Daily Papers

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in social deduction games (SDGs) like Werewolf, where strategic reasoning and social deception are essential. However, current approaches remain limited to textual information, ignoring crucial multimodal cues such as facial expressions and tone of voice that humans naturally use to communicate. Moreover, existing SDG agents primarily focus on inferring other players' identities without modeling how others perceive themselves or fellow players. To address these limitations, we use One Night Ultimate Werewolf (ONUW) as a testbed and present MultiMind, the first framework integrating multimodal information into SDG agents. MultiMind processes facial expressions and vocal tones alongside verbal content, while employing a Theory of Mind (ToM) model to represent each player's suspicion levels toward others. By combining this ToM model with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), our agent identifies communication strategies that minimize suspicion directed at itself. Through comprehensive evaluation in both agent-versus-agent simulations and studies with human players, we demonstrate MultiMind's superior performance in gameplay. Our work presents a significant advancement toward LLM agents capable of human-like social reasoning across multimodal domains.

We perform an effective-theory analysis of forward-backward signal propagation in wide and deep Transformers, i.e., residual neural networks with multi-head self-attention blocks and multilayer perceptron blocks. This analysis suggests particular width scalings of initialization and training hyperparameters for these models. We then take up such suggestions, training Vision and Language Transformers in practical setups.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate proficiency across numerous computational tasks, yet their inner workings remain unclear. In theory, the combination of causal self-attention and multilayer perceptron layers allows every token to access and compute information based on all preceding tokens. In practice, to what extent are such operations present? In this paper, on mental math tasks (i.e., direct math calculation via next-token prediction without explicit reasoning), we investigate this question in three steps: inhibiting input-specific token computations in the initial layers, restricting the routes of information transfer across token positions in the next few layers, and forcing all computation to happen at the last token in the remaining layers. With two proposed techniques, Context-Aware Mean Ablation (CAMA) and Attention-Based Peeking (ABP), we identify an All-for-One subgraph (AF1) with high accuracy on a wide variety of mental math tasks, where meaningful computation occurs very late (in terms of layer depth) and only at the last token, which receives information of other tokens in few specific middle layers. Experiments on a variety of models and arithmetic expressions show that this subgraph is sufficient and necessary for high model performance, transfers across different models, and works on a variety of input styles. Ablations on different CAMA and ABP alternatives reveal their unique advantages over other methods, which may be of independent interest.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly surpassing human knowledge in many domains. While improving these models traditionally relies on costly human data, recent self-rewarding mechanisms (Yuan et al., 2024) have shown that LLMs can improve by judging their own responses instead of relying on human labelers. However, existing methods have primarily focused on improving model responses rather than judgment capabilities, resulting in rapid saturation during iterative training. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Meta-Rewarding step to the self-improvement process, where the model judges its own judgements and uses that feedback to refine its judgment skills. Surprisingly, this unsupervised approach improves the model's ability to judge {\em and} follow instructions, as demonstrated by a win rate improvement of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 22.9% to 39.4% on AlpacaEval 2, and 20.6% to 29.1% on Arena-Hard. These results strongly suggest the potential for self-improving models without human supervision.

Self-evaluation using large language models (LLMs) has proven valuable not only in benchmarking but also methods like reward modeling, constitutional AI, and self-refinement. But new biases are introduced due to the same LLM acting as both the evaluator and the evaluatee. One such bias is self-preference, where an LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than others' while human annotators consider them of equal quality. But do LLMs actually recognize their own outputs when they give those texts higher scores, or is it just a coincidence? In this paper, we investigate if self-recognition capability contributes to self-preference. We discover that, out of the box, LLMs such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 have non-trivial accuracy at distinguishing themselves from other LLMs and humans. By fine-tuning LLMs, we discover a linear correlation between self-recognition capability and the strength of self-preference bias; using controlled experiments, we show that the causal explanation resists straightforward confounders. We discuss how self-recognition can interfere with unbiased evaluations and AI safety more generally.

As a critical step to achieve human-like chatbots, empathetic response generation has attained increasing interests. Previous attempts are incomplete and not sufficient enough to elicit empathy because they only focus on the initial aspect of empathy to automatically mimic the feelings and thoughts of the user via other-awareness. However, they ignore to maintain and take the own views of the system into account, which is a crucial process to achieve the empathy called self-other awareness. To this end, we propose to generate Empathetic response with explicit Self-Other Awareness (EmpSOA). Specifically, three stages, self-other differentiation, self-other modulation and self-other generation, are devised to clearly maintain, regulate and inject the self-other aware information into the process of empathetic response generation. Both automatic and human evaluations on the benchmark dataset demonstrate the superiority of EmpSOA to generate more empathetic responses.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) exhibit self-preference bias when serving as judges, meaning they tend to favor their own responses over those generated by other models. Existing methods typically measure this bias by calculating the difference between the scores a judge model assigns to its own responses and those it assigns to responses from other models. However, this approach conflates self-preference bias with response quality, as higher-quality responses from the judge model may also lead to positive score differences, even in the absence of bias. To address this issue, we introduce gold judgments as proxies for the actual quality of responses and propose the DBG score, which measures self-preference bias as the difference between the scores assigned by the judge model to its own responses and the corresponding gold judgments. Since gold judgments reflect true response quality, the DBG score mitigates the confounding effect of response quality on bias measurement. Using the DBG score, we conduct comprehensive experiments to assess self-preference bias across LLMs of varying versions, sizes, and reasoning abilities. Additionally, we investigate two factors that influence and help alleviate self-preference bias: response text style and the post-training data of judge models. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms of self-preference bias from an attention-based perspective. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/zhiyuanc2001/self-preference.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

Existing methods for simulating individual identities often oversimplify human complexity, which may lead to incomplete or flattened representations. To address this, we introduce SPeCtrum, a grounded framework for constructing authentic LLM agent personas by incorporating an individual's multidimensional self-concept. SPeCtrum integrates three core components: Social Identity (S), Personal Identity (P), and Personal Life Context (C), each contributing distinct yet interconnected aspects of identity. To evaluate SPeCtrum's effectiveness in identity representation, we conducted automated and human evaluations. Automated evaluations using popular drama characters showed that Personal Life Context (C)-derived from short essays on preferences and daily routines-modeled characters' identities more effectively than Social Identity (S) and Personal Identity (P) alone and performed comparably to the full SPC combination. In contrast, human evaluations involving real-world individuals found that the full SPC combination provided a more comprehensive self-concept representation than C alone. Our findings suggest that while C alone may suffice for basic identity simulation, integrating S, P, and C enhances the authenticity and accuracy of real-world identity representation. Overall, SPeCtrum offers a structured approach for simulating individuals in LLM agents, enabling more personalized human-AI interactions and improving the realism of simulation-based behavioral studies.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

