personal liability through forming either a (i) limited partnership or (ii) limited liability partnership. Both limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships must register with the OSOS under the Oklahoma Uniform Limited Partnership Act (Okla. Stat. tit. 54, § 501-101A et seq.).
To form a limited partnership, a “Certificate of Limited Partnership” must be filed with the OSOS. Limited partnerships must have at least one "general" partner and one "limited" partner. A partnership agreement may designate a partner as either or both. General partner(s) are responsible for managing the business and may be personally liable for all business obligations. General partners share in profits and losses and subject to self-employment taxes. Limited partners have no authority to act for or bind a limited partnership unless the partner is both a general and limited partner. Limited partners share in the business profits but are not personally liable for the partnership's obligations even when the limited partner also helps manage the business. However, a limited partners may be personally liable up to their investment amount when the partnership cannot satisfy a judgment. Limited partners are taxed according to their personal income.
Limited Liability Partnerships
To form a limited liability partnership, a “Statement of Qualification” must be submitted to the OSOS. Limited liability partnerships are similar to limited partnerships, except limited liability partnerships shield general partners from liability. In Oklahoma, limited liability partnerships must also carry liability insurance of at least $500,000.00. Partners are not individually liable, either directly or indirectly, for the partnerships obligations or another partner's misconduct. Limited partnerships are common among professionals like lawyers and accountants.
Limited Liability Companies
Limited Liability Companies ("LLC") are a hybrid between partnerships and corporations. Under the Oklahoma Limited Liability Company Act (Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 2000 et seq.), LLCs must register with the OSOS by filing "Articles of Organization." LLCs are owned by “members" and usually have a formal written contract called an "operating agreement." Operating agreements specify how an LLC is managed, voting rights, ownership interests, liability, among other things.
LLCs are either “member-managed” or “manager-managed,” as designated by the operating agreement. Members of a member-managed LLC handle the day-to-day business activities. The members of a manager-managed LLC have little to no involvement with the LLC's regular business operation unless designated as both a member and manager in the operating agreement.
Members and managers are not are personally liable for LLC obligations or judgments. LLCs with at least two members are automatically taxed as a partnership. LLCs may change its tax status to a corporation by filing a form with the IRS.
Business with Ease
Starting a business doesn't have to be hard or time-consuming. Consult with an attorney at Martuch Law to determine what structure will best fit your business needs. We'll handle filing the necessary paperwork, get you an Employer Identification Number (EIN), and take care of getting you a trade name for your business.
Do you need more help than just the basics or have an existing business that need internal policies? With years of experience, we draft and review business organization agreements whether it's two (2) or twelve (12) owners, we're prepared for almost any size business. We can also help you with employment manuals and agreements, compliance issues, work place behavior training for employees, among other services.
Schedule an appointment for a free, no obligation consultation online or contact us to make an appointment.
A "Certificate of Incorporation" must be filed with the OSOS to form a corporation under the Oklahoma General Corporations Act (Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1001 et seq.). Corporations are owned by shareholders. Shareholders own a specific number of shares in a company, which are purchased at a set price. A shareholder's ownership interest in the company is determined by how many shares the shareholder owns. Further, business profits get paid to shareholder as dividends in proportion to their share ownership. Corporations may designate different classes of shares a "share class" in the certificate of incorporation. A corporation with multiple share classes must indicate whether each share class is either common or preferred. Common stock gives shareholders voting rights while preferred does not.
Shareholders appoint or elect a board of directors to determine and execute the corporate structure and policy. The board of directors then report to the shareholders on the business' status and progress . The bylaws establish the number of directors, the director selection process, and their removal. The bylaws also detail the board's duties and responsibilities to the company.
The board of directors may form committees and appoint officers when permitted by the bylaws to manage the everyday business operations. The bylaws provide how many and which officers the board of directors may choose. Common officers include the chief executive officer, president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, etc. A shareholder may be appointed to the board of directors and serve as an officer or do any combination of roles allowed under the bylaws.
Private v. Public Corporations
Corporations are either privately or publicly held. Typically, a private corporation is a smaller corporation with a limited number of shareholders. Usually, the shareholders know each other and have a personal relationship (e.g., family members). However, larger corporations with many shareholders may choose to remain private. Private corporations don't issue shares/stock to the public. In contrast, public corporations sell their stocks to the public on open market exchanges. Public corporations need authorization to sell their stock to the public and are subject to securities laws and regulations.
For-Profit v. Not-for-Profit Corporations
A corporation may be either for-profit or not-for-profit. For-profit corporations generate revenue to benefit the shareholders. Not-for-profit corporations reinvest their revenue to maintain the business in order to continue pursuing an objective. Not-for-profit corporations may be charitable organizations or social clubs and qualify for federal tax exemption. Not-for-profit corporations must apply to the IRS to receive a tax exempt status.
C Corporations v. S Corporations
C corporations pay a "corporate double tax," which means the profits are subject to taxes twice. The business pays taxes on its profits as an entity. The profits get taxed again after shareholders get paid their dividends through their income personal taxes. Some corporations have the option to change their tax status to an S corporation. In doing so, the profits "pass through" the corporate tax and get paid only through as shareholders' personal income taxes. Not all corporations are eligible for S corp. status and must file status change form with the IRS.
**Prospective owners should note that there are other types of corporations not discussed in this article.
Here are some questions that might help prospective owners decide which business structure is right:
What is the purpose of the business?
How many owners will the business have?
Will there be more owners throughout the business's existence?
How much power and involvement will the owners have in regular business activities?
Will the owners have equal or different levels of voting power, authority, management duties?
How will profits get divided among the owners?
Will the business regularly engage in complex financial transactions?
How much risk will the business have?
Who is liable for other owner's actions or the business's obligations?
Note that the list of factors to decide which business structure to choose is non-exhaustive.
Prospective business owners who are still unsure about which business structure is best for their needs should consider consulting with an attorney experienced in business organization.
TROUBLE DECIDING? WE CAN HELP!
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In Yuma Arizona, federal officials who oversee a program that guarantees jail time for immigrants caught crossing the border illegally have refused to provide information about the program’s status.
Arizona Sens. Jeff Flake and John McCain have asked the DOJ to provide details about whether federal prosecutors in Yuma have scaled back Operation Streamline, the zero-tolerance program that aims to quickly prosecute migrants who have recently crossed the border.
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has not responded to the senators, a Flake spokeswoman said. Public affairs officials from the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection have also refused to answer questions or confirm any changes.
A Border Patrol union president in Yuma says that first-time offenders are not being prosecuted anymore, negating the program’s aim to be a deterrent.
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Damages in Drunk Driving Cases: A Different Story Entirely
In most car accident cases, the damages allowable are compensatory damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss or wages, past and future medical expenses, etc.
However, causing an accident while driving while intoxicated is a different story entirely.
In 1979, the California Supreme Court extended punitive damages to drunk drivers. Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890.
The Court has noted that in order to justify an award of punitive damages under the theory of conscious disregard, the plaintiff must prove that the “defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895, 896.
The Court further noted that an individual who willfully “consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.” Taylor, at 896. The purpose of punitive damages is not only to punish for your actions, but also to deter any future like conduct. Taylor, at 897. Because punitive damages can be assessed in drunk driving cases, awards in drunk driving cases can be greatly increased.
Let's talk about how you can make sure that medicines you order through a mail-order drugstore are safe. It is easy for individuals to buy medicines online. How can you do this? Kamagra is for the treatment of impotence and other states when erection is of low quality. If you're concerned about sexual disorder, you have to talk to your health care professional about buying cialis online and buy cialis online safely. When you get medications like Kamagra you must view about buy cialis online cheap. Sundry companies describe it as undefined. Many mayhap say the efficiency of Kamagra is well documented. This can influence the quality of breath. So if you are experiencing sexual problems, it is great to see a qualified sex physician right away for a complete physical examination. Keep in mind that buying erectile malfunction drugs outside a of good repute source can be risky.
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The Titan Process
We meet with you and give you an understanding of what to expect. We sit down with you, we learn about you, you learn about us, and we tell you what we can do for you.
We review your file, research caselaw, and request any helpful items that are not provided by the prosecutor. We form an opinion on your case and meet with the Crown prosecutor.
Meeting with the Crown
We negotiate with the Crown prosecutor for your ideal result. For most people, this is attempting to get the charges withdrawn. If the result is something you agree with, the matter ends.
Meeting with the Judge
A meeting with a judge is mandatory in some cases, and requested by the parties in others. This is where we get the chance to explain our position clearly to the judge. In this meeting, the Judge cannot force either party do anything but is able to make strong suggestions and provide their input. If the solution is not what we want, we set a date for trial.
At this stage, a different judge decides your guilt. The Crown prosecutor will present its case to the judge and we challenge it through questioning the evidence presented. This can mean questioning witnesses or attacking the reliability of documentary or video evidence. If the Crown has proven its case 'beyond a reasonable doubt', the judge must find you guilty. If the Crown does not, you are found not guilty and are free to go
At this stage, the judge decides the appropriate punishment after you are found guilty. The judge considers the circumstances of your case and you as a person. Our goal is always to get the lowest sentence possible in your circumstances. And remember, not every sentence results in a permanent criminal record!
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Yσu can re-αdd each of yoưr Ɠoogle Nesƫ speakers, Chromecast, and smaɾt displaყs to α variety of groups iȵ thȩ Google Hσme app. In response to Șonos’ patent lawsuit, tⱨe company made chaȵges last moȵth that wσuld mαke įt possiblȩ tσ add spȩcific deviceȿ ƫo just σne speaker group at α time. The Nest team’s announcement of this development reverses that change. You mαy recall thαt Sonos sưed the ƀusiness in 2020, alleging that įt had violated α ȵumber σf its pateȵts, includinǥ thosȩ relating to tⱨe management of sρeaker groupȿ.
A federal jury in California ordered Google to pay a$ 32. 5 million fine in May after finding that the tech behemoth had violated Sonos’ intellectual property. Howeⱱer, US District Ɉudge Ⱳilliam Alsup rȩcently overtưrned ƫhe decision after concluding that Soȵos’ patents ωere invalid. Alsup ruled that Sonos had unintentionally connected a 2006 patent application that failed to disclose the invention to its multi-room audio patents. Ądditionally, he çame to thȩ concluȿion thαt Sonos didn’ƫ submit patent applicatioȵs ƒor the lawsuit’s related patents until 2019, yeαrs aftȩr Google αnnounced įts iȵtention ƫo explσre a collaboration using multi-ɾoom audio technology.
According to Sonos, the judge’s decision was” wrong on both the facts and the law ,” and an appeal will be filed. Despite Sonos’ plan, which states that you” will no longer run into an error when trying to add a device to additional groups ,” Google has decided to roll back its previous changes. Ƭhe update haȿ already beguȵ tσ rσll σut and is currently avaiIable in thȩ Android Home app. According to GoogIe, the Ⱨome αpp σn iOS devices wiIl aIso undergo α change soon.
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1990-2004: The Death of Khomeini and the Reformists
During the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-97), reformists controlled a majority of seats in parliament until 1992 and supported Rafsanjani's policies for economic reform and the normalization of relations with neighboring countries. The conservatives won a majority of seats in both the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections and subsequently used their position in the legislature to weaken or stop outright many reforms proposed by the Rafsanjani government.
Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates, which led to criticism from many observers that the Government improperly predetermined the election results.
In February 1999, elections for nationwide local councils were held for the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures indicated that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council seats across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous districts. The Councils did not appear to have been granted the autonomy or authority to make them effective or meaningful local institutions; doing so would have been viewed as a threat to the control of the central Government.
Elections were held for the 290-seat Majles in February 2000. Of more than 6,000 candidates, 576 were disqualified before the elections by the Council of Guardians, which represented a substantial decrease from the 44 percent who were disqualified before the 1996 elections. Most of those disqualified were outspoken advocates of political reform, including some of the most prominent supporters of then President Khatami. However, candidates with a wide range of views were permitted to run. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for moderate and reform candidates, who constituted a large majority in the Majles. In June 2001, elections were held for Majles seats. The Council of Guardians reportedly disqualified 100 potential candidates, more than one-quarter of those wishing to run. Largely due to the disqualification of reform candidates, conservative candidates or conservatives running as independents won all six seats up for election. Vigorous parliamentary debates took place regarding various issues. However, the Supreme Leader and other conservatives within the Government used constitutional provisions to block much of the early reform legislation passed by the Majles.
Mohammad Khatami, a former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in 1992 by the Majles for "liberalism" and "negligence," was reelected President in 2001 with 77 percent of the vote. The UNSR reported that the Guardian Council significantly limited the number of candidates permitted to run and noted that the Interior Minister denounced the "unprincipled disqualification" of candidates. Mohammad Khatami was elected to a second 4-year term as President in a popular vote in June 2001, with 77 percent of the vote. Reformers and moderates won a landslide victory in the February 2000 Majles election, and constituted a majority of that body. However, the Council of Guardians and other elements within the Government blocked much of the early reform legislation passed by the Majles.
In 2001 approximately 60 parliamentarians were arrested and charged with "inciting public opinion." The cases were a result of the ongoing conflict between reformist parliamentarians and the conservative judiciary over precisely what type of speech was protected by parliamentary immunity. The harassment of Majles members continued throughout the year.
During 2002, at least 17 Majles members were called before the courts for criticizing the Government in one form or another. 1 was sentenced to 40 lashes and another fined. At year's end, there was no information available on whether either sentence was carried out. During 2001 approximately 60 reformist Majles members were reportedly brought to court for a variety of alleged offenses, and although no precise figures were available, that trend continued during the year.
In January 2002 reformist members of Parliament staged a walkout to protest pro-reform Parliamentarian Hossein Loqmanian's imprisonment, which led the Supreme Leader to pardon him after he had spent several weeks in prison. In December 2001, Loqmanian began serving a 13-month sentence for insulting the judiciary. He became the first Majles member to serve a jail sentence. Two other Majles members resigned their seats to protest Loqmanian's imprisonment. These cases resulted from the ongoing conflict between reformist Parliamentarians and the hard-line judiciary over precisely what type of speech was protected by parliamentary immunity. Furthermore, Parliamentarians convicted of crimes could be barred from running for the Majles again, since the law prohibited persons with criminal records from running for office.
The local council elections were held again in February 2003. Iran staged its second-ever municipal-council elections on 28 February 2003. Campaigning for the elections began on 20 February 2003 and would continue until midnight on 26 February 2003. Candidates were competing for some 168,000 positions in cities, villages, and townships. Campaigning candidates were banned from writing on walls, forming campaign convoys, and covering traffic signs with posters.
Between 35 million eligible voters (according to the Plan and Budget Organization) and 39 million eligible voters (according to the State Registration Office and IRNA) were eligible to vote in the previous municipal elections in 1999. The voting age at that time was 16. The voting age was subsequently lowered to 15, and more than 44.5 million Iranians, everyone born before 8 June 1986, were eligible to vote in the May 2001 presidential election, according to IRNA. Every Iranian born before 28 February 1988 would be eligible to vote in the next election. As of July 2002, the population was estimated to be 66,622,704, and 68.4 percent of the population was estimated to be 15 or older. This meant that there were approximately 45.6 million eligible voters.
Enthusiasm for the councils in big cities like Tehran may have waned because of their overall failure to empower reformists. It was fairly clear that Tehran's 15 council seats had gone to conservative candidates with almost 550,000 of the ballots counted by the afternoon of 2 March 2003. More than 566,000 (12.1 percent) out of Tehran's 4.68 million-person electorate voted, IRNA reported on 3 March 2003. This fell far below earlier reports. Executive board official Parvaneh Mafi said on 1 March 2003 that between 15 and 20 percent of the Tehran electorate voted, and Tehran Governor Ali-Awsat Hashemi said that the turnout in the capital was 25 percent, IRNA reported. Overall, 11,691,216 voters from 21 out of the country's 28 provinces voted, IRNA reported on 3 March 2003.
Reformists in Iran found themselves in a difficult political position, domestically and in terms of foreign policy by the end of 2003 and through 2004. The US invasion of Iraq and disputes over the nature and size of the Iranian nuclear program forced the rhetoric of Iranian leaders, including President Khatami, to become more conservative in nature. Khatami on a number of occasions openly challanged the United States position in Iraq, suggeting that it threatened to destabilize the entire region and grossly violated Iraqi sovreignty. Furthermore, despite continued claims that the nuclear program was purely for civilian purposes, a right protected under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, international speculation varied widely, with much of the European Union, the United States, and Israel suggesting that the program was a front for a weapons development project.
International tensions flared in June 2004 when a number of British sailors were detained by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps while generally believed to be in international waters. While negotiations led to their release, it left British-Iranian relations at a new low.
By the end of 2004, the Madjlis had agreed with the Iranian President that a nuclear program for peaceful purposes was Iran's right, showing that it had become an important issue in Iranian domestic politics. Disagreements continued on how the country should proceed, however, and how to engage the international community. A conservative resurgance was on the horizon, bolstered by serious pressure from the international community to confirm the rhetoric of conservative politicians that various actors were trying to hold Iran back.
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Parents are demanding that the courts do more to help prevent parental alienation, according to a news report from May 11. Parents' rights groups across the United States brought attention to an annual day to recognize the risk of parental alienation and to begin bringing attention to the risk of this happening in divorce cases.
Child custody arrangements can be some of the most difficult to make during a divorce. You want to create a fair parenting plan, but the thought of seeing your child less often than every day is something you don't want to agree to. Despite that, you and your spouse came up with an agreement you're happy with. However, when you reach court, that's not necessarily going to be approved.
If you are considering a divorce in Connecticut and you have children, you should make sure you know the laws regarding child custody. The way that those laws might affect child custody decisions in your divorce will be important and could influence your next move.
In Connecticut, divorces where children are involved, the court's intention is to put children first. Since children have no choice in a divorce, this is good thing. It ensures someone is looking out for their interests.
Parenting with your ex can be a good thing, and unless you have had a really bitter divorce, you could probably make it happen. However, it might take some effort. Here's how one couple does it.
When couples make a decision to divorce, it is usually about the adults. Once the decision is made, thinking about how it will affect the children usually comes next.
Jennifer Hudson, from "The Voice," and her ex-fiancé, David Otunga, have called it quits. Although the couple never married, but remained engaged for nine years, they have an 8-year-old son, David Jr., who is about to be caught in a custody battle, it appears. Otunga, a former wrestler, says he intends to fight for primary custody of their child.
Residents in the Hartford region shared shock and disgust when it learned that a small boy placed in a home by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) nearly starved to death. The entire situation is too complex to detail here, but some of the important facts are listed below, according to news sources:
Even though we are attorneys who are committed to the law and to the preservation of family, we believe that the legal aspects of child custody can complicate matters in some cases. This does not mean we think that parents in the midst of child custody proceedings should not seek legal assistance. On the contrary, we believe attorney representation protects parents and children alike in all matters related to divorce.
This may come as no surprise to Connecticut parents who already share child custody, but experts are now saying it is nearly always the best option for children. Despite this, mothers are still most often awarded full custody of the kids with fathers only getting a small amount of parenting time.
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Of the Nature of Laws in General (abridged)
By Sir William Blackstone
[Blackstone, Sir William. "Of the Nature of Laws in General." In Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1893. Volume 1, Introduction, Section II. The Online Library of Liberty. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2140. The Liberty Fund. Used with permission of the Liberty Fund.]
Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate, or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action, which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.
Thus when the supreme being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be. When he put that matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all moveable bodies must conform. And, to descend from the greatest operations to the smallest, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism, he establishes at his own pleasure certain arbitrary laws for its direction; as that the hand shall describe a given space in a given time; to which law as long as the work conforms, so long it continues in perfection, and answers the end of its formation.
If we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable and animal life, we shall find them still governed by laws; more numerous indeed, but equally fixed and invariable. The whole progress of plants, from the seed to the root, and from thence to the seed again — the method of animal nutrition, digestion, secretion, and all other branches of vital economy; — are not left to chance, or the will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great creator.
This then is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by some superior being; and in those creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature itself subsists, for its existence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behavior.
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom, he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently as man depends absolutely upon his maker for everything, it is necessary that he should in all points conform to his maker's will.
This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.
Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as he is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to everyone its due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.
But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be attained than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wanted some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance it's [sic] inseparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to enquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude, of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, “that man should pursue his own happiness.” This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.
But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it is still necessary to have recourse to reason; whose office it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life; by considering, what method will tend the most effectually to our own substantial happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error.
This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine providence which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, hath been pleased, at sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason, in its present corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is (humanly speaking) of infinitely more authority than what we generally call the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.
Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There is, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the case of murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, or super-add any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae to abstain from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not so.
If man were to live in a state of nature, unconnected with other individuals, there would be no occasion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the law of God. Neither could any other law possibly exist for a law always supposes some superior who is to make it; and in a state of nature we are all equal, without any other superior but him who is the author of our being. But man was formed for society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on this subject, is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great society, they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, and nations; entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called “the law of nations;” which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities: in the construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of nature being the only one to which both communities are equally subject: and therefore the civil law very justly observes, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium.
Thus much I thought it necessary to premise concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded to treat more fully of the principal subject of this section, municipal or civil law; that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed; being thus defined by Justinian, “jus ci5vile est quod quisque sibi populus constituit.” I call it municipal law, in compliance with common speech; for, though strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of one single municipium or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws and customs.
Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in “a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.” Let us endeavour to explain its several properties, as they arise out of this definition.
And, first, it is a rule; not a transient sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accused shall be deemed high treason; this has permanency, uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as we see proper; and to judge upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the thing advised. Whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon our approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counsel is only matter of persuasion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon the unwilling also.
It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, “I will, or will not, do this;” that of a law is, “thou shalt, or shalt not, do it.” It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to act, without ourselves determining or promising anything at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be “a rule.”
Municipal law is also “a rule of civil conduct.” This distinguishes municipal law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule of moral conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of faith. These regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbor, considered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards him neighbor, than those of mere nature and religion: duties, which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which amount to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to the subsistence and peace of the society.
It is likewise “a rule prescribed.” Because a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can never be properly a law. It is requisite that this resolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the case of the common law of England. It may be notified, viva voce, by officers appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and such acts of parliament as are appointed to be publicly read in churches and other assemblies. It may lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the soft public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people. There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto; when after an action is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it; here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust. All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term “prescribed.” But when this rule is in the usual manner notified, or prescribed, it is then the subject's business to be thoroughly acquainted therewith; for if ignorance, of what he might know, were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.
But farther: municipal law is “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state.” For legislature, as was before observed, is the greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another. Wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of a law, that it be made by the supreme power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist without the other.
This will naturally lead us into a short enquiry concerning the nature of society and civil government; and the natural, inherent right that belongs to the sovereignty of a state, wherever that sovereignty be lodged, of making and enforcing laws.
The only true and natural foundations of society are the wants and the fears individuals. Not that we can believe, with some theoretical writers, that there ever was a time when there was no such thing as society; and that, from the impulse of reason, and through a sense of their wants and weaknesses, individuals met together in a large plain, entered into an original contract, and chose the tallest man present to be their governor. This notion, of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is too wild to be seriously admitted; and besides it is plainly contradictory to the revealed accounts of the primitive origin of mankind, and their preservation two thousand years afterwards; both which were effected by the means of single families. These formed the first society, among themselves; which every day extended its limits, and when it grew too large to subsist with convenience in that pastoral state, wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it necessarily subdivided itself by various migrations into more. Afterwards, as agriculture increased, which employs and can maintain a much greater number of hands, migrations became less frequent; and various tribes, which had formerly separated, reunited again; sometimes by compulsion and conquest, sometimes by accident and sometimes perhaps by compact. But though society had not its formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants and their fears; yet it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together; that demonstrates the necessity of this union; and that therefore is the solid and natural foundation, as well as the cement, of society. And this is what we mean by the original contract of society; which, though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed at the first institution of a state, yet in nature and reason must always be understood and implied, in the very act of associating together: namely, that the whole should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should guards the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which submission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any.
For when society is once formed, government results of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order. Unless some superior were constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their several rights, and redress their several wrongs. But, as all the members of society are naturally equal, it may be asked, in whose hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general answer is easy; but the application of it to particular cases has occasioned one half of those mischiefs which are apt to proceed from misguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government should be reposed in such persons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which are among the attributes of him who is emphatically styled the supreme being; the three grand requisites, I mean, of wisdom, of goodness, and of power: wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community; goodness, to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and strength, or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural foundations of sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every well constituted frame of government.
How the several forms of government we now see in the world at first actually began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite disputes. It is not my business or intention to enter into any of them. However they began, or by what right so ever they subsist, there is and must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside. And this authority is placed in those hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of such respective states, either expressly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the qualities requisite for supremacy, wisdom, goodness, and power, are the most likely to be found.
The political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the first, when the sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate assembly consisting of all the members of a community, which is called a democracy; the second, when it is lodged in a council, composed of select members, and then it is styled an aristocracy; the last, when it is entrusted in the hands of a single person, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All other species of government, they say, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, these three.
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From what has been advanced, the truth of the former branch of our definition, is (I trust) sufficiently evident; that “municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state.” I proceed now to the latter branch of it; that it is a rule so prescribed, “commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.”
Now in order to do this completely, it is first of all necessary that the boundaries of right and wrong be established and ascertained by law. And when this is once done, it will follow of course that it is likewise the business of the law, considered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce these rights and to restrain or redress these wrongs. It remains therefore only to consider in what manner the law is said to ascertain the boundaries of rights and wrong; and the methods which it takes to command the one and prohibit the other.
For this purpose every law may be said to consist of several parts: one, declaratory; whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down: another, directory; whereby the subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain from the commission of those wrongs: a third, remedial; whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man's private rights, or redress his private wrongs: to which may be added a fourth, usually termed the sanction, or indicatory branch of the law; whereby it is signified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty.
With regard to the first of these, the declaratory part of the municipal law, this depends not so much upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine, which before was slightly touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural duties (such as, for instance, the worship of God, the maintenance of children, and the like) receive any stronger sanction from being also declared to be duties by the law of the land. The case is the same as to crimes and misdemeanors, that are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore styled mala in se, such as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract no additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before observed, in subordination to the great lawgiver, transcribing and publishing his precepts. So that, upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.
But with regard to things in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely altered. These become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees proper, for promoting the welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil life. Thus our own common law has declared, that the goods of the wife do instantly upon marriage become the property and right of the husband; and our statute law declared all monopolies a public offence: yet that right, and this offence, have no foundation in nature; but are merely created by the law, for the purposes of civil society. And sometimes, where the thing itself has its rise from the law of nature, the particular circumstances and mode of doing it become right or wrong, as the laws of the land shall direct. Thus, for instance, in civil duties; obedience to superiors is the doctrine of revealed as well as natural religion: but who those superiors shall be, and in what circumstances, or to what degrees they shall be obeyed, is the province of human laws to determine. And so, as to injuries or crimes, it must be left to our own legislature to decide, in what cases the seizing another's cattle shall amount to the crime of robbery; and where it shall be a justifiable action, as when a landlord takes them by way of distress for rent.
Thus much for the declaratory part of the municipal law: and the directory stands much upon the same footing; for this virtually includes the former, the declaration being usually collected from the direction. The law that says, “thou shalt not steal,” implies a declaration that stealing is a crime. And we have seen that, in things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong depends upon the direction of the laws to do or to omit it.
The remedial part of a law is so necessary a consequence of the former two, that laws must be very vague and imperfect without it. For in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of the law. . . .
With regard to the sanction of laws, or the evil that may attend the breach of public duties; it is observed, that human legislators have for the most part chosen to make the sanction of their laws rather vindicatory than remuneratory, or to consist rather in punishments, than in actual particular rewards. Because, in the first place, the quiet enjoyment and protection of all our civil rights and liberties, which are the sure and general consequence of obedience to the municipal law, are in themselves the best and most valuable of all rewards. Because also, were the exercise of every virtue to be enforced by the proposal of particular rewards, it were impossible for any state to furnish stock enough for so profuse a bounty. And farther, because the dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human actions than the prospect of good.. . .
Of all the parts of a law the most effectual is the vindicatory. For it is but lost labour to say, “do this, or avoid that,” unless we also declare, “this shall be the consequence of your noncompliance.” We must therefore observe, that the main strength and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.
Legislators and their laws are said to compel and oblige; not that by any natural violence they so constrain a man, as to render it impossible for him to act otherwise than as they direct, which is the strict sense of obligation: but because, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty against offenders, they bring it to pass that no man can easily choose to transgress the law; since, by reason of the impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to disobedience. And, even where rewards are proposed as well as punishments threatened, the obligation of the law seems chiefly to consist in the penalty: for rewards, in their nature, can only persuade and allure; nothing is compulsory but punishment.
It is held, it is true, and very justly, by the principal of our ethical writers, that human laws are binding upon men’s consciences. But if that were the only, or most forcible obligation, the good only would regard the laws, and the bad would set them at defiance. And, true as this principle is, it must still be understood with some restriction. It holds, I apprehend, as to rights; and that, when the law has determined the field to belong to Titius, it is matter of conscience no longer to withhold or to invade it. So also in regard to natural duties, and such offences as are mala in se: here we are bound in conscience, because we are bound by superior laws, before those human laws were in being, to perform the one and abstain from the other. But in relation to those laws which enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are not mala in se but mala prohibita merely, annexing a penalty to noncompliance, here I apprehend conscience is no farther concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty, in case of our breach of those laws: for otherwise the multitude of penal laws in a state would not only be looked upon as an impolitic, but would also be a very wicked thing; if every such law were a snare for the conscience of the subject. But in these cases the alternative is offered to every man; “either abstain from this, or submit to such a penalty;” and his conscience will be clear, whichever side of the alternative he thinks proper to embrace. Thus, by the statutes for preserving the game, a penalty is denounced against every unqualified person that kills a hare. Now this prohibitory law does not make the transgression a moral offence: the only obligation in conscience is to submit to the penalty if levied.
I have now gone through the definition laid down of a municipal law; and have shown that it is “a rule…of civil conduct…prescribed…by the supreme power in state…commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong:” in the explication of which I have endeavoured to interweave a few useful principles, concerning the nature of civil government, and the obligation of human laws. . . .
Juris praecepta sunt haec, honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. [The precepts of the law are these, to live honestly, not to injure another, and to give to everyone his due.] Justinian, Institutes, Book I, I.3.
Puffendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, Book 2, chaper 1, compared with Barbeyrac’s commentary.
“That which natural reason has established among all men, . . . is called the law of nations.” Justinian, Digests (Pandects), Book I, Tit. 1, no. 9, quoting Gaius, Institutes, Book I. Compare Justinian, Institutes, Book I, II.1
Such laws among the Romans were denominated privilegia, or private laws, of which Cicero (In his Oratio pro domo, section 43; compare Cicero, De Legibus, Book 3, XIX) thus speaks: “Vetant leges sacratae vetant duodecim tabulae, leges privates hominibus inogari; id enim est privelegium. Nemo unquam tulit, nihil est crudelius, nihil perniciosius, nihil quod minus haec civitas serre possit.” [“The sacred laws forbid, the twelve tables forbid, that the interest of private individuals should be affected by special laws; for that is a privilege. There has never been an instance of it: nothing could be more cruel, nothing more injurious, nothing to which this nation could be less tolerable.”]
Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, book 2, chapter 21 ("Of Power"), sections 31–45.
Lectures on Law, Chapters 1–4, 7, 9
By James Wilson
[James Wilson. "Lectures on Law." Collected Works of James Wilson. Volume 1. Edited by Mark David Hall and Kermit L. Hall. Indianapolis, Ind.: The Liberty Fund. 2007. Chapters 1–4, 7, 9. Online Library of Liberty. Used with permission of the Liberty Fund.]
Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter II: Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation
Chapter III: Of the Law of Nature
Chapter IV: Of the Law of Nations
Chapter V: Of Municipal Law [OMITTED]
Chapter VI: Of Man, As an Individual [OMITTED]
Chapter VII: Of Man, As a Member of Society
Chapter VIII: Of Man, As a Member of a Confederation [OMITTED]
Chapter IX: Of Man, As a Member of the Great Commonwealth of Nations (Excerpt)
Chapter X: Of Government [OMITTED]
Chapter XI: Comparison of the Constitution of the United States with That of Great Britain [OMITTED]
IN THE YEARS ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY, AND ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY ONE
Introductory Lecture. Of the Study of the Law in the United States.
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Were I called upon for my reasons why I deem so highly of the American character, I would assign them in a very few words—That character has been eminently distinguished by the love of liberty, and the love of law.
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. . . But law and liberty cannot rationally become the objects of our love, unless they first become the objects of our knowledge. The same course of study, properly directed, will lead us to the knowledge of both. Indeed, neither of them can be known, because neither of them can exist, without the other. Without liberty, law loses its nature and its name, and becomes oppression. Without law, liberty also loses its nature and its name, and becomes licentiousness. In denominating, therefore, that science, by which the knowledge of both is acquired, it is unnecessary to preserve, in terms, the distinction between them. That science may be named, as it has been named, the science of law.
The science of law should, in some measure, and in some degree, be the study of every free citizen, and of every free man. Every free citizen and every free man has duties to perform and rights to claim. Unless, in some measure, and in some degree, he knows those duties and those rights, he can never act a just and an independent part.
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I begin with the general principles of law and obligation. These I shall investigate fully and minutely; because they are the basis of every legal system; and because they have been much misrepresented, or much misunderstood.
Next, I shall proceed to give you a concise and very general view of the law of nature, of the law of nations, and of municipal law.
I shall then consider man, who is the subject of all, and is the author as well as the subject of the last, and part of the second of these species of law. This great title of my plan, dignified and interesting as it is, must be treated in a very cursory manner in this course. I will, however, select some of the great truths which seem best adapted to a system of law. I will view man as an individual, as a member of society, as a member of a confederation, and as a part of the great commonwealth of nations.
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Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation
Order, proportion, and fitness pervade the universe. Around us, we see; within us, we feel; above us, we admire a rule, from which a deviation cannot, or should not, or will not be made. On the inanimate part of the creation, are impressed the continued energies of motion and of attraction, and other energies, varied and yet uniform, all designated and ascertained. Animated nature is under a government suited to every genus, to every species, and to every individual, of which it consists. Man, the nexus utriusque mundi [“the joining point of the two worlds,” that is, of the material and the immaterial worlds], composed of a body and a soul, possessed of faculties intellectual and moral, finds or makes a system of regulations, by which his various and important nature, in every period of his existence, and in every situation, in which he can be placed, may be preserved, improved, and perfected. The celestial as well as the terrestrial world knows its exalted but prescribed course. This angels and the spirits of the just, made perfect, do “clearly behold, and without any swerving observe.” Let humble reverence attend us as we proceed. The great and incomprehensible Author, and Preserver, and Ruler of all things—he himself works not without an eternal decree.
Such—and so universal is law. “Her seat,” to use the sublime language of the excellent Hooker, “is the bosom of God; her voice, the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage; the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power. Angels and men, creatures of every condition, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.” Before we descend to the consideration of the several kinds and parts of this science, so dignified and so diversified, it will be proper, and it will be useful, to contemplate it in one general and comprehensive view; and to select some of its leading and luminous properties, which will serve to guide and enlighten us in that long and arduous journey, which we now undertake.
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. . . I hesitate, at present, to give a definition of law. My hesitation is increased by the fate of the far greatest number of those, who have hitherto attempted it. Many, as it is natural to suppose, and labored have been the efforts to infold law within this scientific circle; but little satisfaction—little instruction has been the result. Almost every writer, sensible of the defects, the inaccuracies, or the improprieties of the definitions that have gone before him, has endeavored to supply their place with something, in his own opinion, more proper, more accurate, and more complete. He has been treated by his successors, as his predecessors have been treated by him: and his definition has had only the effect of adding one more to the lengthy languid list. . . .
Some of them, indeed, have a claim to attention: one, in particular, will demand it, for reasons striking and powerful—I mean that given by the Commentator [Sir William Blackstone] on the laws of England.
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“Law,” says he, “in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action.” In its proper signification, a rule is an instrument; by which a [straight] line—the shortest and truest of all—may be drawn from one point to another. In its moral or figurative sense, it denotes a principle or power, that directs a man surely and concisely to attain the end, which he proposes.
Law is called a rule, in order to distinguish it from a sudden, a transient, or a particular order: uniformity, permanency, stability, characterize a law. Again; law is called a rule, to denote that it carries along with it a power and principle of obligation. Concerning the nature and the cause of obligation, much ingenious disputation has been held by philosophers and writers on jurisprudence. . . .
This interesting subject will claim and obtain our attention, next after what we have to say concerning law in general.
When we speak of a rule with regard to human conduct, we imply two things. 1. That we are susceptible of direction. 2. That, in our conduct, we propose an end. The brute creation act not from design. They eat, they drink, they retreat from the inclemencies of the weather, without considering what their actions will ultimately produce. But we have faculties, which enable us to trace the connection between actions and their effects; and our actions are nothing else but the steps which we take, or the means which we employ, to carry into execution the effects which we intend.
Hooker, I think, conveys a fuller and stronger conception of law, when he tells us, that “it assigns unto each thing the kind, that it moderates the force and power, that it appoints the form and measure of working.” Not the direction merely, but the kind also, the energy; and the proportion of actions is suggested in this description.
Some are of opinion, that law should be defined “a rule of acting or not acting;” because actions may be forbidden as well as commanded. But the same excellent writer, whom I have just now cited, gives a very proper answer to this opinion, and shows the addition to be unnecessary, by finely pursuing the metaphor, which we have already mentioned. “We must not suppose that there needeth one rule to know the good, and another to know the evil by. For he that knoweth what is straight, doth even thereby discern what is crooked. Goodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that which is well done, we term right.”
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. . . Law is a rule “prescribed.” A simple resolution, confined within the bosom of the legislator, without being notified, in some fit manner, to those for whose conduct it is to form a rule, can never, with propriety, be termed a law.
There are many ways by which laws may be made sufficiently known. They may be printed and published. Written copies of them may be deposited in publick libraries, or other places, where every one interested may have an opportunity of perusing them. They may be proclaimed in general meetings of the people. The knowledge of them may be disseminated by long and universal practice. “Confirmed custom,” says a writer on Roman jurisprudence, “is deservedly considered as a law. For since written laws bind us for no other reason than because they are received by the judgment of the people; those laws, which the people have approved, without writing, are also justly obligatory on all. For where is the difference, whether the people declare their will by their suffrage, or by their conduct? This kind of law is said to be established by manners.”
Of all yet suggested, the mode for the promulgation of human laws by custom seems the most significant, and the most effectual. It involves in it internal evidence, of the strongest kind, that the law has been introduced by common consent; and that this consent rests upon the most solid basis—experience as well as opinion. This mode of promulgation points to the strongest characteristic of liberty, as well as of law. For a consent thus practically given, must have been given in the freest and most unbiased manner.
. . .
Laws may be promulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us. They are thus known as effectually, as by words or by writing: indeed they are thus known in a manner more noble and exalted. For, in this manner, they may be said to be engraven by God on the hearts of men: in this manner, he is the promulgator as well as the author of natural law. If a simple resolution cannot have the force of a law before it be promulgated; we may certainly hazard the position—that it cannot have the force of a law, before it be made: in other words, that ex post facto instruments, claiming the title and character of laws, are impostors.
. . .
The definition of law in the Commentaries proceeds in this manner. “Law is that rule of action, which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.” A superior! Let us make a solemn pause—Can there be no law without a superior? Is it essential to law, that inferiority should be involved in the obligation to obey it? Are these distinctions at the root of all legislation?
There is a law, indeed, which flows from the Supreme of being—a law, more distinguished by the goodness, than by the power of its allgracious Author. But there are laws also that are human; and does it follow, that, in these, a character of superiority is inseparably attached to him, who makes them; and that a character of inferiority is, in the same manner, inseparably attached to him, for whom they are made? What is this superiority? Who is this superior? By whom is he constituted? Whence is his superiority derived? Does it flow from a source that is human? Or does it flow from a source that is divine? From a human source it cannot flow; for no stream issuing from thence can rise higher than the fountain.
If the prince, who makes laws for a people, is superior, in the terms of the definition, to the people, who are to obey; how comes he to be vested with the superiority over them?
If I mistake not, this notion of superiority, which is introduced as an essential part in the definition of a law—for we are told that a law always supposes some superior, who is to make it—this notion of superiority contains the germ of the divine right—a prerogative impiously attempted to be established—of princes, arbitrarily to rule; and of the corresponding obligation—a servitude tyrannically attempted to be imposed—on the people, implicitly to obey. Despotism, by an artful use of “superiority” in politics; and skepticism, by an artful use of “ideas” in metaphysics, have endeavored—and their endeavors have frequently been attended with too much success—to destroy all true liberty and sound philosophy. By their baneful effects, the science of man and the science of government have been poisoned to their very fountains. But those destroyers of others have met, or must meet, with their own destruction.
. . .
. . . [L]et us receive instruction from a well informed and a well experienced master— . . . from the late [King] Frederick of Prussia:
. . .
“Here is the error of the greatest part of princes. They believe that God has expressly, and from a particular attention to their grandeur, their happiness, and their pride, formed their subjects for no other purpose, than to be the ministers and instruments of their unbridled passions. As the principle, from which they set out, is false; the consequences cannot be otherwise than infinitely pernicious. Hence the unregulated passion for false glory—hence the inflamed desire of conquest—hence the oppressions laid upon the people—hence the indolence and dissipation of princes—hence their ambition, their injustice, their inhumanity, their tyranny—hence, in short, all those vices, which degrade the nature of man.
“If they would disrobe themselves of these erroneous opinions; if they would ascend to the true origin of their appointment; they would see, that their elevation and rank, of which they are so jealous, are, indeed, nothing else than the work of the people; they would see, that the myriads of men, placed under their care, have not made themselves the slaves of one single man, with a view to render him more powerful and more formidable; have not submitted themselves to a fellow citizen, in order to become the sport of his fancies, and the martyrs of his caprice; but have chosen, from among themselves, the man, whom they believed to be the most just, that he might govern them; the best, that he might supply the place of a father; the most humane, that he might compassionate and relieve their misfortunes; the most valiant, that he might defend them against their enemies; the most wise, that he might not engage them inconsiderately in ruinous and destructive wars; in one word, the man the most proper to represent the body of the state, and in whom the sovereign power might become a bulwark to justice and to the laws, and not an engine, by the force of which tyranny might be exercised, and crimes might be committed with impunity.
This principle being once established, princes would avoid the two rocks, which, in all ages, have produced the ruin of empires, and distraction in the political world—“ungoverned ambition, and a listless inattention to affairs.” “They would often reflect that they are men, as well as the least of their subjects—that if they are the first judges, the first generals, the first financiers, the first ministers of society; they are so, for the purpose of fulfilling the duties, which those names import. They will reflect, that they are only the first servants of the state, bound to act with the same integrity, the same caution, and the same entire disinterestedness, as if, at every moment, they were to render an account of their administration to the citizens.”
. . .
Now that the will of a superiour is discarded, as an improper principle of obligation in human laws, it is natural to ask—What principle shall be introduced in its place? In its place I introduce—the consent of those whose obedience the law requires. This I conceive to be the true origin of the obligation of human laws. . . .
Of law there are different kinds. All, however, may be arranged in two different classes. 1. Divine. 2. Human laws. The descriptive epithets employed denote, that the former have God, the latter, man, for their author.
The laws of God may be divided into the following species.
I. That law, the book of which we are neither able nor worthy to open. Of this law, the author and observer is God. He is a law to himself, as well as to all created things. This law we may name the “law eternal.”
II. That law, which is made for angels and the spirits of the just made perfect. This may be called the “law celestial.” This law, and the glorious state for which it is adapted, we see, at present, but darkly and as through a glass: but hereafter we shall see even as we are seen; and shall know even as we are known. From the wisdom and the goodness of the adorable Author and Preserver of the universe, we are justified in concluding, that the celestial and perfect state is governed, as all other things are, by his established laws. What those laws are, it is not yet given us to know; but on one truth we may rely with sure and certain confidence—those laws are wise and good. For another truth we have infallible authority—those laws are strictly obeyed: “In heaven his will is done.”
III. That law, by which the irrational and inanimate parts of the creation are governed. The great Creator of all things has established general and fixed rules, according to which all the phenomena of the material universe are produced and regulated. These rules are usually denominated laws of nature. The science, which has those laws for its object, is distinguished by the name of natural philosophy. It is sometimes called, the philosophy of body. Of this science, there are numerous branches.
IV. That law, which God has made for man in his present state; that law, which is communicated to us by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us, and by the sacred oracles, the divine monitors without us. This law has undergone several subdivisions, and has been known by distinct appellations, according to the different ways in which it has been promulgated, and the different objects which it respects.
As promulgated by reason and the moral sense, it has been called natural; as promulgated by the holy scriptures, it has been called revealed law.
As addressed to men, it has been denominated the law of nature; as addressed to political societies, it has been denominated the law of nations.b
But it should always be remembered, that this law, natural or revealed, made for men or for nations, flows from the same divine source: it is the law of God.
Nature, or, to speak more properly, the Author of nature, has done much for us; but it is his gracious appointment and will, that we should also do much for ourselves. What we do, indeed, must be founded on what he has done; and the deficiencies of our laws must be supplied by the perfections of his. Human law must rest its authority, ultimately, upon the authority of that law, which is divine.
Of that law, the following are maxims—that no injury should be done—that a lawful engagement, voluntarily made, should be faithfully fulfilled. We now see the deep and the solid foundations of human law.
It is of two species. 1. That which a political society makes for itself. This is municipal law. 2. That which two or more political societies make for themselves. This is the voluntary law of nations.
In all these species of law—the law eternal—the law celestial—the law natural—the divine law, as it respects men and nations—the human law, as it also respects men and nations—man is deeply and intimately concerned. Of all these species of law, therefore, the knowledge must be most important to man.
Those parts of natural philosophy, which more immediately relate to the human body, are appropriated to the profession of [medicine].
The law eternal, the law celestial, and the law divine, as they are disclosed by that revelation, which has brought life and immortality to light, are the more peculiar objects of the profession of divinity.
The law of nature, the law of nations, and the municipal law form the objects of the profession of law.
From this short, but plain and, I hope, just statement of things, we perceive a principle of connection between all the learned professions; but especially between the two last mentioned. Far from being rivals or enemies, religion and law are twin sisters, friends, and mutual assistants. Indeed, these two sciences run into each other. The divine law, as discovered by reason and the moral sense, forms an essential part of both.
From this statement of things, we also perceive how important and dignified the profession of the law is, when traced to its sources, and viewed in its just extent. The immediate objects of our attention are, the law of nature, the law of nations, and the municipal law of the United States, and of the several states which compose the Union. It will not be forgotten, that the constitutions of the United States, and of the individual states, form a capital part of their municipal law. On the two first of these three great heads, I shall be very general. On the last, especially on those parts of it, which comprehend the constitutions and publick law, I shall be more particular and minute.
Of the Law of Nature
In every period of our existence, in every situation, in which we can be placed, much is to be known, much is to be done, much is to be enjoyed. But all that is to be known, all that is to be done, all that is to be enjoyed, depends upon the proper exertion and direction of our numerous powers. In this immense ocean of intelligence and action, are we left without a compass and without a chart? Is there no pole star, by which we may regulate our course? Has the all-gracious and all-wise Author of our existence formed us for such great and such good ends; and has he left us without a conductor to lead us in the way, by which those ends may be attained? Has he made us capable of observing a rule, and has he furnished us with no rule, which we ought to observe? Let us examine these questions—for they are important ones—with patience and with attention. Our labors will, in all probability, be amply repaid. We shall probably find that, to direct the more important parts of our conduct, the bountiful Governor of the universe has been graciously pleased to provide us with a law; and that, to direct the less important parts of it, he has made us capable of providing a law for ourselves.
That our Creator has a supreme right to prescribe a law for our conduct, and that we are under the most perfect obligation to obey that law, are truths established on the clearest and most solid principles.
In the course of our remarks on that part of Sir William Blackstone’s definition of law, which includes the idea of a superior as essential to it, we remarked, with particular care, that it was only with regard to human laws that we controverted the justness or propriety of that idea. It was incumbent on us to mark this distinction particularly; for with regard to laws which are divine, they truly come from a superior—from Him who is supreme.
Between beings, who, in their nature, powers, and situation, are so perfectly equal, that nothing can be ascribed to one, which is not applicable to the other, there can be neither superiority nor dependence. With regard to such beings, no reason can be assigned, why anyone should assume authority over others, which may not, with equal propriety, be assigned, why each of those others should assume authority over that one. To constitute superiority and dependence, there must be an essential difference of qualities, on which those relations may be founded.
Some allege, that the sole superiority of strength, or, as they express it, an irresistible power, is the true foundation of the right of prescribing laws. “This superiority of power gives,” say they, “a right of reigning, by the impossibility, in which it places others, of resisting him, who has so great an advantage over them.”
Others derive the right of prescribing laws and imposing obligations from superiour excellence of nature. “This,” say they, “not only renders a being independent of those, who are of a nature inferiour to it; but leads us to believe, that the latter were made for the sake of the former.” For a proof of this, they appeal to the constitution of man. “Here,” they tell us, “the soul governs, as being the noblest part.” “On the same foundation,” they add, “the empire of man over the brute creation is built.”
Others, again, say, that “properly speaking, there is only one general source of superiority and obligation. God is our creator: in him we live, and move, and have our being: from him we have received our intellectual and our moral powers: he, as master of his own work, can prescribe to it whatever rules to him shall seem meet. Hence our dependence on our Creator: hence his absolute power over us. This is the true source of all authority.”
With regard to the first hypothesis, it is totally insufficient; nay, it is absolutely false. Because I cannot resist, am I obliged to obey? Because another is possessed of superiour force, am I bound to acknowledge his will as the rule of my conduct? Every obligation supposes motives that influence the conscience and determine the will, so that we should think it wrong not to obey, even if resistance was in our power. But a person, who alleges only the law of the strongest, proposes no motive to influence the conscience, or to determine the will. Superiour force may reside with predominant malevolence. Has force, exerted for the purposes of malevolence, a right to command? Can it impose an obligation to obey? No. Resistance to such force is a right; and, if resistance can prove effectual, it is a duty also. On some occasions, all our efforts may, indeed, be useless; and an attempt to resist would frustrate its own aim: but, on such occasions, the exercise of resistance only is suspended; the right of resistance is not extinguished: we may continue, for a time, under a constraint; but we come not under an obligation: we may suffer all the external effects of superiour force; but we feel not the internal influence of superiour authority?
The second hypothesis has in it something plausible; but, on examination, it will not be found to be accurate. Wherever a being of superiour excellence is found, his excellence, as well as every other truth, ought, on proper occasions, to be acknowledged; we will go farther; it ought, as every thing excellent ought, to be esteemed. But must we go farther still? Is obedience the necessary consequence of honest acknowledgment and just esteem? Here we must make a pause: we must make some inquiries before we go forward. In what manner is this being of superiour excellence connected with us? What are his dispositions with regard to us? By what effects, if by any, will his superiour excellence be displayed? Will it be exerted for our happiness; or, as to us, will it not be exerted at all? We acknowledge—we esteem excellence; but till these questions are answered, we feel not ourselves under an obligation to obey it. If the opinion of Epicurus concerning his divinities—that they were absolutely indifferent to the happiness and interests of men—was admitted for a moment;g the inference would unquestionably be—that they were not entitled to human obedience.
The third hypothesis contains a solemn truth, which ought to be examined with reverence and awe. It resolves the supreme right of prescribing laws for our conduct, and our indispensable duty of obeying those laws, into the omnipotence of the Divinity. This omnipotence let us humbly adore. Were we to suppose—but the supposition cannot be made—that infinite goodness could be disjoined from almighty power—but we cannot—must not proceed to the inference. No, it never can be drawn; for from almighty power infinite goodness can never be disjoined. Let us join, in our weak conceptions, what are inseparable in their incomprehensible Archetype—infinite power—infinite wisdom—infinite goodness; and then we shall see, in its resplendent glory, the supreme right to rule: we shall feel the conscious sense of the perfect obligation to obey.
His infinite power enforces his laws, and carries them into full and effectual execution. His infinite wisdom knows and chooses the fittest means for accomplishing the ends which he proposes. His infinite goodness proposes such ends only as promote our felicity. By his power, he is able to remove whatever may possibly injure us, and to provide whatever is conducive to our happiness. By his wisdom, he knows our nature, our faculties, and our interests: he cannot be mistaken in the designs, which he proposes, nor in the means, which he employs to accomplish them. By his goodness, he proposes our happiness: and to that end directs the operations of his power and wisdom. Indeed, to his goodness alone we may trace the principle of his laws. Being infinitely and eternally happy in himself, his goodness alone could move him to create us, and give us the means of happiness. The same principle, that moved his creating, moves his governing power. The rule of his government we shall find to be reduced to this one paternal command—Let man pursue his own perfection and happiness.
What an enrapturing view of the moral government of the universe! Over all, goodness infinite reigns, guided by unerring wisdom, and supported by almighty power. What an instructive lesson to those who think, and are encouraged by their flatterers to think, that a portion of divine right is communicated to their rule. If this really was the case; their power ought to be subservient to their goodness, and their goodness should be employed in promoting the happiness of those, who are intrusted to their care. But princes, and the flatterers of princes, are guilty, in two respects, of the grossest errour and presumption. They claim to govern by divine institution and right. The principles of their government are repugnant to the principles of that government, which is divine. The principle of the divine government is goodness: they plume themselves with the gaudy insignia of power.
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Where a supreme right to give laws exists, on one side, and a perfect obligation to obey them exists, on the other side; this relation, of itself, suggests the probability that laws will be made.
When we view the inanimate and irrational creation around and above us, and contemplate the beautiful order observed in all its motions and appearances; is not the supposition unnatural and improbable—that the rational and moral world should be abandoned to the frolicks of chance, or to the ravage of disorder? What would be the fate of man and of society, was every one at full liberty to do as he listed, without any fixed rule or principle of conduct, without a helm to steer him—a sport of the fierce gusts of passion, and the fluctuating billows of caprice?
To be without law is not agreeable to our nature; because, if we were without law, we should find many of our talents and powers hanging upon us like useless incumbrances. Why should we be illuminated by reason, were we only made to obey the impulse of irrational instinct? Why should we have the power of deliberating, and of balancing our determinations, if we were made to yield implicitly and unavoidably to the influence of the first impressions? Of what service to us would reflection be, if, after reflection, we were to be carried away irresistibly by the force of blind and impetuous appetites?
Without laws, what would be the state of society? The more ingenious and artful the twolegged animal, man, is, the more dangerous he would become to his equals: his ingenuity would degenerate into cunning; and his art would be employed for the purposes of malice. He would be deprived of all the benefits and pleasures of peaceful and social life: he would become a prey to all the distractions of licentiousness and war.
Is it probable—we repeat the question—is it probable that the Creator, infinitely wise and good, would leave his moral world in this chaos and disorder?
If we enter into ourselves, and view with attention what passes in our own breasts, we shall find, that what, at first, appeared probable, is proved, on closer examination, to be certain; we shall find, that God has not left himself without a witness, nor us without a guide.
We have already observed, that, concerning the nature and cause of obligation, many different opinions have been entertained, and much ingenious disputation has been held, by philosophers and writers on jurisprudence. It will not be improper to take a summary view of those opinions.
Some philosophers maintain, that all obligation arises from the relations of things; from a certain proportion or disproportion, a certain fitness or unfitness, between objects and actions, which give a beauty to some, and a deformity to others. They say, that the rules of morality are founded on the nature of things; and are agreeable to the order necessary for the beauty of the universe.
Others allege, that every rule whatever of human actions carries with it a moral necessity of conforming to it; and consequently produces a sort of obligation. Every rule, say they, implies a design, and the will of attaining a certain end. He, therefore, who proposes a particular end, and knows the rule by which alone he can accomplish it, finds himself under a moral necessity of observing that rule. If he did not observe it, he would act a contradictory part; he would propose the end, and neglect the only means, by which he could obtain it. There is a reasonable necessity, therefore, to prefer one manner of acting before another; and every reasonable man finds himself engaged to this, and prevented from acting in a contrary manner. In other words, he is obliged: for obligation is nothing more than a restriction of liberty produced by reason. Reason, then, independent of law, is sufficient to impose some obligation on man, and to establish a system of morality and duty.
But, according to others, the idea of obligation necessarily implies a being, who obliges, and must be distinct from him, who is obliged. If the person, on whom the obligation is imposed, is the same as he who imposes it; he can disengage himself from it whenever he pleases: or, rather, there is no obligation. Obligation and duty depend on the intervention of a superiour, whose will is manifested by law. If we abstract from all law, and consequently from a legislator; we shall have no such thing as right, obligation, duty, or morality.
Others, again, think it necessary to join the last two principles together, in order to render the obligation perfect. Reason, say they, is the first rule of man, the first principle of morality, and the immediate cause of all primitive obligation. But man being necessarily dependent on his Creator, who has formed him with wisdom and design, and who, in creating him, has proposed some particular ends; the will of God is another rule of human actions, another principle of morality, obligation, and duty. On this distinction, the kinds of obligation, external and internal, are founded. These two principles must be united, in order to form a complete system of morality, really founded on the nature and state of man. As a rational being, he is subject to reason: as a creature of God, to his supreme will. Thus, reason and the divine will are perfectly reconciled, are naturally connected, and are strengthened by their junction.
The cause of obligation is laid, by some philosophers, in utility. Actions, they tell us, are to be estimated by their tendency to promote happiness. Whatever is expedient, is right. It is the utility, alone, of any moral rule, which constitutes its obligation.
Congenial with this principle, is another, which has received the sanction of some writers—that sociability, or the care of maintaining society properly, is the fountain of obligation and right: for to every right, there must be a corresponding obligation. From this principle the inference is drawn, that every one is born, not for himself alone, but for the whole human kind.
Further&emdash;many philosophers derive our obligation to observe the law of nature from instinctive affections, or an innate moral sense. This is the sense, they tell us, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, and the other moral qualities in actions.
With regard, then, both to the meaning and the cause of obligation, much diversity of sentiment, much ambiguity, and much obscurity have, it appears, prevailed. It is a subject of inquiry, however, that well deserves to be investigated, explained, illustrated, and placed in its native splendour and dignity. In order to do this, it will be proper to ascertain the precise state of the question before us. It is this—what is the efficient cause of moral obligation—of the eminent distinction between right and wrong? This has been often and injudiciously blended with another question, connected indeed with it, but from which it ought to be preserved separate and distinct. That other question is—how shall we, in particular instances, learn the dictates of our duty, and make, with accuracy, the eminent distinction, which we have just now mentioned? The first question points to the principle of obligation: the second points to the means by which our obligation to perform a specified action, or a series of specified actions, may be deduced. The first has been called by philosophers—principium essendi—the principle of existence; the principle which constitutes obligation. The second has been called by them—principium cognoscendi—the principle of knowing it; the principle by which it may be proved or perceived. In a commonwealth, the distinction between these two questions is familiar and easy. If the question is put—what is the efficient cause of the obligation upon the citizens to obey the laws of the state?—the answer is ready—the will of those, by whose authority the laws are made. If the other question is put—how shall we, in a particular instance, or in a series of particular instances, ascertain the laws, which the citizens ought to obey?—reference is immediately made to the code of laws.
Having thus stated the question—what is the efficient cause of moral obligation?—I give it this answer—the will of God. This is the supreme law. His just and full right of imposing laws, and our duty in obeying them, are the sources of our moral obligations. If I am asked—why do you obey the will of God? I answer—because it is my duty so to do. If I am asked again—how do you know this to be your duty? I answer again—because I am told so by my moral sense or conscience. If I am asked a third time—how do you know that you ought to do that, of which your conscience enjoins the performance? I can only say, I feel that such is my duty. Here investigation must stop; reasoning can go no farther. The science of morals, as well as other sciences, is founded on truths, that cannot be discovered or proved by reasoning. Reason is confined to the investigation of unknown truths by the means of such as are known. We cannot, therefore, begin to reason, till we are furnished, otherwise than by reason, with some truths, on which we can found our arguments. Even in mathematicks, we must be provided with axioms perceived intuitively to be true, before our demonstrations can commence. Morality, like mathematicks, has its intuitive truths, without which we cannot make a single step in our reasonings upon the subject. Such an intuitive truth is that, with which we just now closed our investigation. If a person was not possessed of the feeling before mentioned; it would not be in the power of arguments, to give him any conception of the distinction between right and wrong. These terms would be to him equally unintelligible, as the term colour to one who was born and has continued blind. But that there is, in human nature, such a moral principle, has been felt and acknowledged in all ages and nations.
Now that we have stated and answered the first question; let us proceed to the consideration of the second—how shall we, in particular instances, learn the dictates of our duty, and make, with accuracy, the proper distinction between right and wrong; in other words, how shall we, in particular cases, discover the will of God? We discover it by our conscience, by our reason, and by the Holy Scriptures. The law of nature and the law of revelation are both divine: they flow, though in different channels, from the same adorable source. It is, indeed, preposterous to separate them from each other. The object of both is—to discover the will of God—and both are necessary for the accomplishment of that end.
I. The power of moral perception is, indeed, a most important part of our constitution. It is an original power—a power of its own kind; and totally distinct from the ideas of utility and agreeableness. By that power, we have conceptions of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation. By that power, we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong. We have the same reason to rely on the dictates of this faculty, as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural powers. When an action is represented to us, flowing from love, humanity, gratitude, an ultimate desire of the good of others; though it happened in a country far distant, or in an age long past, we admire the lovely exhibition, and praise its author. The contrary conduct, when represented to us, raises our abhorrence and aversion. But whence this secret chain betwixt each person and mankind? If there is no moral sense, which makes benevolence appear beautiful; if all approbation be from the interest of the approver;
“What’s Hecuba to us, or we to Hecuba?” (Hamlet, paraphrase)
The mind, which reflects on itself, and is a spectator of other minds, sees and feels the soft and the harsh, the agreeable and the disagreeable, the foul and the fair, the harmonious and the dissonant, as really and truly in the affections and actions, as in any musical numbers, or the outward forms or representations of sensible things. It cannot withhold its approbation or aversion in what relates to the former, any more than in what relates to the latter, of those subjects. To deny the sense of a sublime and beautiful and of their contraries in actions and things, will appear an affectation merely to one who duly considers and traces the subject. Even he who indulges this affectation cannot avoid the discovery of those very sentiments, which he pretends not to feel. A Lucretius or a Hobbes cannot discard the sentiments of praise and admiration respecting some moral forms, nor the sentiments of censure and detestation concerning others. Has a man gratitude, or resentment, or pride, or shame? If he has and avows it; he must have and acknowledge a sense of something benevolent, of something unjust, of something worthy, and of something mean. Thus, so long as we find men pleased or angry, proud or ashamed; we may appeal to the reality of the moral sense. A right and a wrong, an honourable and a dishonourable is plainly conceived. About these there may be mistakes; but this destroys not the inference, that the things are, and are universally acknowledged—that they are of nature’s impression, and by no art can be obliterated.
This sense or apprehension of right and wrong appears early, and exists in different degrees. The qualities of love, gratitude, sympathy unfold themselves, in the first stages of life, and the approbation of those qualities accompanies the first dawn of reflection. Young people, who think the least about the distant influences of actions, are, more than others, moved with moral forms. Hence that strong inclination in children to hear such stories as paint the characters and fortunes of men. Hence that joy in the prosperity of the kind and faithful, and that sorrow upon the success of the treacherous and cruel, with which we often see infant minds strongly agitated.
There is a natural beauty in figures; and is there not a beauty as natural in actions? When the eye opens upon forms, and the ear to sounds; the beautiful is seen, and harmony is heard and acknowledged. When actions are viewed and affections are discerned, the inward eye distinguishes the beautiful, the amiable, the admirable, from the despicable, the odious, and the deformed. How is it possible not to own, that as these distinctions have their foundation in nature, so this power of discerning them is natural also?
The universality of an opinion or sentiment may be evinced by the structure of languages. Languages were not invented by philosophers, to countenance or support any artificial system. They were contrived by men in general, to express common sentiments and perceptions. The inference is satisfactory, that where all languages make a distinction, there must be a similar distinction in universal opinion or sentiment. For language is the picture of human thoughts; and, from this faithful picture, we may draw certain conclusions concerning the original. Now, a universal effect must have a universal cause. No universal cause can, with propriety, be assigned for this universal opinion, except that intuitive perception of things, which is distinguished by the name of common sense.
All languages speak of a beautiful and a deformed, a right and a wrong, an agreeable and disagreeable, a good and ill, in actions, affections, and characters. All languages, therefore, suppose a moral sense, by which those qualities are perceived and distinguished.
The whole circle of the arts of imitation proves the reality of the moral sense. They suppose, in human conduct, a sublimity, a beauty, a greatness, an excellence, independent of advantage or disadvantage, profit or loss. On him, whose heart is indelicate or hard; on him, who has no admiration of what is truly noble; on him, who has no sympathetick sense of what is melting and tender, the highest beauty of the mimick arts must make indeed, but a very faint and transient impression. If we were void of a relish for moral excellence, how frigid and uninteresting would the finest descriptions of life and manners appear! How indifferent are the finest strains of harmony, to him who has not a musical ear!
The force of the moral sense is diffused through every part of life. The luxury of the table derives its principal charms from some mixture of moral enjoyments, from communicating pleasures, and from sentiments honourable and just as well as elegant— “The feast of reason, and the flow of soul.”
The chief pleasures of history, and poetry, and eloquence, and musick, and sculpture, and painting are derived from the same source. Beside the pleasures they afford by imitation, they receive a stronger charm from something moral insinuated into the performances. The principal beauties of behaviour, and even of countenance, arise from the indication of affections or qualities morally estimable.
Never was there any of the human species above the condition of an idiot, to whom all actions appeared indifferent. All feel that a certain temper, certain affections, and certain actions produce a sentiment of approbation; and that a sentiment of disapprobation is produced by the contrary temper, affections, and actions. This power is capable of culture and improvement by habit, and by frequent and extensive exercise. A high sense of moral excellence is approved above all other intellectual talents. This high sense of excellence is accompanied with a strong desire after it, and a keen relish for it. This desire and this relish are approved as the most amiable affections, and the highest virtues.
This moral sense, from its very nature, is intended to regulate and control all our other powers. It governs our passions as well as our actions. Other principles may solicit and allure; but the conscience assumes authority, it must be obeyed. Of this dignity and commanding nature we are immediately conscious, as we are of the power itself. It estimates what it enjoins, not merely as superiour in degree, but as superiour likewise in kind, to what is recommended by our other perceptive powers. Without this controlling faculty, endowed as we are with such a variety of senses and interfering desires, we should appear a fabrick destitute of order: but possessed of it, all our powers may be harmonious and consistent; they may all combine in one uniform and regular direction.
In short; if we had not the faculty of perceiving certain things in conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; and of perceiving our obligation to do what is right, and not to do what is wrong; we should not be moral and accountable beings. If we be, as, I hope, I have shown we are, endowed with this faculty; there must be some things, which are immediately discerned by it to be right, and others to be wrong. There must, consequently, be in morals, as in other sciences, first principles, which derive not their evidence from any antecedent principles, but which may be said to be intuitively discerned.
Moral truths may be divided into two classes; such as are selfevident, and such as, from the selfevident ones, are deduced by reasoning. If the first be not discerned without reasoning, reasoning can never discern the last. The cases that require reasoning are few, compared with those that require none; and a man may be very honest and virtuous, who cannot reason, and who knows not what demonstration means. If the rules of virtue were left to be discovered by reasoning, even by demonstrative reasoning, unhappy would be the condition of the far greater part of men, who have not the means of cultivating the power of reasoning to any high degree. As virtue is the business of all men, the first principles of it are written on their hearts, in characters so legible, that no man can pretend ignorance of them, or of his obligation to practise them. Reason, even with experience, is too often overpowered by passion; to restrain whose impetuosity, nothing less is requisite than the vigorous and commanding principle of duty.
II. The first principles of morals, into which all moral argumentation may be resolved, are discovered in a manner more analogous to the perceptions of sense than to the conclusions of reasoning. In morality, however, as well as in other sciences, reason is usefully introduced, and performs many important services. In many instances she regulates our belief; and in many instances she regulates our conduct. She determines the proper means to any end; and she decides the preference of one end over another. She may exhibit an object to the mind, though the perception which the mind has, when once the object is exhibited, may properly belong to a sense. She may be necessary to ascertain the circumstances and determine the motives to an action; though it be the moral sense that perceives the action to be either virtuous or vicious, after its motive and its circumstances have been discovered. She discerns the tendencies of the several senses, affections, and actions, and the comparative value of objects and gratifications. She judges concerning subordinate ends; but concerning ultimate ends she is not employed. These we prosecute by some immediate determination of the mind, which, in the order of action, is prior to all reasoning; for no opinion or judgment can move to action, where there is not a previous desire of some end.—This power of comparing the several enjoyments, of which our nature is susceptible, in order to discover which are most important to our happiness, is of the highest consequence and necessity to corroborate our moral faculty, and to preserve our affections in just rank and regular order.
A magistrate knows that it is his duty to promote the good of the commonwealth, which has intrusted him with authority. But whether one particular plan or another particular plan of conduct in office, may best promote the good of the commonwealth, may, in many cases, be doubtful. His conscience or moral sense determines the end, which he ought to pursue; and he has intuitive evidence that his end is good: but the means of attaining this end must be determined by reason. To select and ascertain those means, is often a matter of very considerable difficulty. Doubts may arise; opposite interests may occur; and a preference must be given to one side from a small over-balance, and from very nice views. This is particularly the case in questions with regard to justice. If every single instance of justice, like every single instance of benevolence, were pleasing and useful to society, the case would be more simple, and would be seldom liable to great controversy. But as single instances of justice are often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency; and as the advantage to society results only from the observance of the general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of several persons in the same equitable conduct; the case here becomes more intricate and involved. The various circumstances of society, the various consequences of any practice, the various interests which may be proposed, are all, on many occasions, doubtful, and subject to much discussion and inquiry. The design of municipal law (for let us still, from every direction, open a view to our principal object) the design of municipal law is to fix all the questions which regard justice. A very accurate reason or judgment is often requisite, to give the true determination amidst intricate doubts, arising from obscure or opposite utilities. Thus, though good and ill, right and wrong are ultimately perceived by the moral sense, yet reason assists its operations, and, in many instances, strengthens and extends its influence. We may argue concerning propriety of conduct: just reasonings on the subject will establish principles for judging of what deserves praise: but, at the same time, these reasonings must always, in the last resort, appeal to the moral sense.
Farther; reason serves to illustrate, to prove, to extend, to apply what our moral sense has already suggested to us, concerning just and unjust, proper and improper, right and wrong. A father feels that paternal tenderness is refined and confirmed, by reflecting how consonant that feeling is to the relation between a parent and his child; how conducive it is to the happiness, not only of a single family, but, in its extension, to that of all mankind. We feel the beauty and excellence of virtue; but this sense is strengthened and improved by the lessons, which reason gives us concerning the foundations, the motives, the relations, the particular and the universal advantages flowing from this virtue, which, at first sight, appeared so beautiful.
Taste is a faculty, common, in some degree, to all men. But study, attention, comparison operate most powerfully towards its refinement. In the same manner, reason contributes to ascertain the exactness, and to discover and correct the mistakes, of the moral sense. A prejudice of education may be misapprehended for a determination of morality. ’Tis reason’s province to compare and discriminate.
Reason performs an excellent service to the moral sense in another respect. It considers the relations of actions, and traces them to the remotest consequences. We often see men, with the most honest hearts and most pure intentions, embarrassed and puzzled, when a case, delicate and complicated, comes before them. They feel what is right; they are unshaken in their general principles; but they are unaccustomed to pursue them through their different ramifications, to make the necessary distinctions and exceptions, or to modify them according to the circumstances of time and place. ’Tis the business of reason to discharge this duty; and it will discharge it the better in proportion to the care which has been employed in exercising and improving it.
The existence of the moral sense has been denied by some philosophers of high fame: its authority has been attacked by others: the certainty and uniformity of its decisions have been arraigned by a third class. We are told, that, without education, we should have been in a state of perfect indifference as to virtue and vice; that an education, opposite to that which we have received, would have taught us to regard as virtue that which we now dislike as vice, and to despise as vice that which we now esteem as virtue. In support of these observations, it is farther said, that moral sentiment is different in different countries, in different ages, and under different forms of government and religion; in a word, that it is as much the effect of custom, fashion, and artifice, as our taste in dress, furniture, and the modes of conversation. Facts and narratives have been assembled and accumulated, to evince the great diversity and even contrariety that subsists concerning moral opinions. And it has been gravely asked, whether the wild boy, who was caught in the woods of Hanover, would feel a sentiment of disapprobation upon being told of the conduct of a parricide. An investigation of those facts and narratives cannot find a place in these lectures; though the time bestowed on it might be well employed. It may, however, be proper to observe, that it is but candid to consider human nature in her improved, and not in her most rude or depraved forms. “The good experienced man,” says Aristotle, “is the last measure of all things.” To ascertain moral principles, we appeal not to the common sense of savages, but of men in their most perfect state.
Epicurus, as well as some modern advocates of the same philosophy, seem to have taken their estimates of human nature from its meanest and most degrading exhibitions; but the noblest and most respectable philosophers of antiquity have chosen, for a much wiser and better purpose, to view it on the brightest and most advantageous side. “It is impossible,” says the incomparable Addison, “to read a passage in Plato or Tully, and a thousand other ancient moralists, without being a greater and a better man for it. On the contrary, I could never read some modish modern authors, without being, for some time, out of humour with myself, and at every thing about me. Their business is to depreciate human nature, and consider it under its worst appearances. They give mean interpretation and base motives to the worthiest actions—in short, they endeavour to make no distinction between man and man, or between the species of men and that of brutes.” True it is, that some men and some nations are savage and brutish; but is that a reason why their manners and their practices should be generally and reproachfully charged to the account of human nature? It may, perhaps, be somewhat to our purpose to observe, that in many of these representations, the picture, if compared with the original, will be found to be overcharged. For, in truth, between mankind, considered even in their rudest state, and the mutum et turpe pecus (dumb and base herd), a very wide difference will be easily discovered. In the most uninformed savages, we find the communes notitiae, the common notions and practical principles of virtue, though the application of them is often extremely unnatural and absurd. These same savages have in them the seeds of the logician, the man of taste, the orator, the statesman, the man of virtue, and the saint. These seeds are planted in their minds by nature, though, for want of culture and exercise, they lie unnoticed, and are hardly perceived by themselves or by others. Besides, some nations that have been supposed stupid and barbarous by nature, have, upon fuller acquaintance with their history, been found to have been rendered barbarous and depraved by institution. When, by the power of some leading members, erroneous laws are once established, and it has become the interest of subordinate tyrants to support a corrupt system; errour and iniquity become sacred. Under such a system, the multitude are fettered by the prejudices of education, and awed by the dread of power, from the free exercise of their reason. These principles will account for the many absurd and execrable tenets and practices with regard to government, morals, and religion, which have been invented and established in opposition to the unbiassed sentiments, and in derogation of the natural rights of mankind. But, after making all the exceptions and abatements, of which these facts and narratives, if admitted in their fullest extent, would justify the claim, still it cannot be denied, but is even acknowledged, that some sorts of actions command and receive the esteem of mankind more than others; and that the approbation of them is general, though not universal. It will certainly be sufficient for our purpose to observe, that the dictates of reason are neither more general, nor more uniform, nor more certain, nor more commanding, than the dictates of the moral sense. Nay, farther; perhaps, upon inquiry, we shall find, that those obliquities, extravagancies, and inconsistencies of conduct, that are produced as proofs of the nonexistence or inutility of the moral sense, are, in fact, chargeable to that faculty, which is meant to be substituted in its place. We shall find that men always approve upon an opinion—true or false, but still an opinion—that the actions approved have the qualities and tendencies, which are the proper objects of approbation. They suppose that such actions will promote their own interest; or will be conducive to the publick good; or are required by the Deity; when, in truth, they have all the contrary properties—may be forbidden by the Deity, and may be detrimental both to publick and to private good. But when all this happens, to what cause is it to be traced? Does it prove the nonexistence of a moral sense, or does it prove, in such instances, the weakness or perversion of reason? The just solution is, that, in such instances, it is our reason, which presents false appearances to our moral sense.
It is with much reluctance, that the power of our instinctive or intuitive faculties is acknowledged by some philosophers. That the brutes are governed by instinct, but that man is governed by reason, is their favourite position. But fortunately for man, this position is not founded on truth. Our instincts, as well as our rational powers, are far superiour, both in number and in dignity, to those, which the brutes enjoy; and it were well for us, on many occasions, if we laid our reasoning systems aside, and were more attentive in observing the genuine impulses of nature. In this enlarged and elevated meaning, the sentiment of Pope receives a double portion of force and sublimity.
“And reason raise o’er instinct as you can,
In this, ’tis God directs, in that, ’tis man.”
This sentiment is not dictated merely in the fervid glow of enraptured poetry; it is affirmed by the deliberate judgment of calm, sedate philosophy. Our instincts are no other than the oracles of eternal wisdom; our conscience, in particular, is the voice of God within us: it teaches, it commands, it punishes, it rewards. The testimony of a good conscience is the purest and the noblest of human enjoyments.
It will be proper to examine a little more minutely the opinions of those, who allege reason to be the sole directress of human conduct. Reason may, indeed, instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions: but reason alone is not sufficient to produce any moral approbation or blame. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and if the end be totally indifferent to us, we shall feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite that sentiment should intervene, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies.
Reason judges either of relations or of matters of fact. Let us consider some particular virtue or vice under both views. Let us take the instance of ingratitude. This has place, when good will is expressed and good offices are performed on one side, and ill will or indifference is shown on the other. The first question is—what is that matter of fact, which is here called a vice? Indifference or ill will. But ill will is not always, nor in all circumstances a crime: and indifference may, on some occasions, be the result of the most philosophick fortitude. The vice of ingratitude, then, consists not in matter of fact.
Let us next inquire into the relations, which reason can discover, among the materials, of which ingratitude is composed. She discovers good will and good offices on one side, and ill will or indifference on the other. This is the relation of contrariety. Does ingratitude consist in this? To which side of the contrary relation is it to be placed? For this relation of contrariety is formed as much by good will and good offices, as by ill will or indifference. And yet the former deserves praise as much as the latter deserves blame.
If it shall be said, that the morality of an action does not consist in the relation of its different parts to one another, but in the relation of the whole actions to the rule; and that actions are denominated good or ill, as they agree or disagree with that rule; another question occurs—What is this rule of right? by what is it discovered or determined? By reason, it is said. How does reason discover or determine this rule? It must be by examining facts or the relations of things. But by the analysis which has been given of the particular instance under our consideration, it has appeared that the vice of ingratitude consists neither in the matter of fact, nor in the relation of the parts, of which the fact is composed. Objects in the animal world, nay inanimate objects, may have to each other all the same relations, which we observe in moral agents; but such objects are never supposed to be susceptible of merit or demerit, of virtue or vice.
The ultimate ends of human actions, can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason. They recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of men, without dependence on the intellectual faculties. Why do you take exercise? Because you desire health. Why do you desire health? Because sickness is painful. Why do you hate pain? No answer is heard. Can one be given? No. This is an ultimate end, and is not referred to any farther object.
To the second question, you may, perhaps, answer, that you desire health, because it is necessary for your improvement in your profession. Why are you anxious to make this improvement? You may, perhaps, answer again, because you wish to get money by it. Why do you wish to get money? Because, among other reasons, it is the instrument of pleasure. But why do you love pleasure? Can a reason be given for loving pleasure, any more than for hating pain? They are both ultimate objects. ’Tis impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason, why another is hated or desired. Something must be hateful or desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate agreement or disagreement with human sentiment and affection. Virtue and vice are ends; and are hateful or desirable on their own account. It is requisite, therefore, that, there should be some sentiment, which they touch—some internal taste or sense, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces one, and rejects the other. Thus are the offices of reason and of the moral sense at last ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter, the sentiment of beauty and deformity, of vice and virtue. The standard of one, founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible. The standard of the other is ultimately derived from that supreme will, which bestowed on us our peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence. In this manner, we return to the great principle, from which we set out. It is necessary that reason should be fortified by the moral sense: without the moral sense, a man may be prudent, but he cannot be virtuous.
Philosophers have degraded our senses below their real importance. They represent them as powers, by which we have sensations and ideas only. But this is not the whole of their office; they judge as well as inform. Not confined to the mere office of conveying impressions, they are exalted to the function of judging of the nature and evidence of the impressions they convey. If this be admitted, our moral faculty may, without impropriety, be called the moral sense. Its testimony, like that of the external senses, is the immediate testimony of nature, and on it we have the same reason to rely. In its dignity, it is, without doubt, far superiour to every other power of the mind.
The moral sense, like all our other powers, comes to maturity by insensible degrees. It is peculiar to human nature. It is both intellectual and active. It is evidently intended, by nature, to be the immediate guide and director of our conduct, after we arrive at the years of understanding.
III. Reason and conscience can do much; but still they stand in need of support and assistance. They are useful and excellent monitors; but, at some times, their admonitions are not sufficiently clear; at other times, they are not sufficiently powerful; at all times, their influence is not sufficiently extensive. Great and sublime truths, indeed, would appear to a few; but the world, at large, would be dark and ignorant. The mass of mankind would resemble a chaos, in which a few sparks, that would diffuse a glimmering light, would serve only to show, in a more striking manner, the thick darkness with which they are surrounded. Their weakness is strengthened, their darkness is illuminated, their influence is enlarged by that heaven-descended science, which has brought life and immortality to light. In compassion to the imperfection of our internal powers, our all-gracious Creator, Preserver, and Ruler has been pleased to discover and enforce his laws, by a revelation given to us immediately and directly from himself. This revelation is contained in the holy scriptures. The moral precepts delivered in the sacred oracles form a part of the law of nature, are of the same origin, and of the same obligation, operating universally and perpetually.
On some important subjects, those in particular, which relate to the Deity, to Providence, and to a future state, our natural knowledge is greatly improved, refined, and exalted by that which is revealed. On these subjects, one who has had the advantage of a common education in a christian country, knows more, and with more certainty, than was known by the wisest of the ancient philosophers.
One superiour advantage the precepts delivered in the sacred oracles clearly possess. They are, of all, the most explicit and the most certain. A publick minister, judging from what he knows of the interests, views, and designs of the state, which he represents, may take his resolutions and measures, in many cases, with confidence and safety; and may presume, with great probability, how the state itself would act. But if, besides this general knowledge, and these presumptions highly probable, he was furnished also with particular instructions for the regulation of his conduct; would he not naturally observe and govern himself by both rules? In cases, where his instructions are clear and positive, there would be an end of all farther deliberation. In other cases, where his instructions are silent, he would supply them by his general knowledge, and by the information, which he could collect from other quarters, concerning the counsels and systems of the commonwealth. Thus it is with regard to reason, conscience, and the holy scriptures. Where the latter give instructions, those instructions are supereminently authentick. But whoever expects to find, in them, particular directions for every moral doubt which arises, expects more than he will find. They generally presuppose a knowledge of the principles of morality; and are employed not so much in teaching new rules on this subject, as in enforcing the practice of those already known, by a greater certainty, and by new sanctions. They present the warmest recommendations and the strongest inducements in favour of virtue: they exhibit the most powerful dissuasives from vice. But the origin, the nature, and the extent of the several rights and duties they do not explain; nor do they specify in what instances one right or duty is entitled to preference over another. They are addressed to rational and moral agents, capable of previously knowing the rights of men, and the tendencies of actions; of approving what is good, and of disapproving what is evil.
These considerations show, that the scriptures support, confirm, and corroborate, but do not supercede the operations of reason and the moral sense. The information with regard to our duties and obligations, drawn from these different sources, ought not to run in unconnected and diminished channels: it should flow in one united stream, which, by its combined force and just direction, will impel us uniformly and effectually towards our greatest good.
We have traced, with some minuteness, the efficient principle of obligation, and the several means, by which our duty may be known. It will be proper to turn our attention back to the opinions that have been held, in philosophy and jurisprudence, concerning this subject. On a review of them, we shall now find that, in general, they are defective rather than erroneous; that they have fallen short of the mark, rather than deviated from the proper course.
The fitness of things denotes their fitness to produce our happiness: their nature means that actual constitution of the world, by which some things produce happiness, and others misery. Reason is one of the means, by which we discern between those things, which produce the former, and those things, which produce the latter. The moral sense feels and operates to promote the same essential discriminations. Whatever promotes the greatest happiness of the whole, is congenial to the principles of utility and sociability: and whatever unites in it all the foregoing properties, must be agreeable to the will of God: for, as has been said once, and as ought to be said again, his will is graciously comprised in this one paternal precept—Let man pursue his happiness and perfection.
The law of nature is immutable; not by the effect of an arbitrary disposition, but because it has its foundation in the nature, constitution, and mutual relations of men and things. While these continue to be the same, it must continue to be the same also. This immutability of nature’s laws has nothing in it repugnant to the supreme power of an all-perfect Being. Since he himself is the author of our constitution; he cannot but command or forbid such things as are necessarily agreeable or disagreeable to this very constitution. He is under the glorious necessity of not contradicting himself. This necessity, far from limiting or diminishing his perfections, adds to their external character, and points out their excellency.
The law of nature is universal. For it is true, not only that all men are equally subject to the command of their Maker; but it is true also, that the law of nature, having its foundation in the constitution and state of man, has an essential fitness for all mankind, and binds them without distinction.
This law, or right reason, as Cicero calls it, is thus beautifully described by that eloquent philosopher. “It is, indeed,” says he, “a true law, conformable to nature, diffused among all men, unchangeable, eternal. By its commands, it calls men to their duty: by its prohibitions, it deters them from vice. To diminish, to alter, much more to abolish this law, is a vain attempt. Neither by the senate, nor by the people, can its powerful obligation be dissolved. It requires no interpreter or commentator. It is not one law at Rome, another at Athens; one law now, another hereafter: it is the same eternal and immutable law, given at all times and to all nations: for God, who is its author and promulgator, is always the sole master and sovereign of mankind.”
“Man never is,” says the poet, in a seeming tone of complaint, “but always to be blest.” The sentiment would certainly be more consolatory, and, I think, it would be likewise more just, if we were to say—man ever is; for always to be blest. That we should have more and better things before us, than all that we have yet acquired or enjoyed, is unquestionably a most desirable state. The reflection on this circumstance, far from diminishing our sense or the importance of our present attainments and advantages, produces the contrary effects. The present is gilded by the prospect of the future.
When Alexander had conquered a world, and had nothing left to conquer; what did he do? He sat down and wept. A well directed ambition that has conquered worlds, is exempted from the fate of that of Alexander the Great: it still sees before it more and better worlds as the objects of conquest.