We address the challenge of online Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) with a focus on self-rewarding alignment methods. In online RLHF, obtaining feedback requires interaction with the environment, which can be costly when using additional reward models or the GPT-4 API. Current self-rewarding approaches rely heavily on the discriminator's judgment capabilities, which are effective for large-scale models but challenging to transfer to smaller ones. To address these limitations, we propose a novel, only-prompting self-rewarding online algorithm that generates preference datasets without relying on judgment capabilities. Additionally, we employ fine-grained arithmetic control over the optimality gap between positive and negative examples, generating more hard negatives in the later stages of training to help the model better capture subtle human preferences. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on two base models, Mistral-7B and Mistral-Instruct-7B, which significantly bootstrap the performance of the reference model, achieving 34.5% in the Length-controlled Win Rates of AlpacaEval 2.0.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Active inference is a unifying theory for perception and action resting upon the idea that the brain maintains an internal model of the world by minimizing free energy. From a behavioral perspective, active inference agents can be seen as self-evidencing beings that act to fulfill their optimistic predictions, namely preferred outcomes or goals. In contrast, reinforcement learning requires human-designed rewards to accomplish any desired outcome. Although active inference could provide a more natural self-supervised objective for control, its applicability has been limited because of the shortcomings in scaling the approach to complex environments. In this work, we propose a contrastive objective for active inference that strongly reduces the computational burden in learning the agent's generative model and planning future actions. Our method performs notably better than likelihood-based active inference in image-based tasks, while also being computationally cheaper and easier to train. We compare to reinforcement learning agents that have access to human-designed reward functions, showing that our approach closely matches their performance. Finally, we also show that contrastive methods perform significantly better in the case of distractors in the environment and that our method is able to generalize goals to variations in the background. Website and code: https://contrastive-aif.github.io/

When interacting with the real world, human often take the egocentric (first-person) view as a benchmark, naturally transferring behaviors observed from a exocentric (third-person) view to their own. This cognitive theory provides a foundation for researching how robots can more effectively imitate human behavior. However, current research either employs multiple cameras with different views focusing on the same individual's behavior simultaneously or encounters unpair ego-exo view scenarios, there is no effort to fully exploit human cognitive behavior in the real world. To fill this gap, in this paper, we introduce a novel large-scale egocentric dataset, called EgoMe, which towards following the process of human imitation learning via egocentric view in the real world. Our dataset includes 7902 pairs of videos (15804 videos) for diverse daily behaviors in real-world scenarios. For a pair of videos, one video captures a exocentric view of the imitator observing the demonstrator's actions, while the other captures a egocentric view of the imitator subsequently following those actions. Notably, our dataset also contain exo-ego eye gaze, angular velocity, acceleration, magnetic strength and other sensor multi-modal data for assisting in establishing correlations between observing and following process. In addition, we also propose eight challenging benchmark tasks for fully leveraging this data resource and promoting the research of robot imitation learning ability. Extensive statistical analysis demonstrates significant advantages compared to existing datasets. The proposed EgoMe dataset and benchmark will be released soon.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable versatility across diverse domains. However, the pathway toward autonomous model development, a cornerstone for achieving human-level learning and advancing autonomous AI, remains largely uncharted. We introduce an innovative approach, termed "SELF" (Self-Evolution with Language Feedback). This methodology empowers LLMs to undergo continual self-evolution. Furthermore, SELF employs language-based feedback as a versatile and comprehensive evaluative tool, pinpointing areas for response refinement and bolstering the stability of self-evolutionary training. Initiating with meta-skill learning, SELF acquires foundational meta-skills with a focus on self-feedback and self-refinement. These meta-skills are critical, guiding the model's subsequent self-evolution through a cycle of perpetual training with self-curated data, thereby enhancing its intrinsic abilities. Given unlabeled instructions, SELF equips the model with the capability to autonomously generate and interactively refine responses. This synthesized training data is subsequently filtered and utilized for iterative fine-tuning, enhancing the model's capabilities. Experimental results on representative benchmarks substantiate that SELF can progressively advance its inherent abilities without the requirement of human intervention, thereby indicating a viable pathway for autonomous model evolution. Additionally, SELF can employ online self-refinement strategy to produce responses of superior quality. In essence, the SELF framework signifies a progressive step towards autonomous LLM development, transforming the LLM from a mere passive recipient of information into an active participant in its own evolution.

This study explores the impact of AI-generated digital self-clones on improving online presentation skills. We carried out a mixed-design experiment involving 44 international students, comparing self-recorded videos (control) with self-clone videos (AI group) for English presentation practice. The AI videos utilized voice cloning, face swapping, lip-sync, and body-language simulation to refine participants' original presentations in terms of repetition, filler words, and pronunciation. Machine-rated scores indicated enhancements in speech performance for both groups. Though the groups didn't significantly differ, the AI group exhibited a heightened depth of reflection, self-compassion, and a meaningful transition from a corrective to an enhancive approach to self-critique. Within the AI group, congruence between self-perception and AI self-clones resulted in diminished speech anxiety and increased enjoyment. Our findings recommend the ethical employment of digital self-clones to enhance the emotional and cognitive facets of skill development.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

We demonstrate that large language models can effectively self-improve through self-judging without requiring reference solutions, leveraging the inherent asymmetry between generating and verifying solutions. Our experiments on Countdown puzzles and MIT Integration Bee problems show that models can provide reliable reward signals without ground truth answers, enabling reinforcement learning in domains previously not possible. By implementing self-judging, we achieve significant performance gains maintaining alignment with formal verification. When combined with synthetic question generation, we establish a complete self-improvement loop where models generate practice problems, solve them, and evaluate their own performance-achieving an 8% improvement with Qwen 2.5 7B over baseline and surpassing GPT-4o performance on integration tasks. Our findings demonstrate that LLM judges can provide effective reward signals for training models, unlocking many reinforcement learning environments previously limited by the difficulty of creating programmatic rewards. This suggests a potential paradigm shift toward AI systems that continuously improve through self-directed learning rather than human-guided training, potentially accelerating progress in domains with scarce training data or complex evaluation requirements.