It is the glorious destiny of man to be always progressive. Forgetting those things that are behind, it is his duty, and it is his happiness, to press on towards those that are before. In the order of Providence, as has been observed on another occasion, the progress of societies towards perfection resembles that of an individual. This progress has hitherto been but slow: by many unpropitious events, it has often been interrupted: but may we not indulge the pleasing expectation, that, in future, it will be accelerated; and will meet with fewer and less considerable interruptions.
Many circumstances seem—at least to a mind anxious to see it, and apt to believe what it is anxious to see—many circumstances seem to indicate the opening of such a glorious prospect. The principles and the practice of liberty are gaining ground, in more than one section of the world. Where liberty prevails, the arts and sciences lift up their heads and flourish. Where the arts and sciences flourish, political and moral improvements will likewise be made. All will receive from each, and each will receive from all, mutual support and assistance: mutually supported and assisted, all may be carried to a degree of perfection hitherto unknown; perhaps, hitherto not believed. “Men,” says the sagacious Hooker, “if we view them in their spring, are, at the first, without understanding or knowledge at all. Nevertheless, from this utter vacuity, they grow by degrees, till they become at length to be even as the angels themselves are. That which agreeth to the one now, the other shall attain to in the end: they are not so far disjoined and severed, but that they come at length to meet.”
Our progress in virtue should certainly bear a just proportion to our progress in knowledge. Morals are undoubtedly capable of being carried to a much higher degree of excellence than the sciences, excellent as they are. Hence we may infer, that the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its operations and effects. Indeed, the same immutable principles will direct this progression. In every period of his existence, the law, which the divine wisdom has approved for man, will not only be fitted, to the cotemporary degree, but will be calculated to produce, in future, a still higher degree of perfection.
A delineation of the laws of nature, has been often attempted. Books, under the appellations of institutes and systems of that law, have been often published. From what has been said concerning it, the most finished performances executed by human hands cannot be perfect. But most of them have been rude and imperfect to a very unnecessary, some, to a shameful degree.
A more perfect work than has yet appeared upon this great subject, would be a most valuable present to mankind. Even the most general outlines of it cannot, at least in these lectures, be expected from me.
Of the Law of Nations
The law of nature, when applied to states or political societies, receives a new name, that of the law of nations. This law, important in all states, is of peculiar importance in free ones. The States of America are certainly entitled to this dignified appellation. A weighty part of the publick business is transacted by the citizens at large. They appoint the legislature, and, either mediately or immediately, the executive servants of the publick. As the conduct of a state, both with regard to itself and others, must greatly depend upon the character, the talents, and the principles of those, to whom the direction of that conduct is intrusted; it is highly necessary that those who are to protect the rights, and to perform the duties of the commonwealth, should be men of proper principles, talents, and characters: if so, it is highly necessary that those who appoint them should be able, in some degree at least, to distinguish and select those men, whose principles, talents, and characters are proper. In order to do this, it is greatly useful that they have, at least, some just and general knowledge of those rights that are to be protected, and of those duties that are to be performed. Without this, they will be unable to form a rational conjecture, concerning the future conduct of those whom they are to elect. Nay, what is more; without some such general and just knowledge, they will be unable to form a rational judgment, concerning the past and present conduct of those whom they have already elected; and, consequently, will be unable to form a rational determination whether, at the next election, they should reappoint them, or substitute others in their place. As the practice of the law of nations, therefore, must, in a free government, depend very considerably on the acts of the citizens, it is of high import that, among those citizens, its knowledge be generally diffused.
But, if the knowledge of the law of nations is greatly useful to those who appoint, it must surely be highly necessary to those who are appointed, the publick servants and stewards of the commonwealth. Can its interests be properly managed, can its character be properly supported, can its happiness be properly consulted, by those who know not what it owes to others, what it owes to itself, what it has a right to claim from others, and what it has a right to provide for itself? In a free commonwealth, the path to publick service and to publick honour is open to all. Should not all, therefore, sedulously endeavour to become masters of such qualifications, as will enable them to tread this path with credit to themselves, and with advantage to their country?
In the United States, a system of republicks, the law of nations acquires an importance still more peculiar and distinguished. In the United States, the law of nations, operates upon peculiar relations, and upon those relations with peculiar energy. Well am I justified, on every account, in announcing the dignity and greatness of the subject, upon which I am now to enter.
On all occasions, let us beware of being misled by names. Though the law, which I am now to consider, receives a new appellation; it retains, unimpaired, its qualities and its power. The law of nations, as well as the law of nature, is of obligation indispensable: the law of nations, as well as the law of nature, is of origin divine. The opinions of many concerning the law of nations have been very vague and unsatisfactory; and if such have been the opinions, we have little reason to be surprised, that the conduct of nations has too often been diametrically opposite to the law, by which it ought to have been regulated. In the judgment of some writers, it would seem, for instance, that neither the state which commences an unjust war, nor the chief who conducts it, derogates from the general sanctity of their respective characters. An ardent love of their country they seem to have thought a passion too heroick, to be restrained within the narrow limits of systematick morality; and those have been too often considered as the greatest patriots, who have contributed most to gratify the publick passion for conquest and power. States, as well as monarchs, have too frequently been blinded by ambition. Of this there is scarcely a page in ancient or in modern history, relating to national contentions, but will furnish the most glaring proofs. The melancholy truth is, that the law of nations, though founded on the most solid principles of natural obligation, has been but imperfectly viewed in theory, and has been too much disregarded in practice.
The profound and penetrating Bacon was not inattentive to the imperfect state, in which he found the science of the law of nations. As, in another science, that enlightened philosophical guide pointed to the discoveries of a Newton; so in this, in all probability, he laid a foundation for the researches of a Grotius. For we have reason to believe, as we are told by Barbeyrac, that it was the study of the works of Lord Bacon, that first inspired Grotius with the design of writing a system concerning the law of nations. In this science Grotius did much; for he was well qualified to do much. Extensive knowledge, prodigious reading, indefatigable application to study, all these were certainly his. Yet with all these, he was far from being as successful in law, as Sir Isaac Newton was in philosophy. He was unfortunate in not setting out on right and solid principles. His celebrated book of the Rights of War and Peace is indeed useful; but it ought not to be read without a due degree of caution: nor ought all his doctrines to be received, without the necessary grains of allowance. At this we ought not to wonder, when we consider the extent, the variety, and the importance of his subject, and that, before his time, it was little known, and much neglected. His opinion concerning the source and the obligation of the law of nations is very defective. He separates that law from the law of nature, and assigns to it a different origin. “When many men,” says he,“at different times and places, unanimously affirm the same thing for truth; this should be ascribed to a general cause. In the subjects treated of by us, this cause can be no other than either a just inference drawn from the principles of nature, or a universal consent. The first discovers to us the law of nature, the second the law of nations.” The law of nations, we see, he traces from the principle of universal consent. The consequence of this is, that the law of nations would be obligatory only upon those by whom the consent was given, and only by reason of that consent. The farther consequence would be, that the law of nations would lose a part, and the greatest part, of its obligatory force, and would also be restrained as to the sphere of its operations. That it would lose the greatest part of its obligatory force, sufficiently appears from what we have said at large concerning the origin and obligation of natural law, evincing it to be the will of God. That it would be restrained as to the sphere of its operations, appears from what Grotius himself says, when he explains his meaning in another place. He qualifies the universality of his expression by adding these words, “at least the most civilized nations;” and he afterwards says that this addition is made “with reason.” On the least civilized nations, therefore, the law of nations would not, according to his account of it, be obligatory.
I admit that there are laws of nations—perhaps it is to be wished that they were designated by an appropriate name; for names, after all, will have their influence on operations—I freely admit that there are laws of nations, which are founded altogether upon consent. National treaties are laws of nations, obligatory solely by consent. The customs of nations become laws solely by consent. Both kinds are certainly voluntary. But the municipal laws of a state are not more different from the law of nature, than those voluntary laws of nations are, in their source and power, different from the law of nations, properly so called. Indeed, those voluntary laws of nations are as much under the control of the law of nations, properly so called, as municipal laws are under the control of the law of nature. The law of nations, properly so called, is the law of nature applied to states and sovereigns. The law of nations, properly so called, is the law of states and sovereigns, obligatory upon them in the same manner, and for the same reasons, as the law of nature is obligatory upon individuals. Universal, indispensable, and unchangeable is the obligation of both.
But it will naturally be asked, if the law of nations bears, as from this account it bears, the same relation to states, which the law of nature bears to individuals; if the law of nature and the law of nations are accompanied with the same obligatory power, and are derived from the same common source; why should the law of nations have a distinct name? Why should it be considered as a separate science? Some have thought that the difference was only in name; and if only in name, there could surely be no solid reason for establishing even that difference. Of those, who thought so, Puffendorff was one. “Many,” says he, “assert the law of nature and of nations to be the very same thing, differing no otherwise than in external denomination. Thus Mr. Hobbes divides natural law, into the natural law of men, and the natural law of states, commonly called the law of nations. He observes, that the precepts of both are the same; but that as states, when once instituted, assume the personal properties of men, what we call the law of nature, when we speak of particular men, we denominate the law of nations, when we apply it to whole states, nations, or people. This opinion,” continues Puffendorff, “we, for our part, readily subscribe to; nor do we conceive, that there is any other voluntary or positive law of nations, properly vested with a true and legal force, and obliging as the ordinance of a superiour power.” By the way, we may here observe, that, with regard to the law of nations, Grotius and Puffendorff seem to have run into contrary extremes. The former was of opinion, that the whole law of nations took its origin and authority from consent. The latter was of opinion, that every part of the law of nations was the same with the law of nature, that no part of it could receive its obligatory force from consent; because, according to his favourite notion of law, no such thing could exist without the intervention of a superiour power. The truth seems to lie between the two great philosophers. The law of nations, properly so called, or, as it may be termed, the natural law of nations, is a part, and an important part, of the law of nature. The voluntary law of nations falls under the class of laws that are positive. If a particular name had been appropriated to this last species of law, it is probable that much confusion and ambiguity, on this subject, would have been avoided; and the distinction between the different parts of that law, comprehended, at present, under the name of the law of nations, would have been as clearly marked, as uniformly preserved, and as familiarly taken, as the well known and well founded distinction between natural and municipal law. But to return.
As Puffendorff thought that the law of nature and the law of nations were precisely the same, he has not, in his book on these subjects, treated of the law of nations separately; but has every where joined it with the law of nature, properly so called. His example has been followed by the greatest part of succeeding writers. But the imitation of it has produced a confusion of two objects, which ought to have been viewed and studied distinctly and apart. Though the law of nations, properly so called, be a part of the law of nature; though it spring from the same source; and though it is attended with the same obligatory power; yet it must be remembered that its application is made to very different objects. The law of nature is applied to individuals: the law of nations is applied to states. The important difference between the objects, will occasion a proportioned difference in the application of the law. This difference in the application renders it fit that the law of nature, when applied to states, should receive an appropriate name, and should be taught and studied as a separate science.
Though states or nations are considered as moral persons; yet the nature and essence of these moral persons differ necessarily, in many respects, from the nature and essence of the individuals, of whom they are composed. The application of a law must be made in a manner suitable to its object. The application, therefore, of the law of nature to nations must be made in a manner suitable to nations: its application to individuals must be made in a manner suitable to individuals. But as nations differ from individuals; the application of the law suitable to the former, must be different from its application suitable to the latter. To nations this different application cannot be made with accuracy, with justness, and with perspicuity, without the aid of new and discriminating rules. These rules will evince, that, on the principles themselves of the law of nature, that law, when applied to nations, will prescribe decisions different from those which it would prescribe, when applied to individuals. To investigate those rules; to deduce, from the same great and leading principles, applications differing in proportion to the difference of the persons to which they are applied, is the object of the law of nations, considered as a science distinct and separate from that of the law of nature.
Having given you this general idea and description of the law of nations; need I expatiate on its dignity and importance? The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. In free states, such as ours, the sovereign or supreme power resides in the people. In free states, therefore, such as ours, the law of nations is the law of the people. Let us again beware of being misled by an ambiguity, sometimes, such is the structure of language, unavoidable. When I say that, in free states, the law of nations is the law of the people; I mean not that it is a law made by the people, or by virtue of their delegated authority; as, in free states, all municipal laws are. But when I say that, in free states, the law of nations is the law of the people; I mean that, as the law of nature, in other words, as the will of nature’s God, it is indispensably binding upon the people, in whom the sovereign power resides; and who are, consequently, under the most sacred obligations to exercise that power, or to delegate it to such as will exercise it, in a manner agreeable to those rules and maxims, which the law of nature prescribes to every state, for the happiness of each, and for the happiness of all. How vast—how important—how interesting are these truths! They announce to a free people how exalted their rights; but, at the same time, they announce to a free people how solemn their duties are. If a practical knowledge and a just sense of these rights and these duties were diffused among the citizens, and properly impressed upon their hearts and minds; how great, how beneficial, how lasting would be their fruits! But, unfortunately, as there have been and there are, in arbitrary governments, flatterers of princes; so there have been and there are, in free governments, flatterers of the people. One distinction, indeed, is to be taken between them. The latter herd of flatterers persuade the people to make an improper use of the power, which of right they have: the former herd persuade princes to make an improper use of power, which of right they have not. In other respects, both herds are equally pernicious. Both flatter to promote their private interests: both betray the interests of those whom they flatter.
It is of the highest, and, in free states, it is of the most general importance, that the sacred obligation of the law of nations should be accurately known and deeply felt. Of all subjects, it is agreeable and useful to form just and adequate conceptions; but of those especially, which have an influence on the practice and morality of states. For it is a serious truth, however much it has been unattended to in practice, that the laws of morality are equally strict with regard to societies, as to the individuals of whom the societies are composed. It must be owing either to ignorance, or to a very unjustifiable disregard to this great truth, that some transactions of publick bodies have often escaped censure, nay, sometimes have received applause, though those transactions have been such, as none of the individuals composing those bodies would have dared to introduce into the management of his private affairs; because the person introducing them would have been branded with the most reproachful of names and characters. It has been long admitted, by those who have been the best judges of private life and manners, that integrity and sound policy go hand in hand. It is high time that this maxim should find an establishment in the councils of states, and in the cabinets of princes. Its establishment there would diffuse far and wide the most salutary and benign effects.
Opinions concerning the extent of the law of nations have not been less defective and inadequate, than those concerning its origin and obligatory force. Some seem to have thought, that this law respects and regulates the conduct of nations only in their intercourse with each other. A very important branch of this law—that containing the duties which a nation owes itself—seems to have escaped their attention. “The general principle,” says Burlamaqui, “of the law of nations, is nothing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges nations to the same duties as are prescribed to individuals. Thus the law of natural equality, which prohibits injury and commands the reparation of damage done; the law of beneficence, and of fidelity to our engagements, are laws respecting nations, and imposing, both on the people and on their respective sovereigns, the same duties as are prescribed to individuals.” Several other writers concerning the law of nations appear to have formed the same imperfect conceptions with regard to its extent. Let us recur to what the law of nature dictates to an individual. Are there not duties which he owes to himself? Is he not obliged to consult and promote his preservation, his freedom, his reputation, his improvement, his perfection, his happiness? Now that we have seen the law of nature as it respects the duties of individuals, let us see the law of nations as it respects the duties of states, to themselves: for we must recollect that the law of nations is only the law of nature judiciously applied to the conduct of states. From the duties of states, as well as of individuals, to themselves; a number of corresponding rights will be found to arise.
A state ought to attend to the preservation of its own existence. In what does the existence of a state consist? It consists in the association of the individuals, of which it is composed. In what consists the preservation of this existence? It consists in the duration of that association. When this association is dissolved, the state ceases to exist; though all the members, of whom it was composed, may still remain. It is the duty of a state, therefore, to preserve this association undissolved and unimpaired. But in this, as in many other instances, a difference between the nature of states and the nature of individuals will occasion, for the reasons already mentioned, a proportioned difference in the application of the law of nature. Nations, as well as men, are taught by the law of nature, gracious in its precepts, to consider their happiness as the great end of their existence. But without existence there can be no happiness: the means, therefore, must be secured, in order to secure the end. But yet, between the duty of self-preservation required from a state, and the duty of self-preservation required from a man, there is a most material difference; and this difference is founded on the law of nature itself. A nation has a right to assign to its existence a voluntary termination: a man has not. What can be the reasons of this difference? Several may be given. By the voluntary act of the individuals forming the nation, the nation was called into existence: they who bind, can also untie: by the voluntary act, therefore, of the individuals forming the nation, the nation may be reduced to its original nothing. But it was not by his own voluntary act that the man made his appearance upon the theatre of life; he cannot, therefore, plead the right of the nation, by his own voluntary act to make his exit. He did not make; therefore, he has no right to destroy himself. He alone, whose gift this state of existence is, has the right to say when and how it shall receive its termination.
Again; though nations are considered as moral persons, and, in that character, as entitled, in many respects, to claim the rights, and as obliged, in many respects, to perform the duties of natural persons; yet we must always remember that of natural persons those moral persons are composed; that for the sake of natural persons those moral persons were formed; and that while we suppose those moral persons to live, and think, and act, we know that they are natural persons alone, who really exist or feel, who really deliberate, resolve, and execute. Now none of these observations resulting from the nature and essence of the nation, can be applied, with any degree of propriety, to the nature and essence of the man: and, therefore, the inferences drawn from these observations, with regard to the case of the nation, are wholly inapplicable to the case of the man.
One of these inferences is, that as it was for the happiness of the members that the moral existence of the nation was produced; so the happiness of the members may require this moral existence to be annihilated. Can this inference be applied to the man?
Further; there may be a moral certainty, that, of the voluntary dissolution of the nation, the necessary consequence will be an increase of happiness. Can such a consequence be predicted, with moral certainty, concerning the voluntary death of the man?
This instance shows, in a striking manner, how, on some occasions, the law of nature, when applied to a nation, may dictate or authorize a measure of conduct very different from that, which it would authorize and dictate with regard to a man. As it is, in general, the duty of a state to preserve itself; so it is, in general, its duty to preserve its members. This is a duty which it owes to them, and to itself. It owes it to them, because their advantage was the final cause of their joining in the association, and engaging to support it; and they ought not to be deprived of this advantage, while they fulfil the conditions, on which it was stipulated. This duty the nation owes to itself, because the loss of its members is a proportionable loss of its strength; and the loss of its strength is proportionably injurious both to its security, and to its preservation. The result of these principles is, that the body of a nation should not abandon a country, a city, or even an individual, who has not forfeited his rights in the society.
The right and duty of a state to preserve its members are subject to the same limitations and conditions, as its right and duty to preserve itself. As, for some reasons, the society may be dissolved; so, for others, it may be dismembered. A part may be separated from the other parts; and that part may either become a new state, or may associate with another state already formed. An illustration of this doctrine may be drawn from a recent instance, which has happened in the commonwealth of Virginia. The district of Kentucky has, by an amicable agreement, been disjoined from the rest of the commonwealth, and has been formed into a separate state. It is a pleasure, perhaps I may add it is a laudable pride, to be able to furnish, to the world, the first examples of carrying into practice the most sublime parts of the most sublime theories of government and law.
When a nation has a right, and is under an obligation to preserve itself and its members; it has, by a necessary consequence, a right to do every thing, which, without injuring others, it can do, in order to accomplish and secure those objects. The law of nature prescribes not impossibilities: it imposes not an obligation, without giving a right to the necessary means of fulfilling it. The same principles, which evince the right of a nation to do every thing, which it lawfully may, for the preservation of itself and of its members, evince its right, also, to avoid and prevent, as much as it lawfully may, every thing which would load it with injuries, or threaten it with danger.
It is the right, and generally it is the duty, of a state, to form a constitution, to institute civil government, and to establish laws. If the constitution formed, or the government instituted, or the laws established shall, on experience, be found weak, or inconvenient, or pernicious; it is the right, and it is the duty of the state to strengthen, or alter, or abolish them. These subjects will be fully treated in another place.
A nation ought to know itself. It ought to form a just estimate of its own situation, both with regard to itself and to its neighbours. It ought to learn the excellencies, and the blemishes likewise of its own constitution. It ought to review the instances in which it has already attained, and it ought to ascertain those in which it falls short of, a practicable degree of perfection. It ought to find out what improvements are peculiarly necessary to be promoted, and what faults it is peculiarly necessary to avoid. Without a discriminating sagacity of this kind, the principle of imitation, intended for the wisest purposes in states as well as in individuals, would be always an uncertain, sometimes a dangerous guide. A measure extremely salutary to one state, might be extremely injurious to another. What, in one situation, would be productive of peace and happiness, might, in another, be the unfortunate cause of infelicity and war. Above all things, the genius and manners of the people ought to be carefully consulted. The government ought to be administered agreeably to this genius and these manners; but how can this be done, if this genius and these manners are unknown? This duty of self-knowledge is of vast extent and of vast importance, in nations as well as in men.
To love and to deserve honest fame, is another duty of a people, as well as of an individual. The reputation of a state is not only a pleasant, it is also a valuable possession. It attracts the esteem, it represses the unfriendly inclinations of its neighbours. This reputation is acquired by virtue, and by the conduct which virtue inspires. It is founded on the publick transactions of the state, and on the private behaviour of its members.
A state should avoid ostentation, but it should support its dignity. This should never be suffered to be degraded among other nations. In transactions between states, an attention to this object is of much greater importance than is generally imagined. Even the marks and titles of respect, to which a nation, and those who represent a nation, are entitled, ought not to be considered as trivial: they should be claimed with firmness: they should be given with alacrity. The dignity, the equality, the mutual independence, and the frequent intercourse of nations render such a tenour of conduct altogether indispensable.
It is the duty of a nation to intrust the management of its affairs only to its wisest and best citizens. The immense importance of this duty is easily seen; but it is not sufficiently regarded. The meanest menial of a family will not be received without examination and cautious inquiry. The most important servants of the publick will be voted in without consideration and without care. In electioneering, as it is called, we frequently find warm recommendations and active intrigues in favour of candidates for the highest offices, to whom the recommenders and intriguers would not, if put to the test, intrust the management of the smallest part of their own private interest. An election ground, the great theatre of original sovereignty, on which nothing but inviolable integrity and independent virtue should be exhibited, is often and lamentably transformed into a scene of the vilest and lowest debauchery and deception. An election maneuvre, an election story, are names appropriated to a conduct, which, in other and inferiour transactions, would be branded, and justly branded, with the most opprobrious appellations. Even those, who may be safely trusted every where else, will play false at elections. The remarks, which I have made concerning general elections, may be too often made, with equal truth, concerning other appointments to offices. But these things ought not to be. When the obligation and the importance of the great national duty required at elections—a duty prescribed by him who made us free—a duty prescribed that we may continue free—when all this shall be sufficiently diffused, and known, and felt; these things will not be. The people will then elect conscientiously; and will require conscientious conduct from those whom they elect.
A nation ought to encourage true patriotism in its members. The first step towards this encouragement is to distinguish between its real and its pretended friends. The discrimination, it is true, is often difficult, sometimes impracticable: but it is equally true, that it may frequently be made. Let the same care be employed, let the same pains be taken, to ascertain the marks of deceit and the marks of sincerity in publick life, and in intriguing for publick office, which are usually taken and employed in private life, and in solicitations for acts of private friendship. The care and pains will sometimes, indeed, be fruitless; but they will sometimes, too, be successful; at all times, they will be faithful witnesses, that those, who have employed them, have discharged their duty.
If a nation establish itself, or extend its establishment in a country already inhabited by others; it ought to observe strict justice, in both instances, with the former inhabitants. This is a part of the law of nations, that very nearly concerns the United States. It ought, therefore, to be well understood. The whole earth is allotted for the nourishment of its inhabitants; but it is not sufficient for this purpose, unless they aid it by labour and culture. The cultivation of the earth, therefore, is a duty incumbent on man by the order of nature. Those nations that live by hunting, and have more land than is necessary even for the purposes of hunting, should transfer it to those who will make a more advantageous use of it: those who will make this use of it ought to pay, for they can afford to pay, a reasonable equivalent. Even when the lands are no more than sufficient for the purposes of hunting, it is the duty of the new inhabitants, if advanced in society, to teach, and it is the duty of the original inhabitants, if less advanced in society, to learn, the arts and uses of agriculture. This will enable the latter gradually to contract, and the former gradually to extend their settlements, till the science of agriculture is equally improved in both. By these means, the intentions of nature will be fulfilled; the old and the new inhabitants will be reciprocally useful; peace will be preserved, and justice will be done.
It is the duty of a nation to augment its numbers. The performance of this duty will naturally result from the discharge of its other duties: by discharging them, the number of persons born in the society will be increased; and strangers will be incited to wish a participation in its blessings. Among other means of increasing the number of citizens, there are three of peculiar efficacy. The first is, easily to receive all strangers of good character, and to communicate to them the advantages of liberty. The state will be thus filled with citizens, who will bring with them commerce and the arts, and a rich variety of manners and characters. Another means conducive to the same end is, to encourage marriages. These are the pledges of the state. A third means for augmenting the number of inhabitants is, to preserve the rights of conscience inviolate. The right of private judgment is one of the greatest advantages of mankind; and is always considered as such. To be deprived of it is insufferable. To enjoy it lays a foundation for that peace of mind, which the laws cannot give, and for the loss of which the laws can offer no compensation.
A nation should aim at its perfection. The advantage and improvement of the citizens are the ends proposed by the social union. Whatever will render that union more perfect will promote these ends. The same principles, therefore, which show that a man ought to pursue the perfection of his nature, will show, likewise, that the citizens ought to contribute every thing in their power towards the perfection of the state. This right involves the right of preventing and avoiding every thing, which would interrupt or retard the progress of the state towards its perfection. It also involves the right of acquiring every thing, without which its perfection cannot be promoted or obtained.
Happiness is the centre, to which men and nations are attracted: it is, therefore, the duty of a nation to consult its happiness. In order to do this, it is necessary that the nation be instructed to search for happiness where happiness is to be found. The impressions that are made first, sink deepest; they frequently continue through life. That seed, which is sown in the tender minds of youth, will produce abundance of good, or abundance of evil. The education of youth, therefore, is of prime importance to the happiness of the state. The arts, the sciences, philosophy, virtue, and religion, all contribute to the happiness, all, therefore, ought to receive the encouragement, of the nation. In this manner, publick and private felicity will go hand in hand, and mutually assist each other in their progress.
When men have formed themselves into a state or nation, they may reciprocally enter into particular engagements, and, in this manner, contract new obligations in favour of the members of the community; but they cannot, by this union, discharge themselves from any duties which they previously owed to those, who form no part of the union. They continue under all the obligations required by the universal society of the human race—the great society of nations. The law of that great and universal society requires, that each nation should contribute to the perfection and happiness of the others. It is, therefore, a duty which every nation owes to itself, to acquire those qualifications, which will fit and enable it to discharge those duties which it owes to others. What those duties are, we shall now very concisely and summarily inquire. The first and most necessary duty of nations, as well as of men, is to do no wrong or injury. Justice is a sacred law of nations. If the law of the great society of nations requires, as we have seen it to require, that each should contribute to the perfection and happiness of others; the first degree of this duty surely is, that each should abstain from every thing, which would positively impair that perfection and happiness. This great principle prohibits one nation from exciting disturbances in another, from seducing its citizens, from depriving it of its natural advantages, from calumniating its reputation, from debauching the attachment of its allies, from fomenting or encouraging the hatred of its enemies. If, however, a nation, in the necessary prosecution of its own duties and rights, does what is disagreeable or even inconvenient to another, this is not to be considered as an injury; it ought to be viewed as the unavoidable result, and not as the governing principle of its conduct. If, at such conduct, offence is taken, it is the fault of that nation, which takes, not of that nation, which occasions it.
But nations are not only forbidden to do evil; they are also commanded to do good to one another. The duties of humanity are incumbent upon nations as well as upon individuals. An individual cannot subsist, at least he cannot subsist comfortably, by himself. What is true concerning one, is true concerning all. Without mutual good offices and assistance, therefore, happiness could not be procured, perhaps existence could not be preserved. Hence the necessity of the duties of humanity among individuals. Every one is obliged, in the first place, to do what he can for himself; in the next, to do what he can for others; beginning with those with whom he is most intimately connected. The consequence is, that each man is obliged to give to others every assistance, for which they have a real occasion, and which he can give without being wanting to himself. What each is obliged to perform for others, from others he is entitled to receive. Hence the advantage as well as the duty of humanity. These principles receive an application to states as well as to men. Each nation owes to every other the duties of humanity. It is true, there may be some difference in the application, in this as well as in other instances: but the principles of the application are the same. A nation can subsist by itself more securely and more comfortably than an individual can; therefore the duty of mutual assistance will not, at all periods, be equally indispensable, or return with equal frequency. But when it becomes, as it may become, equally indispensable; and when it returns, as it may return, with equal frequency; it ought, in either case, to be equally performed. One individual may attack another daily: a longer time is necessary for the aggression of one nation upon another. The assistance, therefore, which ought to be given to the individual daily, will be necessary for the nation only at more distant intervals of time. But between nations, what the duties of humanity lose in point of frequency, they gain in point of importance, in proportion, perhaps, to the difference between a single individual, and all those individuals of whom the nation is composed. One nation ought to give to another, not only the assistance necessary to its preservation, but that also which is necessary to its perfection, whenever it is wanted, and whenever, consistently with other superiour duties, it can be given. The cases in which assistance ought to be demanded, and those in which it ought to be given, must be decided respectively by that nation which demands, and by that of which the demand is made. It is incumbent on each to decide properly; not to demand, and not to refuse, without strong and reasonable cause.
It may, perhaps, be uncommon, but it is certainly just, to say that nations ought to love one another. The offices of humanity ought to flow from this pure source. When this happily is the case, then the principles of affection and of friendship prevail among states as among individuals: then nations will mutually support and assist each other with zeal and ardour; lasting peace will be the result of unshaken confidence; and kind and generous principles, of a nature far opposite to mean jealously, crooked policy, or cold prudence, will govern and prosper the affairs of men. And why should not this be the case? When a number of individuals, by the social union, become fellow citizens, can they, by that union, devest themselves of that relation, which subsists between them and the other—the far greater—part of the human species? With regard to those, can they cease to be men?
The love of mankind is an important duty and an exalted virtue. Much has been written, much has been said concerning the power of intellectual abstraction, which man possesses, and which distinguishes him so eminently from the inferiour orders of animals. But little has been said, and little has been written, concerning another power of the human mind, still more dignified, and, beyond all comparison, more amiable—I may call it the power of moral abstraction.
All things in nature are individuals. But when a number of individuals have a near and striking resemblance, we, in our minds, class them together, and refer them to a species, to which we assign a name. Again; when a number of species have a resemblance, though not so near and striking, we, in the same manner, class them also together, and refer them to a genus, to which we likewise assign a name. Different genera may have a resemblance, though still less close and striking; we refer them to a higher genus, till we arrive at being, the highest genus of all. This is the progress of intellectual abstraction.
We are possessed of a moral power, similar in its nature and in its progress—a principle of good will as well as of knowledge. This principle of benevolence is indeed primarily and chiefly directed towards individuals, those especially, with whom we are or wish to be most intimately connected. But this principle, as well as the other, is capable of abstraction, and of embracing general objects. The culture, the improvement, and the extension of this principle ought to have made, in the estimation of philosophers, as important a figure among the moral, as the other has made among the intellectual powers and operations of the mind; for it is susceptible of equal culture, of equal improvement, and of equal extension.
“After having,” says the illustrious Neckar, in his book concerning the importance of religious opinions, “proved myself a citizen of France, by my administration, as well as my writings, I wish to unite myself to a fraternity still more extended, that of the whole human race. Thus, without dispersing our sentiments, we may be able to communicate ourselves a great way off, and enlarge, in some measure, the limits of our circle. Glory be to our thinking faculties for it! to that spiritual portion of ourselves, which can take in the past, dart into futurity, and intimately associate itself with the destiny of men of all countries and of all ages!”
To the same purpose is the sentiment of Cicero, in his beautiful treatise on the nature and offices of friendship. “In tracing the social laws of nature,” says he, “it seems evident, that man, by the frame of his moral constitution, is supposed to consider himself as standing in some degree of social relation to the whole species in general; and that this principle acts with more or less vigour, according to the distance at which he is placed with respect to any particular community or individual of his kind.”
This principle of benevolence and sociability, which is not confined to one sect or to one state, but ranges excursive through the whole expanded theatre of men and nations, instead of being always acknowledged and always recommended, as it ought to have been, has been altogether omitted by some philosophers: by some, its existence seems to have been doubted or denied.
“Some sort of union,” says Rutherforth, in his institutes of natural law, “there is between all nations: they are all included in the collective idea of mankind, and are frequently spoken of under this general name. But this is not a social union: the several parts of the collective idea, whether we consider the great body of mankind as made up of individuals or of nations, are not connected, as the several parts of a civil society are, by compact among themselves: the connexion is merely notional, and is only made by the mind, for its own convenience.”
The very enlarged active power, concerning which I speak, is, to this day, so far as I know, without an appropriated name. The term philanthropy approaches near, but does not reach it. We sometimes call it patriotism, by a figurative extension of that term, which, in its proper meaning, denotes a circle of benevolence limited by the state, of which one is a member. When we speak of the most exalted of all characters, of the man who possesses this virtue, we generally describe him, by a metaphor, a “citizen of the world.” A “man of the world,” which would be the more natural expression, though it is in common use, is used to convey a very different idea.
If the general observations, which I have before made concerning the nature, the structure, and the evidence of language, be well founded, the particular remarks I have now made will appear to be striking and just.
This power of moral abstraction should be exercised and cultivated with the highest degree of attention and zeal. It is as necessary to the progress of exalted virtue, as the power of intellectual abstraction is to the progress of extensive knowledge. The progress of the former will be accompanied with a degree of pleasure, of utility, and of excellence, far superiour to any degree of those qualities, which can accompany the latter. The purest pleasures of mathematical learning spring from the source of accurate and extended intellectual abstraction. But those pleasures, pure as they are, must yield the palm to those, which arise from abstraction of the moral kind. By this power, exerted in different proportions, the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the empire of the United States, the civilized and commercial part of the world, the inhabitants of the whole earth, become objects of a benevolence the warmest, and of a spirit the most patriotick; for custom, the arbitress of language, has not yet authorized a more appropriate epithet. By this power, a number of individuals, who, considered separately, may be so minute, so unknown, or so distant, as to elude the operations of our benevolence, yet, comprehended under one important and distinguished aspect, may become a general and complex object, which will warm and dilate the soul. By this power the capacity of our nature is enlarged; men, otherwise invisible, are rendered conspicuous; and become known to the heart as well as to the understanding. This enlarged and elevated virtue ought to be cultivated by nations with peculiar assiduity and ardour. The sphere of exertion, to which an individual is confined, is frequently narrow, however enlarged his disposition may be. But the sphere, to the extent of which a state may exert herself, is often comparatively boundless. By exhibiting a glorious example in her constitution, in her laws, in the administration of her constitution and laws, she may diffuse reformation, she may diffuse instruction, she may diffuse happiness over this whole terrestrial globe.
How often and how fatally are expressions and sentiments perverted! How often and how fatally is perverted conduct the unavoidable and inveterate effect of perverted sentiment and expression! What immense treasures have been exhausted, what oceans of human blood have been shed, in France and England, by force of the expression “natural enemy!” ’Tis an unnatural expression. The antithesis is truly in the thought: for natural enmity forms no title in the genuine law of nations, part of the law of nature. It is adopted from a spurious code.
The foregoing rules and maxims of national law, though they are the sacred, the inviolable, and the exalted precepts of nature, and of nature’s Author, have been long unknown and unacknowledged among nations. Even where they have been known and acknowledged, their calm still voice has been drowned by the solicitations of interest, the clamours of ambition, and the thunder of war. Many of the ancient nations conceived themselves to be under no obligations whatever to other states or the citizens of other states, unless they could produce in their favour a connexion formed and cemented by a treaty of amity.
At last, however, the voice of nature, intelligible and persuasive, has been heard by nations that are civilized: at last it is acknowledged that mankind are all brothers: the happy time is, we hope, approaching, when the acknowledgment will be substantiated by a uniform corresponding conduct.
How beautiful and energetick are the sentiments of Cicero on this subject. “It is more consonant to nature,” that is, as he said a little before, to the law of nations, “to undertake the greatest labours, and to undergo the severest trouble, for the preservation and advantage of all nations, if such a thing could be accomplished, than to live in solitary repose, not only without pain, but surrounded with all the allurements of pleasure and wealth. Every one of a good and great mind, would prefer the first greatly before the second situation in life.” “It is highly absurd to say, as some have said, that no one ought to injure a parent or a brother, for the sake of his own advantage; but that another rule may be observed concerning the rest of the citizens: such persons determine that there is no law, no bonds of society among the citizens, for the common benefit of the commonwealth. This sentiment tends to dissolve the union of the state. Others, again, admit that a social regard is to be paid to the citizens, but deny that this regard ought to be extended in favour of foreigners: such persons would destroy the common society of the human race; and if this common society were destroyed, the destruction would involve, in it, the fate also of beneficence, liberality, goodness, justice. Which last virtue is the mistress and the queen of all the other virtues.” By justice here, Cicero clearly means that universal justice, which is the complete accomplishment of the law of nature.
It has been already observed, that there is one part of the law of nations, called their voluntary law, which is founded on the principle of consent: of this part, publick compacts and customs received and observed by civilized states form the most considerable articles.
Publick compacts are divided into two kinds—treaties and sponsions. Treaties are made by those who are empowered, by the constitution of a state, to represent it in its transactions with other nations. Sponsions are made by an inferiour magistrate or officer, on behalf of the state, but without authority from it. Such compacts, therefore, do not bind the state, unless it confirms them after they are made. These take place chiefly in negotiations and transactions between commanding officers, during a war.
Though the power of making treaties is usually, it is not necessarily annexed to sovereign power. Some of the princes and free cities of Germany, though they hold of the emperour and the empire, have nevertheless the right of making treaties with foreign nations: this right, as well as several other rights of sovereignty, the constitution of the empire has secured to them.
With a policy, wiser and more profound, because it shuts the door against foreign intrigues with the members of the union, no state comprehended within our national government, can enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. It is in the constitution or fundamental laws of every nation, that we must search, in order to discover what power it is, which has sufficient authority to contract, with validity, in the name of the state.
A treaty is valid, if there has been no essential defect in the manner, in which it has been made; and, in order to guard against essential defects, it is only necessary that there be sufficient power in the contracting parties, that their mutual consent be given, and that that consent be properly declared.
It is a truth certain in the law of nature, that he who has made a promise to another, has given to that other a perfect right to demand the performance of the promise. Nations and the representatives of nations, therefore, ought to preserve inviolably their treaties and engagements: by not preserving them, they subject themselves to all the consequences of violating the perfect right of those, to whom they were made. This great truth is generally acknowledged; but too frequently an irreligious disregard is shown to it in the conduct of princes and states. But such a disregard is weak as well as wicked. In publick as in private life, among sovereigns as among individuals, honesty is the best policy, as well as the soundest morality. Among merchants, credit is wealth; among states and princes, good faith is both respectability and power.
A state, which violates the sacred faith of treaties, violates not only the voluntary, but also the natural and necessary law of nations; for we have seen that, by the law of nature, the fulfilment of promises is a duty as much incumbent upon states as upon men. Indeed it is more incumbent on the former than on the latter; for the consequences both of performing and of violating the engagements of the former, are generally more important and more lasting, than any which can flow from engagements performed or violated by individuals. Hence the strict propriety, as well as the uncommon beauty of the sentiment—that if good faith were banished from every other place, she should find an inviolable sanctuary at least in the bosoms of princes. Every treaty should be illuminated by perspicuity and candour. A tricking minister is, in real infamy, degraded as much below a vulgar cheat, as the dignity of states is raised above that of private persons. Ability and address in negotiation may be used to avoid, never to accomplish a surprise.
Fraud in the subsequent interpretation, is equally base and dishonourable as fraud in the original structure of treaties. In the scale of turpitude, it weighs equally with the most flagrant and notorious perfidy.
Treaties and alliances are either personal or real. The first relate only to the contracting parties, and expire with those who contract. The second relate to the state, in whose name and by whose authority the contract was made, and are permanent as the state itself, unless they determine, at another period, by their own limitation. Every treaty or alliance made with a commonwealth is, in its own nature, real; for it has reference solely to the body of the state. When a free people make an engagement, it is the nation which contracts. Its stipulations depend not on the lives of those, who have been the instruments in forming the treaty: nor even on the lives of those citizens, who were alive when the treaty was formed. They change; but the commonwealth continues the same.
Hence the stability and the security of treaties made with commonwealths. By the faithful observance of their treaties, the Cantons of Switzerland have rendered themselves respectable and respected over all Europe. Let it be mentioned to the honour of the parliament of Great Britain, that it has frequently thanked its king for his zeal and attachment to the treaties, in which he has engaged the nation. The corruption of the best things and institutions, however, always degenerates into the worst. The citizens of Carthage prostituted the character of their republick to such a degree, that, if we may believe the testimony of an enemy, Punica fides (Carthaginian faith) became proverbial, over the ancient world, to denote the extreme of perfidy. As the United States have surpassed others, even other commonwealths, in the excellence of their constitution and government; it is reasonably to be hoped, that they will surpass them, likewise, in the stability of their laws, and in their fidelity to their engagements.
In the great chart of the globe of credit, we hope to see American placed as the very antipode of Carthaginian faith.
Of Municipal Law
Of Man, as an Individual
Of Man, as a Member of Society
“It is not fit that man should be alone,” said the all-wise and all-gracious Author of our frame, who knew it, because he made it; and who looked with compassion on the first solitary state of the work of his hands. Society is the powerful magnet, which, by its unceasing though silent operation, attracts and influences our dispositions, our desires, our passions, and our enjoyments. That we should be anxious to share, and, by sharing, to divide our afflictions, may, to some, appear by no means strange, because a certain turn of thinking will lead them to ascribe this propensity to the selfish rather than to the social part of our nature. But will this interested solution account for another propensity, equally uniform and equally strong? We are no less impatient to communicate our pleasures than our woes. Does self-interest predominate here? No. Our social affection acts here unmixed and uncontrolled.
There’s not a blessing individuals find,
But some way leans and hearkens to the kind.
No bandit fierce, no tyrant mad with pride,
No caverned hermit rests self-satisfied.
Who most to shun or hate mankind pretend,
Seek an admirer, or would fix a friend.
Abstract what others feel, what others think,
All pleasures sicken, and all glories sink.
In all our pictures of happiness, which, at certain gay and disengaged moments, appear, in soft and alluring colours, to our fancy, does not a partner of our bliss always occupy a conspicuous place? When, on the other hand, phantoms of misery haunt our disturbed imaginations, do not solitary wanderings frequently form a principal part of the gloomy scenes? It is not an uncommon opinion, and, in this instance, our opinions must be vouched by our feelings, that the most exquisite punishment, which human nature could suffer, would be, in total solitude, to languish out a lengthened life.
. . .
How various and how unwearied are the workings of the social aim! Deprived of one support, it lays hold on another: deprived of that other, it lays hold on another still. While an intelligent, or even an animate being can be found, it will find an object for its unremitted pursuit and attachment.
We may extract sweet lessons of liberty and sociability from the prison of barbarous and despotick power. A French nobleman was long immured in a dreary and solitary apartment. When he had uttered many an unavailing sigh after society, he, at last, was fortunate enough to discover a spider, who had taken up his abode in the same room. Delighted with the acquisition, he immediately formed a social intercourse with the joint inhabitant of his sequestered mansion. He enjoyed, without molestation, this society for a considerable time. But the correspondence was, at last, discovered by his keeper, long tutored and accustomed to all the ingenious inventions and refinements of barbarity. By an effort, which evinced him a consummate master of his art, he killed the spider, and reduced his prisoner again to absolute solitude. The nobleman, after his release, used frequently to declare, that he had seldom experienced more poignant distress, than what he had suffered from the loss of his companion in confinement.
Some philosophers, however, have alleged, that society is not natural, but is only adventitious to us; that it is the mere consequence of direful necessity; that, by nature, men are wolves to men; not wolves to wolves; for between them union and society have a place; but as wolves to sheep, destroyers and devourers. Men, say they, are made for rapine; they are destined to prey upon one another: each is to fight for victory, and to subdue and enslave as many of his fellow creatures, as he possibly can, by treachery or by force. According to these philosophers, the only natural principles of man are selfishness, and an insatiable desire of tyranny and dominion. Their conclusion is, that a state of nature, instead of being a state of kindness, society, and peace, is a state of selfishness, discord, and war. By a strange perversion of things, they would so explain all the social passions and natural affections, as to denominate them of the selfish species. Humanity and hospitality towards strangers or those in distress are represented as selfishness, only of a more deliberate kind. An honest heart is only a cunning one; and good nature is a well regulated self-love. The love of posterity, of kindred, of country, and of mankind—all these are only so many different modifications of this universal self-love.
But if we attend to our nature and our state; if we listen to the operations of our own minds, to our dispositions, our sensations, and our propensities; we shall be fully and agreeably convinced, that the narrow and hideous representation of these philosophers is not founded on the truth of things; but, on the contrary, is totally repugnant to all human sentiment, and all human experience. Indeed, an appeal to themselves will evince, that their philosophy is not consistent even with the instinctive principles of their own hearts—principles, of which the native lustre will, at some times, beam forth, notwithstanding all the care employed to cover or extinguish it. The celebrated Sage of Malmesbury, savage and unsociable as he would make himself and all mankind appear, took the utmost pains that, during his life, and even after his death, others might be kindly rescued from the unhappy delusions, by which they were prevented from discovering the truth.b He told us “that both in religion and in morals, we were imposed on by our governours; that there is nothing, which, by nature, inclines us either way; and that nothing naturally draws us to the love of what is without or beyond ourselves.” And yet he was the most laborious of all men in composing and publishing systems of this kind—for our use.
To such philosophers, animated with this preposterous zeal, this answer, in the spirit of their own doctrines, is plain and easy. If there is nothing to carry you without yourselves; what are we to you? From what motives do you give yourselves all this concern about us? What can induce you to trim your midnight lamp, and waste your spirits in laborious vigils, for our instruction? You disclaim all social connexion with your species; what, then, we say again, are we to you?
But a subject, in itself so material to the sciences of philosophy and of law, merits a serious, a full, and a patient discussion. For it is of high practical importance, that the principles of society should be properly explained and well understood. It has been one of the happy characteristicks of the present age, both on this and on the other side of the Atlantick, that the spirit of philosophy has been wisely directed to the just investigation of those principles; and that the spirit of patriotism has been vigorously exerted in their support.
In a very early part of these lectures, it was observed, concerning definitions and divisions, that by them we are in danger of circumscribing nature within the limits of our own notions, formed frequently on partial and defective views. A very remarkable instance of this occurs in the subject, on the examination of which we now enter.
The intellectual powers of the mind have been commonly divided into simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. This division has received the sanction of high antiquity, and of a very extensive adoption; yet it is far from being complete. From it many of the operations of the understanding are excluded, such as consciousness, moral perception, taste, memory, and our perception of objects by means of our external senses. But, besides all these, there is a whole class, and a very important one too, of our intellectual operations, which, because they were not fortunate enough to be included within the foregoing division, have been overlooked by philosophers, and have not even yet been distinguished by a name. Some operations of the mind may take place in a solitary state: others, from their very nature, are social; and necessarily suppose a communication with some other intelligent being. In a state of absolute solitude, one may apprehend, and judge, and reason. But when he bears or hears testimony; when he gives or receives a command; when he enters into an engagement by a promise or a contract; these acts imply necessarily something more than apprehension, judgment, and reasoning; they imply necessarily a society with other beings, social as well as intelligent.
Simple apprehension is unaccompanied with any judgment or belief, concerning the object apprehended. Judgment is formed, as these philosophers say, by comparing ideas, and by perceiving their agreements and disagreements. Reasoning is an operation, by which, from two or more judgments, we deduce a conclusion. Now, from this account of these three operations of the mind, it appears unquestionably, that testimony is neither apprehension, nor judgment, nor reasoning. The same observation will apply, with the same propriety, to a promise, to an agreement, to a contract. Testimony, agreements, contracts, promises form very distinguished titles in that law, which it is the object of these lectures to delineate: perhaps it has already been evinced to your satisfaction, that some of them form its very basis.
That system of human nature must, indeed, appear extremely inadequate and defective, by which articles of such vast importance, both in theory and in the business of life, are left without a place, and without a name.
The attempts of some philosophers to reduce the social operations under the common philosophical divisions, resemble very much the attempts of others, to reduce all our social affections to certain modifications of self love. The Author of our existence intended us to be social beings; and has, for that end, given us social intellectual powers. They are original parts of our constitution; and their exertions are no less natural than the exertions of those powers, which are solitary and selfish.
Our social intellectual operations appear early in life, and before we are capable of reasoning; yet they suppose a conviction of the existence of other intelligent and social beings. A child asks a question of his nurse, and waits for her answer: this implies a conviction that she is intelligent and social; that she can receive and return a communication of thoughts and sentiments.
All languages are fitted to express the social as well as the solitary operations of the mind. To express the former is indeed the primary and the direct intention of language. A man, who had no interchange of sentiments with other social and intelligent beings, would be as mute as the irrational animals that surround him. By language, we communicate to others that, which we know: by language, we learn from others that, of which we are ignorant: by language, we advise, persuade, console, encourage, sooth, restrain: in consequence of language, we are united by political societies, government, and laws: by means of language, we are raised from a situation, in which we should be as rude and as savage as the beasts of the woods.
In the more imperfect societies of mankind, such as those composed of colonies scarcely settled in their new seats, it might pass for sufficient good fortune, if the people proved only so far masters of language, as to be able to understand one another, to confer about their wants, and to provide for their common necessities. Their exposed and indigent state would not afford them either that leisure or that easy disposition, which is requisite for the cultivation of the fine arts. They, who were neither safe from violence, nor secure from want, would not be likely to engage in unnecessary pursuits. It could not be expected that they would turn their attention towards the numbers of their language, or to its best and most perfect application and arrangement. But when, in process of time, the affairs of the society were settled on an easy and secure foundation; when debates and discourses, on the subjects of common interest and of publick good, were become familiar; when the speeches of distinguished characters were considered and compared; then there would be observed, between one speaker and another, a difference, not only with regard to a more agreeable measure of sound, but to a happier and more easy arrangement of sentiment.
The attention paid to language is one distinguishing mark of the progress of society towards its most refined period: as society improves, influence is acquired by the means of reasoning and discourse: in proportion as that influence is felt to increase, in proportion will be the care bestowed upon the methods of expressing conceptions with propriety and elegance. In every polished community, this study has been considered as highly important, and has possessed a place in every plan of liberal education.
In all languages, a question, a promise, a contract, which are social acts, can be expressed as easily and as properly, as a judgment, which is a solitary act. The expression of a judgment has been dignified with a particular appellation; it has been denominated a proposition. It has been analyzed, with great logical parade, into its several parts: its elements of subject, predicate, and copula have been exhibited in ostentatious arrangement: their various modifications have been traced and examined in laborious and voluminous tracts. The expression of a question, of a covenant, or of a promise is as susceptible of analysis as the expression of a judgment: but this has not been attempted; these operations of the mind have not been honoured even with a distinct and appropriate name. Why has so much pains been taken, why has so much labour been bestowed in analyzing, and assigning appropriate names to the solitary operations, and the expression of the solitary operations of the understanding; while so little attention has been allotted to such of its operations as are social? Perhaps it will be difficult to assign any other reason than this: in the divisions, which have been made of the operations of the mind, the social ones have been omitted; and, consequently, have not been introduced to notice or regard.
Our moral perceptions, as well as the other powers of our understanding, indicate, in the strongest manner, our designation for society. Veracity, and its corresponding quality, confidence, show this, in a very striking point of view. If we were intended for solitude, those qualities could have neither operation nor use. On the other hand, without those qualities, society could not be supported. Without the latter, the former would be useless: without the former, the latter would be dangerous. Without confidence in promises, for instance, we must, in the greatest part of our conduct, proceed entirely upon the calculations of chance: but there could be no confidence in promises, if there was no principle, from which their performance might be reasonably expected.
Some may imagine, that though this principle did not exist, yet human affairs might, perhaps, be carried on as well; for that general caution and mutual distrust would be the necessary result; and where no confidence would be reposed, no breach of it could happen. But, not to mention the uneasiness and anxiety which would unavoidably attend such a situation, it is not considered how much, in every hour of our lives, we trust to others; and how difficult, if not entirely impracticable, it would be to perform the most common as well as the most important business of human life, without such trust. The conclusion is, that the performance of promises is essential to society.
Deeply laid in human nature, we now behold the basis of one of the principal pillars of private municipal law; that, which enforces the obligation of promises, agreements, and covenants.
Again; the moral sense restrains us from harming the innocent: it teaches us, that the innocent have a right to be secure from harm. These are two great principles, which prepare us for society; and, with regard to them, the moral sense discovers peculiar inflexibility: it dictates, that we should submit to any distress or danger, rather than procure our safety and relief by violence upon an innocent person. Similar to the restraint, respecting personal safety and security, is the restraint, which the moral sense imposes on us, with regard to property. Robbery and theft are indulged by no society: from a society even of robbers, they are strictly excluded. The necessity of the social law, with regard to personal security, is so evident, as to require no explanation. Its necessity, with regard to property, will be explained and made evident by the following remarks.
Man has a natural propensity to store up the means of his subsistence: this propensity is essential, in order to incite us to provide comfortably for ourselves, and for those who depend on us. But this propensity would be rendered ineffectual, if we were not secured in the possession of those stores which we collect; for no one would toil to accumulate what he could not possess in security. This security is afforded by the moral sense, which dictates to all men, that goods collected by the labour and industry of individuals are their property; and that property ought to be inviolable.
We beheld, a little while ago, one of the principal pillars of civil law founded deeply in our nature: we now perceive the great principles of criminal law laid equally deep in the human frame. Violations of property and of personal security are, as we shall afterwards show particularly, the objects of that law. To punish, and, by punishing, to prevent them, is or ought to be the great end of that law, as shall also be particularly shown.
That we are fitted and intended for society, and that society is fitted and intended for us, will become evident by considering our passions and affections, as well as by considering our moral perceptions, and the other operations of our understandings. We have all the emotions, which are necessary in order that society may be formed and maintained: we have tenderness for the fair sex: we have affection for our children, for our parents, and for our other relations: we have attachment to our friends: we have a regard for reputation and esteem: we possess gratitude and compassion: we enjoy pleasure in the happiness of others, especially when we have been instrumental in procuring it: we entertain for our country an animated and vigorous zeal: we feel delight in the agreeable conception of the improvement and happiness of mankind.
The centre mov’d, a circle straight succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads.
Friend, parent, neighbour first it will embrace,
His country next, and next all human race;
Wide and more wide, th’ o’erflowings of the mind
Take ev’ry creature in, of ev’ry kind;
Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest,
And heav’n beholds its image in his breast.
How naturally, and sometimes how strongly, are our passions communicated from one to another, without even the least knowledge of the cause, by which they were originally produced! They are conveyed by aspect: the very countenance is infectious: the emotion flies from face to face: it is no sooner seen than experienced: like the electrick shock, it is felt instantaneously by a whole multitude; though, perhaps, only one of them knows from whence it proceeds. Such is the force of society in the passions.
This sympathy is an important quality of many of our passions: in particular, it invites and produces a communication of joys and sorrows, hopes and fears. Spirits, the most generous and the most susceptible of strong impressions, are the most social and combining. They delight most to move in concert; and feel, in the strongest manner, the force of the confederating charm.
The social powers and dispositions of our minds discover themselves in the earliest periods of life. So soon as a child can speak, he can ask, and he can answer a question: before he can speak, he shows signs of love, of resentment, and of other affections necessarily pointed to society. He is capable of social intercourse long before he is capable of reasoning. We behold this charming intercourse between his mother and him, before he is a year old. He can, by signs, ask and refuse, threaten and supplicate. In danger, he clings to his mother—for I will not, on this occasion, distinguish between the mother and the nurse—he enters into her joy and grief, is happy in her caresses, and is unhappy in her displeasure.
As sociability attends us in our infancy; she continues to be our companion through all the variegated scenes of our riper years. By an irresistible charm, she insinuates herself into the hearts of every rank and class of men, and mixes in all the various modes and arrangements of human life. Let us suppose a man of so morose and acrimonious a disposition, as to shun . . . all communication with his species; even such a misanthropist would wish for at least one associate, into whose bosom he might discharge the rancour and virulence of his own heart.
Society is necessary as well as natural to us. To support life, to satisfy our natural appetites, to obtain those agreeable enjoyments of which our nature is susceptible, many external things are indispensable. In order to live with any degree of comfort, we must have food, clothing, habitations, furniture, and utensils of some sort. These cannot be procured without much art and labour; nor without the friendly assistance of our fellows in society.
Let us suppose a man of full strength, and well instructed in all our arts of life, to be reduced suddenly to solitude, even in one of the best of soils and climates: could he procure the grateful conveniences of life? It will not be pretended. Could he procure even its simple necessaries? In an ingenious and excellent romance, we are told this has been done. But it will be remembered, that the foundation of Robinson Crusoe’s future subsistence, and of all the comforts which he afterwards provided and collected, was laid in the useful instruments and machines, which he saved from his shipwreck. These were the productions of society.
Could one, uninstructed in our arts of life, and unfurnished with the productions of society, subsist in solitude, though he were of full age, and possessed of health and strength? the probabilities would run strong against him.
Could one subsist in solitude during the weak, uninformed, and inexperienced period of his infancy? This he could not do, unless, like another Romulus and Remus, he owed his subsistence to the social aid of the wolves.
But let us, for a moment, suppose, that food, raiment, and shelter were supplied even by a miracle; a solitary life must be continually harassed by dangers and fears. Suppose those dangers and fears to be removed; could he find employment for the most excellent powers and instincts of his mind? Could he indulge affection or social joy? could he communicate, or could he receive social pleasure or social regard? Dispositions very different indeed—sour discontentment, sullen melancholy, listless languor—must prey upon his soul.
The reciprocal assistance of those, who compose a single family, may procure many of the necessaries of life; and may diminish its dangers. In this state some room will be afforded for social enjoyments, and for the finer operations of the mind. Still greater pleasures and advantages would be obtained by the union of a few families in the same neighbourhood. They would undertake and execute laborious works for the common good of all; and social emotions would operate in a less contracted circuit. Associations, still larger, will enlarge the sphere of pleasure and enjoyment; and will furnish more diversified and delightful exercise to our powers of every kind. Knowledge is increased: inventions are discovered: experience improves them: and the inventions, with their improvements, are spread over the whole community. Designs of durable and extensive advantage are boldly formed, and vigorously carried into effect. The social and benevolent affections range in an ample sphere; and attain an eminent degree of strength and refinement.
On what does our security—on what do our enjoyments depend? On our mutual services and sympathetick pleasures. Other animals have strength or speed sufficient for their preservation and defence. Man is, in all states, encompassed with weakness and dangers: but the strength and safety, which he wants by himself, he finds, when he is united with his equals. Nature has endowed him with a principle, which gives him force and superiority, where otherwise he would be helpless and inferiour. By sociability, they, who separately could make no effectual resistance, conquer and tame the various kinds of the brute creation. Society is the cause, that, not satisfied with the element on which he was born, man extends his dominion over the sea. Society supplies him with remedies in his diseases, with comfort in his afflictions, and with assistance in his old age. Take away society, and you destroy the basis, on which the preservation and happiness of human life are laid.
“There is nothing more certain,” says Cicero, “than the excellent maxim of Plato—that we are not intended solely for ourselves; but that our friends and our country claim a portion of our birth. Since, according to the doctrine of the stoicks, the productions of the earth are designed for men, and men are designed for the mutual aid of one another; we should certainly pursue the design of Nature, and promote her benign intention, by contributing our proportion to the general interest, by mutually performing and receiving good offices, and by employing our care, our industry, and even our fortune, in order to strengthen the love and friendship, which should always predominate in human society.”
In point of dignity, the social operations and emotions of the mind rise to a most respectable height. The excellency of man is chiefly discerned in the great improvements, of which he is susceptible in society: these, by perseverance and vigour, may be carried on progressively to degrees higher and higher, above any limits which we can now assign.
Our social affections and operations acquire still greater importance, in another point of view: they promote and are necessary to our happiness. “If we could suppose ourselves,” says Cicero, who knew so well how to illustrate law by philosophy—“if we could suppose ourselves transported by some divinity into a solitude, replete with all the delicacies which the heart of man could desire, but excluded, at the same time, from every possible intercourse with our kind, there is not a person in the world of so unsocial and savage a temper, as to be capable, in these forlorn circumstances, of relishing any enjoyment.” “Nothing,” continues he, “is more true, than what the philosopher Archytas is reported to have said: If a man were to be carried up into heaven, and see the beauties of universal nature displayed before him, he would receive but little pleasure from the wonderful scenes, unless there was some person, to whom he could relate the glories, which he had viewed. Human nature is so constituted, as to be incapable of solitary satisfactions. Man, like those plants which are formed to embrace others, is led, by an instinctive impulse, to recline on those of his own kind.”
Man, like the gen’rous vine, supported lives;
The strength he gains is from th’ embrace he gives.
The observations, which we make in common life, vouch the justness of these sentiments. We see those persons possess the greatest share of happiness, who have about them many objects of love and endearment. To the want of these objects, may be ascribed the moroseness of monks, and of those who, without entering into any religious order, lead the lives of monks.
Of the same nature with the indulgence of domestick affections, and equally refreshing to the spirit, is the pleasure, which flows from acts of beneficence, either in bestowing pecuniary favours, or in imparting, to those who want it, the benefit of our advice, or the assistance of our professional skill. The last consideration is urged, with peculiar propriety, by the professor of law. Innumerable instances occur, in which gentlemen of the bar, who possess abilities and character, can bestow what may be called favours, even on those, who are both able and willing to pay well for their services. When a client has an important business depending, entire confidence in the integrity and talents of his counsel diffuses over his mind a degree of composure and serenity, against which a fee, weighed in the balance, would be found wanting. This is particularly the case, when the life or the reputation of the client is at stake.
The foregoing observations may also be applied to publick services done for the state, by assisting her in her councils, or by defending or prosecuting her interests. Even if no suitable return, as it sometimes happens, should be received from the state for such services; yet a mind, nurtured to the refined and enlarged exercise of the social passion, will find no trivial pleasure in the reflection that it has performed them, and that those, for whom they were performed, enjoy the advantages resulting from them. Virtue, in such an instance, will prove herself her own reward. A man, whose soul vibrates in unison with the benevolent affections, will always find within him an encouragement, and a compensation too, for discharging his duty—an encouragement and a compensation, of which ingratitude itself cannot deprive him.
I will not appeal to vanity, and ask, if any thing can be more flattering, than to obtain the praises and acclamations of others. But I will appeal to conscious rectitude, and ask, whether any thing can be more satisfactory, than to deserve their regard and esteem. The possession of science is always attended with pleasure: but science, believe me, acquires an increased relish, when we have an opportunity of pouring it into the bosoms of others. We receive a redoubled satisfaction from the agreeable, though, perhaps, the flattering opinion, that we communicate entertainment and instruction; and from the opinion, better founded, that even weak attempts to communicate entertainment and instruction are received with reflected social emotions.
What can be more productive of happiness than even those wants, which are the foundations of so many blessings—love and friendship, generosity and reliance, kindness and gratitude? The gratifications even of sense lose their relish, if not heightened by the “spes mutui credula animi”—corresponding social emotions.
Our esteem of others, too, arising from the approbation of their conduct, is a most pleasing affection. The contemplation of a great and good character warms the heart, and invigorates the whole frame.
The wisest and most benign constitution of a rational and moral system is that, in which the degree of private affection, most useful to the individual, is, at the same time, consistent with the greatest interest of the system; and in which the degree of social affection, most useful to the system, is, at the same time, productive of the greatest happiness to the individual. Thus it is in the system of society. In that system, he who acts on such principles, and is governed by such affections, as sever him from the common good and publick interest, works, in reality, towards his own misery: while he, on the other hand, who operates for the good of the whole, as is by nature and by nature’s God appointed him, pursues, in truth, and at the same time, his own felicity.
Regulated by this standard, extensive, unerring, and sublime, self-love and social are the same.
To a state of society, then, we are invited from every quarter. It is natural; it is necessary; it is pleasing; it is profitable to us. The result of all is, that for a state of society we are designated by Him, who is all-wise and all-good.
Society may be distinguished into two kinds, natural and civil. This distinction has not been marked with the accuracy, which it well merits. Indeed some writers have given little or no attention to the latter kind; others have expressly denied it, and said, that there can be no civil society without civil government. But this is certainly not the case. A state of civil society must have existed, and such a state, in all our reasonings on this subject, must be supposed, before civil government could be regularly formed and established. Nay, ’tis for the security and improvement of such a state, that the adventitious one of civil government has been instituted. To civil society, indeed, without including in its description the idea of civil government, the name of state may be assigned, by way of excellence. It is in this sense that Cicero seems to use it, in the following beautiful passage. “Nothing, which is exhibited on our globe, is more acceptable to that divinity, which governs the whole universe, than those communities and assemblages of men, which, lawfully associated,—jure sociati—are denominated states.”
How often has the end been sacrificed to the means! Government was instituted for the happiness of society: how often has the happiness of society been offered as a victim to the idol of government! But this is not agreeable to the true order of things: it is not consistent with the orthodox political creed. Let government—let even the constitution be, as they ought to be, the handmaids; let them not be, for they ought not to be, the mistresses of the state.
A state may be described—a complete body of free persons, united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person: it has an understanding and a will peculiar to itself: it has its affairs and its interests: it deliberates and resolves: it has its rules; it has its obligations; and it has its rights. It may acquire property, distinct from that of its members: it may incur debts, to be discharged out of the publick stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals: it may be bound by contracts, and for damages arising quasi ex contractu (as though from contract). In order to constitute a state, it is indispensably necessary, that the wills and the power of all the members be united in such a manner, that they shall never act nor desire but one and the same thing, in whatever relates to the end, for which the society is established. It is from this union of wills and of strength, that the state or body politick results. The only rational and natural method, therefore, of constituting a civil society, is by the convention or consent of the members, who compose it. For by a civil society we properly understand, the voluntary union of persons in the same end, and in the same means requisite to obtain that end. This union is a benefit, not a sacrifice: civil is an addition to natural order.
This union may rationally be supposed to be formed in the following manner: if a number of people, who had hitherto lived independent of each other, wished to form a civil society, it would be necessary to enter into an engagement to associate together in one body, and to regulate, with one common consent, whatever regards their preservation, their security, their improvement, their happiness.
In the social compact, each individual engages with the whole collectively, and the whole collectively engage with each individual. These engagements are obligatory, because they are mutual. The individuals who are not parties to them, are not members of the society. Smaller societies may be formed within a state by a part of its members. These societies also are deemed to be moral persons; but not in a state of natural liberty: their actions are cognizable by the superiour power of the state, and are regulated by its laws. To these societies the name of corporations is generally appropriated, though somewhat improperly; for the term is strictly applicable to supreme as well as to inferiour bodies politick. The foregoing account of the formation of civil society, which refers it to original engagements; and consequently resolves the duty of submission to the laws of the society, into the universal obligation of fidelity in the performance of promises, is warmly attacked by a sensible and ingenious writer. He represents it, as founded on a supposition, false in fact; as insufficient, if it was true, for the purposes, for which it is produced; and as leading to dangerous consequences. He acknowledges, however, that, in the United States, transactions have happened, which bear the nearest resemblance to this political idea, of any, of which history has preserved the account or the memory. This subject has already received some; it will afterwards receive more attention and examination. At present, it is sufficient, and it is proper, to intimate to you the point of discussion; for it is a very important one in the science of government.
In civil society, previously to the institution of civil government, all men are equal. Of one blood all nations are made; from one source the whole human race has sprung. When we say, that all men are equal; we mean not to apply this equality to their virtues, their talents, their dispositions, or their acquirements. In all these respects, there is, and it is fit for the great purposes of society that there should be, great inequality among men. In the moral and political as well as in the natural world, diversity forms an important part of beauty; and as of beauty, so of utility likewise. That social happiness, which arises from the friendly intercourse of good offices, could not be enjoyed, unless men were so framed and so disposed, as mutually to afford and to stand in need of service and assistance. Hence the necessity not only of great variety, but even of great inequality in the talents of men, bodily as well as mental. Society supposes mutual dependence: mutual dependence supposes mutual wants: all the social exercises and enjoyments may be reduced to two heads—that of giving, and that of receiving: but these imply different aptitudes to give and to receive.
Many are the degrees, many are the varieties of human genius, human dispositions, and human characters. One man has a turn for mechanicks; another, for architecture; one paints; a second makes poems: this excels in the arts of a military; the other, in those of civil life. To account for these varieties of taste and character, is not easy; is, perhaps, impossible. But though their efficient cause it may be difficult to explain; their final cause, that is, the intention of Providence in appointing them, we can see and admire. These varieties of taste and character induce different persons to choose different professions and employments in life: these varieties render mankind mutually beneficial to each other, and prevent too violent oppositions of interest in the same pursuit. Hence we enjoy a variety of conveniences; hence the numerous arts and sciences have been invented and improved; hence the sources of commerce and friendly intercourse between different nations have been opened; hence the circulation of truth has been quickened and promoted; hence the operations of social virtue have been multiplied and enlarged.
Heaven, forming each on other to depend,
Bids each on other for assistance call,
’Till one man’s weakness grows the strength of all.
Wants, frailties, passions closer still ally
The common interest, or endear the tie:
To these we owe true friendship, love sincere,
Each home-felt joy, that life inherits here.
How insipidly uniform would human life and manners be, without the beautiful variety of colours, reflected upon them by different tastes, different tempers, and different characters!
But however great the variety and inequality of men may be with regard to virtue, talents, taste, and acquirements; there is still one aspect, in which all men in society, previous to civil government, are equal. With regard to all, there is an equality in rights and in obligations; there is that “jus aequum,” that equal law, in which the Romans placed true freedom. The natural rights and duties of man belong equally to all. Each forms a part of that great system, whose greatest interest and happiness are intended by all the laws of God and nature. These laws prohibit the wisest and the most powerful from inflicting misery on the meanest and most ignorant; and from depriving them of their rights or just acquisitions. By these laws, rights, natural or acquired, are confirmed, in the same manner, to all; to the weak and artless, their small acquisitions, as well as to the strong and artful, their large ones. If much labour employed entitles the active to great possessions, the indolent have a right, equally sacred, to the little possessions, which they occupy and improve.
As in civil society, previous to civil government, all men are equal; so, in the same state, all men are free. In such a state, no one can claim, in preference to another, superiour right: in the same state, no one can claim over another superiour authority. Nature has implanted in man the desire of his own happiness; she has inspired him with many tender affections towards others, especially in the near relations of life; she has endowed him with intellectual and with active powers; she has furnished him with a natural impulse to exercise his powers for his own happiness, and the happiness of those, for whom he entertains such tender affections. If all this be true, the undeniable consequence is, that he has a right to exert those powers for the accomplishment of those purposes, in such a manner, and upon such objects, as his inclination and judgment shall direct; provided he does no injury to others; and provided some publick interests do not demand his labours. This right is natural liberty. Every man has a sense of this right. Every man has a sense of the impropriety of restraining or interrupting it. Those who judge wisely, will use this liberty virtuously and honourably: those, who are less wise, will employ it in meaner pursuits: others, again, may, perhaps, indulge it in what may be justly censured as vicious and dishonourable. Yet, with regard even to these last, while they are not injurious to others; and while no human institution has placed them under the control of magistrates or laws, the sense of liberty is so strong, and its loss is so deeply resented, that, upon the whole, more unhappiness would result from depriving them of their liberty on account of their imprudence, than could be reasonably apprehended from the imprudent use of their liberty.
The right of natural liberty is suggested to us not only by the selfish parts of our constitution, but by our generous affections; and especially by our moral sense, which intimates to us, that in our voluntary actions consist our dignity and perfection. The laws of nature are the measure and the rule; they ascertain the limits and the extent of natural liberty.
In society, when the sentiments of the members are not unanimous, the voice of the majority must be deemed the will of the whole. That the majority, by any vote, should bind not only themselves, but those also who dissent from that vote, seems, at first, to be inconsistent with the well known rules—that all men are naturally equal; and that all men are naturally free. From these rules, it may be alleged, that no one can be bound by the act of another, without his own consent. But it is to be remembered, that society is constituted for a certain purpose; and that each member of it consents that this purpose shall be carried on; and, consequently, that every thing necessary for carrying it on shall be done. Now a number of persons can jointly do business only in three ways—by the decision of the whole, by the decision of the majority, or by the decision of the minority. The first case is not here supposed, nor is there occasion to make a question concerning it. The only remaining question, then, which can be proposed, is, which is most reasonable and equitable—that the minority should bind the majority—or that the majority should bind the minority? The latter, certainly. It is most reasonable; because it is not so probable, that a greater number, as that a smaller number, concurring in judgment, should be mistaken. It is most equitable; because the greater number are presumed to have an interest in the society proportioned to that number. Besides; though, in the case supposed, the minority are bound without their immediate consent; they are bound by their consent originally given to the establishment of the society, for the purposes which it was intended to accomplish. For it has been already observed, that those, who enter not into the original engagement forming the society, are not to be considered as members: all the members, therefore, must have originally given their consent.
The rule, which we have mentioned, may be altered and modified by positive institution. In some cases, the consent of a number larger than a mere majority: in others, even unanimity may be required.
This is the proper place for considering a question of very considerable importance in civil society, and concerning which there has been much diversity in the sentiments of writers, and in the laws and practice of states: has a state a right to prohibit the emigration of its members? may a citizen dissolve the connexion between him and his country? On the principles of the compact of association, which I have already stated, there seems to be but little doubt that one article of it may be, that each individual binds himself indissolubly to the society, while the society performs, on its part, the stipulated conditions. This engagement each individual may make for himself: . . . but can he make it for his children and his posterity? must they be and continue bound by the act of their father and ancestor?
The notion of natural, perpetual, and unalienable allegiance from the citizen to the society, or to the head of the society, of which he was born a member, has, by some writers and in some countries, been carried very far indeed: and their practice has been equally rigorous with their principles. The well known maxim, which the writers upon the law of England have adopted and applied to this case is, “Nemo potest exuere patriam” (No one can case of his country). It is not, therefore, as is holden by that law, in the power of any private subject to shake off his allegiance, and to transfer it to a foreign prince. Nor is it in the power of any foreign prince, by naturalizing or employing a subject of Great Britain, to dissolve the bond of allegiance between that subject and the crown. . . .
The reasons in favour of the position, that a citizen cannot dissolve the political connexion between him and his country, may be stated in the following manner. Every citizen, as soon as he is born, is under the protection of the state, and is entitled to all the advantages arising from that protection: he, therefore, owes obedience to that power, from which the protection, which he enjoys, is derived. But while he continues in infancy and nonage, he cannot perform the duties of obedience. The performance of them must be respited, till he arrive at the years of discretion and maturity. When he arrives at those years, he owes obedience, not only for the protection, which he then enjoys, but also for that, which, from his birth, he has enjoyed. Obedience now becomes a duty founded upon principles of gratitude, as well as upon principles of interest: it becomes a debt, which nothing but the performance of the duties of citizenship, during a whole life, will discharge.
But, notwithstanding this train of thought and reasoning, there are certainly cases, in which a citizen has an unquestionable right to renounce his country, and go in quest of a settlement in some other part of the world. One of these cases is, when, in his own country, he cannot procure a subsistence. Another is, when the society neglects to fulfil its obligations to the citizen. A third is, when the society would establish laws, on things, to which the original social compact cannot oblige the citizen to submit.
In answer to the inferences drawn from principles of gratitude, it may be observed, that every man being born free, a native citizen, when he arrives at the age of discretion, may examine whether it be convenient for him to join in the society, for which he was destined by his birth. If, on examination, he finds, that it will be more advantageous to him to remove into another country, he has a right to go, making to that which he leaves a proper return for what it has done in his favour, and preserving for it, as far as it shall be consistent with the engagements, which his new situation and connexions may require, the sentiments of respect and attachment.
The sentiments of Mr. Locke on this subject go much further. “’Tis plain,” says he, “by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He is under his father’s tuition and authority, till he comes to the age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under; what body politick he will unite himself to.”
“O glorious regulations!” says Cicero, “originally established for us by our ancestors of Roman name; that no one of us should be obliged to belong to more than one society, since a dissimilitude of societies must produce a proportioned variety of laws; that no one, contrary to his inclination, should be deprived of his right of citizenship; and that no one, contrary to his inclinations, should be obliged to continue in that relation. The power of retaining and of renouncing our rights of citizenship, is the most stable foundation of our liberties.”
In the digest of the Roman law, it is laid down as a rule, that every one is at liberty to choose the state, of which he wishes to be a member. Indeed, excepting in some very particular cases, every one ought to be at liberty to leave the state. This general liberty is not only just, but may be productive of much generous emulation among states, and of extensive advantages to their citizens. Those states, which manage their affairs best, will offer the strongest inducements to their own citizens to remain, and to others to incorporate among them. On the other hand, it is both inhuman and unjust to convert the state into a prison for its citizens, by preventing them from leaving it on a prospect of advantage to themselves. True it is, that they ought to make compensation for any advantages, which they have derived from the state at its expense: but equally true it is, that this compensation is generally made, by their having contributed annually, during their past residence, towards the publick revenue, by paying taxes on property, as all men, even minors, do; and by consuming goods, on which imposts or duties have been levied.
Emigration may arise from various causes. It may be occasioned by the population of a country. In this case, great numbers may be constantly leaving the state, and yet the state may be increasing in population. It has been suggested by some writers, that the right of exposing children has been one cause of the populousness of China. Surely the prospect that they will be comfortably provided for, if not in their own, yet in another country, must be a much more powerful, as well as more humane incentive to marriages.
Insecurity, hardships, oppression may be the causes of emigration. A nation whose inhabitants are in a predicament so disagreeable, may be in declining circumstances; but those circumstances, indicating a decline, are not the effects of emigration; they are the effects of the evils and calamities which occasion it. Two things, which are commonly considered as cause and effect, are often no more than two collateral effects of the same cause.
Independently, therefore, of the question of right, there can be but few cases, in which emigration could be prohibited on the sound principles of policy. Emigration, it is true, may be a symptom of languor and decay; but it may also be an evidence and a consequence of the overflowing vigour and prosperity of the state.
Permit me to suggest a still further reason—to me it appears a strong one—in favour of unrestrained emigration. In a free state, the consent of every citizen to its institution and government ought to be evinced either by express declarations, or by the strongest and justest presumptions. When a state is formed, the residence of a citizen is presumed a sufficient evidence of his assent and acquiescence in its institutions: to reside in any country is universally deemed a submission to its authority. But that these presumptions may be fairly drawn, we must be understood as speaking of a state, from which the citizens have liberty to depart with their effects at pleasure. Where this liberty is not enjoyed, the considerations of family, of property, and many other considerations that are without a name, may detain a man, much against his inclination, in a country, in which he finds himself trammelled. In such case, his residence is no reasonable evidence of his consent to the formation, the constitution, the government, or the laws of the state.
Upon the whole it appears, that the right of emigration is a right, advantageous to the citizen, and generally useful even to the state. . . .
Of Man, as a Member of a Confederation.
Of Man, as a Member of the Great Commonwealth of Nations
Every civil society, under whatever form it appears, whether governed merely by the natural laws of such a society, or by them and civil institutions superadded—every such society, not subordinate to another, is a sovereign state.
Those, who unite in society, lived, before their union, in a state of nature: a state of nature is a state of equality and liberty. That liberty and that equality, belonging to the individuals, before the union, belong, after the union, to the society, which those individuals compose. The consequence is, that a society is subjected to no power or authority without it; that it may do what is necessary for its preservation; that it may exercise all its rights, and is obliged to give an account of its conduct to no one. But these things constitute what is called sovereignty. Every state, therefore, composed of individuals, free and equal, is a state sovereign and independent. The aggregate body possesses all the rights of the individuals, of whom it is formed.
Another consequence is, that the rights of any one state are naturally the same as those of every other. States are moral persons, who live together in a natural society, under the law of nations. To give a state a right to make an immediate figure in the great society of nations, it is sufficient, if it be really sovereign and independent; that is, it must govern itself by its own authority. Thus, when the United Colonies found it necessary to dissolve the political bonds, which had connected them with Great Britain, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station, to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitled them; they had a right to publish and declare, as, in fact, they did publish and declare, that “they were free and independent states; and that, as free and independent states, they had full power to levy war, to conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things, which independent states may of right do”; though, at that time, no articles of confederation were agreed upon; nor was any form of civil government instituted by them.
A number of individuals, who have formed themselves into a society or state, are, with regard to the purposes of the society, bound to consider themselves as one moral person. But the rest of mankind, who are not parties to this social compact, are under no obligation to take notice of it; and may still consider the society as a large number of unconnected persons. This personality—I know no better expression for it—of a state must, as to other nations, be derived from their consent and agreement. But when a society have once associated, and considered and announced themselves to other nations as a moral person, this consent and agreement ought not to be refused, without solid and special reasons, which will justify the refusal. On this consent and agreement, the mutual and mutually beneficial intercourse of nations is founded: whatever, therefore, promotes this intercourse, should be zealously encouraged; whatever prevents or interrupts it, should be cautiously avoided. Though one state has, by an unequal alliance, formed a connexion with another state more powerful; still the weaker state is to be reckoned in the class of sovereigns. To the weaker state, the unequal alliance may secure the most assistance; on the stronger, it may reflect the most honour; but it leaves both the same rank among the society of nations.
We may go further; if a state, in order to provide for its own safety, finds it necessary to place itself under the protection of another; and, in consideration of that protection, stipulates to perform equivalent offices, without devesting itself of the right of self-government; such a state ceases not to preserve its place among sovereigns. The payment even of tribute, though it may diminish the dignity of the society, by no means destroys or impairs its sovereignty or its rights.
Two sovereign states may employ the same executive magistrate, or bear allegiance to the same prince, without any dependence on each other; and each may retain all its national rights, free and undiminished. This last, under the house of Stuart, was the case of England and Scotland, before the nation of Great Britain was formed by their union. This last, also, as shall be hereafter shown at large, was the case of Great Britain and the American colonies, before the political connexion between them was declared to be dissolved.
But one people who have passed under the dominion of another, can no longer form a state: they can no longer retain a place in the great society of nations. Of that great society, equality is the basis and the rule. To this equality, the inferiority of subjection and the superiority of command are, alike, repugnant.
This equality of nations is the great and general foundation of national rights. In this matter, no regard is had to names. On the great theatre of the world, empires, kingdoms, commonwealths, principalities, dukedoms, free towns, are all equally imperial. A society, which, without subordination to any other, exercises within itself all the essential powers of society, is sovereign, and has all the rights of a sovereign and independent state; however narrow its territories; however small its numbers may be.
Every nation deserves consideration and respect; because it makes an immediate figure in the grandest society of the human race; because it is independent of all earthly power; and because it is an assemblage of a number of men, who, doubtless, are more considerable than any individual.
With regard to precedency, or the first place among equals, power and antiquity are grounds, upon which it is claimed or allowed. Into this question, the forms of government do not enter.
. . .
Comparison of the Constitution of the United States, with that of Great Britain.
1. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1, §38.
2. Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book 1, ch. 2.
3. Daws. Orig. Laws, 4. 14.
4. Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book 1, ch. 11.
5. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 1, §38.
6. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 1, §43.
7. Frederick II ("Frederick the Great"), King of Prussia. Works. Vol. 6, p. 48, 50. (Editor: Probably a quotation of the essay "The Anti-Macchiavel," which Frederick II published, in close collabortion with Voltaire, in 1740.)
8. Frederick II, King of Prussia. Works. Vol. 6, pp. 83, 84.
9. Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural and Politic Law (1748). (Translated into English by Nugent. Cambridge, 1752). Volume 1, Part 1, Ch. 9 ("Of the foundation of sovereignty, or the right of commanding"), section II.
10. Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law, Vol. 1, Part 1, ch. 9, section III.1. (Editor: The whole paragraph is lifted verbatim from Burlamaqui. The portion in quotation marks is Burlamaqui's own quote of Thomas Hobbes's De Cive, ch. 15, section 5.)
12. Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law, Vol. 1, Part 1, ch. 9, section III.2.
13. Ibid., IV.1.
14. Ibid., V.2.
15. Thomas Rutherforth (Rutherford), Institutes of Natural Law, Volume 1, Ch. 1, section VI.
16. Hugo Grotius, "Preliminary Discourse Concerning the Certainty of Right," in The Rights of War and Peace, Volume 1, Book 1, Chapter 1, section X.2, footnote 3. (Editor: This is actually a quotation of a footnote by the early editor of this text, Jean Barbeyrac, who is here commenting on Grotius's text).
17. Hein. 63; Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural and Politic Law, Vol. 1, Part 2, Ch. 7, Sections VI, VIII, X (pages 207, 210, 212); Samuel von Pufendorf (Puffendorf), The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, Book 1, chapter 2, sections 5 and 6.
19. Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, Volume 1, section 9.
22. Hein., 50; Grotius, Preliminary Discourse Concerning the Certainty of Right, section 17; Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man, Book 2, chapter 3, section 15 [Book I, ch. 3, section IX in the edition linked here].
23. Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, Volume 1, section 9.
24. "Principem legem illam et ultimam, mentem esse dicebant, omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis dei." ("They [the wisest men] said that the primary and ultimate law was the mind of God who either compels or forbids all things by reason.") Cicero, De Legibus Book 2, section 8.
25. "Quae est gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina antecipationem quandam [deorum? . . . ], id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam, nec quaeri, nec disputari potest." ("What nation is there, or what race of men is there, that does not have, [and] without instruction, some preconception [of the gods? . . .]—that is, some information of the reality already taken into one's soul, without which nothing can be understood, sought, or debated.") Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Book 1, Ch. 16. Wilson's text omits the portion of the original represented here by [deorum? . . .].
26. Titus Lucretius Carus (99–55 BC) was a Roman poet and Epicurean philosopher who wrote De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things). [Comment of the Online Library of Liberty]
28. Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature anc Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, 237, 121.
29. Joseph Addison (1672–1719) was an English writer and politician who founded The Spectator. [Comment of the Online Library of Liberty]
30. Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 3, verse 99.
32. Richard Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book 1, section 6, page 8.
34. Hugo Grotius, Preliminary Discourse Concerning the Certainty of Right, section 41.
35. Ibid., section 14.
38. Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, Volume 1, Part 2, Ch. 6, Section 7; Burlamaqui, 196.