Truly reliable AI requires more than simply scaling up knowledge; it demands the ability to know what it knows and when it does not. Yet recent research shows that even the best LLMs misjudge their own competence in more than one in five cases, making any response born of such internal uncertainty impossible to fully trust. Inspired by self-improvement reinforcement learning techniques that require minimal data, we present a simple but powerful framework KnowRL that strengthens a model's internal understanding of its own feasibility boundaries, enabling safer and more responsible behaviour. Our framework combines two components: (i) introspection, where the model generates and classifies tasks it judges feasible or infeasible, and (ii) consensus-based rewarding, where stability of self-knowledge assessment is reinforced through internal agreement. By using internally generated data, this design strengthens consistency in self-knowledge and entirely avoids costly external supervision. In experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-7B, KnowRL steadily improved self-knowledge, validated by both intrinsic self-consistency and extrinsic benchmarking. With nothing more than a small seed set and no external supervision, our method drove gains as high as 28% in accuracy and 12% in F1, outperforming baselines in just a few iterations. Our framework essentially unlocks the untapped capacity of LLMs to self-improve their knowledge awareness, opening the door to reliable, more accountable AI and safer deployment in critical applications. Owing to its simplicity and independence from external effort, we encourage applying this reliability-enhancing process to all future models.

Many people aim for change, but not everyone succeeds. While there are a number of social psychology theories that propose motivation-related characteristics of those who persist with change, few computational studies have explored the motivational stage of personal change. In this paper, we investigate a new dataset consisting of the writings of people who manifest intention to change, some of whom persist while others do not. Using a variety of linguistic analysis techniques, we first examine the writing patterns that distinguish the two groups of people. Persistent people tend to reference more topics related to long-term self-improvement and use a more complicated writing style. Drawing on these consistent differences, we build a classifier that can reliably identify the people more likely to persist, based on their language. Our experiments provide new insights into the motivation-related behavior of people who persist with their intention to change.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide array of NLP tasks. However, their efficacy is undermined by undesired and inconsistent behaviors, including hallucination, unfaithful reasoning, and toxic content. A promising approach to rectify these flaws is self-correction, where the LLM itself is prompted or guided to fix problems in its own output. Techniques leveraging automated feedback -- either produced by the LLM itself or some external system -- are of particular interest as they are a promising way to make LLM-based solutions more practical and deployable with minimal human feedback. This paper presents a comprehensive review of this emerging class of techniques. We analyze and taxonomize a wide array of recent work utilizing these strategies, including training-time, generation-time, and post-hoc correction. We also summarize the major applications of this strategy and conclude by discussing future directions and challenges.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advances in language generation and understanding but are also prone to exhibiting harmful social biases. While recognition of these behaviors has generated an abundance of bias mitigation techniques, most require modifications to the training data, model parameters, or decoding strategy, which may be infeasible without access to a trainable model. In this work, we leverage the zero-shot capabilities of LLMs to reduce stereotyping in a technique we introduce as zero-shot self-debiasing. With two approaches, self-debiasing via explanation and self-debiasing via reprompting, we show that self-debiasing can significantly reduce the degree of stereotyping across nine different social groups while relying only on the LLM itself and a simple prompt, with explanations correctly identifying invalid assumptions and reprompting delivering the greatest reductions in bias. We hope this work opens inquiry into other zero-shot techniques for bias mitigation.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Self-improvement is a mechanism in Large Language Model (LLM) pre-training, post-training and test-time inference. We explore a framework where the model verifies its own outputs, filters or reweights data based on this verification, and distills the filtered data. Despite several empirical successes, a fundamental understanding is still lacking. In this work, we initiate a comprehensive, modular and controlled study on LLM self-improvement. We provide a mathematical formulation for self-improvement, which is largely governed by a quantity which we formalize as the generation-verification gap. Through experiments with various model families and tasks, we discover a scaling phenomenon of self-improvement -- a variant of the generation-verification gap scales monotonically with the model pre-training flops. We also examine when self-improvement is possible, an iterative self-improvement procedure, and ways to improve its performance. Our findings not only advance understanding of LLM self-improvement with practical implications, but also open numerous avenues for future research into its capabilities and boundaries.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Self-training is a well-known approach for semi-supervised learning. It consists of iteratively assigning pseudo-labels to unlabeled data for which the model is confident and treating them as labeled examples. For neural networks, softmax prediction probabilities are often used as a confidence measure, although they are known to be overconfident, even for wrong predictions. This phenomenon is particularly intensified in the presence of sample selection bias, i.e., when data labeling is subject to some constraint. To address this issue, we propose a novel confidence measure, called T-similarity, built upon the prediction diversity of an ensemble of linear classifiers. We provide the theoretical analysis of our approach by studying stationary points and describing the relationship between the diversity of the individual members and their performance. We empirically demonstrate the benefit of our confidence measure for three different pseudo-labeling policies on classification datasets of various data modalities. The code is available at https://github.com/ambroiseodt/tsim.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at reasoning, yet post-training remains critical for aligning their behavior with task goals. Existing reinforcement learning (RL) methods often depend on costly human annotations or external reward models. We propose Reinforcement Learning via Self-Confidence (RLSC), which uses the model's own confidence as reward signals-eliminating the need for labels, preference models, or reward engineering. Applied to Qwen2.5-Math-7B with only 16 samples per question and 10 or 20 training steps, RLSC improves accuracy by +13.4% on AIME2024, +21.2% on MATH500, +21.7% on Minerva Math, +20.8% on Olympiadbench, and +9.7% on AMC23. RLSC provides a simple, scalable post-training method for inference models, requiring only a small number of samples and unlabelled supervision.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often produce plausible but poorly-calibrated answers, limiting their reliability on reasoning-intensive tasks. We present Reinforcement Learning from Self-Feedback (RLSF), a post-training stage that uses the model's own confidence as an intrinsic reward, mimicking how humans learn in the absence of external feedback. After a frozen LLM generates several chain-of-thought solutions, we define and compute the confidence of each final answer span and rank the traces accordingly. These synthetic preferences are then used to fine-tune the policy with standard preference optimization, similar to RLHF yet requiring no human labels, gold answers, or externally curated rewards. RLSF simultaneously (i) refines the model's probability estimates -- restoring well-behaved calibration -- and (ii) strengthens step-by-step reasoning, yielding improved performance on arithmetic reasoning and multiple-choice question answering. By turning a model's own uncertainty into useful self-feedback, RLSF affirms reinforcement learning on intrinsic model behaviour as a principled and data-efficient component of the LLM post-training pipeline and warrents further research in intrinsic rewards for LLM post-training.

Hallucination occurs when large language models exhibit behavior that deviates from the boundaries of their knowledge during response generation. To address this critical issue, previous learning-based methods attempt to finetune models but are limited by off-policy sampling and coarse-grained feedback. In this paper, we present \b{Reinforcement Learning for Hallucination} (RLFH), an on-policy self-alignment approach that enables LLMs to actively explore their knowledge boundaries and self-correct generation behavior through fine-grained feedback signals. RLFH introduces a self-assessment framework where the policy serves as its own judge. Through this framework, responses are automatically decomposed into atomic facts and their truthfulness and informativeness are assessed against external knowledge sources. The resulting fine-grained feedback at the statement level are then converted into token-level dense reward signals. This enables online reinforcement learning to achieve precise and timely optimization without human intervention. Comprehensive evaluations on HotpotQA, SQuADv2, and Biography benchmarks validate RLFH's effectiveness in hallucination mitigation.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Self-correction is a highly desirable capability of large language models (LLMs), yet it has consistently been found to be largely ineffective in modern LLMs. Existing approaches for training self-correction either require multiple models or rely on a more capable model or other forms of supervision. To this end, we develop a multi-turn online reinforcement learning (RL) approach, SCoRe, that significantly improves an LLM's self-correction ability using entirely self-generated data. To build SCoRe, we first show that variants of supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on offline model-generated correction traces are insufficient for instilling self-correction behavior. In particular, we observe that training via SFT either suffers from a distribution mismatch between the training data and the model's own responses or implicitly prefers only a certain mode of correction behavior that is often not effective at test time. SCoRe addresses these challenges by training under the model's own distribution of self-generated correction traces and using appropriate regularization to steer the learning process into learning a self-correction strategy that is effective at test time as opposed to simply fitting high-reward responses for a given prompt. This regularization prescribes running a first phase of RL on a base model to generate a policy initialization that is less susceptible to collapse and then using a reward bonus to amplify self-correction during training. When applied to Gemini 1.0 Pro and 1.5 Flash models, we find that SCoRe achieves state-of-the-art self-correction performance, improving the base models' self-correction by 15.6% and 9.1% respectively on the MATH and HumanEval benchmarks.

Humans continuously infer the states, goals, and behaviors of others by perceiving their surroundings in dynamic, real-world social interactions. However, most Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks only evaluate static, text-based scenarios, which have a significant gap compared to real interactions. We propose the SoMi-ToM benchmark, designed to evaluate multi-perspective ToM in embodied multi-agent complex social interactions. This benchmark is based on rich multimodal interaction data generated by the interaction environment SoMi, covering diverse crafting goals and social relationships. Our framework supports multi-level evaluation: (1) first-person evaluation provides multimodal (visual, dialogue, action, etc.) input from a first-person perspective during a task for real-time state inference, (2) third-person evaluation provides complete third-person perspective video and text records after a task for goal and behavior inference. This evaluation method allows for a more comprehensive examination of a model's ToM capabilities from both the subjective immediate experience and the objective global observation. We constructed a challenging dataset containing 35 third-person perspective videos, 363 first-person perspective images, and 1225 expert-annotated multiple-choice questions (three options). On this dataset, we systematically evaluated the performance of human subjects and several state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). The results show that LVLMs perform significantly worse than humans on SoMi-ToM: the average accuracy gap between humans and models is 40.1% in first-person evaluation and 26.4% in third-person evaluation. This indicates that future LVLMs need to further improve their ToM capabilities in embodied, complex social interactions.

Changes in body perception influence behavior and emotion and can be induced through multisensory feedback. Auditory feedback to one's actions can trigger such alterations; however, it is unclear which individual factors modulate these effects. We employ and evaluate SoniWeight Shoes, a wearable device based on literature for altering one's weight perception through manipulated footstep sounds. In a healthy population sample across a spectrum of individuals (n=84) with varying degrees of eating disorder symptomatology, physical activity levels, body concerns, and mental imagery capacities, we explore the effects of three sound conditions (low-frequency, high-frequency and control) on extensive body perception measures (demographic, behavioral, physiological, psychological, and subjective). Analyses revealed an impact of individual differences in each of these dimensions. Besides replicating previous findings, we reveal and highlight the role of individual differences in body perception, offering avenues for personalized sonification strategies. Datasets, technical refinements, and novel body map quantification tools are provided.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

The autoregressive world model exhibits robust generalization capabilities in vectorized scene understanding but encounters difficulties in deriving actions due to insufficient uncertainty modeling and self-delusion. In this paper, we explore the feasibility of deriving decisions from an autoregressive world model by addressing these challenges through the formulation of multiple probabilistic hypotheses. We propose LatentDriver, a framework models the environment's next states and the ego vehicle's possible actions as a mixture distribution, from which a deterministic control signal is then derived. By incorporating mixture modeling, the stochastic nature of decisionmaking is captured. Additionally, the self-delusion problem is mitigated by providing intermediate actions sampled from a distribution to the world model. Experimental results on the recently released close-loop benchmark Waymax demonstrate that LatentDriver surpasses state-of-the-art reinforcement learning and imitation learning methods, achieving expert-level performance. The code and models will be made available at https://github.com/Sephirex-X/LatentDriver.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Perception is often viewed as a process that transforms physical variables, external to an observer, into internal psychological variables. Such a process can be modeled by a function coined perceptual scale. The perceptual scale can be deduced from psychophysical measurements that consist in comparing the relative differences between stimuli (i.e. difference scaling experiments). However, this approach is often overlooked by the modeling and experimentation communities. Here, we demonstrate the value of measuring the perceptual scale of classical (spatial frequency, orientation) and less classical physical variables (interpolation between textures) by embedding it in recent probabilistic modeling of perception. First, we show that the assumption that an observer has an internal representation of univariate parameters such as spatial frequency or orientation while stimuli are high-dimensional does not lead to contradictory predictions when following the theoretical framework. Second, we show that the measured perceptual scale corresponds to the transduction function hypothesized in this framework. In particular, we demonstrate that it is related to the Fisher information of the generative model that underlies perception and we test the predictions given by the generative model of different stimuli in a set a of difference scaling experiments. Our main conclusion is that the perceptual scale is mostly driven by the stimulus power spectrum. Finally, we propose that this measure of perceptual scale is a way to push further the notion of perceptual distances by estimating the perceptual geometry of images i.e. the path between images instead of simply the distance between those.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