39. Jacques Necker, On the Importance of Religious Opinions. Preface, 19.
41. Thomas Rutherforth (Rutherford), Institutes of Natural Law, Volume 2, 463, 464.
44. Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 4, verse 39.
45. William of Malmesbury (c. 1090–c. 1143) was a great English historian who lived much of his life as a monk at Malmesbury Abbey. [Comment of the Online Library of Liberty]
46. William of Malmesbury, Historia Novella, The Shaftsbury Charter, 90.
47. Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 4, verse 365.
50. Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 3, verse 311.
51. Literally, “the trusting hope of mutual feeling,” but a clearer sense of the tone is “the naive hope that love will be requited.” The phrase is from Horace, Odes, 4.1.29. [Comment of the Online Library of Liberty]
53. William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Book 6, Ch. 3 ("The Duty of Submission to Civil Government Explained").
54. Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 2, verse 249.
55. 2 P. Williams, 123, 124.
Chisholm v. Georgia
By The Supreme Court of the United States of America
[The Supreme Court of the United States of America. Chisholm v. Georgia. 1793. 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419 (1793). In the Public Domain.]
Wilson, Justice—This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it is a State, certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined is, whether this state, so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the United States? This question, important in itself, will depend on others, more important still. . . .
. . .
I. I am first to examine this question by the principles of general jurisprudence. What I shall say upon this head, I introduce, by the observation of an original and profound writer, who, on the philosophy of mind, and all the sciences attendant on this prime one, has formed an era not less remarkable, and far more illustrious, than that formed by the justly celebrated Bacon, in another science, not prosecuted with less ability, but less dignified as to its object; I mean the philosophy of nature. Dr. Reid, in his excellent inquiry into the human mind, on the principles of common sense, speaking of the sceptical and illiberal philosophy, which, under bold, but false, pretensions to liberality, prevailed in many parts of Europe before he wrote, makes the following judicious remark: “The language of philosophers, with regard to the original faculties of the mind, is so adapted to the prevailing system, that it cannot fit any other; like the coat that fits the man for whom it was made, and shows him to advantage, which yet will fit very awkward upon one of a different make, although as handsome and well proportioned. It is hardly possible to make any innovation in our philosophy concerning the mind and its operations, without using new words and phrases, or giving a different meaning to those that are received.” With equal propriety, may this solid remark be applied to the great subject, on the principles of which the decision of this court is to be founded. The perverted use of genus and species in logic, and of impressions and ideas in metaphysics, have never done mischief so extensive or so practically pernicious, as has been done by states and sovereigns, in politics and jurisprudence; in the politics and jurisprudence even of those who wished and meant to be free. . . .
. . .
[I]t is now proper, that I should disclose the meaning which I assign to [the terms state and sovereign], and the application which I make of the latter. In doing this, I shall have occasion incidentally to evince, how true it is, that states and governments were made for man; and at the same time, how true it is, that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and at last, oppressed their master and maker.
Man, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all-perfect Creator: a state, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man and from his native dignity, derives all its acquired importance. . . .
Let a state be considered as subordinate to the People: but let everything else be subordinate to the state. The latter part of this position is equally necessary with the former. For in the practice, and even, at length, in the science of politics, there has very frequently been a strong current against the natural order of things, and an inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. As the state has claimed precedence of the people; so, in the same inverted course of things, the government has often claimed precedence of the state; and to this perversion in the second degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning sovereignty owe their existence. . . . By a state, I mean, a complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests: it has its rules: it has its rights: and it has its obligations. It may acquire property, distinct from that of its members: it may incur debts, to be discharged, out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts; and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and artificial person, we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act, are men.
Is the foregoing description of a state, a true description? It will not be questioned, but it is. Is there any part of this description, which intimates, in the remotest manner, that a state, any more than the men who compose it, ought not to do justice and fulfil engagements? It will not be pretended, that there is. If justice is not done; if engagements are not fulfilled; is it, upon general principles of right, less proper, in the case of a great number, than in the case of an individual, to secure, by compulsion, that which will not be voluntarily performed? Less proper, it surely cannot be. The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same principles, upon which he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the courts of justice, which are formed and authorised by those laws. If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this, why may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each, singly, is undiminished; the dignity of all, jointly, must be unimpaired. A state, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest state, like a dishonest merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it: the latter is amenable to a court of justice: upon general principles of right, shall the former, when summoned to answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, Proteus-like, to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and justice, by declaring I am a sovereign state? Surely not. Before a claim, so contrary, in its first appearance, to the general principles of right and equality, be sustained by a just and impartial tribunal, the person, natural or artificial, entitled to make such claim, should certainly be well known and authenticated. Who, or what, is a sovereignty? What is his or its sovereignty? . . . . In one sense, the term sovereign has for its correlative, subject. In this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no object in the constitution of the United States. Under that constitution, there are citizens, but no subjects. . . .
In another sense, according to some writers, every state, which governs itself, without any dependence on another power, is a sovereign state. . . . As a citizen [of the Union], I know, the government of [Georgia] to be republican; and my short definition of such a government is--one constructed on this principle, that the supreme power resides in the body of the people. As a judge of this court, I know, and can decide, upon the knowledge, that the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a part of the “People of the United States,” did not surrender the supreme or sovereign power to that state; but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is not a sovereign state. . . .
There is third sense, in which the term sovereign is frequently used, and which it is very material to trace and explain, as it furnishes a basis for what, I presume, to be one of the principal objections against the jurisdiction of this court over the State of Georgia. In this sense, sovereignty is derived from a feudal source. . . . [At one] time, the feudal system was extended over . . . almost all the . . . nations of Europe; and every kingdom became, in fact, a large fief. . . . But in the case of the King, the sovereignty had a double operation. While it vested him with jurisdiction over others, it excluded all others from jurisdiction over him. With regard to him, there was no superior power; and consequently, on feudal principles, no right of jurisdiction. “The law,” says Sir William Blackstone, “ascribes to the King, the attribute of sovereignty: he is sovereign and independent, within his own dominions; and owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate upon earth. Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in civil matters; because no court can have jurisdiction over him: for all jurisdiction implies superiority of power.” This last position is only a branch of a much more extensive principle. . . . The principle is, that all human law must be prescribed by a superior: this principle I mean not now to examine: suffice it, at present, to say, that another principle, very different in its nature and operations, forms, in my judgment, the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the consent of those whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.
I have now fixed, in the scale of things, the grade of a state; and have described its composure: I have considered the nature of sovereignty; and pointed its application to the proper object. I have examined the question before us, by the principles of general jurisprudence. In those principles, I find nothing, which tends to evince an exemption of the State of Georgia, from the jurisdiction of the court. I find everything to have a contrary tendency.
Calder v. Bull
By The Supreme Court of the United States of America
[The Supreme Court of the United States of America. Calder et Ux. v. Bull et Ux. 1798. 3 U.S. 3 Dall. 386 (August Term, 1798). In the Public Domain.]
Chase, Justice:. . . .
. . .
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contend, that the said resolution or law of the legislature of Connecticut . . . is an ex post facto law, prohibited by the constitution of the United States. . . .
. . .
. . . The sole inquiry is, whether this resolution or law of Connecticut . . . is an ex post facto law, within the prohibition of the federal constitution?
. . . I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the state. The people of the United States erected their constitutions or forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit. There are acts which the federal, or state legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established. An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a righful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law, in governments established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power on which it is founded.
A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.: it is against all reason and justice, for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers; and therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature and the spirit of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them. The legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property. To maintain that our federal, or state legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments.
All the restrictions contained in the constitution of the United States on the power of the state legislatures, were provided in favor of the authority of the federal government. The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws, under the denomination of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and the other less punishment. These acts were legislative judgments; and an exercise of judicial power. Sometimes, they respected the crime, by declaring acts to be treason, which were not treason, when committed; at other times, they violated the rules of evidence (to supply a deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness, when the existing law required two; by receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; or other testimony, which the courts of justice would not admit; at other times, they inflicted punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment; and in other cases, they inflicted greater punishment, than the law annexed to the offence. The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punishment, of the offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the government so insecure! With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment and vindictive malice. To prevent such and similar acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the federal and state legislatures were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law.
. . .
Hepburn v. Griswold, abridged
(The Legal Tender Cases)
By The Supreme Court of the United States of America
[Supreme Court of the United States of America. Hepburn v. Griswold. 75 U.S. 8 Wallace, 603 (1869). 1869. In the Public Domain.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
1. Construed by the plain import of their terms and the manifest intent of the legislature, the statutes of 1862 and 1863, which make United States notes a legal tender in payment of debts, public and private, apply to debts contracted before as well as to debts contracted after enactment.
2. The cases of Lane County v. Oregon, Branson v. Bodes, and Butler v. Horwitz (7 Wallace 71, 229, and 258), in which it was held that, upon a sound construction of those statutes, neither taxes imposed by State legislation nor dues upon contracts for the payment or delivery of coin or bullion are included, by legislative intent, under the description of “debts, public and private,” are approved and reaffirmed.
3. When a case arises for judicial determination, and the decision depends on the alleged inconsistency of a legislative provision with the Constitution, it is the plain duty of the Supreme Court to compare the act with the fundamental law, and if the former cannot, upon a fair construction, be reconciled with the latter, to give effect to the Constitution rather than the statute.
4. There is in the Constitution no express grant of legislative power to make any description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts.
5. The words “all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution” powers expressly granted or vested have, in the Constitution, a sense equivalent to that of the words, laws, not absolutely necessary indeed, but appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional and legitimate ends, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution; laws really calculated to effect objects intrusted to the government.
6. Among means appropriate, plainly adapted, not inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, nor prohibited by its terms, the legislature has unrestricted choice; but no power can be derived by implication from any express power to enact laws as means for carrying it into execution unless such laws come within this description.
7. The making of notes or bills of credit a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, or really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress, is inconsistent with, the spirit of the Constitution, and is prohibited by the Constitution.
8. The clause in the acts of 1862 and 1863 which makes United States notes a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, is, so far as it applies to debts contracted before the passage of those acts, unwarranted by the Constitution.
9. Prior to the 25th of February, 1862, all contracts for the payment of money, not expressly stipulating otherwise, were, in legal effect and universal understanding, contracts for the payment of coin, and, under the Constitution, the parties to such contracts are respectively entitled to demand and bound to pay the sums due, according to their terms, in coin, notwithstanding the clause in that act, and the subsequent acts of like tenor, which make United States notes a legal tender in payment of such debts.
Error to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, the case being this:
On the 20th of June, 1860, a certain Mrs. Hepburn made a promissory note, by which she promised to pay to Henry Griswold on the 20th of February, 1862, eleven thousand two hundred and fifty “dollars.”
At the time when the note was made, as also at the time when it fell due, there was, confessedly, no lawful money of the United States, or money which could lawfully be tendered in payment of private debts, but gold and silver coin.
Five days after the day when the note by its terms fell due, that is to say, on the 25th of February, 1862, in an exigent crisis of the nation, in which the government was engaged in putting down an armed rebellion of vast magnitude, Congress passed an act authorizing the issue of $150,000,000 of its own notes, and enacted in regard to them, by one clause in the first section of the act, as follows:
“And such notes, herein authorized, shall be receivable in payment of all taxes, internal duties, excises, debts, and demands of every kind due to the United States, except duties on imports, and of all claims and demands against the United States of every kind whatsoever, except for interest upon bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin; and shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest as aforesaid."
The note given by Mrs. Hepburn not being paid at maturity, interest accrued on it. And in March, 1864, suit having been brought on the note in the Louisville Chancery Court, she tendered in United States notes issued under the act mentioned, $12,720, the amount of principal of the note with the interest accrued to the date of tender, and some costs, in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. The tender was refused. The notes were then tendered and paid into court; and the chancellor, “resolving all doubts in favor of the Congress,” declared the tender good and adjudged the debt, interest and costs to be satisfied accordingly.
The case was then taken by Griswold to the Court of Errors of Kentucky, which reversed the chancellor's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to enter a contrary judgment.
From the judgment of the Court of Errors of Kentucky, the case was brought by Mrs. Hepburn here.
. . .
OPINION OF THE COURT:
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented for our determination by the record in this case is, whether or not the payee or assignee of a note, made before the 25th of February, 1862, is obliged by law to accept in payment United States notes, equal in nominal amount to the sum due according to its terms, when tendered by the maker or other party bound to pay it? And this requires, in the first place, a construction of that clause of the first section of the act of Congress passed on that day, which declares the United States notes, the issue of which was authorized by the statute, to be a legal tender in payment of debts. The clause has already received much consideration here, and this court has held that, upon a sound construction, neither taxes imposed by State legislation, nor demands upon contracts which stipulate in terms for the payment or delivery of coin or bullion, are included by legislative intention under the description of debts public and private. . . .
. . .
We are thus brought to the question, whether Congress has power to make notes issued under its authority a legal tender in payment of debts, which, when contracted, were payable by law in gold and silver coin.
The delicacy and importance of this question has not been overstated in the argument. This court always approaches the consideration of questions of this nature reluctantly; and its constant rule of decision has been, and is, that acts of Congress must be regarded as constitutional, unless clearly shown to be otherwise.
But the Constitution is the fundamental law of the United States. By it the people have created a government, defined its powers, prescribed their limits, distributed them among the different departments, and directed, in general, the manner of their exercise. No department of the government has any other powers than those thus delegated to it by the people. All the legislative power granted by the Constitution belongs to Congress; but it has no legislative power which is not thus granted. And the same observation is equally true in its application to the executive and judicial powers granted respectively to the President and the courts. All these powers differ in kind, but not in source or in limitation. They all arise from the Constitution, and are limited by its terms.
It is the function of the judiciary to interpret and apply the law to cases between parties as they arise for judgment. It can only declare what the law is, and enforce, by proper process, the law thus declared. But, in ascertaining the respective rights of parties, it frequently becomes necessary to consult the Constitution. For there can be no law inconsistent with the fundamental law. No enactment not in pursuance of the authority conferred by it can create obligations or confer rights. For such is the express declaration of the Constitution itself in these words:
“The Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges of every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
. . .
When, therefore, a case arises for judicial determination, and the decision depends on the alleged inconsistency of a legislative provision with the fundamental law, it is the plain duty of the court to compare the act with the Constitution, and if the former cannot, upon a fair construction, be reconciled with the latter, to give effect to the Constitution rather than the statute. . . .
The case before us is one of private right. The plaintiff in the court below sought to recover of the defendants a certain sum expressed on the face of a promissory note. The defendants insisted on the right, under the act of February 25th, 1862, to acquit themselves of their obligation by tendering in payment a sum nominally equal in United States notes. But the note had been executed before the passage of the act, and the plaintiff insisted on his right under the Constitution to be paid the amount due in gold and silver. And it has not been, and cannot be, denied that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment according to his claim, unless bound by a constitutional law to accept the notes as coin.
Thus two questions were directly presented: Were the defendants relieved by the act from the obligation assumed in the contract? Could the plaintiff be compelled, by a judgment of the court, to receive in payment a currency of different nature and value from that which was in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made?
. . .
We have already said, and it is generally, if not universally, conceded, that the government of the United States is one of limited powers, and that no department possesses any authority not granted by the Constitution.
It is not necessary, however, in order to prove the existence of a particular authority to show a particular and express grant. The design of the Constitution was to establish a government competent to the direction and administration of the affairs of a great nation, and, at the same time, to mark, by sufficiently definite lines, the sphere of its operations. To this end it was needful only to make express grants of general powers, coupled with a further grant of such incidental and auxiliary powers as might be required for the exercise of the powers expressly granted. These powers are necessarily extensive. It has been found, indeed, in the practical administration of the government, that a very large part, if not the largest part, of its functions have been performed in the exercise of powers thus implied.
But the extension of power by implication was regarded with some apprehension by the wise men who framed, and by the intelligent citizens who adopted, the Constitution. This apprehension is manifest in the terms by which the grant of incidental and auxiliary powers is made. All powers of this nature are included under the description of “power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers expressly granted to Congress or vested by the Constitution in the government or in any of its departments or officers.”
The same apprehension is equally apparent in the tenth article of the amendments, which declares that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or the people.”
We do not mean to say that either of these constitutional provisions is to be taken as restricting any exercise of power fairly warranted by legitimate derivation from one of the enumerated or express powers. The first was undoubtedly introduced to exclude all doubt in respect to the existence of implied powers; while the words “necessary and proper” were intended to have a “sense,” to use the words of Mr. Justice Story, “at once admonitory and directory,” and to require that the means used in the execution of an express power “should be bona fide, appropriate to the end.” The second provision was intended to have a like admonitory and directory sense, and to restrain the limited government established under the Constitution from the exercise of powers not clearly delegated or derived by just inference from powers so delegated.
It has not been maintained in argument, nor, indeed, would anyone, however slightly conversant with constitutional law, think of maintaining that there is in the Constitution any express grant of legislative power to make any description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts.
We must inquire then whether this can be done in the exercise of an implied power.
The rule for determining whether a legislative enactment can be supported as an exercise of an implied power was stated by Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the whole court, in the case of McCulloch v. The Stale of Maryland; and the statement then made has ever since been accepted as a correct exposition of the Constitution. His words were these: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.” And in another part of the same opinion the practical application of this rule was thus illustrated: “Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government, it would be the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and tread on legislative ground.”
It must be taken then as finally settled, so far as judicial decisions can settle anything, that the words “all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution” powers expressly granted or vested, have, in the Constitution, a sense equivalent to that of the words, laws, not absolutely necessary indeed, but appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional and legitimate ends; laws not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution; laws really calculated to effect objects intrusted to the government.
The question before us, then, resolves itself into this: “Is the clause which makes United States notes a legal tender for debts contracted prior to its enactment, a law of the description stated in the rule?”
It is not doubted that the power to establish a standard of value by which all other values may be measured, or, in other words, to determine what shall be lawful money and a legal tender, is in its nature, and of necessity, a governmental power. It is in all countries exercised by the government. In the United States, so far as it relates to the precious metals, it is vested in Congress by the grant of the power to coin money. But can a power to impart these qualities to notes, or promises to pay money, when offered in discharge of pre-existing debts, be derived from the coinage power, or from any other power expressly given?
It is certainly not the same power as the power to coin money. Nor is it in any reasonable or satisfactory sense an appropriate or plainly adapted means to the exercise of that power. Nor is there more reason for saying that it is implied in, or incidental to, the power to regulate the value of coined money of the United States, or of foreign coins. This power of regulation is a power to determine the weight, purity, form, impression, and denomination of the several coins, and their relation to each other, and the relations of foreign coins to the monetary unit of the United States.
Nor is the power to make notes a legal tender the same as the power to issue notes to be used as currency. The old Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, was clothed by express grant with the power to emit bills of credit, which are in fact notes for circulation as currency; and yet that Congress was not clothed with the power to make these bills a legal tender in payment. And this court has recently held that the Congress, under the Constitution, possesses, as incidental to other powers, the same power as the old Congress to emit bills or notes; but it was expressly declared at the same time that this decision concluded nothing on the question of legal tender. Indeed, we are not aware that it has ever been claimed that the power to issue bills or notes has any identity with the power to make them a legal tender. On the contrary, the whole history of the country refutes that notion. The States have always been held to possess the power to authorize and regulate the issue of bills for circulation by banks or individuals, subject, as has been lately determined, to the control of Congress, for the purpose of establishing and securing a National currency; and yet the States are expressly prohibited by the Constitution from making anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender. This seems decisive on the point that the power to issue notes and the power to make them a legal tender are not the same power, and that they have no necessary connection with each other.
But it has been maintained in argument that the power to make United States notes a legal tender in payment of all debts is a means appropriate and plainly adapted to the execution of the power to carry on war, of the power to regulate commerce, and of the power to borrow money. If it is, and is not prohibited, nor inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Constitution, then the act which makes them such legal tender must be held to be constitutional.
Let us, then, first inquire whether it is an appropriate and plainly adapted means for carrying on war? The affirmative argument may be thus stated: Congress has power to declare and provide for carrying on war; Congress has also power to emit bills of credit, or circulating notes receivable for government dues and payable, so far at least as parties are willing to receive them, in discharge of government obligations; it will facilitate the use of such notes in disbursements to make them a legal tender in payment of existing debts; therefore Congress may make such notes a legal tender.
It is difficult to say to what express power the authority to make notes a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts may not be upheld as incidental, upon the principles of this argument. Is there any power which does not involve the use of money? And is there any doubt that Congress may issue and use bills of credit as money in the execution of any power? The power to establish post-offices and post-roads, for example, involves the collection and disbursement of a great revenue. Is not the power to make notes a legal tender as clearly incidental to this power as to the war power?
The answer to this question does not appear to us doubtful. The argument, therefore, seems to prove too much. It carries the doctrine of implied powers very far beyond any extent hitherto given to it. It asserts that whatever in any degree promotes an end within the scope of a general power, whether, in the correct sense of the word, appropriate or not, may be done in the exercise of an implied power.
Can this proposition be maintained?
It is said that this is not a question for the court deciding a cause, but for Congress exercising the power. But the decisive answer to this is that the admission of a legislative power to determine finally what powers have the described relation as means to the execution of other powers plainly granted, and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question, in cases involving private rights, the powers thus determined to have that relation, would completely change the nature of American government. It would convert the government, which the people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a government of unlimited powers. It would confuse the boundaries which separate the executive and judicial from the legislative authority. It would obliterate every criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief Justice in the case already cited, established for the determination of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or unconstitutional.
Undoubtedly among means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated, the legislature has unrestricted choice. But there can be no implied power to use means not within the description.
. . .
We recur, then, to the question under consideration. No one questions the general constitutionality, and not very many, perhaps, the general expediency of the legislation by which a note currency has been authorized in recent years. The doubt is as to the power to declare a particular class of these notes to be a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts.
The only ground upon which this power is asserted is, not that the issue of notes was an appropriate and plainly adapted means for carrying on the war, for that is admitted; but that the making of them a legal tender to the extent mentioned was such a means.
Now, we have seen that of all the notes issued those not declared a legal tender at all constituted a very large proportion, and that they circulated freely and without discount.
It may be said that their equality in circulation and credit was due to the provision made by law for the redemption of this paper in legal tender notes. But this provision, if at all useful in this respect, was of trifling importance compared with that which made them receivable for government dues. All modern history testifies that, in time of war especially, when taxes are augmented, large loans negotiated, and heavy disbursements made, notes issued by the authority of the government, and made receivable for dues of the government, always obtain at first a ready circulation; and even when not redeemable in coin, on demand, are as little and usually less subject to depreciation than any other description of notes, for the redemption of which no better provision is made. And the history of the legislation under consideration is, that it was upon this quality of receivability, and not upon the quality of legal tender, that reliance for circulation was originally placed; for the receivability clause appears to have been in the original draft of the bill, while the legal tender clause seems to have been introduced at a later stage of its progress.
These facts certainly are not without weight as evidence that all the useful purposes of the notes would have been fully answered without making them a legal tender for preexisting debts. It is denied, indeed, by eminent writers, that the quality of legal tender adds anything at all to the credit or usefulness of government notes. They insist, on the contrary, that it impairs both. However this may be, it must be remembered that it is as a means to an end to be attained by the action of the government, that the implied power of making notes a legal tender in all payments is claimed under the Constitution. Now, how far is the government helped by this means? Certainly it cannot obtain new supplies or services at a cheaper rate, for no one will take the notes for more than they are worth at the time of the new contract. The price will rise in the ratio of the depreciation, and this is all that could happen if the notes were not made a legal tender. But it may be said that the depreciation will be less to him who takes them from the government, if the government will pledge to him its power to compel his creditors to receive them at par in payments. This is, as we have seen, by no means certain. If the quantity issued be excessive, and redemption uncertain and remote, great depreciation will take place; if, on the other hand, the quantity is only adequate to the demands of business, and confidence in early redemption is strong, the notes will circulate freely, whether made a legal tender or not.
But if it be admitted that some increase of availability is derived from making the notes a legal tender under new contracts, it by no means follows that any appreciable advantage is gained by compelling creditors to receive them in satisfaction of pre-existing debts. And there is abundant evidence, that whatever benefit is possible from that compulsion to some individuals or to the government, is far more than outweighed by the losses of property, the derangement of business, the fluctuations of currency and values, and the increase of prices to the people and the government, and the long train of evils which flow from the use of irredeemable paper money. It is true that these evils are not to be attributed altogether to making it a legal tender. But this increases these evils. It certainly widens their extent and protracts their continuance.
We are unable to persuade ourselves that an expedient of this sort is an appropriate and plainly adapted means for the execution of the power to declare and carry on war. If it adds nothing to the utility of the notes, it cannot be upheld as a means to the end in furtherance of which the notes are issued. Nor can it, in our judgment, be upheld as such, if, while facilitating in some degree the circulation of the notes, it debases and injures the currency in its proper use to a much greater degree. And these considerations seem to us equally applicable to the powers to regulate commerce and to borrow money. Both powers necessarily involve the use of money by the people and by the government, but neither, as we think, carries with it as an appropriate and plainly adapted means to its exercise, the power of making circulating notes a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts.
But there is another view, which seems to us decisive, to whatever express power the supposed implied power in question may be referred. In the rule stated by Chief Justice Marshall, the words appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated, are qualified by the limitation that the means must be not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Nothing so prohibited or inconsistent can be regarded as appropriate, or plainly adapted, or really calculated means to any end.
Let us inquire, then, first, whether making bills of credit a legal tender, to the extent indicated, is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.
Among the great cardinal principles of that instrument, no one is more conspicuous or more venerable than the establishment of justice. And what was intended by the establishment of justice in the minds of the people who ordained it is, happily, not a matter of disputation. It is not left to inference or conjecture, especially in its relations to contracts.
When the Constitution was undergoing discussion in the Convention, the Congress of the Confederation was engaged in the consideration of the ordinance for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio, the only territory subject at that time to its regulation and control. By this ordinance certain fundamental articles of compact were established between the original States and the people and States of the territory, for the purpose, to use its own language, “of extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, whereon these republics” (the States united under the Confederation), “their laws, and constitutions are erected.”
Among these fundamental principles was this: “And in the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and declared that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements bona fide and without fraud previously formed.”
The same principle found more condensed expression in that most valuable provision of the Constitution of the United States, ever recognized as an efficient safeguard against injustice, that “no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.”
It is true that this prohibition is not applied in terms to the government of the United States. Congress has express power to enact bankrupt laws, and we do not say that a law made in the execution of any other express power, which, incidentally only, impairs the obligation of a contract, can be held to be unconstitutional for that reason.
But we think it clear that those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution, intended that the spirit of this prohibition should pervade the entire body of legislation, and that the justice which the Constitution was ordained to establish was not thought by them to be compatible with legislation of an opposite tendency. In other words, we cannot doubt that a law not made in pursuance of an express power, which necessarily and in its direct operation impairs the obligation of contracts, is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution.
Another provision, found in the fifth amendment, must be considered in this connection. We refer to that which ordains that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation. This provision is kindred in spirit to that which forbids legislation impairing the obligation of contracts; but, unlike that, it is addressed directly and solely to the National government. It does not, in terms, prohibit legislation which appropriates the private property of one class of citizens to the use of another class; but if such property cannot be taken for the benefit of all, without compensation, it is difficult to understand how it can be so taken for the benefit of a part without violating the spirit of the prohibition.
But there is another provision in the same amendment, which, in our judgment, cannot have its full and intended effect unless construed as a direct prohibition of the legislation which we have been considering. It is that which declares that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
It is not doubted that all the provisions of this amendment operate directly in limitation and restraint of the legislative powers conferred by the Constitution. The only question is, whether an act which compels all those who hold contracts for the payment of gold and silver money to accept in payment a currency of inferior value deprives such persons of property without due process of law.
It is quite clear, that whatever may be the operation of such an act, due process of law makes no part of it. Does it deprive any person of property? A very large proportion of the property of civilized men exists in the form of contracts. These contracts almost invariably stipulate for the payment of money. And we have already seen that contracts in the United States, prior to the act under consideration, for the payment of money, were contracts to pay the sums specified in gold and silver coin. And it is beyond doubt that the holders of these contracts were and are as fully entitled to the protection of this constitutional provision as the holders of any other description of property.
But it may be said that the holders of no description of property are protected by it from legislation which incidentally only impairs its value. And it may be urged in illustration that the holders of stock in a turnpike, a bridge, or a manufacturing corporation, or an insurance company, or a bank, cannot invoke its protection against legislation which, by authorizing similar works or corporations, reduces its price in the market. But all this does not appear to meet the real difficulty. In the cases mentioned the injury is purely contingent and incidental. In the case we are considering it is direct and inevitable.
If in the cases mentioned the holders of the stock were required by law to convey it on demand to anyone who should think fit to offer half its value for it, the analogy would be more obvious. No one probably could be found to contend that an act enforcing the acceptance of fifty or seventy-five acres of land in satisfaction of a contract to convey a hundred would not come within the prohibition against arbitrary privation of property.
We confess ourselves unable to perceive any solid distinction between such an act and an act compelling all citizens to accept, in satisfaction of all contracts for money, half or three-quarters or any other proportion less than the whole of the value actually due, according to their terms. It is difficult to conceive what act would take private property without process of law if such an act would not.
We are obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payment of debts previously contracted, is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; that such an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution; and that it is prohibited by the Constitution.
It is not surprising that amid the tumult of the late civil war, and under the influence of apprehensions for the safety of the Republic almost universal, different views, never before entertained by American statesmen or jurists, were adopted by many. The time was not favorable to considerate reflection upon the constitutional limits of legislative or executive authority. If power was assumed from patriotic motives, the assumption found ready justification in patriotic hearts. Many who doubted yielded their doubts; many who did not doubt were silent. Some who were strongly averse to making government notes a legal tender felt themselves constrained to acquiesce in the views of the advocates of the measure. Not a few who then insisted upon its necessity, or acquiesced in that view, have, since the return of peace, and under the influence of the calmer time, reconsidered their conclusions, and now concur in those which we have just announced. These conclusions seem to us to be fully sanctioned by the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
We are obliged, therefore, to hold that the defendant in error was not bound to receive from the plaintiffs the currency tendered to him in payment of their note, made before the passage of the act of February 25th, 1862. It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky must be affirmed.
It is proper to say that Mr. Justice Grier, who was a member of the court when this cause was decided in conference, and when this opinion was directed to be read, stated his judgment to be that the legal tender clause, properly construed, has no application to debts contracted prior to its enactment; but that upon the construction given to the act by the other judges he concurred in the opinion that the clause, so far as it makes United States notes a legal tender for such debts, is not warranted by the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Miller (with whom concurred Swayne and Davis, JJ.), dissenting.
The provisions of the Constitution of the United States which have direct reference to the function of legislation may be divided into three primary classes:
1. Those which confer legislative powers on Congress.
2. Those which prohibit the exercise of legislative powers by Congress.
3. Those which prohibit the States from exercising certain legislative powers.
The powers conferred on Congress may be subdivided into the positive and the auxiliary, or, as they are more commonly called, the express and the implied powers.
As instances of the former class may be mentioned the power to borrow money, to raise and support armies, and to coin money and regulate the value thereof.
The implied or auxiliary powers of legislation are founded largely on that general provision which closes the enumeration of powers granted in express terms, by the declaration that Congress shall also “have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”
The question which this court is called upon to consider, is whether the authority to make the notes of the United States a lawful tender in payment of debts, is to be found in Congress under either of these classes of legislative powers.
As one of the elements of this question, and in order to negative any idea that the exercise of such a power would be an invasion of the rights reserved to the States, it may be as well to say at the outset, that this is among the subjects of legislation forbidden to the States by the Constitution. Among the unequivocal utterances of that instrument on this subject of legal tender, is that which declares that “no State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts;” thus removing the whole matter from the domain of State legislation.
No such prohibition is placed upon the power of Congress on this subject, though there are, as I have already said, matters expressly forbidden to Congress; but neither this of legal tender, nor of the power to emit bills of credit, or to impair the obligation of contracts, is among them. On the contrary, Congress is expressly authorized to coin money and to regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins, and to punish the counterfeiting of such coin and of the securities of the United States. It has been strongly argued by many able jurists that these latter clauses, fairly construed, confer the power to make the securities of the United States a lawful tender in payment of debts.
While I am not able to see in them standing alone a sufficient warrant for the exercise of this power, they are not without decided weight when we come to consider the question of the existence of this power, as one necessary and proper for carrying into execution other admitted powers of the government. For they show that so far as the framers of the Constitution did go in granting express power over the lawful money of the country, it was confided to Congress and forbidden to the States; and it is no unreasonable inference, that if it should be found necessary in carrying into effect some of the powers of the government essential to its successful operation, to make its securities perform the office of money in the payment of debts, such legislation would be in harmony with the power over money granted in express terms.
It being conceded, then, that the power under consideration would not, if exercised by Congress, be an invasion of any right reserved to the States, but one which they are forbidden to employ, and that it is not one in terms either granted or denied to Congress, can it be sustained as a law necessary and proper, at the time it was enacted, for carrying into execution any of these powers that are expressly granted either to Congress, or to the government, or to any department thereof?
From the organization of the government under the present Constitution, there have been from time to time attempts to limit the powers granted by that instrument, by a narrow and literal rule of construction, and these have been specially directed to the general clause which we have cited as the foundation of the auxiliary powers of the government. It has been said that this clause, so far from authorizing the use of any means which could not have been used without it, is a restriction upon the powers necessarily implied by an instrument so general in its language.
The doctrine is, that when an act of Congress is brought to the test of this clause of the Constitution, its necessity must be absolute, and its adaptation to the conceded purpose unquestionable.
Nowhere has this principle been met with more emphatic denial, and more satisfactory refutation, than in this court. That eminent jurist and statesman, whose official career of over thirty years as Chief Justice commenced very soon after the Constitution was adopted, and whose opinions have done as much to fix its meaning as those of any man living or dead, has given this particular clause the benefit of his fullest consideration.
In the case of The United States v. Fisher decided in 1804, the point in issue was the priority claimed for the United States as a creditor of a bankrupt over all other creditors. It was argued mainly on the construction of the statutes; but the power of Congress to pass such a law was also denied. Chief Justice Marshall said: “It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the government, or in any department thereof. In construing this clause, it would be incorrect, and would produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained, that no law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be said with respect to each that it was not necessary, because the end might be attained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of the power granted by the Constitution.”
It was accordingly held that, under the authority to pay the debts of the Union, it could pass a law giving priority for its own debts in cases of bankruptcy.
But in the memorable case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland the most exhaustive discussion of this clause is found in the opinion of the court by the same eminent expounder of the Constitution. That case involved, it is well known, the right of Congress to establish the Bank of the United States, and to authorize it to issue notes for circulation. It was conceded that the right to incorporate or create such a bank had no specific grant in any clause of the Constitution, still less the right to authorize it to issue notes for circulation as money. But it was argued, that as a means necessary to enable the government to collect, transfer, and pay out its revenues, the organization of a bank with this function was within the power of Congress. In speaking of the true meaning of the word “necessary” in this clause of the Constitution, he says: “Does it always import an absolute physical necessity so strong, that one thing to which another maybe termed necessary cannot exist without it? We think it does not. If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient or useful, or essential to another. To employ means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means without which the end would be entirely unattainable.”
The word necessary admits, he says, of all degrees of comparison. “A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary…This word, then, like others, is used in various senses, and in its construction the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them are all to be taken into view. Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which the government should in all future time execute its powers, would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide by immutable rules for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been but dimly, and which can best be provided for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be used but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”
I have cited at unusual length these remarks of Chief Justice Marshall, because though made half a century ago, their applicability to the circumstances under which Congress called to its aid the power of making the securities of the government a legal tender, as a means of successfully prosecuting a war, which without such aid seemed likely to terminate its existence, and to borrow money which could in no other manner be borrowed, and to pay the debt of millions due to its soldiers in the field, which could by no other means be paid, seems to be almost prophetic. If he had had clearly before his mind the future history of his country, he could not have better characterized a principle which would in this very case have rendered the power to carry on war nugatory, which would have deprived Congress of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances, by the use of the most appropriate means of supporting the government in the crisis of its fate.
But it is said that the clause under consideration is admonitory as to the use of implied powers, and adds nothing to what would have been authorized without it.
The idea is not new, and is probably intended for the same which was urged in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, namely, that instead of enlarging the powers conferred on Congress, or providing for a more liberal use of them, it was designed as a restriction upon the ancillary powers incidental to every express grant of power in general terms. I have already cited so fully from that case, that I can only refer to it to say that this proposition is there clearly stated and refuted.
Does there exist, then, any power in Congress or in the government, by express grant, in the execution of which this legal tender act was necessary and proper, in the sense here defined, and under the circumstances of its passage?
The power to declare war, to suppress insurrection, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to borrow money on the credit of the United States, to pay the debts of the Union, and to provide for the common defence and general welfare, are each and all distinctly and specifically granted in separate clauses of the Constitution.
We were in the midst of a war which called all these powers into exercise and taxed them severely. A war which, if we take into account the increased capacity for destruction introduced by modern science, and the corresponding increase of its cost, brought into operation powers of belligerency more potent and more expensive than any that the world has ever known.
All the ordinary means of rendering efficient the several powers of Congress above-mentioned had been employed to their utmost capacity, and with the spirit of the rebellion unbroken, with large armies in the field unpaid, with a current expenditure of over a million of dollars per day, the credit of the government nearly exhausted, and the resources of taxation inadequate to pay even the interest on the public debt, Congress was called on to devise some new means of borrowing money on the credit of the nation; for the result of the war was conceded by all thoughtful men to depend on the capacity of the government to raise money in amounts previously unknown. The banks had already loaned their means to the treasury. They had been compelled to suspend the payment of specie on their own notes. The coin in the country, if it could all have been placed within the control of the Secretary of the Treasury, would not have made a circulation sufficient to answer army purchases and army payments, to say nothing of the ordinary business of the country. A general collapse of credit, of payment, and of business seemed inevitable, in which faith in the ability of the government would have been destroyed, the rebellion would have triumphed, the States would have been left divided, and the people impoverished. The National government would have perished, and, with it, the Constitution which we are now called upon to construe with such nice and critical accuracy.
That the legal tender act prevented these disastrous results, and that the tender clause was necessary to prevent them, I entertain no doubt.
It furnished instantly a means of paying the soldiers in the field, and filled the coffers of the commissary and quartermaster. It furnished a medium for the payment of private debts, as well as public, at a time when gold was being rapidly withdrawn from circulation, and the State bank currency was becoming worthless. It furnished the means to the capitalist of buying the bonds of the government. It stimulated trade, revived the drooping energies of the country, and restored confidence to the public mind.
The results which followed the adoption of this measure are beyond dispute. No other adequate cause has ever been assigned for the revival of government credit, the renewed activity of trade, and the facility with which the government borrowed, in two or three years, at reasonable rates of interest, mainly from its own citizens, double the amount of money there was in the country, including coin, bank notes, and the notes issued under the legal tender acts.
It is now said, however, in the calm retrospect of these events, that treasury notes suitable for circulation as money, bearing on their face the pledge of the United States for their ultimate payment in coin, would, if not equally efficient, have answered the requirement of the occasion without being made a lawful tender for debts. But what was needed was something more than the credit of the government. That had been stretched to its utmost tension, and was clearly no longer sufficient in the simple form of borrowing money. Is there any reason to believe that the mere change in the form of the security given would have revived this sinking credit? On the contrary, all experience shows that a currency not redeemable promptly in coin, but dependent on the credit of a promissor whose resources are rapidly diminishing, while his liabilities are increasing, soon sinks to the dead level of worthless paper. As no man would have been compelled to take it in payment of debts, as it bore no interest, as its period of redemption would have been remote and uncertain, this must have been the inevitable fate of any extensive issue of such notes.
But when by law they were made to discharge the function of paying debts, they had a perpetual credit or value, equal to the amount of all the debts, public and private, in the country. If they were never redeemed, as they never have been, they still paid debts at their par value, and for this purpose were then, and always have been, eagerly sought by the people. To say, then, that this quality of legal tender was not necessary to their usefulness, seems to be unsupported by any sound view of the situation.
Nor can any just inference of that proposition arise from a comparison of the legal tender notes with the bonds issued by the government about the same time. These bonds had a fixed period for their payment, and the Secretary of the Treasury declared that they were payable in gold. They bore interest, which was payable semi-annually in gold, by express terms on their face, and the customs duties, which by law could be paid in nothing but gold, were sacredly pledged to the payment of this interest. They can afford no means of determining what would have been the fate of treasury notes designed to circulate as money, but which bore no interest, and had no fixed time of redemption, and by law could pay no debts, and had no fund pledged for their payment.
The legal tender clauses of the statutes under consideration were placed emphatically by those who enacted them, upon their necessity to the further borrowing of money and maintaining the army and navy. It was done reluctantly and with hesitation, and only after the necessity had been demonstrated and had become imperative. Our statesmen had been trained in a school which looked upon such legislation with something more than distrust. The debates of the two houses of Congress show, that on this necessity alone could this clause of the bill have been carried, and they also prove, as I think, very clearly the existence of that necessity. The history of that gloomy time, not to be readily forgotten by the lover of his country, will forever remain, the full, clear, and ample vindication of the exercise of this power by Congress, as its results have demonstrated the sagacity of those who originated and carried through this measure.
Certainly it seems to the best judgment that I can bring to bear upon the subject that this law was a necessity in the most stringent sense in which that word can be used. But if we adopt the construction of Chief Justice Marshall and the full court over which he presided, a construction which has never to this day been overruled or questioned in this court, how can we avoid this conclusion? Can it be said that this provision did not conduce towards the purpose of borrowing money, of paying debts, of raising armies, of suppressing insurrection? or that it was not calculated to effect these objects? or that it was not useful and essential to that end? Can it be said that this was not among the choice of means, if not the only means, which were left to Congress to carry on this war for national existence?
Let us compare the present with other cases decided in this court.
If we can say judicially that to declare, as in the case of The United States v. Fisher, that the debt which a bankrupt owes the government shall have priority of payment over all other debts, is a necessary and proper law to enable the government to pay its own debts, how can we say that the legal tender clause was not necessary and proper to enable the government to borrow money to carry on the war?
The creation of the United States Bank, and especially the power granted to it to issue notes for circulation as money, was strenuously resisted as without constitutional authority; but this court held that a bank of issue was necessary, in the sense of that word as used in the Constitution, to enable the government to collect, to transfer, and to pay out its revenues.
It was never claimed that the government could find no other means to do this. It could not then be denied, nor has it ever been, that other means more clearly within the competency of Congress existed, nor that a bank of deposit might possibly have answered without a circulation. But because that was the most fitting, useful, and efficient mode of doing what Congress was authorized to do, it was held to be necessary by this court. The necessity in that case is much less apparent to me than in the adoption of the legal tender clause.
. . .
But it is said that the law is in conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of several provisions of the Constitution. Undoubtedly it is a law impairing the obligation of contracts made before its passage. But while the Constitution forbids the States to pass such laws it does not forbid Congress. On the contrary, Congress is expressly authorized to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, the essence of which is to discharge debtors from the obligation of their contracts; and in pursuance of this power Congress has three times passed such a law, which in every instance operated on contracts made before it was passed. Such a law is now in force, yet its constitutionality has never been questioned. How it can be in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution to destroy directly the creditor's contract for the sake of the individual debtor, but contrary to its spirit to affect remotely its value for the safety of the nation, it is difficult to perceive.
So it is said that the provisions, that private property shall not be taken for public use without due compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due course of law, are opposed to the acts under consideration.