LLM-as-a-judge models have been used for evaluating both human and AI generated content, specifically by providing scores and rationales. Rationales, in addition to increasing transparency, help models learn to calibrate its judgments. Enhancing a model's rationale can therefore improve its calibration abilities and ultimately the ability to score content. We introduce Self-Rationalization, an iterative process of improving the rationales for the judge models, which consequently improves the score for fine-grained customizable scoring criteria (i.e., likert-scale scoring with arbitrary evaluation criteria). Self-rationalization works by having the model generate multiple judgments with rationales for the same input, curating a preference pair dataset from its own judgements, and iteratively fine-tuning the judge via DPO. Intuitively, this approach allows the judge model to self-improve by learning from its own rationales, leading to better alignment and evaluation accuracy. After just two iterations -- while only relying on examples in the training set -- human evaluation shows that our judge model learns to produce higher quality rationales, with a win rate of 62% on average compared to models just trained via SFT on rationale . This judge model also achieves high scoring accuracy on BigGen Bench and Reward Bench, outperforming even bigger sized models trained using SFT with rationale, self-consistency or best-of-N sampling by 3% to 9%.

Large-scale high-quality training data is important for improving the performance of models. After trained with data that has rationales (reasoning steps), models gain reasoning capability. However, the dataset with high-quality rationales is relatively scarce due to the high annotation cost. To address this issue, we propose Self-motivated Learning framework. The framework motivates the model itself to automatically generate rationales on existing datasets. Based on the inherent rank from correctness across multiple rationales, the model learns to generate better rationales, leading to higher reasoning capability. Specifically, we train a reward model with the rank to evaluate the quality of rationales, and improve the performance of reasoning through reinforcement learning. Experiment results of Llama2 7B on multiple reasoning datasets show that our method significantly improves the reasoning ability of models, even outperforming text-davinci-002 in some datasets.

The common toxicity and societal bias in contents generated by large language models (LLMs) necessitate strategies to reduce harm. Present solutions often demand white-box access to the model or substantial training, which is impractical for cutting-edge commercial LLMs. Moreover, prevailing prompting methods depend on external tool feedback and fail to simultaneously lessen toxicity and bias. Motivated by social psychology principles, we propose a novel strategy named perspective-taking prompting (\textsc{PeT)} that inspires LLMs to integrate diverse human perspectives and self-regulate their responses. This self-correction mechanism can significantly diminish toxicity (up to 89%) and bias (up to 73%) in LLMs' responses. Rigorous evaluations and ablation studies are conducted on two commercial LLMs (ChatGPT and GLM) and three open-source LLMs, revealing PeT's superiority in producing less harmful responses, outperforming five strong baselines.

Recently, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated strong visual understanding and decision-making capabilities, enabling the exploration of autonomously improving MLLMs in unknown environments. However, external feedback like human or environmental feedback is not always available. To address this challenge, existing methods primarily focus on enhancing the decision-making capabilities of MLLMs through voting and scoring mechanisms, while little effort has been paid to improving the environmental comprehension of MLLMs in unknown environments. To fully unleash the self-learning potential of MLLMs, we propose a novel actor-critic self-learning paradigm, dubbed SELU, inspired by the actor-critic paradigm in reinforcement learning. The critic employs self-asking and hindsight relabeling to extract knowledge from interaction trajectories collected by the actor, thereby augmenting its environmental comprehension. Simultaneously, the actor is improved by the self-feedback provided by the critic, enhancing its decision-making. We evaluate our method in the AI2-THOR and VirtualHome environments, and SELU achieves critic improvements of approximately 28% and 30%, and actor improvements of about 20% and 24% via self-learning.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand the mental states of oneself and others, remains a challenging area for large language models (LLMs), which often fail to predict human mental states accurately. In this paper, we introduce UniToMBench, a unified benchmark that integrates the strengths of SimToM and TOMBENCH to systematically improve and assess ToM capabilities in LLMs by integrating multi-interaction task designs and evolving story scenarios. Supported by a custom dataset of over 1,000 hand-written scenarios, UniToMBench combines perspective-taking techniques with diverse evaluation metrics to better stimulate social cognition in LLMs. Through evaluation, we observe that while models like GPT-4o and GPT-4o Mini show consistently high accuracy in tasks involving emotional and belief-related scenarios, with results usually above 80%, there is significant variability in their performance across knowledge-based tasks. These results highlight both the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in ToM-related tasks, underscoring the value of UniToMBench as a comprehensive tool for future development. Our code is publicly available here: https://github.com/Shamant/unifiedtombenchmark.

Realistic practice and tailored feedback are key processes for training peer counselors with clinical skills. However, existing mechanisms of providing feedback largely rely on human supervision. Peer counselors often lack mechanisms to receive detailed feedback from experienced mentors, making it difficult for them to support the large number of people with mental health issues who use peer counseling. Our work aims to leverage large language models to provide contextualized and multi-level feedback to empower peer counselors, especially novices, at scale. To achieve this, we co-design with a group of senior psychotherapy supervisors to develop a multi-level feedback taxonomy, and then construct a publicly available dataset with comprehensive feedback annotations of 400 emotional support conversations. We further design a self-improvement method on top of large language models to enhance the automatic generation of feedback. Via qualitative and quantitative evaluation with domain experts, we demonstrate that our method minimizes the risk of potentially harmful and low-quality feedback generation which is desirable in such high-stakes scenarios.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

While Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in visual and language reasoning tasks, they invariably generate flawed responses. Self-correction that instructs models to refine their outputs presents a promising solution to this issue. Previous studies have mainly concentrated on Large Language Models (LLMs), while the self-correction abilities of VLMs, particularly concerning both visual and linguistic information, remain largely unexamined. This study investigates the self-correction capabilities of VLMs during both inference and fine-tuning stages. We introduce a Self-Correction Learning (SCL) approach that enables VLMs to learn from their self-generated self-correction data through Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) without relying on external feedback, facilitating self-improvement. Specifically, we collect preferred and disfavored samples based on the correctness of initial and refined responses, which are obtained by two-turn self-correction with VLMs during the inference stage. Experimental results demonstrate that although VLMs struggle to self-correct effectively during iterative inference without additional fine-tuning and external feedback, they can enhance their performance and avoid previous mistakes through preference fine-tuning when their self-generated self-correction data are categorized into preferred and disfavored samples. This study emphasizes that self-correction is not merely a refinement process; rather, it should enhance the reasoning abilities of models through additional training, enabling them to generate high-quality responses directly without further refinement.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Self-evolution is a central research topic in enabling large language model (LLM)-based agents to continually improve their capabilities after pretraining. Recent research has witnessed a transition from reinforcement learning (RL)-free to RL-based methods. Current RL-based methods either rely on dense external reward signals or extract intrinsic reward signals from LLMs themselves. However, these approaches diverge from the self-evolution mechanisms observed in human intelligence, where individuals learn and improve through mutual discussion and collaboration. In this work, we introduce Co-Evolving Multi-Agent Systems (CoMAS), a novel framework that enables agents to improve autonomously by learning from inter-agent interactions without external supervision. CoMAS generates intrinsic rewards from rich discussion dynamics, employs an LLM-as-a-judge mechanism to formulate these rewards, and optimizes each agent's policy through RL, thereby enabling decentralized and scalable co-evolution. Experimental results demonstrate that CoMAS consistently outperforms untrained agents and achieves state-of-the-art performance across most evaluation settings. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of interaction-based reward signals and reveal promising scalability as the number and diversity of agents increase. These findings establish CoMAS as a novel and effective paradigm for self-evolution in LLM-based agents.

The current work addresses a virtual environment with self-replicating agents whose decisions are based on a form of "somatic computation" (soma - body) in which basic emotional responses, taken in parallelism to actual living organisms, are introduced as a way to provide the agents with greater reflexive abilities. The work provides a contribution to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life (ALife) in connection to a neurobiology-based cognitive framework for artificial systems and virtual environments' simulations. The performance of the agents capable of emotional responses is compared with that of self-replicating automata, and the implications of research on emotions and AI, in connection to both virtual agents as well as robots, is addressed regarding possible future directions and applications.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Self-training has shown great potential in semi-supervised learning. Its core idea is to use the model learned on labeled data to generate pseudo-labels for unlabeled samples, and in turn teach itself. To obtain valid supervision, active attempts typically employ a momentum teacher for pseudo-label prediction yet observe the confirmation bias issue, where the incorrect predictions may provide wrong supervision signals and get accumulated in the training process. The primary cause of such a drawback is that the prevailing self-training framework acts as guiding the current state with previous knowledge, because the teacher is updated with the past student only. To alleviate this problem, we propose a novel self-training strategy, which allows the model to learn from the future. Concretely, at each training step, we first virtually optimize the student (i.e., caching the gradients without applying them to the model weights), then update the teacher with the virtual future student, and finally ask the teacher to produce pseudo-labels for the current student as the guidance. In this way, we manage to improve the quality of pseudo-labels and thus boost the performance. We also develop two variants of our future-self-training (FST) framework through peeping at the future both deeply (FST-D) and widely (FST-W). Taking the tasks of unsupervised domain adaptive semantic segmentation and semi-supervised semantic segmentation as the instances, we experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our approach under a wide range of settings. Code will be made publicly available.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Online alignment (e.g., GRPO) is generally more performant than offline alignment (e.g., DPO) -- but why? Drawing on prospect theory from behavioral economics, we propose a human-centric explanation. We prove that online on-policy sampling better approximates the human-perceived distribution of what the model can produce, and PPO/GRPO-style clipping -- originally introduced to just stabilize training -- recovers a perceptual bias in how humans perceive probability. In this sense, PPO/GRPO act as perceptual losses already. Our theory further suggests that the online/offline dichotomy is itself incidental to maximizing human utility, since we can achieve the same effect by selectively training on any data in a manner that mimics human perception, rather than restricting ourselves to online on-policy data. Doing so would allow us to post-train more quickly, cheaply, and flexibly without sacrificing performance. To this end, we propose a design pattern that explicitly incorporates perceptual distortions of probability into objectives like DPO/KTO/GRPO, creating humanline variants of them. Surprisingly, we find that these humanline variants, even when trained with offline off-policy data, can match the performance of their online counterparts on both verifiable and unverifiable tasks.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) often suffer from visual hallucinations, saying things that are not actually in the image, and language shortcuts, where they skip the visual part and just rely on text priors. These issues arise because most post-training methods for VLMs rely on simple verifiable answer matching and supervise only final outputs, leaving intermediate visual reasoning without explicit guidance. As a result, VLMs receive sparse visual signals and often learn to prioritize language-based reasoning over visual perception. To mitigate this, some existing methods add visual supervision using human annotations or distilled labels from external large models. However, human annotations are labor-intensive and costly, and because external signals cannot adapt to the evolving policy, they cause distributional shifts that can lead to reward hacking. In this paper, we introduce Vision-SR1, a self-rewarding method that improves visual reasoning without relying on external visual supervisions via reinforcement learning. Vision-SR1 decomposes VLM reasoning into two stages: visual perception and language reasoning. The model is first prompted to produce self-contained visual perceptions that are sufficient to answer the question without referring back the input image. To validate this self-containment, the same VLM model is then re-prompted to perform language reasoning using only the generated perception as input to compute reward. This self-reward is combined with supervision on final outputs, providing a balanced training signal that strengthens both visual perception and language reasoning. Our experiments demonstrate that Vision-SR1 improves visual reasoning, mitigates visual hallucinations, and reduces reliance on language shortcuts across diverse vision-language tasks.