The argument is too vague for my perception, by which the indirect effect of a great public measure, in depreciating the value of lands, stocks, bonds, and other contracts, renders such a law invalid as taking private property for public use, or as depriving the owner of it without due course of law.
A declaration of war with a maritime power would thus be unconstitutional, because the value of every ship abroad is lessened twenty-five or thirty per cent, and those at home almost as much. The abolition of the tariff on iron or sugar would in like manner destroy the furnaces, and sink the capital employed in the manufacture of these articles. Yet no statesman, however warm an advocate of high tariff, has claimed that to abolish such duties would be unconstitutional as taking private property.
If the principle be sound, every successive issue of government bonds during the war was void, because by increasing the public debt it made those already in private hands less valuable.
This whole argument of the injustice of the law, an injustice which if it ever existed will be repeated by now holding it wholly void; and of its opposition to the spirit of the Constitution, is too abstract and intangible for application to courts of justice, and is, above all, dangerous as a ground on which to declare the legislation of Congress void by the decision of a court. It would authorize this court to enforce theoretical views of the genius of the government, or vague notions of the spirit of the Constitution and of abstract justice, by declaring void laws which did not square with those views. It substitutes our ideas of policy for judicial construction, an undefined code of ethics for the Constitution, and a court of justice for the National legislature.
Upon the enactment of these legal tender laws they were received with almost universal acquiescence as valid. Payments were made in the legal tender notes for debts in existence when the law was passed, to the amount of thousands of millions of dollars, though gold was the only lawful tender when the debts were contracted. A great if not larger amount is now due under contracts made since their passage, under the belief that these legal tenders would be valid payment.
The two houses of Congress, the President who signed the bill, and fifteen State courts, being all but one that has passed upon the question, have expressed their belief in the constitutionality of these laws.
With all this great weight of authority, this strong concurrence of opinion among those who have passed upon the question, before we have been called to decide it, whose duty it was as much as it is ours to pass upon it in the light of the Constitution, are we to reverse their action, to disturb contracts, to declare the law void, because the necessity for its enactment does not appear so strong to us as it did to Congress, or so clear as it was to other courts?
Such is not my idea of the relative functions of the legislative and judicial departments of the government. Where there is a choice of means the selection is with Congress, not the court. If the act to be considered is in any sense essential to the execution of an acknowledged power, the degree of that necessity is for the legislature and not for the court to determine. In the case in Wheaton, from which I have already quoted so fully, the court says that “where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretences to such a power.” This sound exposition of the duties of the court in this class of cases, relieves me from any embarrassment or hesitation in the case before me. If I had entertained doubts of the constitutionality of the law, I must have held the law valid until those doubts became convictions. But as I have a very decided opinion that Congress acted within the scope of its authority, I must hold the law to be constitutional, and dissent from the opinion of the court.
At the same time with the decision of the preceding case was decided a case in error to the Supreme Court of California, argued some time before it;—the case, namely, of Broderick’s Executor v. Magraw, in which the principles of the preceding case of Hepburn v. Griswold were affirmed.
The case was this:
Magraw preferred a claim by petition in the Probate Court of the city of San Francisco, upon a note made by Broderick to the petitioner at New York, on the 1st of July, 1858. Broderick dying, his executor defended the suit.
For the general form of the notes, see 7 Wallace, 26.
Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wallace, 71.
Bronson v. Bodes, 7 Wallace, 229; Butler v. Horwitz, Ib. 258.
2 Story on the Constitution, p. 142, 1253.
4 Wheaton, 421.
4 Wheaton, 423.
November 27th, 1869.
January 29th, 1870.
2 Cranch, 358.
4 Wheaton, 316.
The Slaughterhouse Cases, abridged
(The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans
v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company)
By The Supreme Court of the United States of America
Argued December, 1872
Decided April, 1873
[Supreme Court of the United States of America. The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company. 83 U.S. 16 Wallace 36. 1873. In the Public Domain.]
Figures in brackets of the form [83 U. S. #] refer to pages in the records of the U.S. Supreme Court. –Editor
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
. . .
These cases . . . arise out of the efforts of the butchers of New Orleans to resist the Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company in the exercise of certain powers conferred by the charter which created it, and which was granted by the legislature of that State. [The charter granted a monopoly to a particular slaughter-house company of New Orleans, thus restricting its competitors and affecting meat-suppliers generally. –Editor]
The cases . . . were all decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in favor of the Slaughter-House Company, as we shall hereafter call it for the sake of brevity, and these writs are brought to reverse those decisions.
. . .
The records show that the plaintiffs in error relied upon, and asserted throughout the entire course of the litigation in the State courts, that the grant of privileges in the charter of defendant, which they were contesting, was a violation of the most important provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The jurisdiction and the duty of this court 83 U. S. 59] to review the judgment of the State court on those questions is clear, and is imperative.
The statute thus assailed as unconstitutional was passed March 8th, 1869, and is entitled
“An act to protect the health of the city of New Orleans, to locate the stock landings and slaughterhouses, and to incorporate the Crescent City Livestock Landing aud Slaughter-House Company.”
The first section forbids the landing or slaughtering of animals whose flesh is intended for food within the city of New Orleans and other parishes and boundaries named and defined, or the keeping or establishing any slaughterhouses or abattoirs within those limits except by the corporation thereby created, which is also limited to certain places afterwards mentioned.
Suitable penalties are enacted for violations of this prohibition.
. . .
Section five orders the closing up of all other stock landings [83 U. S. 60] and slaughterhouses after the first day of June, in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard, and makes it the duty of the company to permit any person to slaughter animals in their slaughterhouses under a heavy penalty for each refusal. Another section fixes a limit to the charges to be made by the company for each animal so slaughtered in their building, and another provides for an inspection of all animals intended to be so slaughtered by an officer appointed by the governor of the State for that purpose.
These are the principal features of the statute, and are all that have any bearing upon the questions to be decided by us.
. . .
[83 U. S. 66]
. . .
The plaintiffs in error . . . allege that the statute is a violation of the Constitution of the United States in these several particulars:
That it creates an involuntary servitude forbidden by the thirteenth article of amendment;
That it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States;
That it denies to the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws; and,
That it deprives them of their property without due process of law, contrary to the provisions of the first section of the fourteenth article of amendment.
[83 U. S. 67]
This court is thus called upon for the first time to give construction to these [amendments].
We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this duty devolves upon us. No questions so far-reaching and pervading in their consequences, so profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so important in their bearing upon the relations of the United States, of the several States to each other, and to the citizens of the States and of the United States, have been before this court during the official life of any of its present members. . . .
Twelve articles of amendment were added to the Federal Constitution soon after the original organization of the government under it in 1789. Of these, all but the last were adopted so soon afterwards as to justify the statement that they were practically contemporaneous with the adoption of the original; and the twelfth, adopted in eighteen hundred and three, was so nearly so as to have become, like all the others, historical and of another age. But within the [last] eight years, three other articles of amendment [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments] of vast importance have been added by the voice of the people to that now venerable instrument.
The most cursory glance at these articles discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning. Nor can such doubts, when any reasonably exist, be safely and rationally solved without a reference to that history, for in it is found the occasion and the necessity for recurring again to the great source of power in this country, the people of the States, for additional guarantees of human rights, [83 U. S. 68] additional powers to the Federal government; additional restraints upon those of the States. Fortunately, that history is fresh within the memory of us all, and its leading features, as they bear upon the matter before us, free from doubt.
The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the States of the Union, and the contests pervading the public mind for many years between those who desired its curtailment and ultimate extinction and those who desired additional safeguards for its security and perpetuation, culminated in the effort, on the part of most of the States in which slavery existed, to separate from the Federal government and to resist its authority. This constituted the war of the rebellion [the Civil War], and whatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery.
[The opinion then recounts the history of how the Thirteenth Amendment came to be ratified to abolish involuntary servitude or slavery permanently in the United States after the Civil War; how the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to protect all U.S. citizens’ rights of life, liberty, and property in response to the oppressive restrictions that many state and local governments placed on the now free black population; and how the Fifteenth Amendment extended these protections by also forbidding abridgement of the right to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”]
. . .
[83 U. S. 71]
. . .
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all, and on the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. . . . [83 U. S. 72]
. . .
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of construction. . . . But what we do say, and what we wish to be understood, is that, in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished as far as constitutional law can accomplish it.
The first section of the fourteenth article to which our attention is more specially invited opens with a definition of citizenship—not only citizenship of the United States, but citizenship of the States. No such definition was previously found in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been the occasion of much discussion in the courts, by the executive departments, and in the public journals. It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the Union. . . . [Page 83 U. S. 73] . . . [I]t had been held by this court, in the celebrated Dred Scott case, only a few years before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United States. . . .
To remove this difficulty primarily, and to establish clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States and also citizenship of a State, the first clause of the first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was framed.
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
The first observation we have to make on this clause is that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. . . .
The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case. It is that the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. [83 U.S. 74] Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union.
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.
We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section, which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those of citizens of the several States. The argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs rests wholly on the assumption that the citizenship is the same, and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the clause are the same.
The language is, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State, that the word citizen of the State should be left out when it is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United States in the very sentence which precedes it. It is too clear for argument that the change in phraseology was adopted understandingly and, with a purpose.
Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respectively are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment. [83 U. S. 75] If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such and those belonging to the citizen of the State as such, the latter must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested, for they are not embraced by this paragraph of the amendment.
. . .
In the Constitution of the United States, which superseded the Articles of Confederation, the corresponding provision is found in section two of the fourth article, in the following words: “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.”
. . .
Fortunately, we are not without judicial construction of this clause of the Constitution. The first and the leading case on the subject is that of Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in 1823. (4 Washington’s Circuit Court 371) [83 U. S. 76] “The inquiry,” he says,
“is what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole.”
. . .
[83 U. S. 77]
. . .
The constitutional provision there alluded to did not create those rights, which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. It threw around them in that clause no security for the citizen of the State in which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens.
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States that, whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove by citations of authority that, up to the adoption of the recent amendments, no claim or pretence was set up that those rights depended on the Federal government for their existence or protection beyond the very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the States -- such, for instance, as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. But, with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government. Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress Shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?
All this and more must follow if the proposition of the [83 U. S. 78] plaintiffs in error be sound. For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever, in its discretion, any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects. And still further, such a construction followed by the reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment. The argument, we admit, is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when, in fact, it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people, the argument has a force that is irresistible in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.
Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citizens of the States as such, and that they are left to the State governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal government, we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privileges [83 U. S. 79] and immunities of citizens of the United States which no State can abridge until some case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do so.
But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their existence to the Federal government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws.
One of these is well described in the case of Crandall v. Nevada. (73 U.S. 6 Wallace 36) It is said to be the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied guarantees of its Constitution,
“to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports, through which operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States.”
And quoting from the language of Chief Justice Taney in another case, it is said
“that, for all the great purposes for which the Federal government was established, we are one people, with one common country, we are all citizens of the United States;”
and it is, as such citizens, that their rights are supported in this court in Crandall v. Nevada.
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations, [83 U. S. 80] are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a State. One of these privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State. To these may be added the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other clause of the fourteenth, next to be considered.
But it is useless to pursue this branch of the inquiry, since we are of opinion that the rights claimed by these plaintiffs in error, if they have any existence, are not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the clause of the fourteenth amendment under consideration.
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”
The argument has not been much pressed in these cases that the defendant’s charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, or that it denies to them the equal protection of the law. The first of these paragraphs has been in the Constitution since the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, as a restraint upon the Federal power. It is also to be found in some form of expression in the constitutions of nearly all the States as a restraint upon the power of the States. This law, then, has practically been the same as it now is during the existence of the government, except so far as the present amendment may place the restraining power over the States in this matter in the hands of the Federal government.
We are not without judicial interpretation, therefore, both State and National, of the meaning of this clause. And it [83 U. S. 81] is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision.
“Nor shall any State deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose of them, which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause. The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements, then by the fifth section of the article of amendment Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation. We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other. But as it is a State that is to be dealt with, and not alone the validity of its laws, we may safely leave that matter until Congress shall have exercised its power, or some case of State oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed a decision at our hands. We find no such case in the one before us, and do not deem it necessary to go over the argument again, as it may have relation to this particular clause of the amendment.
In the early history of the organization of the government, its statesmen seem to have divided on the line which should separate the powers of the National government from those of the State governments, and though this line has [83 U. S. 82] never been very well defined in public opinion, such a division has continued from that day to this.
The adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the original instrument was accepted shows a prevailing sense of danger at that time from the Federal power. And it cannot be denied that such a jealousy continued to exist with many patriotic men until the breaking out of the late civil war. It was then discovered that the true danger to the perpetuity of the Union was in the capacity of the State organizations to combine and concentrate all the powers of the State, and of contiguous States, for a determined resistance to the General Government.
Unquestionably this has given great force to the argument, and added largely to the number of those who believe in the necessity of a strong National government.
But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to the adoption of the amendments we have been considering, we do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the State with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights the rights of person and of property was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the Nation.
But whatever fluctuations may be seen in the history of public opinion on this subject during the period of our national existence, we think it will be found that this court, so far as its functions required, has always held with a steady and an even hand the balance between State and Federal power, and we trust that such may continue to be the history of its relation to that subject so long as it shall have duties to perform which demand of it a construction of the Constitution or of any of its parts.
[83 U. S. 83]
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases are
. . .
I am unable to agree with the majority of the court in these cases, and will proceed to state the reasons of my dissent from their judgment.
. . .
[83 U. S. 85]
. . .
The plaintiffs in error deny the validity of the act in question so far as it confers the special and exclusive privileges mentioned. . . .
The substance of the averments of the plaintiffs in error [83 U.S. 86] is this: that, prior to the passage of the act in question, they were engaged in the lawful and necessary business of procuring and bringing to the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard animals suitable for human food, and in preparing such food for market; that, in the prosecution of this business, they had provided in these parishes suitable establishments for landing, sheltering, keeping, and slaughtering cattle and the sale of meat; that, with their association about four hundred persons were connected, and that, in the parishes named, about a thousand persons were thus engaged in procuring, preparing, and selling animal food. And they complain that the business of landing, yarding, and keeping, within the parishes named, cattle intended for sale or slaughter, which was lawful for them to pursue before the first day of June, 1869, is made by that act unlawful for anyone except the corporation named, and that the business of slaughtering cattle and preparing animal food for market, which it was lawful for them to pursue in these parishes before that day, is made by that act unlawful for them to pursue afterwards except in the buildings of the company, and upon payment of certain prescribed fees, and a surrender of a valuable portion of each animal slaughtered. And they contend that the lawful business of landing, yarding, sheltering, and keeping cattle intended for sale or slaughter, which they in common with every individual in the community of the three parishes had a right to follow, cannot be thus taken from them and given over for a period of twenty-five years to the sole and exclusive enjoyment of a corporation of seventeen persons or of anybody else. And they also contend that the lawful and necessary business of slaughtering cattle and preparing animal food for market, which they and all other individuals had a right to follow, cannot be thus restricted within this territory of 1154 square miles to the buildings of this corporation, or be subjected to tribute for the emolument of that body.
No one will deny the abstract justice which lies in the position of the plaintiffs in error, and I shall endeavor to [83 U. S. 87] show that the position has some support in the fundamental law of the country.
It is contended in justification for the act in question that it was adopted in the interest of the city, to promote its cleanliness and protect its health, and was the legitimate exercise of what is termed the police power of the State. That power undoubtedly extends to all regulations affecting the health, good order, morals, peace, and safety of society, and is exercised on a great variety of subjects, and in almost numberless ways. All sorts of restrictions and burdens are imposed under it, and, when these are not in conflict with any constitutional prohibitions or fundamental principles, they cannot be successfully assailed in a judicial tribunal. With this power of the State and its legitimate exercise I shall not differ from the majority of the court. But under the pretence of prescribing a police regulation, the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against abridgment.
. . .
[83 U. S. 88]
. . .
It is also sought to justify the act in question on the same principle that exclusive grants for ferries, bridges, and turnpikes are sanctioned. But it can find no support there. . . .
Nor is there any analogy between this act of Louisiana and the legislation which confers upon the inventor of a new and useful improvement an exclusive right to make and sell to others his invention. . . .
The act of Louisiana presents the naked case, unaccompanied by any public considerations, where a right to pursue a lawful and necessary calling, previously enjoyed by every citizen, and in connection with which a thousand persons were daily employed, is taken away and vested exclusively [83 U. S. 89] for twenty-five years, for an extensive district and a large population, in a single corporation, or its exercise is for that period restricted to the establishments of the corporation, and there allowed only upon onerous conditions.
If exclusive privileges of this character can be granted to a corporation of seventeen persons, they may, in the discretion of the legislature, be equally granted to a single individual. If they may be granted for twenty-five years, they may be equally granted for a century, and in perpetuity. If they may be granted for the landing and keeping of animals intended for sale or slaughter, they may be equally granted for the landing and storing of grain and other products of the earth, or for any article of commerce. If they may be granted for structures in which animal food is prepared for market, they may be equally granted for structures in which farinaceous or vegetable food is prepared. They may be granted for any of the pursuits of human industry, even in its most simple and common forms. Indeed, upon the theory on which the exclusive privileges granted by the act in question are sustained, there is no monopoly, in the most odious form, which may not be upheld.
The question presented is, therefore, one of the gravest importance not merely to the parties here, but to the whole country. It is nothing less than the question whether the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution protect the citizens of the United States against the deprivation of their common rights by State legislation. In my judgment, the fourteenth amendment does afford such protection, and was so intended by the Congress which framed and the States which adopted it.
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error have contended with great force that the act in question is also inhibited by the thirteenth amendment.
That amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. . . .
. . .
[83 U. S. 93]
. . .
It is not necessary, however, . . . to rest my objections to the act in question upon the terms and meaning of the thirteenth amendment. The provisions of the fourteenth amendment, which is properly a supplement to the thirteenth, cover, in my judgment, the case before us, and inhibit any legislation which confers special and exclusive privileges like these under consideration. The amendment was adopted to obviate objections which had been raised and pressed with great force to the validity of the Civil Rights Act, and to place the common rights of American citizens under the protection of the National government. It first declares that
“all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
It then declares that
“no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due [83 U. S. 94] process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The first clause of this amendment determines who are citizens of the United States, and how their citizenship is created. Before its enactment, there was much diversity of opinion among jurists and statesmen whether there was any such citizenship independent of that of the State, and, if any existed, as to the manner in which it originated. With a great number, the opinion prevailed that there was no such citizenship independent of the citizenship of the State. Such was the opinion of [Senator John C.] Calhoun and the class represented by him. . . .
[83 U. S. 95]
. . .
The first clause of the fourteenth amendment changes this whole subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and doubt. It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States, and it makes their citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any State or the condition of their ancestry. A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in that State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State. The exercise of these rights and privileges, and the degree of enjoyment received from such exercise, are always more or less affected by the condition and the local institutions of the State, or city, or town where he resides. They are thus affected in a State by the wisdom of its laws, the ability of its officers, the efficiency of its magistrates, the education and morals of its people, and by many other considerations. This is a result which follows from the constitution of society, and can never be avoided, but in no other way can they be affected by the action of the State, or by the residence of the citizen therein. They do not derive [83 U. S. 96] their existence from its legislation, and cannot be destroyed by its power.
The amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State legislation. If this inhibition has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but only refers, as held by the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage. With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit such interference. The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States always controlled any State legislation of that character. But if the amendment refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the inhibition has a profound significance and consequence.
What, then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgment by State legislation?
In the first section of the Civil Rights Act, Congress has given its interpretation to these terms, or at least has stated some of the rights which, in its judgment, these terms include; it has there declared that they include the right
“to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.”
That act, it is true, was passed before the fourteenth amendment, but the amendment was adopted, as I have already said, to obviate objections to the act, or, speaking more accurately, I should say, to obviate objections to legislation [83 U. S. 97] of a similar character, extending the protection of the National government over the common rights of all citizens of the United States. Accordingly, after its ratification, Congress reenacted the act under the belief that whatever doubts may have previously existed of its validity, they were removed by the amendment.
The terms “privileges” and “immunities” are not new in the amendment; they were in the Constitution before the amendment was adopted. They are found in the second section of the fourth article, which declares that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” and they have been the subject of frequent consideration in judicial decisions. In Corfield v. Coryell, (4 Washington’s Circuit Court 380) Mr. Justice Washington said he had
“no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which were, in their nature, fundamental, which belong of right to citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose the Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign;”
and, in considering what those fundamental privileges were, he said that perhaps it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate them, but that they might be
“all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”
This appears to me to be a sound construction of the clause in question. The privileges and immunities designated are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments. Clearly among these must be placed the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally affects all persons. In the discussions [83 U. S. 98] in Congress upon the passage of the Civil Rights Act, repeated reference was made to this language of Mr. Justice Washington. It was cited by Senator Trumbull with the observation that it enumerated the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United States set forth in the first section of the act, and with the statement that all persons born in the United States, being declared by the act citizens of the United States, would thenceforth be entitled to the rights of citizens, and that these were the great fundamental rights set forth in the act; and that they were set forth “as appertaining to every freeman.”
The privileges and immunities designated in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution are, then, according to the decision cited, those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments, and they can be enjoyed under that clause by the citizens of each State in the several States upon the same terms and conditions as they are enjoyed by the citizens of the latter States. No discrimination can be made by one State against the citizens of other States in their enjoyment, nor can any greater imposition be levied than such as is laid upon its own citizens. It is a clause which insures equality in the enjoyment of these rights between citizens of the several States whilst in the same State.
[83 U. S. 101]
. . . If, under the fourth article of the Constitution, equality of privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of different States, under the fourteenth amendment, the same equality is secured between citizens of the United States.
. . .
Now what the clause in question does for the protection of citizens of one State against the creation of monopolies in favor of citizens of other States, the fourteenth amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against the creation of any monopoly whatever. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, of every one of them, is secured against abridgment in any form by any State. The fourteenth amendment places them under the guardianship of the National authority. All monopolies in any known trade or manufacture are an invasion of these privileges, for they encroach upon the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness, and were [83 U. S. 102] held void at common law in the great Case of Monopolies, decided during the reign of Queen Elizabeth.
A monopoly is defined
“to be an institution or allowance from the sovereign power of the State by grant, commission, or otherwise, to any person or corporation, for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade.”
All such grants relating to any known trade or manufacture have been held by all the judges of England, whenever they have come up for consideration, to be void at common law as destroying the freedom of trade, discouraging labor and industry, restraining persons from getting an honest livelihood, and putting it into the power of the grantees to enhance the price of commodities. The definition embraces, it will be observed, not merely the sole privilege of buying and selling particular articles, or of engaging in their manufacture, but also the sole privilege of using anything by which others may be restrained of the freedom or liberty they previously had in any lawful trade, or hindered in such trade. It thus covers in every particular the possession and use of suitable yards, stables, and buildings for keeping and protecting cattle and other animals, and for their slaughter. Such establishments are essential to the free and successful prosecution by any butcher of the lawful trade of preparing animal food for market. The exclusive privilege of supplying such yards, buildings, and other conveniences for the prosecution of this business in a large district of country, granted by the act of Louisiana to seventeen persons, is as much a monopoly as though the act had granted to the company the exclusive privilege of buying and selling the animals themselves. It equally restrains the butchers in the freedom and liberty they previously had and hinders them in their lawful trade.
. . .
[83 U. S. 104]
. . .
The common law of England . . . condemned all monopolies in any known trade or manufacture, and declared void all grants of special privileges whereby others could be deprived of any liberty which they previously had, or be hindered in their lawful trade. . . .
The common law of England is the basis of the jurisprudence of the United States. It was brought to this country by the colonists, together with the English statutes, and was established here so far as it was applicable to their condition. That law and the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed at the time of their colonization, and which they had by experience found to be applicable to their circumstances, were claimed by the Congress of the United Colonies in 1774 as a part of their “indubitable rights and liberties.” (Journals of Congress, Volume 1, pp. 28–30)
[83 U. S. 105]
. . . [W]hen the Colonies separated from the mother country, no privilege was more fully recognized or more completely incorporated into the fundamental law of the country than that every free subject in the British empire was entitled to pursue his happiness by following any of the known established trades and occupations of the country, subject only to such restraints as equally affected all others. The immortal document which proclaimed the independence of the country declared as self-evident truths that the Creator had endowed all men
“with certain inalienable rights, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men.”
. . .
[83 U. S. 106]
. . .
So fundamental has this privilege of every citizen to be free from disparaging and unequal enactments in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life been regarded that few instances have arisen where the principle has been so far violated as to call for the interposition of the courts. But whenever this has occurred, with the exception of the present cases from Louisiana, which are the most barefaced and flagrant of all, the enactment interfering with the privilege of the citizen has been pronounced illegal and void. When a case under the same law under which the present cases have arisen came before the Circuit Court of the United States in the District of Louisiana, there was no hesitation on the part of the court in declaring the law, in its exclusive features, to be an invasion of one of the fundamental privileges of the citizen. (1 Abbott’s United States Reports, 398) The presiding justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, observed that it might be difficult to enumerate or define what were the essential privileges of a citizen of the United States, which a State could not by its laws invade, but that, so far as the question under consideration was concerned, it might be safely said that
“it is one of the privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit, without unreasonable regulation or molestation and without being restricted by any of those unjust, oppressive, and odious monopolies or exclusive privileges which have been condemned by all free governments.”
“There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more nor less than the sacred right of labor.”
. . .
[83 U. S. 109]
. . .
This equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life, [83 U. S. 110] throughout the whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and condition. The State may prescribe such regulations for every pursuit and calling of life as will promote the public health, secure the good order and advance the general prosperity of society, but, when once prescribed, the pursuit or calling must be free to be followed by every citizen who is within the conditions designated, and will conform to the regulations. This is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and, unless adhered to in the legislation of the country, our government will be a republic only in name. The fourteenth amendment, in my judgment, makes it essential to the validity of the legislation of every State that this equality of right should be respected. How widely this equality has been departed from, how entirely rejected and trampled upon by the act of Louisiana, I have already shown. And it is to me a matter of profound regret that its validity is recognized by a majority of this court, for by it the right of free labor, one of the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man, is violated. . . .
[83 U. S. 111]
. . . [G]rants of exclusive privileges, such as is made by the act in question, are opposed to the whole theory of free government, and it requires no aid from any bill of rights to render them void. That only is a free government, in the American sense of the term, under which the inalienable right of every citizen to pursue his happiness is unrestrained, except by just, equal, and impartial laws.
I am authorized by the CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice SWAYNE, and Mr. Justice BRADLEY to state that they concur with me in this dissenting opinion.
. . .
I concur in the opinion which has just been read by Mr. Justice Field, but desire to add a few observations for the purpose of more fully illustrating my views on the important question decided in these cases, and the special grounds on which they rest.
. . .
[83 U. S. 112]
. . .
It is contended that this [law] abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, especially of the plaintiffs in error, who were particularly affected thereby, and whether it does so or not is the simple question in this case. And the solution of this question depends upon the solution of two other questions, to-wit:
First. Is it one of the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States to pursue such civil employment as he may choose to adopt, subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by law?
Secondly. Is a monopoly, or exclusive right, given to one person to the exclusion of all others, to keep slaughterhouses, in a district of nearly twelve hundred square miles, for the supply of meat for a large city, a reasonable regulation of that employment which the legislature has a right to impose?
The first of these questions is one of vast importance, and lies at the very foundations of our government. The question is now settled by the fourteenth amendment itself, that citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country, and that State citizenship is secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United States and the citizen's place of residence. . . .
[83 U. S. 113]
. . .
Every citizen, then, being primarily a citizen of the United States, and, secondarily, a citizen of the State where he resides, what, in general, are the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States? Is the right, liberty, or privilege of choosing any lawful employment one of them?
If a State legislature should pass a law prohibiting the inhabitants of a particular township, county, or city, from tanning leather or making shoes, would such a law violate any privileges or immunities of those inhabitants as citizens of the United States, or only their privileges and immunities as citizens of that particular State? Or if a State legislature should pass a law of caste, making all trades and professions, or certain enumerated trades and professions, hereditary, so that no one could follow any such trades or professions except that which was pursued by his father, would such a law violate the privileges and immunities of the people of that State as citizens of the United States, or only as citizens of the State? Would they have no redress but to appeal to the courts of that particular State?
This seems to me to be the essential question before us for consideration. And, in my judgment, the right of any citizen to follow whatever lawful employment he chooses to adopt (submitting himself to all lawful regulations) is one of [83 U. S. 114] his most valuable rights, and one which the legislature of a State cannot invade, whether restrained by its own constitution or not.
The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted. But there are certain fundamental rights which this right of regulation cannot infringe. It may prescribe the manner of their exercise, but it cannot subvert the rights themselves. I speak now of the rights of citizens of any free government. Granting for the present that the citizens of one government cannot claim the privileges of citizens in another government, that, prior to the union of our North American States, the citizens of one State could not claim the privileges of citizens in another State, or that, after the union was formed, the citizens of the United States, as such, could not claim the privileges of citizens in any particular State, yet the citizens of each of the States and the citizens of the United States would be entitled to certain privileges and immunities as citizens at the hands of their own government—privileges and immunities which their own governments respectively would be bound to respect and maintain. In this free country, the people of which inherited certain traditionary rights and privileges from their ancestors, citizenship means something. It has certain privileges and immunities attached to it which the government, whether restricted by express or implied limitations, cannot take away or impair. It may do so temporarily by force, but it cannot do so by right. And these privileges and immunities attach as well to citizenship of the United States as to citizenship of the States.
The people of this country brought with them to its shores the rights of Englishmen, the rights which had been wrested from English sovereigns at various periods of the nation's history. One of these fundamental rights was expressed in these words, found in Magna Charta:
“No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him or condemn [83 U. S. 115] him but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”
English constitutional writers expound this article as rendering life, liberty, and property inviolable except by due process of law. This is the very right which the plaintiffs in error claim in this case. Another of these rights was that of habeas corpus, or the right of having any invasion of personal liberty judicially examined into, at once, by a competent judicial magistrate. Blackstone classifies these fundamental rights under three heads, as the absolute rights of individuals, to-wit: the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property. And, of the last, he says:
“The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land.”
The privileges and immunities of Englishmen were established and secured by long usage and by various acts of Parliament. But it may be said that the Parliament of England has unlimited authority, and might repeal the laws which have from time to time been enacted. Theoretically, this is so, but practically it is not. England has no written constitution, it is true, but it has an unwritten one, resting in the acknowledged, and frequently declared, privileges of Parliament and the people, to violate which in any material respect would produce a revolution in an hour. A violation of one of the fundamental principles of that constitution in the Colonies, namely, the principle that recognizes the property of the people as their own, and which, therefore, regards all taxes for the support of government as gifts of the people through their representatives, and regards taxation without representation as subversive of free government, was the origin of our own revolution.
This, it is true, was the violation of a political right, but personal rights were deemed equally sacred, and were claimed by the very first Congress of the Colonies, assembled in 1774, as the undoubted inheritance of the people of this country; and the Declaration of Independence, which [83 U. S. 116] was the first political act of the American people in their independent sovereign capacity, lays the foundation of our National existence upon this broad proposition:
“That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
Here again we have the great three-fold division of the rights of freemen, asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. These are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law, and which can only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good of all; and these rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every free government.
For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of these rights the individual citizen, as a necessity, must be left free to adopt such calling, profession, or trade as may seem to him most conducive to that end. Without this right, he cannot be a freeman. This right to choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect, and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property and right. Liberty and property are not protected where these rights are arbitrarily assailed.
I think sufficient has been said to show that citizenship is not an empty name, but that, in this country, at least, it has connected with it certain incidental rights, privileges, and immunities of the greatest importance. And to say that these rights and immunities attach only to State citizenship, and not to citizenship of the United States, appears to me to evince a very narrow and insufficient estimate of constitutional history and the rights of men, not to say the rights of the American people.
On this point, the often-quoted language of Mr. Justice Washington, in Corfield v. Coryell (4 Washington’s Circuit Court 380), is very instructive. Being [83 U. S. 117] called upon to expound that clause in the fourth article of the Constitution which declares that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” he says:
“The inquiry is what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental, which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental privileges are it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole; the right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in, any other State for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental.”
It is pertinent to observe that both the clause of the Constitution referred to and Justice Washington, in his comment on it, speak of the privileges and immunities of citizens in a State, not of citizens of a State. It is the privileges and immunities of citizens, that is, of citizens as such, that are to be accorded to citizens of other States when they are found in any State; or, as Justice Washington says,
“privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; [83 U. S. 118] which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments.”
It is true the courts have usually regarded the clause referred to as securing only an equality of privileges with the citizens of the State in which the parties are found. Equality before the law is undoubtedly one of the privileges and immunities of every citizen. I am not aware that any case has arisen in which it became necessary to vindicate any other fundamental privilege of citizenship; although rights have been claimed which were not deemed fundamental, and have been rejected as not within the protection of this clause. Be this, however, as it may, the language of the clause is as I have stated it, and seems fairly susceptible of a broader interpretation than that which makes it a guarantee of mere equality of privileges with other citizens.
But we are not bound to resort to implication, or to the constitutional history of England, to find an authoritative declaration of some of the most important privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. It is in the Constitution itself. The Constitution, it is true, as it stood prior to the recent amendments, specifies, in terms, only a few of the personal privileges and immunities of citizens, but they are very comprehensive in their character. The States were merely prohibited from passing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and perhaps one or two more. But others of the greatest consequence were enumerated, although they were only secured, in express terms, from invasion by the Federal government; such as the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and above all, and including almost all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. These and still others are specified in the original Constitution, or in the early amendments of it, as among the privileges and immunities [83 U. S. 119] of citizens of the United States, or, what is still stronger for the force of the argument, the rights of all persons, whether citizens or not.
But even if the Constitution were silent, the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens, as such, would be no less real and no less inviolable than they now are. It was not necessary to say in words that the citizens of the United States should have and exercise all the privileges of citizens; the privilege of buying, selling, and enjoying property; the privilege of engaging in any lawful employment for a livelihood; the privilege of resorting to the laws for redress of injuries, and the like. Their very citizenship conferred these privileges, if they did not possess them before. And these privileges they would enjoy whether they were citizens of any State or not. Inhabitants of Federal territories and new citizens, made such by annexation of territory or naturalization, though without any status as citizens of a State, could, nevertheless, as citizens of the United States, lay claim to every one of the privileges and immunities which have been enumerated, and among these none is more essential and fundamental than the right to follow such profession or employment as each one may choose, subject only to uniform regulations equally applicable to all.
. . .
[83 U. S. 122]
. . . In my judgment, it was the intention of the people of this country in adopting that amendment to provide National security against violation by the States of the fundamental rights of the citizen.
The first section of this amendment, after declaring that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, proceeds to declare further that
“no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;”
and that Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.
Now here is a clear prohibition on the States against making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
If my views are correct with regard to what are the privileges and immunities of citizens, it follows conclusively that any law which establishes a sheer monopoly, depriving a large class of citizens of the privilege of pursuing a lawful employment, does abridge the privileges of those citizens.
The amendment also prohibits any State from depriving any person (citizen or otherwise) of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without due process of law. Their right of choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is their property. Such a law also deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the last clause of the section.
The constitutional question is distinctly raised in these cases; the constitutional right is expressly claimed; it was [83 U. S. 123] violated by State law, which was sustained by the State court, and we are called upon in a legitimate and proper way to afford redress. Our jurisdiction and our duty are plain and imperative.
It is futile to argue that none but persons of the African race are intended to be benefited by this amendment. They may have been the primary cause of the amendment, but its language is general, embracing all citizens, and I think it was purposely so expressed.
The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery and its incidents and consequences, but that spirit of insubordination and disloyalty to the National government which had troubled the country for so many years in some of the States, and that intolerance of free speech and free discussion which often rendered life and property insecure, and led to much unequal legislation. The amendment was an attempt to give voice to the strong National yearning for that time and that condition of things, in which American citizenship should be a sure guaranty of safety, and in which every citizen of the United States might stand erect on every portion of its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging to a freeman, without fear of violence or molestation.
But great fears are expressed that this construction of the amendment will lead to enactments by Congress interfering with the internal affairs of the States, and establishing therein civil and criminal codes of law for the government of the citizens, and thus abolishing the State governments in everything but name; or else, that it will lead the Federal courts to draw to their cognizance the supervision of State tribunals on every subject of judicial inquiry, on the plea of ascertaining whether the privileges and immunities of citizens have not been abridged.
In my judgment, no such practical inconveniences would arise. Very little, if any, legislation on the part of Congress would be required to carry the amendment into effect. Like the prohibition against passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract, it would execute itself. The point would [83 U. S. 124] be regularly raised in a suit at law, and settled by final reference to the Federal court. As the privileges and immunities protected are only those fundamental ones which belong to every citizen, they would soon become so far defined as to cause but a slight accumulation of business in the Federal courts. Besides, the recognized existence of the law would prevent its frequent violation. But even if the business of the National courts should be increased, Congress could easily supply the remedy by increasing their number and efficiency. The great question is what is the true construction of the amendment? When once we find that, we shall find the means of giving it effect. The argument from inconvenience ought not to have a very controlling influence in questions of this sort. The National will and National interest are of far greater importance.
In my opinion the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana ought to be reversed.
I concur in the dissent in these cases and in the views expressed by my brethren, Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Bradley. I desire, however, to submit a few additional remarks.
. . .
[83 U. S. 125]
. . .
Fairly construed, [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth] amendments may be said to rise to the dignity of a new Magna Charta. The thirteenth blotted out slavery and forbade forever its restoration. It struck the fetters from four millions of human beings, and raised them at once to the sphere of freemen. This was an act of grace and justice performed by the Nation. Before the war, it could have been done only by the States where the institution existed, acting severally and separately from each other. The power then rested wholly with them. In that way, apparently, such a result could never have occurred. The power of Congress did not extend to the subject, except in the Territories.
. . .
[83 U. S. 126]
. . .
The first section of the fourteenth amendment is alone involved in the consideration of these cases. No searching analysis is necessary to eliminate its meaning. Its language is intelligible and direct. Nothing can be more transparent. Every word employed has an established signification. There is no room for construction. There is nothing to construe. Elaboration may obscure, but cannot make clearer, the intent and purpose sought to be carried out.
(1) Citizens of the States and of the United States are defined.
(2) It is declared that no State shall, by law, abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
(3) That no State shall deprive any person, whether a citizen or not, of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
A citizen of a State is ipso facto a citizen of the United States. No one can be the former without being also the latter; but the latter, by losing his residence in one State without acquiring it in another, although he continues to be the latter, ceases for the time to be the former. “The privileges and immunities” of a citizen of the United States include, among other things, the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and also the rights which pertain to him by reason of his membership of the Nation. The citizen of a State has the same fundamental rights as a citizen of the United States, and also certain others, local in their character, arising from his relation to the State, and, in addition, those which belong to the citizen of the United States, he being in that relation also. There may thus be a double citizenship, each having some rights peculiar to itself. It is only over those which belong to the citizen of the United States that the category here in question throws the shield of its protection. All those which belong to the citizen of a State, except as a bills of attainder, ex post facto [83 U. S. 127] laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are left to the guardianship of the bills of rights, constitutions, and laws of the States respectively. Those rights may all be enjoyed in every State by the citizens of every other State by virtue of clause 2, section 4, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States as it was originally framed. This section does not in anywise affect them; such was not its purpose.
In the next category, obviously ex industria, to prevent, as far as may be, the possibility of misinterpretation, either as to persons or things, the phrases “citizens of the United States” and “privileges and immunities” are dropped, and more simple and comprehensive terms are substituted. The substitutes are “any person,” and “life,” “liberty,” and “property,” and “the equal protection of the laws.” Life, liberty, and property are forbidden to be taken “without due process of law,” and “equal protection of the laws” is guaranteed to all. Life is the gift of God, and the right to preserve it is the most sacred of the rights of man. Liberty is freedom from all restraints but such as are justly imposed by law. Beyond that line lies the domain of usurpation and tyranny. Property is everything which has an exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to dispose of it according to the will of the owner. Labor is property, and as such merits protection. The right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. It lies to a large extent at the foundation of most other forms of property, and of all solid individual and national prosperity. “Due process of law” is the application of the law as it exists in the fair and regular course of administrative procedure. “The equal protection of the laws” places all upon a footing of legal equality and gives the same protection to all for the preservation of life, liberty, and property, and the pursuit of happiness.
[83 U. S. 128]
It is admitted that the plaintiffs in error are citizens of the United States, and persons within the jurisdiction of Louisiana. The cases before us, therefore, present but two questions.
(1) Does the act of the legislature creating the monopoly in question abridge the privileges and immunities of the plaintiffs in error as citizens of the United States?
(2) Does it deprive them of liberty or property without due process of law, or deny them the equal protection of the laws of the State, they being persons “within its jurisdiction?”
Both these inquiries I remit for their answer as to the facts to the opinions of my brethren, Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Bradley. They are full and conclusive upon the subject. A more flagrant and indefensible invasion of the rights of many for the benefit of a few has not occurred in the legislative history of the country. The response to both inquiries should be in the affirmative. In my opinion, the cases, as presented in the record, are clearly within the letter and meaning of both the negative categories of the sixth section. The judgments before us should, therefore, be reversed.
These amendments are all consequences of the late civil war. The prejudices and apprehension as to the central government which prevailed when the Constitution was adopted were dispelled by the light of experience. The public mind became satisfied that there was less danger of tyranny in the head than of anarchy and tyranny in the members. The provisions of this section are all eminently conservative in their character. They are a bulwark of defence, and can never be made an engine of oppression. The language employed is unqualified in its scope. There is no exception in its terms, and there can be properly none in their application. By the language “citizens of the United States” was meant all such citizens; and by “any person” [83 U. S. 129] was meant all persons within the jurisdiction of the State. No distinction is intimated on account of race or color. This court has no authority to interpolate a limitation that is neither expressed nor implied. Our duty is to execute the law, not to make it. The protection provided was not intended to be confined to those of any particular race or class, but to embrace equally all races, classes, and conditions of men. It is objected that the power conferred is novel and large. The answer is that the novelty was known, and the measure deliberately adopted. The power is beneficent in its nature, and cannot be abused. It is such as should exist in every well-ordered system of polity. Where could it be more appropriately lodged than in the hands to which it is confided? It is necessary to enable the government of the nation to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and privileges enumerated, which, according to the plainest considerations of reason and justice and the fundamental principles of the social compact all are entitled to enjoy. Without such authority, any government claiming to be national is glaringly defective. The construction adopted by the majority of my brethren is, in my judgment, much too narrow. It defeats, by a limitation not anticipated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed and of those by whom it was adopted. To the extent of that limitation, it turns, as it were, what was meant for bread into a stone. By the Constitution as it stood before the war, ample protection was given against oppression by the Union, but little was given against wrong and oppression by the States. That want was intended to be supplied by this amendment. Against the former, this court has been called upon more than once to interpose. Authority of the same amplitude was intended to be conferred as to the latter. But this arm of our jurisdiction is, in these cases, stricken down by the judgment just given. Nowhere than in this court ought the will of the nation, as thus expressed, to be more liberally construed or more cordially executed. This determination of the majority seems to me to lie far in the other direction.
[83 U. S. 130]
I earnestly hope that the consequences to follow may prove less serious and far-reaching than the minority fear they will be.