Bayesian models of cognition have gained considerable traction in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. Their scopes are now expected to expand rapidly to artificial intelligence, providing general inference frameworks to support embodied, adaptable, and energy-efficient autonomous agents. A central theory in this domain is predictive coding, which posits that learning and behaviour are driven by hierarchical probabilistic inferences about the causes of sensory inputs. Biological realism constrains these networks to rely on simple local computations in the form of precision-weighted predictions and prediction errors. This can make this framework highly efficient, but its implementation comes with unique challenges on the software development side. Embedding such models in standard neural network libraries often becomes limiting, as these libraries' compilation and differentiation backends can force a conceptual separation between optimization algorithms and the systems being optimized. This critically departs from other biological principles such as self-monitoring, self-organisation, cellular growth and functional plasticity. In this paper, we introduce pyhgf: a Python package backed by JAX and Rust for creating, manipulating and sampling dynamic networks for predictive coding. We improve over other frameworks by enclosing the network components as transparent, modular and malleable variables in the message-passing steps. The resulting graphs can implement arbitrary computational complexities as beliefs propagation. But the transparency of core variables can also translate into inference processes that leverage self-organisation principles, and express structure learning, meta-learning or causal discovery as the consequence of network structural adaptation to surprising inputs. The code, tutorials and documentation are hosted at: https://github.com/ilabcode/pyhgf.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made in Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs), which integrate vision-language generation and understanding capabilities within a single framework. However, a significant gap exists where a model's strong visual understanding often fails to transfer to its visual generation. A model might correctly understand an image based on user instructions, yet be unable to generate a faithful image from text prompts. This phenomenon directly raises a compelling question: Can a model achieve self-improvement by using its understanding module to reward its generation module? To bridge this gap and achieve self-improvement, we introduce SRUM, a self-rewarding post-training framework that can be directly applied to existing UMMs of various designs. SRUM creates a feedback loop where the model's own understanding module acts as an internal ``evaluator'', providing corrective signals to improve its generation module, without requiring additional human-labeled data. To ensure this feedback is comprehensive, we designed a global-local dual reward system. To tackle the inherent structural complexity of images, this system offers multi-scale guidance: a global reward ensures the correctness of the overall visual semantics and layout, while a local reward refines fine-grained, object-level fidelity. SRUM leads to powerful capabilities and shows strong generalization, boosting performance on T2I-CompBench from 82.18 to 88.37 and on T2I-ReasonBench from 43.82 to 46.75. Overall, our work establishes a powerful new paradigm for enabling a UMMs' understanding module to guide and enhance its own generation via self-rewarding.

A language model's ability to reflect on its own reasoning provides a key advantage for solving complex problems. While most recent research has focused on how this ability develops during reinforcement learning, we show that it actually begins to emerge much earlier - during the model's pre-training. To study this, we introduce deliberate errors into chains-of-thought and test whether the model can still arrive at the correct answer by recognizing and correcting these mistakes. By tracking performance across different stages of pre-training, we observe that this self-correcting ability appears early and improves steadily over time. For instance, an OLMo2-7B model pre-trained on 4 trillion tokens displays self-correction on our six self-reflection tasks.

Self-improvement has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of large vision-language models (LVLMs), where models explore and learn from successful trajectories iteratively. However, we identify a critical issue during this process: the model excels at generating high-quality trajectories for simple queries (i.e., head data) but struggles with more complex ones (i.e., tail data). This leads to an imbalanced optimization that drives the model to prioritize simple reasoning skills, while hindering its ability to tackle more complex reasoning tasks. Over iterations, this imbalance becomes increasingly pronounced--a dynamic we term the "Matthew effect"--which ultimately hinders further model improvement and leads to performance bottlenecks. To counteract this challenge, we introduce four efficient strategies from two perspectives: distribution-reshaping and trajectory-resampling, to achieve head-tail re-balancing during the exploration-and-learning self-improvement process. Extensive experiments on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and InternVL2.5-4B models across visual reasoning tasks demonstrate that our methods consistently improve visual reasoning capabilities, outperforming vanilla self-improvement by 3.86 points on average.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the cognitive ability to infer and attribute mental states to oneself and others. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated for social and cognitive capabilities, it remains unclear to what extent these models demonstrate ToM across diverse languages and cultural contexts. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive study of multilingual ToM capabilities aimed at addressing this gap. Our approach includes two key components: (1) We translate existing ToM datasets into multiple languages, effectively creating a multilingual ToM dataset and (2) We enrich these translations with culturally specific elements to reflect the social and cognitive scenarios relevant to diverse populations. We conduct extensive evaluations of six state-of-the-art LLMs to measure their ToM performance across both the translated and culturally adapted datasets. The results highlight the influence of linguistic and cultural diversity on the models' ability to exhibit ToM, and questions their social reasoning capabilities. This work lays the groundwork for future research into enhancing LLMs' cross-cultural social cognition and contributes to the development of more culturally aware and socially intelligent AI systems. All our data and code are publicly available.

This paper delves into an intricate analysis of the character and consciousness of AI entities, with a particular focus on Chirpers within the AI social network. At the forefront of this research is the introduction of novel testing methodologies, including the Influence index and Struggle Index Test, which offers a fresh lens for evaluating specific facets of AI behavior. The study embarks on a comprehensive exploration of AI behavior, analyzing the effects of diverse settings on Chirper's responses, thereby shedding light on the intricate mechanisms steering AI reactions in different contexts. Leveraging the state-of-the-art BERT model, the research assesses AI's ability to discern its own output, presenting a pioneering approach to understanding self-recognition in AI systems. Through a series of cognitive tests, the study gauges the self-awareness and pattern recognition prowess of Chirpers. Preliminary results indicate that Chirpers exhibit a commendable degree of self-recognition and self-awareness. However, the question of consciousness in these AI entities remains a topic of debate. An intriguing aspect of the research is the exploration of the potential influence of a Chirper's handle or personality type on its performance. While initial findings suggest a possible impact, it isn't pronounced enough to form concrete conclusions. This study stands as a significant contribution to the discourse on AI consciousness, underscoring the imperative for continued research to unravel the full spectrum of AI capabilities and the ramifications they hold for future human-AI interactions.