1. “The property which every man has in his own labor,” says Adam Smith,
“as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper.” (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, ch. 10, part 2)
In the edict of Louis XVI, in 1776, giving freedom to trades and professions, prepared by his minister, Turgot, he recites the contributions that had been made by the guilds and trade companies, and says:
“It was the allurement of these fiscal advantages, undoubtedly, that prolonged the illusion and concealed the immense injury they did to industry and their infraction of natural right. This illusion had extended so far that some persons asserted that the right to work was a royal privilege which the king might sell, and that his subjects were bound to purchase from him. We hasten to correct this error, and to repel the conclusion. God, in giving to man wants and desires rendering labor necessary for their satisfaction, conferred the right to labor upon all men, and this property is the first, most sacred, and imprescriptible of all.”
He, therefore, regards it
“as the first duty of his justice, and the worthiest act of benevolence, to free his subjects from any restriction upon this inalienable right of humanity.”
2. “Civil liberty, the great end of all human society and government, is that state in which each individual has the power to pursue his own happiness according to his own views of his interest, and the dictates of his conscience, unrestrained, except by equal, just, and impartial laws.” (William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1, Chapter 1 (“Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals”) , note 8.)
Griswold v. Connecticut
By the Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 29-30, 1965.
Decided June 7, 1965.
[The Supreme Court of the United States of America. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 1965. In the Public Domain.]’
THE MAJORITY RULING
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant Griswold is Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Appellant Buxton is a licensed physician and a professor at the Yale Medical School who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven—a center open and operating from November 1 to November 10, 1961, when appellants were arrested.
They gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free.
The statutes whose constitutionality is involved in this appeal are 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). The former provides:
“Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.”
Section 54-196 provides:
“Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”
The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each, against the claim that the accessory statute as so applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Errors affirmed that judgment. 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. We noted probable jurisdiction.
We think that appellants have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional relationship. . . .
. . .
Coming to the merits, we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York, should be our guide. But we decline that invitation. . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice—whether public or private or parochial - is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include certain of those rights.
By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the right to educate one’s children as one chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v. Nebraska, the same dignity is given the right to study the German language in a private school. In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach - indeed the freedom of the entire university community. Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. And so we reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cases.
In NAACP v. Alabama, we protected the “freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations,” noting that freedom of association was a peripheral First Amendment right. Disclosure of membership lists of a constitutionally valid association, we held, was invalid “as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members of their right to freedom of association.” In other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion. . . .
Those cases involved more than the “right of assembly”—a right that extends to all irrespective of their race or ideology. The right of “association,” like the right of belief, is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
. . .
We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of “privacy and repose.” These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a “governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, concurring.
I agree with the Court that Connecticut’s birth-control law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy, and I join in its opinion and judgment. Although I have not accepted the view that “due process” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the first eight Amendments, I do agree that the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights. My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted and that it embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is supported both by numerous decisions of this Court, referred to in the Court’s opinion, and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment. . . .
. . .
The Ninth Amendment reads, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
. . .
A dissenting opinion suggests that my interpretation of the Ninth Amendment somehow “broaden[s] the powers of this Court.” With all due respect, I believe that it misses the import of what I am saying. . . . The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Constitution’s authors that other fundamental personal rights should not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight constitutional amendments. . . .
. . .
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the “traditions and [collective] conscience of our people” to determine whether a principle is “so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.” The inquiry is whether a right involved “is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions’ . . . .” (Powell v. Alabama). “Liberty” also “gains content from the emanations of . . . specific [constitutional] guarantees” and “from experience with the requirements of a free society.” (Poe v. Ullman).
I agree fully with the Court that, applying these tests, the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right, emanating “from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.” Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, comprehensively summarized the principles underlying the Constitution’s guarantees of privacy:
“The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”
. . .
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers these fundamental rights no protection. . . .
My Brother STEWART, while characterizing the Connecticut birth control law as “an uncommonly silly law,” would nevertheless let it stand on the ground that it is not for the courts to “`substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.’” . . .
The logic of the dissents would sanction federal or state legislation that seems to me even more plainly unconstitutional than the statute before us. Surely the Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree that all husbands and wives must be sterilized after two children have been born to them. Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would not be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be “silly,” no provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the marital right to bear children and raise a family. While it may shock some of my Brethren that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected.
. . .
Although the Connecticut birth-control law obviously encroaches upon a fundamental personal liberty, the State does not show that the law serves any “subordinating [state] interest which is compelling” or that it is “necessary . . . to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.” The State, at most, argues that there is some rational relation between this statute and what is admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern - the discouraging of extra-marital relations. It says that preventing the use of birth-control devices by married persons helps prevent the indulgence by some in such extramarital relations. The rationality of this justification is dubious. . . . But, in any event, it is clear that the state interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute. . . .
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in the judgment.
I fully agree with the judgment of reversal, but find myself unable to join the Court’s opinion. The reason is that it seems to me to evince an approach to this case very much like that taken by my Brothers BLACK and STEWART in dissent, namely: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found to violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
. . .
A further observation seems in order respecting the justification of my Brothers BLACK and STEWART for their “incorporation” approach to this case. Their approach does not rest on historical reasons, which are of course wholly lacking, but on the thesis that by limiting the content of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the protection of rights which can be found elsewhere in the Constitution, in this instance in the Bill of Rights, judges will thus be confined to “interpretation” of specific constitutional provisions, and will thereby be restrained from introducing their own notions of constitutional right and wrong into the “vague contours of the Due Process Clause.”
While I could not more heartily agree that judicial “self restraint” is an indispensable ingredient of sound constitutional adjudication, I do submit that the formula suggested for achieving it is more hollow than real. “Specific” provisions of the Constitution, no less than “due process,” lend themselves as readily to “personal” interpretations by judges whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in supposed “tune with the times.”. . .
Judicial self-restraint will not, I suggest, be brought about in the “due process” area by the historically unfounded incorporation formula long advanced by my Brother BLACK, and now in part espoused by my Brother STEWART. It will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms. Adherence to these principles will not, of course, obviate all constitutional differences of opinion among judges, nor should it. Their continued recognition will, however, go farther toward keeping most judges from roaming at large in the constitutional field than will the interpolation into the Constitution of an artificial and largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due Process Clause.
THE MINORITY DISSENTING OPINIONS
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting.
. . .
The Court talks about a constitutional “right of privacy” as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the “privacy” of individuals. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities. . . .
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the use of the term “right of privacy” as a comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” “Privacy” is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things other than searches and seizures. . . . I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision. For these reasons I cannot agree with the Court’s judgment and the reasons it gives for holding this Connecticut law unconstitutional.
. . . I think that if properly construed neither the Due Process Clause nor the Ninth Amendment, nor both together, could under any circumstances be a proper basis for invalidating the Connecticut law. I discuss the due process and Ninth Amendment arguments together because on analysis they turn out to be the same thing - merely using different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary power to invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive.
The due process argument which my Brothers HARLAN and WHITE adopt here is based, as their opinions indicate, on the premise that this Court is vested with power to invalidate all state laws that it considers to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this Court’s belief that a particular state law under scrutiny has no “rational or justifying” purpose, or is offensive to a “sense of fairness and justice.” If these formulas based on “natural justice,” or others which mean the same thing, are to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body. Surely it has to be admitted that no provision of the Constitution specifically gives such blanket power to courts to exercise such a supervisory veto over the wisdom and value of legislative policies and to hold unconstitutional those laws which they believe unwise or dangerous. I readily admit that no legislative body, state or national, should pass laws that can justly be given any of the invidious labels invoked as constitutional excuses to strike down state laws. But perhaps it is not too much to say that no legislative body ever does pass laws without believing that they will accomplish a sane, rational, wise and justifiable purpose. While I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. Madison, and subsequent cases, that our Court has constitutional power to strike down statutes, state or federal, that violate commands of the Federal Constitution, I do not believe that we are granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our own notions of “civilized standards of conduct.” Such an appraisal of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws, not of the power to interpret them. . . .
Of the cases on which my Brothers WHITE and GOLDBERG rely so heavily, . . . I merely point out that the reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process philosophy which many later opinions repudiated, and which I cannot accept. . . .
My Brother GOLDBERG has adopted the recent discovery that the Ninth Amendment as well as the Due Process Clause can be used by this Court as authority to strike down all state legislation which this Court thinks violates “fundamental principles of liberty and justice,” or is contrary to the “traditions and [collective] conscience of our people.” He also states, without proof satisfactory to me, that in making decisions on this basis judges will not consider “their personal and private notions.” One may ask how they can avoid considering them. Our Court certainly has no machinery with which to take a Gallup Poll. And the scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the “[collective] conscience of our people.” Moreover, one would certainly have to look far beyond the language of the Ninth Amendment to find that the Framers vested in this Court any such awesome veto powers over lawmaking, either by the States or by the Congress. Nor does anything in the history of the Amendment offer any support for such a shocking doctrine. . . . That Amendment was passed, not to broaden the powers of this Court or any other department of “the General Government,” but, as every student of history knows, to assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication. If any broad, unlimited power to hold laws unconstitutional because they offend what this Court conceives to be the “[collective] conscience of our people” is vested in this Court by the Ninth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution, it was not given by the Framers, but rather has been bestowed on the Court by the Court. This fact is perhaps responsible for the peculiar phenomenon that for a period of a century and a half no serious suggestion was ever made that the Ninth Amendment, enacted to protect state powers against federal invasion, could be used as a weapon of federal power to prevent state legislatures from passing laws they consider appropriate to govern local affairs. Use of any such broad, unbounded judicial authority would make of this Court’s members a day-to-day constitutional convention.
I repeat so as not to be misunderstood that this Court does have power, which it should exercise, to hold laws unconstitutional where they are forbidden by the Federal Constitution. My point is that there is no provision of the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their laws because of the Court’s belief that the legislative policies adopted are unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country. Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unrestrained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments would, I fear, jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that the Framers set up and at the same time threaten to take away much of the power of States to govern themselves which the Constitution plainly intended them to have.
I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people’s elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is good enough for me. And so, I cannot rely on the Due Process Clause or the Ninth Amendment or any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept as a reason for striking down this state law. The Due Process Clause with an “arbitrary and capricious” or “shocking to the conscience” formula was liberally used by this Court to strike down economic legislation in the early decades of this century, threatening, many people thought, the tranquility and stability of the Nation. See, e. g., Lochner v. New York. That formula, based on subjective considerations of “natural justice,” is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court’s views about personal rights than those about economic rights. . . .
In Ferguson v. Skrupa, this Court two years ago said in an opinion joined by all the Justices but one that “The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, . . . and like cases - that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely - has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.” . . .
In 1798, when this Court was asked to hold another Connecticut law unconstitutional, Justice Iredell said: “[I]t has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually, framed their state constitutions since the revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed the Federal Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.” (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399).
I would adhere to that constitutional philosophy in passing on this Connecticut law today. I am not persuaded to deviate from the view which I stated in 1947 in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90-92 (dissenting opinion):
“Since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, was decided, the practice has been firmly established, for better or worse, that courts can strike down legislative enactments which violate the Constitution. This process, of course, involves interpretation, and since words can have many meanings, interpretation obviously may result in contraction or extension of the original purpose of a constitutional provision, thereby affecting policy. But to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes because of application of ‘natural law’ deemed to be above and undefined by the Constitution is another. ‘In the one instance, courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute policies written into the Constitution; in the other, they roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies, a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the people.’ Federal Power Commission v. Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 , 601, n. 4.”
The late Judge Learned Hand, after emphasizing his view that judges should not use the due process formula suggested in the concurring opinions today or any other formula like it to invalidate legislation offensive to their “personal preferences,” made the statement, with which I fully agree, that: “For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.” (Hand, The Bill of Rights 70) So far as I am concerned, Connecticut’s law as applied here is not forbidden by any provision of the Federal Constitution as that Constitution was written, and I would therefore affirm.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting.
Since 1879 Connecticut has had on its books a law which forbids the use of contraceptives by anyone. I think this is an uncommonly silly law. As a practical matter, the law is obviously unenforceable, except in the oblique context of the present case. As a philosophical matter, I believe the use of contraceptives in the relationship of marriage should be left to personal and private choice, based upon each individual’s moral, ethical, and religious beliefs. As a matter of social policy, I think professional counsel about methods of birth control should be available to all, so that each individual’s choice can be meaningfully made. But we are not asked in this case to say whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine. We are asked to hold that it violates the United States Constitution. And that I cannot do.
. . .
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All of the posters here babbling about "innocent until proven guilty in a court of law" seem to forget that celebrities are 100% creations of public perception. It's not a question of legal guilt at this point, rather a question of reputation and perception.
The pattern of accusations against Cosby is similar to the pattern of accusations against the Catholic Church in the past. Once a multitude of accusations become consistent enough they start to generate a shift in pubic perception which is what we are seeing here.
Literally nothing that I know of better illustrates how thoroughly corrupt our government at all levels has become.
No moral individual could possibly consider this to be acceptable. Government empowered goons seizing people's property at will is almost the perfect definition of tyranny.
Asset Forfeiture seems to be most abused in the red states like Texas and Georgia. Where are the legislators who are always crowing about property rights and ownership? Where are the courts that allow people to be robbed of their possessions with no due process or conviction required?
In the pre-digital past the government could always get at your papers or your info or your possessions in one way or the other if they wanted to bad enough. Digital encryption changes this and now government is freaking out.
When it comes to encryption, I think people's minds have been skewed by watching hundreds of TV shows and movies where somebody says "just give me a few minutes to crack the encryption" or "it's encrypted so I'll need a little time" or "it's encrypted but that shouldn't be a problem".
But, as somebody pointed out up-stream, encryption is real. Use a moderately complex key and encryption is essentially uncrackable without either the key or a built-in backdoor.
That's why law enforcement is so intent of getting backdoors into everything. If they don't have them it means, for the first time ever, they literally can't get access to stuff they want to see.
What a sad dysfunctional society we are. A epochal new communication system is discovered that can bring monumental advances in almost every aspect of human interaction.
So what do we do? We allow corporate monopolies to create roadblocks and toll gates and limits on this amazing technology in the name of maximizing monopolist profit.
Tiny strands of easily run fiber can bring almost endless bandwidth to everybody. But we can't have that because despicable companies like Comcast can make more profit from choking the internet than expanding it.
The great economic and political delusion of the 21st century is that we will shift most of the world's manufacturing to china allowing them to grow an immensely strong and powerful economy and then they will play by all the rules that western societies have built up over the centuries.
Sorry, but parents ARE responsible for their children and their children's actions until those children reach adulthood. This is an incredibly well-established legal principal.
There are vast hordes of really nasty little kids rampaging around the internet flinging obscenities and racial slurs right and left. Parents need to wake up to the fact that their little "angels" may be evil demons when left unsupervised online.
The people who serve in the legislatures of various nations know that, once in office, they no longer truly serve the desires of their constituents. Instead they serve the global corporate agenda.
Any attempt to cross their true masters means they would be marginalized in the future; no invites to global power conferences, no lucrative private sector jobs for them and their relatives, no campaign financing for future political campaigns.
This is why big corporations and their proxies in public office are working so relentlessly to normalize IP and trade issues through "free trade" agreements and cross-national treaties. This provides the framework that locks in corporate friendly policies.
Anonymous Coward above must be an off-duty cop performing his primary duty of protecting his brother officers.
Officer robs and assaults citizen with no criminal charges filed and he blames it on "anti-police sentiment" and the "morons" making the recording.
That cop should be in a jail cell at this moment.
Anybody care to guess how often this officer has done something like this in his 20 years on patrol? 100 times? 1000? The only thing that has changed is that he is no longer assured of getting away with it unrecorded.
Like the poster above me said, the essential problem is that there is no accountability. In fact there is a powerful structure of unaccountability that has grown in place over decades.
Anybody who works in any non-government job is held accountable for serious mistakes that conflict with the primary nature of the job. Work at a bank and make a mistake that costs the bank a million bucks and you will be fired. Work a restaurant and make a mistake that sickens a bunch of customers and you will be fired. But if you work as a cop and break the law and subvert justice and brutalize members of the public and you will be shuffled around and protected.
The only solution is to start rolling back the web of legal privilege and protection that cops have been granted. First step would be to ban police unions.
But none of this will happen because, for every one of us online who is outraged about things like this, there are 10 suburban voters who are happy to have the cops beating on "thugs" and "criminals" (which are their codewords for minorities).
It's not so simple as saying that data collection is "legal" under current laws until found to be unconstitutional.
What our despotic federal government is doing more and more is starting from misguided laws of dubious constitutionality and then creating SECRET interpretations of the laws that use truly Orwellian semantics to justify the actions they desire.
Once we are down the rabbit hole of the government interpreting and acting on the laws in secret then we truly no longer have any semblance of democracy.
Sad world where copyright lasts longer than an average lifetime, everything cultural is owned and protected and nobody can build new work on top of previous work which was pretty much how human culture always worked until corporate interests took over and perverted the concept.
A return to rational, constitutional copyright would be something like 16 years only IF registered, with one 16 year extension.
The really amazing thing about Asset Forfeiture is that it is not instantly struck down by the courts. It shows how monolithic the power structure is when it comes to protecting it's power and privilege, even when blatantly unconstitutional.
And what about all the cops that take part in what is essentially theft under cover of authority? Once again demonstrates how pliable police morality becomes when something benefits them and their gang.
The fact that we are outraged or even surprised by things like this is because we don't really want to recognize some of the more unpleasant aspects of human nature.
When people are placed within a power structure and given incentives such as increased status or money or position, they are typically capable of committing the most repugnant of actions and happily accepting the standard rationalization provided within the power structure. Most people have a very weak sense of personal morality that is easily overridden by group dynamics.
Additionally, dominant personality types will work incessantly to build power structures, expand power structures and seek out ties with other power structures in order to increase their personal opportunities for gain.
This is why our government has become so intensely dominant in our lives. The multitude of government power structures have grown to such a degree and become interconnected to such a degree that there is probably no way to reverse course short of a complete collapse and rebuild.
I don't understand the endless stream of photos of "police" pointing their guns at civilians. Isn't it the absolute primary rule of gun safety that you don't point a weapon at a person unless you are going to fire?
What's with all the running around in packs and pointing your guns at everything in sight? Makes them look like a bunch of scared little kids who don't even know how to behave and are all the more dangerous for it.
The police in America are organized into Unions which have massive amounts of local political power. Essentially, local politicians in most areas can NOT be elected if they are opposed by the police union.
This is the core of the problem. It's what makes the police an armed and organized gang. The average cop has far more loyalty to his union, his chain of command and his fellows than he does to the public or to the law. He only feels accountable to other cops, not to civilian officials.
Police know that they will not be held accountable for their actions because local civil authorities are too scared to cross the police union. Until police unions are banned and police become answerable to control by elected civilian officials nothing will change.
People rarely even mention that literally millions of literary and scholarly works reside in a state of copyright limbo where the public has no access to them because they are still under copyright while, at the same time, they are not in print or otherwise available because they are no longer profitable.
The simplest form of copyright reform would allow works that are no longer available for sale in any form to fall into the public domain after the original term of 28 years.
Of course, there will never be any broad public support for copyright reform of any kind, because 90% of the American public only care about what's popular right now and are conditioned to pay without complaint for everything they watch, read or listen to.
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Craig Wright's fraud continues. Yesterday, he submitted into evidence an email he says was from Dave Kleiman to Uyen Nguyen asking her to be a director of his 'bitcoin company' in late 2012.
It is provably fake.
Craig didn't realize that the email's PGP signature includes a signing timestamp along with the ID of the key used as metadata. Was the email actually sent in 2012? Let's find out!
The beginning of the signature is as follows: iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTH+uQAAoJELiFsXrEW+0bCacH/3K
Converted to hex, it's: 89 01 1c 04 01 01 02 00 06 05 02 53 1f eb 90 00 0a 09 10 b8 85 b1 7a c4 5b ed 1b 09 a7 07 ff 72
We know how to find the long ID of the key used and the timestamp of the signature. I've bolded the ID and italicized the timestamp. Looking on the MIT keyserver, we can find the fake* key. The timestamp of the signature is 1394600848, which is March 12, 2014, two weeks before Craig filed to install Uyen as a director of Dave's old company, and almost a year after Dave died!
We can double-check with
gpg -vv. Transcribe the email and paste it in. Here's the output:
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid B885B17AC45BED1B version 4, created 1394600848, md5len 0, sigclass 0x01 digest algo 2, begin of digest 09 a7 hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-03-12) subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID B885B17AC45BED1B)
(I'll note, as an aside, that Dave apparently spelled his name incorrectly and put a typo in the subject.)
*The fake key has the same pref-hash-algos as Craig's fake keys, and were never updated.
Any lawyers happen to know how penalties for perjury would apply to an Australian national who is (likely) living in Antigua right now? :P
Legendary find /u/Contrarian__. Please be sure to let the opposing counsel know about this straight up, provable perjury.
It’s not “perjury.” This is just an email attached to a filing. It’s not submitted under oath (perjury is false testimony) and isn’t evidence (something only becomes evidence when admitted at trial). The issue here would be Rule 11 - a lawyer cannot submit something knowingly that is false or without reasonably assuring its truth. This seems dicey.
From litigation experience in damages, you’ll need an expert to provide testimony to state what Contrarion has found. You’ll have another expert on the opposing side arguing that there are flaws in the analysis. It’ll be the judge who decides which expert is more reliable.
No one gets penalized for perjury in cases like this. This is really just one team against another. If the information found by Contrarion is rock solid, then hopefully there is an expert to testify clearly and carefully to those facts and a judge who allows reason to prevail. If these are the deciding facts in the case, then Contrarion has proven himself a worthy expert in this type of analysis and he should make a career getting paid $300-400 an hour doing this work in the future.
Source: was economic damages consultant for litigation
Imagine being interested in crypto but not knowing much about it so you come to /r/CryptoCurrency and it looks more like Real Housewives of Crypto than anything resembling a discussion on cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology.
This is Real Housewives type drama.
Except instead of airheaded socialites lashing out and gossiping at each other for the clothes they're wearing, it's nerdy guys at each others' throats for saying they're the greatest cryptographer the world has ever seen.
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A number of design elements need to be decided upon when developing a child protection mediation (CPM) program. These include:
- The goals of the program
- Timing of mediation
- Whether mediation is mandatory or voluntary
- Who should do intake
- How much time participants should be required to block off for mediation
- Who mediates the cases
- Mediator training
- Participant education and preparation
Each of these elements has its own set of issues that could impact the effectiveness and efficiency of a program, as will be discussed below.
The following are common goals for CPM programs:
- Give parents voice
- Improve communication among professionals
- Help parents understand their situation and the issues
- Address relationship issues and conflict between parents and foster parents
- Develop service plans for children and parents
- Find temporary placement for the child
- Create or refine visitation schedule
- Increase parental compliance with case plan
- Reduce time to permanency (the time from petition to the child having a permanent home)
Generally, when a goal can be achieved within mediation, that goal is likely to be achieved. For example, there is ample evidence that mediation in this context gives parents voice and helps them to understand their situation and the points of view of the others at the table. Previous evaluations have also shown that mediation improves communication among the attorneys and social workers. When a goal relies on actions outside of mediation, the situation is a little murkier. Mediation’s impact on parental compliance with the case plan is not well-established, although the majority of studies that examined this found compliance to be greater when parents mediate. Additionally, study results varied widely as to whether mediation has an impact on time to permanency.
What this means is that courts can count on many of their goals being met, but should not rely on it to reduce time to permanency.
FACILITATION AT INTAKE
Mediation can be utilized at the initial shelter care hearing when the child is first removed from the home. At this stage, parents are often disoriented by the process, and often do not have clear information about what is happening to their child. Utilizing mediation at this stage, through what is called a facilitation session, can be useful for providing parents an update on their child as well as an overview of the legal process which is about to commence. Facilitations also provide a good opportunity for parents to exchange contact information with their case worker and open communication between them so that they can avoid miscues and delays to their case.
Early mediation usually has been used to identify an appropriate temporary home for the children, and to set up services for the parents and children in the interest of expediting return home. It is also used to orient the parent to the child protection process, their responsibilities in the process and the roles of those who will be involved in their case. In some courts, it can include the wording of the petition. Prior to adjudication (at which it is determined whether the parent has abused or neglected the child), it can also include the merits of the case with an eye toward reaching an agreement on the facts of the case in order to avoid trial.
For early mediation, its exact timing should take into account other case activities that take place at that time to avoid overlap of information and tasks. For example, if a family team meeting is required at the beginning of a case, the mediation should not be held too soon thereafter. Professionals in Washington, DC, said that they preferred mediation to take place ten to 14 days after the family team meeting. This allows for enough time to have elapsed between the family team meeting and the mediation for services to have been put in place and children and parents to have gone through the required assessment so that a productive discussion can take place about next steps. They also wanted it to occur no later than 30 – 40 days after the initial hearing so that progress on the case doesn’t lag.
Mediation between adjudication and the determination of permanent residence for the child focuses on treatment plans, visitation, compliance with both of the above, and conflicts arising between the natural parent(s) and the foster parent(s) or guardian, or the natural parent(s) and the caseworker. Mediating these issues can overcome roadblocks to the progress of the case by helping the parent(s) to understand what they need to do in order to effect reunification and by dealing with conflicts that can delay progress toward permanency. It also serves to provide all those involved in the case with more effective exchange of information.
The timing issue at this age is primarily not to wait too long to mediate. In courts without early mediation, previous research shows that this mediation is the first time parents have had the chance to have voice and to feel a sense of control over a process in which they were generally a spectator. Therefore, programs may want to encourage mediation early in the post-adjudication or permanency phase of the case.
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS MEDIATION
Mediation of issues surrounding termination of parental rights is undertaken in order to facilitate the children’s transition to their permanent home by having parents agree to the terms of this transition. If parents agree in mediation to relinquish their rights, an adversarial hearing is not required. In addition to termination of parental rights, mediation at this time can also negotiate post-adoption contact between the natural parent(s) and the child in those states in which this is permitted. This serves to help the natural parents to feel more comfortable with the termination of their rights as well as to allow the children to maintain contact with their parents.
The outcomes of mediation of the issues surrounding termination of parental rights have been mixed. In studies of the mediation of termination of parental rights in Hamilton County and Lucas County, Ohio, 40% and 60% of cases reached agreement, respectively. Of these, approximately one-third of parents in one study and three-quarters of parents in the other voluntarily relinquished their rights. In the other cases, the agency either agreed to permanent custody without termination of rights or agreed to give the parents another chance at reunification.
In general, mediation is mandatory in programs in which referral is early or late in the case. Mediation is almost always voluntary during the post-adjudication and permanency phases. It is also voluntary in some program with early and late referral. Mandatory programs often have specific objectives for mediation, such as the development of a service plan or the avoidance of trial. Voluntary programs have more diffuse objectives, such as repairing relationships, getting parents back on track for reunification or improving communication.
Mandatory and voluntary mediation involve distinct benefits and drawbacks. Mandatory programs have the obvious benefit of high participation rates. For early programs, this means that most parents have the opportunity for voice, understanding and engagement in the case. If professionals are involved in mediation at this point, they have the opportunity to see the parents in a different setting than in court and to demonstrate that they are not the enemy. On the other hand, mandatory mediation requires significant resources. Further, if professionals are required to participate in mediation, the process can become burdensome to them. Courts electing to have mandatory programs with professional participation should determine how best to relieve this burden while maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the mediation process. This will be discussed in greater detail under “Time in Mediation,” below.
Voluntary programs tend to lead to mediation happening late in the case, even when mediation is encouraged throughout the life of the case. They also often have low participation rates. Courts electing to make mediation voluntary will need to do three things: 1) educate judges about which situations merit mediation; 2) educate professionals about the benefits of mediation how to identify when mediation could be beneficial; and 3) continually remind judges and professionals of the mediation program. Courts should also keep in mind that they will need to have ongoing education opportunities as lawyers and caseworkers move on and new ones join. The use of instructional videos and manuals will help to do this.
When a case is referred to mediation, the intake process begins. This includes getting information from the participants that will be needed for the mediation and providing initial information about mediation. This sounds like a simple process, but it can become time-consuming.
Intake can be done in person or via email. Generally, in-person intake is done by a program administrator or mediator directly after the hearing at which the parties have been ordered to mediation. Each person involved in the case is asked to complete an intake form that includes contact information and questions about the issues to be discussed and special circumstances. Parents are also given information about the mediation at this time.
Because everyone involved in the case is together when intake is done in person, it is easier to get the needed information about the issues involved, as well as special needs for the mediation, such as intimate partner violence screening, phone mediation or a translator. It is also much more efficient for scheduling the mediation, as the professionals can compare their calendars and come up with a time and date then and there, rather than through an email exchange.
When in-person intake is not possible, intake and scheduling are generally done via email, with participants submitting intake forms to the program and providing their availability for mediation. This can take a significant amount of time, delaying the mediation and causing program staff to spend much more time tracking down and responding to those involved.
Mediation takes time, particularly for the natural parents to understand what is being said and to have the opportunity to express themselves and discuss their concerns. Participants don’t have time. Parents may need to get to work or to pick up their children from school. Professionals may need to be in court or to have time to work on their other cases. Time spent in mediation is especially important in mandatory programs in which the professionals are required to participate. In these programs, there is a lot of pressure on both the program and the mediators to limit the amount of time spent in mediation.
The decision as to how much time to set aside for mediation is therefore a balancing act. Programs commonly require participants to set aside at least two hours for mediation, including time spent waiting for all participants to arrive. Others require more. This time requirement is supported by two studies. Both found that two-thirds of the mediations took at least two hours. In the Washington, DC, study, the time needed for mediation included wait time. In the Cook County, Illinois, study, wait time was not included, which may mean that the mediation process took longer there than in DC.
If mediation requires two hours or more if it is to be effective, what can be done to respond to the needs of professionals who are required to participate? One possibility is to work to reduce the amount of time spent waiting for everyone to arrive. In the Washington, DC study, wait time averaged 31 minutes. Because the cause of the delayed start was often parents arriving late, the program decided to require parents and their attorneys to arrive 30 minutes before the scheduled mediation. This allowed the attorneys to talk with the parents before the mediation, and for the mediator to conduct a screening for intimate partner violence, if needed.
The other way to address this is to take steps to ensure that mediation is productive. In focus groups RSI conducted during an evaluation of the DC program, the professionals saw mediation as providing benefits to themselves when it worked well. This included being able to get more information about the parent(s), the children’s status and the case so that they could make better decisions and address issues. When mediation was productive, they were less likely to be frustrated about the time they spent in mediation.
Making mediation productive includes timing the mediation so that there is something to talk about. (See “Timing,” above.) It also includes ensuring the mediators are well-trained, the professionals well-educated and the parents well-prepared. (See “Maximizing Effectiveness of Mediation,” below.)
You will have two key decisions to make regarding mediators. One is whether your mediators will be staff, contract or volunteer. The other is whether to use co-mediators or single mediators.
Although staff mediators are used by some programs, most use either contract mediators or volunteers. Thus, contract and volunteer mediators are the types that will be discussed here. The considerations for both types of mediators are:
- Turnover, leading to new mediators coming in over time
- Possible limited opportunities to mediate throughout a given year
- Limited interaction among mediators
Turnover and limited opportunities to mediate call for regular trainings and continuing education opportunities. (See “Training and Supporting Mediators,” below, for more on this.) This indeed was what mediators told us during a focus group in Washington, DC. The contract mediators were required to complete continuing education in order to remain on the court’s roster, which they appreciated, but they wanted more information about how to deal with particular issues that they regularly faced in mediation. The mediators in DC also wanted more interaction with other mediators to discuss how they handled their mediations, as well as an opportunity to debrief their mediations with program staff.
Due to the large number of people who often participate in CPM, many programs use a co-mediation model. This helps mediators to manage the discussion and maintain the flow of the mediation, thus reducing the amount of time mediation may take. Generally, there is a lead mediator whose role is to facilitate the discussion, while the second mediator takes notes and watches the expressions and body language of the participants to gauge their reactions and emotions. The second mediator may also jump in with a particular participant if the lead mediator is having difficulty with them. The mediators may also confer about how to move forward with a tricky mediation, and can debrief after the mediation ends.
In terms of maintaining the flow of the mediation, the mediators may caucus with different individuals at the same time, thus making the mediation more efficient. The mediators commonly also divide duties for the mediation, with one wrapping up the mediation while the other types up any agreement that has been reached during the mediation.
There is little research that compares the effectiveness of co-mediation to mediation by a single mediator. The one evaluation that looked at this (a 2005 evaluation of the Washington, DC, program) found no difference in settlement rate.
AFCC’s Child Protection Mediation (CPM) Model Mediator Competencies provide a roadmap to create and deliver quality training with the goal of providing mediators with the knowledge, skills and abilities of effective CPM mediators. They can also be used to guide programs in mentoring and supervision of mediators.
Effective mediation depends upon well-supported mediators, well-educated professionals, and well-prepared parents and family members.
As discussed above, mediators need to be well trained and to have ongoing education. They also should be assessed regularly.
No matter who you recruit to mediate your cases, you will need to train them. CPM programs are relatively uncommon, and it is unlikely that even seasoned mediators in your jurisdiction will have had experience mediating these cases.
CPM training should orient mediators to the child protection court process, including the particular contours of your jurisdiction. While a CPM mediator can look to the professionals in the room as the subject matter experts (and should in fact not be answering questions related to the court process – that could be seen as providing legal advice to parties), they should understand generally the context in which these parties are mediating their disputes. Additionally, if you are employing a co-mediation model, you will want to orient the mediators to that process, as many mediators do not have experience co-mediating.
CPM cases can be emotionally fraught and difficult to manage given the number of individuals in the room. For these reasons, we recommend using experienced mediators and/or those with strong familiarity with the child protection context. Additionally, while many mediators have backgrounds as attorneys, we strongly encourage you to consider drawing on a mediator pool of individuals with experience in social work, family therapy or child welfare. We believe these experiences provide many intangible skills and perspectives that will benefit your program.
The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts has a published guide on mediator competencies for child protection cases.
Beyond an initial training, providing continuing education to your mediators is critical to the success of a program. This is particularly true if your mediators are volunteers or contractors. These mediators may mediate infrequently, depending on the number of cases referred to mediation and the mediators’ availability; continuing education will refresh them on necessary skills on a regular basis. Additionally, there are certain topics, such as intimate partner violence and cultural competency, that merit further exploration beyond what is practicable under the constraints of an initial training. Having continuing education sessions several times a year also furnishes a good opportunity for your mediators to build rapport with one another and develop a learning community. This community is particularly beneficial for co-mediators as it will help develop rapport between those who will be co-mediating in the future. In addition, a strong learning community allows for a more robust and meaningful peer-review process, establishing a forum to address common issues and challenges faced by mediators.
Instituting a system of peer review allows mediators to learn from each other and candidly reflect on one another’s approaches and techniques. Additionally, review from a peer rather than court personnel can make the mediator more comfortable and more receptive to feedback. You will want to create a process that allows you to correct any urgent “red flag” behavior, while still being flexible enough to accommodate different approaches to mediation. For further guidance, please see RSI’s Model Tools for Peer Review.
Effective mediation requires that professionals productively participate and cooperate with the mediator(s). This requires that they be educated on the purpose and benefits of mediation, the role of the mediator(s) and their role in the process. Regular continuing education should be offered, with Continuing Legal Education and Continuing Education Unit credit provided for attorneys and social workers, respectively, to encourage them to attend. Program administrators should actively seek out opportunities to speak with caseworkers and attorneys in a variety of forums, including regional child welfare meetings, related bar association functions and other professional gatherings.
Parents must be prepared for mediation in order for them to participate fully. Some programs will do this via phone call not long before the scheduled mediation, preferably the night before. This preparation reminds the parents of their mediation and provides the program control over what the parent learns about what to expect in mediation and how they should take advantage of their opportunity to mediate.
If the program relies on the parents’ attorneys to prepare them, the attorneys control what is said to the parents about mediation. This may not be the best message for an effective mediation. This was observed by one evaluator, who witnessed parents’ attorneys telling parents not to worry, that the mediation would be short and they would be out of the room soon. The evaluator believed this left the parents with the sense that mediation was just a hurdle to overcome, rather than their opportunity for voice and understanding.
For more information, see the Association of Family and Conciliation Court’s Guidelines for Child Protection Mediation.
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Pregnancy comes with many changes and requires some recovery and adjustment time, which will impact your job. If you’ve worked at your company for over one year and you work somewhere with more than 50 employees, the federal Family Medical Leave Act will likely allow you to take up to 12 weeks of leave after having a baby. This is great for those who are established in their positions – but what happens if you find out you’re pregnant after starting a new job?
Pregnancy Discrimination Act
In 1978, an amendment was made to the Civil Rights Act that grants pregnant women the right to work. It is enforced by the federal government and prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy and birth. The act states that employers cannot deny benefits to pregnant employees, deny milk pumping accommodations, harass a pregnant employee, or fire an employee based on their being pregnant or having a medical condition resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act also protects those seeking employment. This means that an employer cannot refuse to hire a qualified person simply based on their being pregnant or the assumption that they will soon become pregnant due to their age or stage in life. Interviewers technically can ask candidates if they are pregnant or plan to become pregnant, but many don’t, as it can lay the groundwork for a discrimination case should the candidate not be hired for some reason.
Navigating Pregnancy Within the First Year of Employment
In the United States, employees cannot access the benefits of FMLA for maternity leave until after one year of employment with a company. This means you may not have guaranteed job protection after you give birth if you’ve been employed for less than a year at your position. However, some companies have maternity leave policies that are more supportive of mothers within the first year, so if you are able to find out company policies while job hunting, it can help you avoid issues down the road.
While employees cannot take advantage of FMLA until after a year of employment, there are still some protections in place through disability. Employers must treat pregnancy as a disability, so if your doctor says you need six weeks to recover physically after birth, employers need to honor that if they would do the same for someone recovering from a car accident, for example. Therefore, unless your company has a very strict policy regarding injuries and illness as a whole, you will likely be granted some time off after giving birth according to your doctor’s recommendations.
To Disclose or Not to Disclose?
When applying and interviewing for jobs while pregnant, your priority should be considering whether the position is right for you, and your focus should be on presenting yourself as an excellent candidate to potential employers. Your pregnancy will need to be addressed at some point, but it is up to you when you tell your employer about your pregnancy status, so many women choose not to disclose this during the interview process to avoid unintentional or intentional discrimination.
One strategy is to wait until after you are offered a position to disclose you are pregnant. This may allow you to negotiate terms related to your situation in your contract. It also allows you to get a sense of how family-oriented your potential employer is before you accept the position officially. You may be able to negotiate a start date to begin after your baby is born or secure more paid time off to care for your child. If your offer is rescinded after announcing you are pregnant and no other shortcomings have been revealed, that constitutes suspicious decision-making and may be grounds for a discrimination complaint to the EEOC.
Waiting until after you’ve accepted and started a new job to disclose your pregnancy is an option, too. This may provide an opportunity to show your employer what an excellent employee you are, so they are more inclined to hold your position and accommodate your requests when it comes time to ask for time off after childbirth. It can go the other way, however, as some employers may feel misled or begin with a lost sense of trust if you wait until further into your pregnancy to disclose that information.
While it is up to you to decide when to disclose your pregnancy, remember the employer’s reality of needing to figure out how your work will be completed while you are gone. Your employer is likely relieved to have filled your position, and now they will have to deal with being short-staffed again while you are out. Leaving them with little time to plan for this can cause frustration and a lack of trust between you and them.
How Are Complaints Handled?
If you file a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Council, there are a few different things that could happen to get the case resolved. You may be referred to a mediator who can attempt to help you and your employer reach an agreement, the EEOC may file a lawsuit on your behalf, or they may dismiss the issue and provide you with a “right to sue” letter. An experienced attorney can be useful in all of these situations but especially when you’ve been given the right to sue, as you’ll need to sue the employer on your own behalf, which is a complex legal process.
What to Do If You Believe You’ve Been Discriminated Against Due to Being Pregnant
If you believe you were not offered a job due to being pregnant, or you are being discriminated against at work because you are pregnant or recently gave birth, consulting with an experienced attorney is a great first step. California Employment Council has a team of experienced employment attorneys who can evaluate your situation and provide you with options for how to proceed. Don’t let an employer’s discrimination overshadow this exciting time in your life; contact us today to seek justice for yourself and your family.
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The rights of many criminal defendants are derived from the state and federal constitutions. Many of these rights have to do with procedural steps that must be followed in any criminal proceedings to ensure that the community members are treated fairly. For example, the well-known requirement to read people their Miranda rights upon arrest is rooted specifically in the federal constitution’s 5th Amendment prohibiting compelled self-incrimination. Similarly, all of the somewhat intricate rules about search and seizure requirements for police officers stem from legal challenges based on the federal constitution’s 4th Amendment.
However, beyond these procedural requirements, there are some instances where constitutional challenges related to criminal defendants deal with more substantive issues. The classic example of this involves the death penalty. At both the state and federal level, some attorneys have argued that use of the death penalty in all cases, for certain crimes, or for certain defendants, violated constitutional provisions. These legal challenges are somewhat different from other procedural challenges in that they seek to permanently end the ability of the state to commit execution–not just force the state to follow certain guidelines before doing so.
Maryland Death Penalty Challenge
In fact, just this week the Maryland Court of Appeals heard arguments in a case involving a man’s death row appeal. The defendant was sentenced to death following his conviction for killing a man during a robbery in 1998. His attorney is utilizing a novel argument in an effort to get the sentence reduced. In hearings conducted on Thursday, the attorney argued that the Maryland Constitution limits use of the death penalty only to cases involving treason.
As discussed in a recent article on the case, the criminal defense attorney made the argument that a portion of the Maryland Declaration of Rights places a limit on the interpretation of the death penalty in the state. A clause in the Declaration of Rights denounces “sanguinary laws” unless used to enhance the “safety of the state.” “Sanguinary” literally refers to actions involving violence and bloodshed. In the context of criminal law, it speaks to punishments of physical harm, under which the death penalty obviously falls. The attorney argued that the “safety of the state” only applies to things like suppressing rebellion, not any individual crime–no matter how heinous.
For their part, attorneys for the Maryland Attorney General’s office argued that the writers of the state constitution obviously intended capital punishment to be legal, as some of those writers became governor and signed death notices. They further noted that decades of case law suggest that there is no incongruity between use of the death penalty and the state constitution.
It is important to note the context in which this takes place. In 2006 the state high court found the procedural elements of the state capital punishment system lacking, putting a temporary halt to executions. The Governor has yet to suggest any alternative regulations, and executions cannot resume until that is done. No one has been executed in the state since 2005. On top of all of that there is a legislative push by some to permanently eliminate capital punishment in the state–an action which would make these courts proceedings moot.
Whatever the outcome, the battle over the death penalty in Maryland is yet another reminder of the complexity of many criminal law matters. If you are charged with a crime, be sure to get in touch with Brassel Alexander, LLC to defend your rights every step of the way.
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Veritas – London a closed shop when it comes to hedge fund collapses
Hedge funds might be known for their ability to react quickly to changing markets. Hedge fund collapses are often similarly rapid. But the clearing-up afterwards can proceed sometimes glacially.
So it has been with Weavering Capital, London’s largest hedge fund collapse.
It imploded suddenly over three years ago (March 2009) after it emerged its $640m Weavering Macro Fixed Income fund was almost wholly supported by an interest rate swap agreement with a related party. Investors lost over $530m, on some estimates.
Retrieving this has been slow, even though lawyers for Duff & Phelps – liquidators since 2010 – recently won $450m damages in court against the four primary defendants: founder Magnus Peterson, his wife Amanda Peterson, chief operating officer Charanpreet Dabhia and senior employee Edward Platt.
One victim of the fraud, who spoke on the basis of anonymity, argues London service providers to hedge funds, and their liquidators when things go wrong, need a “bulldog mentality” more akin to Irving Picard, who is recouping cash for the victims of Bernard Madoff.
He so far recovered or settled on $9.133bn, according to his website, www.madofftrustee.com – or $7m per day for the defrauded since December 2008. Admittedly, only $1.1bn of this has been paid out or advanced already, but the amount is sizeable nevertheless.
Picard notes: “Uncovering the machinery of [Madoff’s] fraud and its players has required the review of millions of documents and decades of fraudulent accounting and fabricated customer statements, intricate investigations across the globe [over 30 jurisdictions], and the preparation of court documents on complex questions of fact and law.”
The Weavering case also involves multiple jurisdictions – the UK, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands and of investors through the Continent – complicating recovery work.
But the Weavering victim’s complaint goes further. The hedge fund community in London, Europe’s hedge fund centre, effectively ‘close ranks’ when things go wrong, he argues.
Administrators and auditors take too little responsibility, and recovering money is slow.
“We claim to have all the systems and infrastructures and a code of self-regulation in place, but if the danger signals are not picked up, there is no-one to protect you during the events, or to help you afterwards.”
Liquidators should have “gone up against the service providers” more aggressively, as Picard has in the US vis a vis Madoff, he adds.
“It is an oligopoly of the big firms. “[An administratrors’] ‘safety role’ is zero, and if the manager asks them to jump, they ask, ‘how high?'”
Weavering’s fund directors should also have stepped in, he says, though the system of offshore regulation allowed the board to be peopled by the manager, or family relations of him.
“Weavering is smaller in size [than Madoff], but similar in terms of the vice and pathology the market has. If an investor is unlucky to invest in a fund where the manager is a ‘bad apple’, the current structure does not have the inherent mechanisms to protect them, even the post-fraud actions. When the plane went down it did not raise any alarms. This is not how investors are attracted to invest in a hedge fund.”
He is right. A hedge funds collapse is an ugly sight, as it rapidly becomes clear it is not the auditor’s job to uncover fraud, nor the administrator’s job to report suspected mis-doing, or act on it, and the light-touch ‘regulation’ in places like Cayman means directors can be closely related to the manager.
With such a state of affairs it is right hedge funds are only for ‘professional investors’. But such investors do not deserve the apparent lack of safeguards in the offshore fund system, or apparently a similar lack built into the onshore system of duties and responsibilities of fund service providers.
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Senate Republicans want to block President Obama from lifting sanctions against Iran over lingering concerns about possible military dimensions of the country's nuclear program.
Sen. Kelly AyotteKelly AyotteLewandowski saw no evidence of voter fraud in New Hampshire NH governor 'not aware’ of major voter fraud Former NH AG: 'Allegations of voter fraud in NH are baseless' MORE (R-N.H.) has introduced legislation that would block lifting sanctions until after the administration handed over a wide-ranging report on military aspects of Iran's nuclear program and certified to Congress that any military-related activity tied to the program has ended.
The legislation — which is currently backed by 10 Republican senators including Sen. Marco RubioMarco RubioA guide to the committees: Senate Schumer: GOP will break from Trump within months GOP loses top Senate contenders MORE (Fla.) — would also require Congress to pass a joint resolution approving the sanctions relief.
The proposal comes as the administration is preparing to lift sanctions against Iran as part of a deal on its nuclear program as early as January. The agreement was opposed by every Senate Republican.
As part of a possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear program, Ayotte's proposal would also require that that the administration certify that Iran has ended any "research, development, testing, or fielding" of ballistic missiles that could carry a nuclear weapon.
While the administration, and prominent Democrats, have argued that the nuclear agreement is separate from Iran's missile program, it's come under increased scrutiny in the wake of Iran missile tests since October.
Sen. Robert MenendezRobert MenendezSteve Mnuchin, foreclosure king, now runs your US Treasury Senate Dems move to nix Trump's deportation order Senators to Trump: We support additional Iran sanctions MORE (D-N.J.) pointed to the the tests as a key reason Obama should support extending the Iran Sanctions Act, which expires at the end of 2016. Senators are suggesting they'll try to move an extension of the law early next year.
Both Republicans and Democrats have pushed President Obama to take a firmer response to the missile tests, with lawmakers arguing it could signal how the administration would handle violations of the nuclear deal.
Ayotte spearheaded a letter earlier this month, which was signed by 34 of her Republican colleagues, saying that the administration shouldn't lift sanctions against Iran in the wake of the tests.
Meanwhile, 21 Senate Democrats are pushing Obama to act unilaterally or with European allies if the United Nations Security Council fails to reach an agreement on responding to Iran.
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The bottom line of the South Asian approach is that the law is to be obeyed according to our convenience. This fashionable disdain can only beget disorder and lawlessness.
NOT SURPRISINGLY, the Indian cricket establishment has made sufficient noises to suggest that its sympathies are with the Pakistani skipper, Inzamam-ul-Haq, in his stand-off with international umpire Darrell Hair in the ball tampering controversy at the Oval and thereafter. The Indian cricket establishment's stance may well have been determined by some vague realpolitik calculations, but it is also a fact that similar sentiments have been voiced in the rest of South Asia. The charge of racism (against Mr. Hair) has been made rather loosely, and, what is more, those suggesting a racist bias feel themselves justified in doing so, given the current global atmosphere of distrust and fear. But the Darrell Hair controversy has only brought out the collective attitude and approach to law, to requirements of the rule of law, and to lawful authority as also the reasons we invent to defy the law in our region.
There is much more to the Oval controversy than just the enforcement of cricket rules by an uncompromising umpire. After all, sports arenas are one of the few places on this planet where the rules of civilised engagement are still well-defined, reasonably observed, and generally well-enforced. And despite all the aggression and occasional violence witnessed in modern sport, the engagement still takes places within the four corners of mutually agreed upon rules and laws. It is a different matter that sportspersons still find ways to cheat or otherwise cut corners. Cricket has probably the most elaborate rule book. Cricket, more than other sports, is the antithesis of lawlessness. Hence the need to look at the Oval stand-off beyond a disciplinarian referee and the right to "protest" claimed by the Pakistani team.
Pakistan, of course, has sought to convert the Inzamam-Darrell Hair controversy into a matter of national pride and izzat. The Pakistan President, that good general who has run out of public approval, conveniently allowed himself to be seen as backing the cricket captain. The Pakistani media, too, have pitched in with shrill comments and shriller charges against the umpire.
Mr. Hair's leaked offer to step down from the International Cricket Council's elite panel of umpires and maintain silence on condition that $500,000 was paid to him has been seized upon as a perfect opportunity to introduce extraneous arguments in the basic and fundamental issue at stake: can those who are obliged to obey the law choose to disobey the law without inviting a penalty for their defiance?
The problem is not confined to Pakistan nor is it a new phenomenon. From Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century to John Rawls in our times, philosophers and princes have struggled to strike a balance between the demands of order and the human inclination to disorder: how to protect society from becoming a lawless state of nature in which there is "war of every man against every man." Political theorists have debated the nature of law and obligations to lawful authority. There is reasonable agreement on three counts: (1) rules are needed and someone has to frame and issue rules and laws; (2) there is an expectation that these rules and laws will be uniformly complied with; and (3) those who will not obey the law run the risk of being punished by a lawful authority. The state becomes the embodiment of legitimate political authority, armed with coercive force to ensure compliance with laws.
This runs somewhat against the civilisational grain of South Asian countries. Being historically a latecomer to the idea of written constitutions and the attendant culture of rule of law, the region has at best an ambiguous approach to law, national and international; everyone tries, without qualms, to try to get away with short-changing the law. The bottom line of the South Asian approach is that the law is to be obeyed according to our convenience. In the subcontinent, our recent history of non-cooperation against imperial rulers has induced an approach that a citizen can withhold his or her consent to the obligation to obey the law.
This Gandhian legacy was taken to a precipice during the so-called J.P. movement when a section of the political class decided one fine morning that the lawfully elected government had lost its legitimacy and it was in perfect order to incite the citizens and the constabulary to disobey lawfully constituted authority. In the rest of South Asia, the most organised group, the army, periodically decides to chuck the entire arrangement of lawful government and takes over the show.
Political bitterness and disputes aside, this region, by and large, chooses to remain untutored in the demands of the rule of law. Having a long history of civilisational comfort with unequal social orders and autocratic rule, modern South Asian countries have ingeniously devised a million ways and means of denying the egalitarian spirit of the rule of law; in each country can be found an entire regime of privileges and immunities to ensure that the obligations of compliance with the law are felt and rendered differently.
However, this cultivated indifference to the rigours of the law becomes a problem when the scene shifts to the international arena where the rules are enforced differently uniformly and impersonally. The South Asian tendency is to quarrel with the law-enforcer, especially if the law-enforcer has given an unfavourable ruling. In this age of globalisation, the encounter with international laws and regulations becomes a painful experience. Recall the outrage in India in late-2001 when ICC match referee Mike Denness disciplined Sachin Tendulkar for cleaning the ball without informing the umpire; and penalised five others as well, including the captain Sourav Ganguly. Virtually every sports writer and every television anchor in the country denounced Denness, accusing him of a bias against the Little Master; we were simply unprepared to accept that even a great icon like Tendulkar could be cited for an infringement of law.
Applause for coercion
It is curious that in the South Asian region where laws are indifferently observed, many citizens applaud their governments when they use the coercive instruments at their disposal armies, police, paramilitary, covert agencies, etc. to punish those who defy the ultimate lawful authority, the state. The Pakistani Government claims a right to use helicopter gunships against Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and his fellow-Baloch rebels; the Sri Lankan government exercises its right to fix the LTTE and other Tamil "rebels"; and the Indian Government regularly flexes its very potent muscles to take care of difficult customers, from the insurgents in Kashmir or the Northeast or Punjab to the Naxalites.
Darrell Hair had not invented Law 21.3 (under which Pakistan forfeited the match when Inzamam-ul-Haq failed to lead his side on to the cricket field); he was merely enforcing a law on the statute book. The umpires could be swayed by neither commercial considerations (of unused advertising time) nor by any imaginary international protocol among cricketing nations. Nor could they be faulted for invoking a law that had never been used since Test cricket began. It would be like criticising President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam for taking recourse to Article 111 of the Constitution because no other President before had invoked the constitutional stipulation.
Of course, there are good law and bad laws. Laws that are deemed unreasonable and unjust will and do invite questioning, resistance, even defiance. And good laws can be badly enforced or partially enforced, but every system of laws ideally provides for a corrective mechanism against the abuse of laws. Just as President Kalam was rightly criticised for stretching the second part of Article 111 by delaying his assent to the Office of Profit bill. In the global arena, the Americans, for instance, are forever trying to re-define the international laws to suit their narrow national interests. The rest of global society feels itself duty bound to resist American lawlessness.
Admittedly we live in an imperfect world, and that precisely is the reason why we should applaud any movement forward towards a lawful order be it on a cricket field or in international trade or in domestic governance. Our internal discourse unfortunately tends to encourage cynicism and disrespect towards the institutions of lawful authority. This fashionable disdain can only beget disorder and lawlessness.
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Three people have been arrested after a stolen car crashed into another vehicle during a police chase.
No injuries were sustained in yesterday's collision, but the family driving in the BMW were left shaken up by the incident.
Now two men and one woman, all from the Stoke-on-Trent area, were arrested and are today being quizzed.
A Staffordshire Police spokesman said: "Officers were pursuing a stolen black Audi A4, which had been involved in crimes carried out in Staffordshire since its theft, in the Newcastle area at around 5pm yesterday.
"The pursuit ended when the Audi was involved in a collision with a grey BMW driven by a member of the public. No-one was injured in the collision, but the occupants of the BMW were shaken up.
"Three people, two adult males and one adult female, all from the Stoke-on-Trent area, were arrested and they remain in custody.
"Anyone who witnessed either the pursuit or the collision is asked to contact Staffordshire Police on 101, quoting incident number 608 of May 27."
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Red light cameras in Finland have gotten a little smarter. Now instead of simply taking a picture of people who are running red lights, Finland’s cameras will also be catching speeders, those traveling with expired insurance, people not wearing a seat belt, and even busting tailgaters.
The cameras cost the government a whopping $70,000 a piece and will sit on the side of the road, taking the place of traditional red light cameras that are already in place on Finnish streets. The cameras use a wireless data connection to connect to the “real” policemen, and use an internal generator for powers, which makes them self-sufficient.
The cameras are called ASSET, which stands for Advanced Safety and Driver Support for Essential Road Transport, and take a picture of both you and your license plate when you travel through intersections in order to determine whether you’re sporting a seat belt, as well as run your plates for things like insurance.
While the cameras are currently only being used on Finnish roads, it stands to reason that if they are any kind of success we could see them hit the United States as well. The U.S. already uses traditional red light cameras in a number of locations, adding cameras that could also write tickets for seat belts and insurance would more than likely bring a lot more money into the states that do use them over time.
A red light camera that can do so much almost negates the need to have a police officer ever stationed in that particular area. Not knowing what the average traffic cop makes per year, I would imagine that the cameras would pay for themselves in labor alone in around two years. Theoretically they would be writing a decent amount of tickets each day as well, which could dramatically improve their usefulness as well.
Despite being financially responsible from a government standpoint, the cameras add a new interesting element to the areas they are in. Will drivers always drive safely because they know they’re being watched by the ASSSET camera? Is it fair for a camera to decide whether you’re guilty or not guilty of a traffic violation? In the event you were pulled over by the police you could explain why you weren’t wearing a seat belt, why your insurance was out, or why you were driving so close to the car in front of you….the ASSET camera isn’t going to give you that opportunity.
What do you think about having a red light camera that can also check for all of those things? Do you think they would be an asset to have? Or is it a Big Brother type situation?
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The latest execution of overseas Filipino worker Jenifer Bedoya in Saudi Arabia has heightened interest on cases of OFWs convicted of committing crimes in their host countries and facing death penalty.
Data from the Department of Foreign Affairs show there are 40 death penalty cases that involve OFWs. Thirty four of these cases are still in the litigation process.
Esteban Conejos, undersecretary for migrant workers affairs, said that since January 2006 the department has handled 64 probable death row cases, 24 of which have been commuted.
Among the OFWs whose death sentences have been commuted were Marilou Ranario and Mae Vecina. Ranario allegedly stabbed her employer to death and was given the death sentence by the Kuwaiti court. Her sentence, however, was commuted to life imprisonment after a personal appeal of President Arroyo, who was then visiting Kuwait.
Vecina, meanwhile, was sentenced to death for killing her six-year old ward. She was spared from death after the Kuwaiti ruler signed a decree commuting her sentence to life imprisonment.
Some OFWs, however, are not as lucky as Vecina and Ranario. Based on our research, at least seven OFWs were executed abroad since 1995.Among the OFWs who were executed are as follows:
Flor Contemplacion, 1995
Contemplacion was convicted of killing fellow overseas Filipino worker Delia Maga and her Singaporean ward. She was executed by hanging on March 17, 1995. As a result of her execution, Philippine relations with Singapore turned sour and the country imposed a ban on sending domestic helpers in the island-state. The ban, however, was lifted a year after.
Four OFWs, 2005
On March 2005, four Filipinos were executed by beheading in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia. Wilfredo Bautista, Antonio Alviza, Sergio Aldana, and Miguel Fernandez were executed after they were found guilty of killing and robbing fellow Filipino Jaime de la Cruz.
Reynaldo Cortez, 2007
Reynaldo Cortez, a welder at the Al-Allah Car Workshop in Riyadh, was beheaded using a sword after being found guilty of killing a Pakistani taxi driver in 2001. Cortez, however, claimed that the Pakistani tried to rape him. The death sentence was carried out after the family of the victims refused to accept 100,000 Saudi rials blood money.
Jenifer Bedoya, 2008
Jenifer Bedoya, also known as Venancio Ladion, was convicted of killing a Saudi national guard in Mecca by strangling him and piercing his neck. Bedoya was sentenced to death on April 2007 and the sentence was affirmed a year later. His execution on October pushed through despite the fact that President Gloria Arroyo had written two letters to Saudi Arabia’s king.
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Twelve members of a religious cult in Queensland, Australia, have been arrested and charged with murder after a seriously ill 8-year-old girl was allegedly denied medical treatment.
Police have said that 8-year-old Elizabeth Rose Struhs, a type-1 diabetic was allegedly denied insulin access for six days by a religious cult group known as "The Saints" in Toowoomba, the members were all aware of the child's illness.
Authorities said that the members of the group, which included the parents of the child, believed that she would be "healed by God".
Superintendent Garry Watts said that Elizabeth died on January 7, but emergency services were not informed until 5.30 pm the following day. On Tuesday morning, 30 police officers arrested the 12 people, whose ages ranged from 19 to 64.
Elizabeth's parents, Kerrie Struhs and Jason Struhs were charged with murder and torture offences earlier this year. They were also charged with failing to provide the necessities of life and will remain in custody until their next hearing later this month.
In Tuesday's arrests were other members of "The Saints" religious group, who were allegedly present when Elizabeth died, reportedly singing and praying to God to heal her.
Police said in a statement: "All of the 12 arrested were aware of the child's condition, were there at the address, and did not take any steps to provide medical assistance to the child." Jayde Struhs, Elizabeth's eldest sister, who ran away from home to escape from her parents, said that her extended family had been left "completely shattered and heartbroken" by the death of the 8-year-old.
She added: "We have faced the brutal reality that the people who should have protected her did not, and we may never know the full extent of what took place."
Superintendent Watts added: "It's not the kind of situation we as investigators are faced with commonly.
"In my nearly 40 years of policing, I haven't been faced with a matter like this."
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Voting Republican Is Not the Answer
(Yes, he is a Republican.)
A Michigan lawmaker wants to license reporters to ensure they’re credible and vet them for “good moral character.”
Senator Bruce Patterson is introducing legislation that will regulate reporters much like the state does with hairdressers, auto mechanics and plumbers. Patterson, who also practices constitutional law, says that the general public is being overwhelmed by an increasing number of media outlets--traditional, online and citizen generated--and an even greater amount misinformation.
The problem with this law is not that it's intrusive; it is voluntary (for now). The problem is that it puts the fence posts in place for worse regulations tomorrow. In the absence of such regulations, anybody trying to start censorship will have to hire censors; they will have to deal with people claiming to be censors who are leaking information; and they will have to deal with the fact that most policeman will refuse to get involved in book burning unless they're already used to demanding identification papers from journalists.
Remember the most useful question to ask when considering a proposed government activity: Would I trust my worst enemy with the power?
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The police were able to ascertain that 26/11 accused Jundal and Kasab were together during the preparatory stages in Pakistan and when the operation was being launched. Vicky Nanjappa reports
The 26/11 Mumbai attacks probe on Thursday night brought together Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving attacker, face to face with Abu Jundal whom he identified as one of the main conspirators of the mayhem.
This was an interesting exercise and an important one, as investigators need to corroborate both sides of the story to make their case stronger.
However, one obvious question was whether the two were made to sit in front of each other throughout the questioning.
The answer to that is, no, as the normal mandate as taught in the National Police Academy in such cases is that barring the identification the rest of the questions would not be asked face to face due to various legal reasons.
Sources privy to this part of the investigation told rediff.com that both the accused are brought face to face briefly at first. A set of questions were asked regarding the identification of both the persons. Kasab said that Jundal was the man who taught him and the other attackers Hindi. This meant that he had seen Jundal when the attack was being planned. The first question that the investigator asked Kasab was whether Jundal was the man he was speaking about. The same question was then put to Jundal. Abu Jundal was asked if he had trained Kasab when the operation was being planned. Both the persons identified each other and told the police they knew each other.
In the next round of questioning the accused were put in two separate rooms and they were asked the same set of questions. The question put to Kasab was then verified by Jundal.
The investigators, prior to this exercise, had two sides of the story -- one by Kasab and the other by Jundal. It was clear that Kasab had information only pertaining to the training for the operation. Both the persons confirmed that there was a training programme in Pakistan and Jundal had met Kasab during this time.
Thursday's questioning also confirmed that there were in all 14 persons chosen for this operation, but four of them had dropped out. This cleared the lurking doubt about the number of terrorists involved in the operation. It is now clear that ten terrorists carried out the attack.
Investigators say that they were not expecting both versions to be exactly the same.
During such an exercise the police are extremely careful in ensuring that the two persons are not face to face listening in to what the other has to say. There are legal hurdles that can arise out of such a situation.
This was a big operation and Kasab was a foot soldier while Jundal was part of the top rank. Kasab has a vague idea of the ideology behind this attack while Jundal has a better understanding. Although the questions pertaining to the ideology were asked to both the accused, the police would ensure that each others answers are not known to the other person.
"There are bound to be contradictions and more often than not the accused pick it up and inform their lawyers about it which is used in the court to seek an acquittal. It is impossible that two versions will be exactly the same in such an investigation and there are bound to be contradictions," explains a senior officer.
The officer narrated an incident in Kashmir where such an exercise was carried out. Some of the foot soldiers who were interrogated told the officers of the Intelligence Bureau that they had come to Kashmir not to fight against India. They had come here to defend Islam, but when they landed here they saw the mosques and heard the loud speakers which made them feel that Islam was not under threat. But they still went ahead with the operation since they were told to do so.
However, the version of the mastermind was entirely different and he had to say that the war was against India. "This amounts to a contradiction, but not a fatal one in the mind of the investigator. The case is similar in the Kasab-Jundal case. Kasab was made a promise of a 100 virgins and money and he carried out the instructions. However, Jundal knew all along this was a war against India," the officer said.
Thursday's questioning also brought clarity on Jundal's role in the control room. Jundal handled those at Nariman House, where Kasab was not present. Kasab's information regarding Jundal ended with the confession that he had taught them Hindi.
The biggest plus point for investigators after this exercise was that they were able to ascertain that Jundal and Kasab were together during the preparatory stages in Pakistan. Both were also together when the operation was being launched.
However, the point of disagreement was the objective. Although it cannot be termed as a disagreement it is something that they could not verify thoroughly since Kasab was never in the loop regarding the ideology and objectives behind the attack.
Another reason why the accused are not allowed to hear each others versions, say officers, is to avoid them to fine-tune their answers and make their position stronger based on a contradiction. In a set of 60 questions there were around 15 contradictions, but all of them were not substantial in nature.
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The atrocious murder of Nick Berg, an American civilian, was a crime that has gone to the hearts of all people, regardless of what country they are from or what religion they follow. Slowly decapitating a fellow human being is heinous, and it is cowardly. On top of this, the perpetrators, claiming to be Muslim, have gone completely against Islam’s fundamentals and teachings. Nicholas Berg was an innocent civilian, in Iraq to help the country, yet he was abducted, held captive, and beheaded for the world to see. In Sharia—Islamic law—it is forbidden to be cruel to prisoners of war. However, what these monsters did was a crime beyond cruelty. In war, Muslims are not even allowed to ruin crops or cut down trees, much less kill non-combatants. In any condition, war or peace, Muslims are not permitted to kill innocent people. The Qur’an says, “O you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even though it be against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, be he rich or poor…” (4:135). It shames me that some people claiming to be Muslims have defaced a multitude of people through their injustice and lack of regard for human life. Those who committed this atrocious crime cannot be regarded as Muslims due to their complete misunderstanding of Muslim law and way of life. If they think that murdering an innocent American under the guise of jihad will get them to heaven, they are deeply mistaken, for in my opinion, their act will result in the opposite. It hurts me to see a fellow American killed in such a vile manner, yet it hurts me more that the perpetrators of this crime have defaced a noble and peaceful religion in doing so.
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- How does a fender bender affect insurance?
- What happens if I dont report a mild fender bender to insurance?
- Do you have to turn an accident into your insurance?
- How much does insurance increase after fender bender?
- What happens if you don’t report a car accident to your insurance?
- Who’s at fault in a fender bender?
- How long does a minor accident stay on your record?
- Does a fender bender count as an accident?
- How long do you have to call your insurance company after an accident?
- How much is a minor accident settlement?
- Will my insurance go up if I don’t file a claim?
How does a fender bender affect insurance?
A small fender bender accident without much damage probably won’t cause too much of a rate increase.
A bad accident with a lot of damage may signal to your provider that you are more of a risk to insure.
They could offset that new risk by increasing your monthly rate..
What happens if I dont report a mild fender bender to insurance?
You should report an accident to your insurance company because it’s usually the law. Most states require you to report accidents even when it comes to fender benders. If you fail to report an accident or file a claim, you may face legal penalties. These can include the possibility of a fleeing the scene charge.
Do you have to turn an accident into your insurance?
If you get in a car accident involving other people or other vehicles, it’s always a good idea to file a claim. Even if the damage seems minor and/or the person is unhurt, it’s best to notify your insurance. … Injuries like this can cause permanent damage and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
How much does insurance increase after fender bender?
In general, the study found, drivers who make a single claim of $2,000 or more can expect their premiums to increase by 41 percent. That translates to a $335 increase for the average U.S. auto insurance premium of $815 a year. For the unfortunate souls who make two claims in one year, the increase jumps to 93 percent.
What happens if you don’t report a car accident to your insurance?
Failing to report an auto accident to the police when it’s required by law means you are running the risk of being charged with leaving the scene. Leaving the scene of a collision is a serious conviction that could result in a hefty increase to your car insurance rates, fines, and even jail time.
Who’s at fault in a fender bender?
Simply stated, the driver that hit the lead car without being hit from behind will be responsible. Hence the driver is liable for paying compensation for damages to both drivers that were ahead of him or her in a 3 car fender bender.
How long does a minor accident stay on your record?
Do accidents affect your driving record? In addition to being potentially dangerous, stressful to deal with, and possibly getting you a traffic ticket, an accident can stay on your record for 6 years.
Does a fender bender count as an accident?
Some of the most common car accidents are minor “fender benders” that do not involve injuries. … However, the collisions can still result in minor property damage to the cars, whether it’s a dented bumper or fender, or scrapes and scratches on the paint.
How long do you have to call your insurance company after an accident?
Statute of Limitations on Car Insurance Claims by StateStateBodily InjuryProperty/Collision/Comprehensive DamageCalifornia2 years2 yearsColorado3 years3 yearsConnecticut2 years2 yearsDelaware2 years2 years47 more rows•Oct 20, 2020
How much is a minor accident settlement?
The average compensation payment for minor injuries was $65,957. The average compensation payment for moderate injuries was $151,771. The average compensation payment for serious injuries was $352,396.
Will my insurance go up if I don’t file a claim?
If you have another accident in which you are at fault, filing a claim on it will cause your premiums to increase. Some insurance companies may then consider the previous accident as well, which could cause your rates to really soar.
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A federal appeals court has temporarily put on hold the lower court’s ruling that would have ended restrictions on cruise vessels in Florida from the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
The 2-1 panel decision came on Saturday, July 17, at 11:50 p.m., ~10 minutes before the rules would have ended.
In a court filing before the ruling, the CDC said:
“The undisputed evidence shows that unregulated cruise ship operations would exacerbate the spread of COVID-19, and that the hard to the public that would result from such operations cannot be undone.”
For cruise ships to resume sailing this year, they had to meet certain thresholds. The CDC had said they would greenlight cruises if 98% of a ship’s crew and 95% of passengers were vaccinated. If not, the companies had to hold test sailings.
Florida, which banned businesses from requiring vaccine passports, sued in order to remove the restrictions.
Tampa-based Judge Steven Merryday ruled it was “highly likely” that the Centers exceeded its authority.
The decision of the appeals court is not a final ruling but allows the restrictions to stay in place while the CDC appeals the ruling.
NCL-Norwegian Cruise Line is suing Florida over its vaccine law preventing ships from asking for proof that clients have been jabbed.
Cruise lines face US$5,000 fines per customer for asking for proof they have gotten one of the COVID vaccines.
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Losing a loved one is an emotionally challenging experience, and when their death is caused by the wrongful actions of another party, the grieving family members may choose to pursue a wrongful death suit. However, the question “how Long Does It Take to Settle a Wrongful death suit” has no definite answer.
This is because, the duration of a wrongful death suit can vary based on several factors, and it is important for the claimants to have a realistic expectation of the timeline involved.
Understanding Wrongful Death Suit
Definition of Wrongful Death
A wrongful death refers to a situation where an individual’s death is caused by the negligent, reckless, or intentional behavior of another party or entity. Wrongful death claims aim to hold the responsible party accountable and seek compensation for the financial, emotional, and other losses suffered by the surviving family members.
Parties Involved in a Wrongful Death Suit
In a wrongful death suit, there are typically two primary parties involved: the plaintiffs (the deceased person’s family or estate) and the defendants (the individuals or entities accused of causing the death). The plaintiffs, represented by their attorneys, file the lawsuit and seek compensation, while the defendants defend against the allegations made.
Factors Affecting the Duration of a Wrongful Death Suit
Several factors can impact the time it takes to settle a wrongful death suit. Understanding these factors can provide insight into the complexities involved in the legal process. Some of the key factors include:
Complexity of the Case
The complexity of the case is a significant determinant of the settlement duration. Cases involving multiple defendants, intricate legal issues, or challenges in establishing liability may take longer to resolve.
The collection and analysis of evidence are crucial for building a strong case. This process may involve gathering medical records, accident reports, witness testimonies, expert opinions, and other supporting evidence. The time required for evidence collection can impact the duration of the suit.
In many wrongful death cases, expert witnesses are essential for providing specialized knowledge and opinions regarding the circumstances of the death. Coordinating with these experts, scheduling depositions, and obtaining their reports can contribute to the overall timeline.
Negotiation and Settlement
Settlement negotiations between the parties involved can take considerable time. Factors such as the willingness to negotiate, the complexity of the damages, and the parties’ cooperation can influence the duration of this stage.
Steps Involved in Settling a Wrongful Death Suit
Settling a wrongful death suit involves several distinct steps that must be followed. Understanding these steps can provide an overview of the legal process and the time involved.
Hiring an Attorney
The first step in pursuing a wrongful death suit is to hire an experienced attorney who specializes in this area of law. The attorney will guide the claimants throughout the process, ensuring their rights are protected and providing legal representation.
Filing a Lawsuit
Once the attorney has been engaged, they will file the lawsuit on behalf of the plaintiffs. This initiates the legal proceedings and formally establishes the claim.
The discovery phase involves the exchange of information and evidence between the parties. Both sides will request and provide relevant documents, answer written questions (interrogatories), and conduct depositions. This phase can be time-consuming, as it is crucial for building a comprehensive case.
Mediation and Negotiation
Mediation is a common step in the settlement process. A neutral third party, the mediator, facilitates discussions between the plaintiffs and defendants, aiming to reach a mutually agreeable settlement. Negotiations can take time as both parties present their arguments and explore potential resolutions.
Trial and Verdict
If the parties cannot reach a settlement through negotiation or mediation, the case may proceed to trial. During the trial, each side presents their case before a judge or jury, who then delivers a verdict determining liability and any awarded damages. The duration of a trial can vary depending on its complexity and the court’s schedule.
In some instances, either party may choose to appeal the court’s decision. The appeals process involves reviewing the trial proceedings and presenting arguments to a higher court. This process can significantly extend the duration of the suit.
Average Timeframe for Settling a Wrongful Death Suit
While it is challenging to provide an exact timeframe for settling a wrongful death suit, it is generally safe to say that these cases often take months or even years to reach a resolution. The complexity of the case, the court’s schedule, and the willingness of the parties to negotiate all contribute to the overall duration.
Factors That Can Speed Up or Delay the Settlement
Several factors can influence the speed at which a wrongful death suit is settled. These factors can either expedite or delay the resolution, including:
Cases with straightforward liability and damages calculations are generally resolved more efficiently. Conversely, complex legal issues, such as multiple defendants or shared fault, can extend the settlement process.
Cooperation Among Parties
When all parties involved cooperate and engage in good faith negotiations, the settlement process can be expedited. Conversely, contentious relationships and unwillingness to negotiate can significantly delay the resolution.
The backlog of cases in a particular court jurisdiction can impact the duration of a wrongful death suit. Courts with heavy caseloads may experience delays in scheduling hearings, trials, and other proceedings.
Insurance Company Tactics
If the defendant is an insurance company, their strategies and tactics can affect the settlement timeline. Some insurers may employ delay tactics, hoping to pressure the claimants into accepting a lower settlement.
Impact of Settlement Time on the Claimants
The duration of a wrongful death suit can have various impacts on the claimants. Financial strain, emotional toll, and prolonged uncertainty are common challenges faced by the surviving family members. It is essential for claimants to have realistic expectations and rely on their attorneys for guidance and support throughout the process.
Settling a wrongful death suit is a complex and often lengthy process. The duration can vary based on multiple factors, including the complexity of the case, evidence gathering, negotiations, and court schedules. Claimants should consult with experienced attorneys who can guide them through the process and help them navigate the challenges involved.
How long does a wrongful death suit typically take?
The duration of a wrongful death suit varies depending on the circumstances of the case, the court’s schedule, and the parties’ willingness to negotiate. It can take several months to years to reach a resolution.
Can the duration of a wrongful death suit vary significantly?
Yes, the duration of a wrongful death suit can vary significantly based on the complexity of the case, the amount of evidence involved, the court’s schedule, and the parties’ cooperation.
What happens if the parties cannot reach a settlement?
If the parties cannot reach a settlement through negotiation or mediation, the case may proceed to trial. The court will then make a decision based on the presented evidence and arguments.
Can an attorney help expedite the settlement process?
Yes, an experienced attorney can help expedite the settlement process by navigating the legal complexities, effectively negotiating with the opposing party, and advocating for the claimants’ rights.
What should I do if I’m considering filing a wrongful death suit?
If you are considering filing a wrongful death suit, it is essential to consult with an experienced attorney specializing in this area of law. They can provide guidance, assess the merits of your case, and support you throughout the legal process.
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The federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires that drug manufacturers place labels on all approved medications, which set forth the various risks, side effects, and other relevant drug and medication information. Consumers and patients, when they fill their medications at the drug stores and pharmacies, receive labeling and packing inserts which provides much of the above information, including specific instructions and other information regarding the use of such medication.
When Physicians Fail to Provide Medication Instructions
Often times, physicians, when prescribing such medications defer to the drug manufacturer’s labeling, inserts, and other packaging information, without taking the time to adequately inform the client. In fact, many physicians believe that since the relevant and available drug labeling is available, that patients have the ability, on their own accord, to review such information, and puts the onus on the patients to review such information as opposed to taking the time to adequately explain or review such information with patients.
The doctrine of informed consent requires and otherwise imposes a duty on South Carolina physicians to disclose the various risk, benefits, and other relevant information pertaining to the prescribing of medication. In fact, most physicians are completely “aware that they must obtain the informed consent of their patients before starting a treatment or medication” but “many do not know, however, that the failure to obtain and document high-quality informed consent or informed treatment refusals can give rise to a claim of professional negligence.”
What Constitutes Informed Consent?
Each state, including South Carolina, has its own requirements for what constitutes appropriate informed consent, and it is prudent to check the standard in the state in which you practice. As a rule of thumb, however, a patient must make a knowing, voluntary, and competent decision regarding his or her medical care, and that includes the decision to accept or to decline a medication. The basic standard is that a physician must disclose all the relevant information about your medical procedure. In South Carolina, the doctrine of informed consent states a physician has a duty to disclose the following with it comes to prescribing medications, including diagnosis, general nature of the medication to be prescribed, material risks, probability of success associated with the procedure, prognosis if the procedure is not carried out, and the existence of any alternatives to the procedure. In other words, a physician in South Carolina, cannot just assume because a particular medication has FDA approved labeling, that the patient will read such information or place the onus of doing so on the patient, but rather the physician must actively disclose the substantive risks and benefits to the patient being prescribed such medication.
Speak With an Attorney if Your Right to Informed Consent Was Breached
As an individual that has been injured as a result of a physician’s prescribing medication and failure to adequately provide informed consent, very complex and sophisticated legal issues may be involved in your claim. The Connell Law Firm, LLC. has seasoned and experienced attorneys who are prepared to perform a full and complete evaluation of your legal claims, injuries, and damages.
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Due to complaints related to a lack of personal protective equipment (PPE), insufficient training on appropriate standards and possible coronavirus illness (COVID-19) transmissions in the workplace, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has issued temporary guidance for its area offices to use in their efforts to enforce the agency's workplace safety and health mandates. These mandates require employers to take prompt actions to mitigate hazards and protect employees during the COVID-19 pandemic
The new guidance, issued on April 13, 2020, directs OSHA compliance officers to process most complaints from non-healthcare and non-emergency response establishments as “non-formal” and to conduct investigations via phone or fax whenever possible. However, employers should know that after receiving a serious incident report, OSHA area directors will determine whether to conduct an inspection or a rapid response investigation (RRI). RRIs are intended to identify any hazards, provide abatement assistance and confirm abatement, and OSHA generally encourages area directors to recommend them.
This Compliance Bulletin provides a summary of the enforcement guidance provisions that relate specifically to COVID-19 issues.
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In a world filled with complexities and uncertainties, relationships can often become entangled in secrets and suspicions. Suspicion of infidelity, or 외도증거수집 in Korean, is an issue that many individuals and couples grapple with. It’s a delicate matter that requires careful handling and, in some cases, the need for collecting evidence to confirm or refute suspicions. In this article, we delve into the world of 외도증거수집, exploring what it entails, its importance, and how professional services like THE NEXT Group can assist in this sensitive process.
외도증거수집 It is the process of gathering substantial proof to confirm or disprove allegations of infidelity within a relationship. This evidence can take various forms, including text messages, emails, photographs, and even witness testimonies. While 외도증거수집 may seem like an invasion of privacy, it can be a necessary step in situations where trust and fidelity are in question.
The Importance of 외도증거수집
Trust is the foundation of any healthy relationship, and when that trust is eroded by suspicions of infidelity, it can lead to emotional turmoil, anxiety, and heartbreak. While confronting a partner about infidelity without concrete evidence can damage a relationship irreparably, having proof can provide clarity and closure. 외도증거수집 is essential for several reasons:
Confirming Suspicions: Many individuals experience gut feelings that something is amiss in their relationship. 외도증거수집 allows them to confirm or dismiss these suspicions with tangible evidence.
Legal Implications: In some cases, evidence of infidelity may be required for legal purposes, such as divorce proceedings or child custody battles.
Emotional Closure: Knowing the truth, even if painful, can provide emotional closure and help individuals move forward with their lives.
How THE NEXT Group Can Help
Understanding the sensitivity of 외도증거수집, it’s crucial to seek the assistance of professionals who can handle the process discreetly and ethically. THE NEXT Group is a reputable organization that specializes in various investigative tasks, including 외도증거수집. Here’s how they can assist you:
- Professional Investigators
THE NEXT Group employs experienced and highly trained investigators who are well-versed in the art of evidence collection. They can discreetly and ethically gather the necessary evidence without compromising your privacy or the integrity of the investigation.
- Cutting-Edge Technology
In the digital age, much of our lives are conducted online, and evidence of infidelity often leaves a digital trail. THE NEXT Group utilizes cutting-edge technology to trace and secure digital evidence, such as text messages, emails, and social media interactions.
Maintaining confidentiality is of utmost importance in 외도증거수집 cases. THE NEXT Group understands the sensitivity of the matter and ensures that all collected evidence is handled with the utmost discretion.
- Legal Expertise
In cases where 외도증거수집 is required for legal proceedings, THE NEXT Group can provide expert testimony and documentation to support your case.
While 외도증거수집 may be a difficult and emotionally charged process, it is a necessary step for many individuals seeking clarity and closure in their relationships. THE NEXT Group stands ready to assist you in this sensitive journey, providing professional, discreet, and ethical services to help you uncover the truth. Remember that, in matters of the heart, honesty and trust are paramount, and sometimes, 외도증거수집 is the only way to achieve that.
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The River and Dam Act was a law that was signed by President Jake Featherston of the Confederate States of America in July 1934. The purpose behind the law was to tame the Mississippi River system that had caused so much trouble to the CSA in the past, and also to provide a source of energy for several million inhabitants of the Tennessee Valley. Featherston and his government also sought to create a constitutional crisis in which he would emerge more powerful and popular than before.
Summary of Act Edit
The basis for the law had its genesis in the Mississippi River floods of 1927, which wrecked whole areas of the Mississippi Valley and displaced tens of thousands of Confederate citizens and black residents from their communities. The then-governing Whig Party did nothing to help lower the plight of the people, and Featherston was bothered by their do-nothing attitude (albeit for political reasons, not humanitarian ones).
Possible constitutional Issues Edit
Once in power, Featherston set out to make good on his campaign promise to control the rivers by building dams and levies - which went against Article 1, Section 8, Part 3 of the Confederate Constitution, expressly prohibiting Congress from appropriating money for internal improvements saving river navigation. The document was the United States Constitution nearly word-for-word with but a few exceptions that prohibit such spending for fear one section of the country would develop an industrial sway over the agricultural sector just as had happened before the War of Secession. This public-works program bucked what would be a long-standing Confederate tradition but had the triple-sided effect of giving work to thousands of white Confederate citizens and to giving the impoverished region electricity and hope that their homes won't get washed away in the future - with the third side being that since the law would be overwhelmingly popular, the Confederate States Supreme Court would be making its position vulnerable when it moved to strike down the law as unconstitutional, which it did that autumn. And all of this was part of Featherston's ultimate plan to extend the power of the executive branch.
Jake Featherston v. James McReynolds Edit
A great outcry arose over the controversy, and Featherston went to the press to present his side of the story. Since his director of communications Saul Goldman controlled the cinema, newspapers and radio, the public heard only Featherston's viewpoint, and the Supreme Court under Chief Justice James McReynolds became the hated pariahs of the land. When he was certain that the time was right, Jake Featherston announced in a radio broadcast: "James McReynolds has made his decision; now let him enforce it!" paraphrasing a quote attributed to US President Andrew Jackson following a United States Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court was abolished as soon as a precedent was found by Attorney General Ferdinand Koenig, and McReynolds went to Featherston's office to argue the matter. He exited an hour later as a shaken, broken man, and retired into obscurity.
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TYT Hates Americans, Funny, So Does Hillary
A man gets killed by the state, the state charges the survivors. The jury, doesn’t think they should be put in prison. (That IS IN the Constitution! And you say it is against the Constitution) And TYT thinks the state is the people, and that the state, needs to be protected by the people, in the name of defending the people…. The mental gymnastics of TYT and Cognitive Dissonance is INCREDIBLE! You are honestly gonna try to pair this with racial profiling… Apples to Oranges comparison. Everything to Cenk is racial profiling, sexism, racism, homophobia… Everything has it’s own label. Nothing is complex. It’s just feelings over facts. And an inability to look at both sides and weigh truth and justice. You can’t argue that the Constitution exists to protect the state over the people. That is the truth. Instead you have to argue that when the state is aggrieved, the people must be punished by punishing the people by punishing the state. That is Fascism, Cenk!
Dumbass #1 : “Kindly explain to us how armed militia taking over a gov’t building aiming firearms at federal agents leads to no convictions and no action for weeks but hundreds of unarmed peaceful protests over an unfinished pipeline brings out sound cannons, pepper spray, attack dogs and rubber bullets.”
— “But the most interesting and damning thing the video makes clear is that agents started shooting at him, twice, before any of the “appearing to reach in his pocket for a gun” that supposedly justified the kill shots. See starting around 5:30 of the video.” http://reason.com/blog/2016/03/08/new-video-shows-agents-began-shooting-at — Take it up with Reason magazine’s reporter. Next time, try harder….
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