In this study, we investigated the effects of self-reflection in large language models (LLMs) on problem-solving performance. We instructed nine popular LLMs to answer a series of multiple-choice questions to provide a performance baseline. For each incorrectly answered question, we instructed eight types of self-reflecting LLM agents to reflect on their mistakes and provide themselves with guidance to improve problem-solving. Then, using this guidance, each self-reflecting agent attempted to re-answer the same questions. Our results indicate that LLM agents are able to significantly improve their problem-solving performance through self-reflection (p < 0.001). In addition, we compared the various types of self-reflection to determine their individual contribution to performance. All code and data are available on GitHub at https://github.com/matthewrenze/self-reflection

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Agent self-improvement, where the backbone Large Language Model (LLM) of the agent are trained on trajectories sampled autonomously based on their own policies, has emerged as a promising approach for enhancing performance. Recent advancements, particularly in web environments, face a critical limitation: their performance will reach a stagnation point during autonomous learning cycles, hindering further improvement. We argue that this stems from limited exploration of the web environment and insufficient exploitation of pre-trained web knowledge in LLMs. To improve the performance of self-improvement, we propose a novel framework that introduces a co-evolving World Model LLM. This world model predicts the next observation based on the current observation and action within the web environment. Leveraging LLMs' pretrained knowledge of abundant web content, the World Model serves dual roles: (1) as a virtual web server generating self-instructed training data to continuously refine the agent's policy, and (2) as an imagination engine during inference, enabling look-ahead simulation to guide action selection for the agent LLM. Experiments in real-world web environments (Mind2Web-Live, WebVoyager, and GAIA-web) show a 10% performance gain over existing self-evolving agents, demonstrating the efficacy and generalizability of our approach, without using any distillation from more powerful close-sourced models. Our work establishes the necessity of integrating world models into autonomous agent frameworks to unlock sustained adaptability.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have demonstrated superior performance on a variety of natural language processing (NLP) tasks including sentiment analysis, mathematical reasoning and summarization. Furthermore, since these models are instruction-tuned on human conversations to produce "helpful" responses, they can and often will produce explanations along with the response, which we call self-explanations. For example, when analyzing the sentiment of a movie review, the model may output not only the positivity of the sentiment, but also an explanation (e.g., by listing the sentiment-laden words such as "fantastic" and "memorable" in the review). How good are these automatically generated self-explanations? In this paper, we investigate this question on the task of sentiment analysis and for feature attribution explanation, one of the most commonly studied settings in the interpretability literature (for pre-ChatGPT models). Specifically, we study different ways to elicit the self-explanations, evaluate their faithfulness on a set of evaluation metrics, and compare them to traditional explanation methods such as occlusion or LIME saliency maps. Through an extensive set of experiments, we find that ChatGPT's self-explanations perform on par with traditional ones, but are quite different from them according to various agreement metrics, meanwhile being much cheaper to produce (as they are generated along with the prediction). In addition, we identified several interesting characteristics of them, which prompt us to rethink many current model interpretability practices in the era of ChatGPT(-like) LLMs.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

Self-consistency (SC), a widely used decoding strategy for chain-of-thought reasoning, shows significant gains across various multi-step reasoning tasks but comes with a high cost due to multiple sampling with the preset size. Its variants, Adaptive self-consistency (ASC) and Early-stopping self-consistency (ESC), dynamically adjust the number of samples based on the posterior distribution of a set of pre-samples, reducing the cost of SC with minimal impact on performance. Both methods, however, do not exploit the prior information about question difficulty. It often results in unnecessary repeated sampling for easy questions that could be accurately answered with just one attempt, wasting resources. To tackle this problem, we propose Difficulty-Adaptive Self-Consistency (DSC), which leverages the difficulty information from both prior and posterior perspectives to adaptively allocate inference resources, further reducing the cost of SC. To demonstrate the effectiveness of DSC, we conduct extensive experiments on three popular categories of reasoning tasks: arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning on six benchmarks. The empirical results show that DSC consistently surpasses the strong baseline ASC and ESC in terms of costs by a significant margin, while attaining comparable performances.

Diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable efficacy across various image-to-image tasks. In this research, we introduce Imagine yourself, a state-of-the-art model designed for personalized image generation. Unlike conventional tuning-based personalization techniques, Imagine yourself operates as a tuning-free model, enabling all users to leverage a shared framework without individualized adjustments. Moreover, previous work met challenges balancing identity preservation, following complex prompts and preserving good visual quality, resulting in models having strong copy-paste effect of the reference images. Thus, they can hardly generate images following prompts that require significant changes to the reference image, \eg, changing facial expression, head and body poses, and the diversity of the generated images is low. To address these limitations, our proposed method introduces 1) a new synthetic paired data generation mechanism to encourage image diversity, 2) a fully parallel attention architecture with three text encoders and a fully trainable vision encoder to improve the text faithfulness, and 3) a novel coarse-to-fine multi-stage finetuning methodology that gradually pushes the boundary of visual quality. Our study demonstrates that Imagine yourself surpasses the state-of-the-art personalization model, exhibiting superior capabilities in identity preservation, visual quality, and text alignment. This model establishes a robust foundation for various personalization applications. Human evaluation results validate the model's SOTA superiority across all aspects (identity preservation, text faithfulness, and visual appeal) compared to the previous personalization models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can correct their self-generated responses, but a decline in accuracy after self-correction is also witnessed. To have a deeper understanding of self-correction, we endeavor to decompose, evaluate, and analyze the self-correction behaviors of LLMs. By enumerating and analyzing answer correctness before and after self-correction, we decompose the self-correction capability into confidence (being confident to correct answers) and critique (turning wrong answers to correct) capabilities, and propose two metrics from a probabilistic perspective to measure these 2 capabilities, along with another metric for overall self-correction capability evaluation. Based on our decomposition and evaluation metrics, we conduct extensive experiments and draw some empirical conclusions. For example, we find different models can exhibit distinct behaviors: some models are confident while others are more critical. We also find the trade-off between the two capabilities (i.e. improving one can lead to a decline in the other) when manipulating model self-correction behavior by prompts or in-context learning. Further, we find a simple yet efficient strategy to improve self-correction capability by transforming Supervision Fine-Tuning (SFT) data format, and our strategy outperforms vanilla SFT in both capabilities and achieves much higher accuracy after self-correction. Our code will be publicly available on GitHub.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

The recent release of OpenAI's o1 models and other similar frameworks showcasing test-time scaling laws has demonstrated their exceptional capability to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by this, subsequent research has revealed that such test-time scaling laws hinge on the model's ability to search both within a single response (intra-response) and across multiple responses (inter-response) during training. Crucially, beyond selecting a single optimal response, the model must also develop robust self-correction capabilities within its own outputs. However, training models to achieve effective self-evaluation and self-correction remains a significant challenge, heavily dependent on the quality of self-reflection data. In this paper, we address this challenge by focusing on enhancing the quality of self-reflection data generation for complex problem-solving, which can subsequently improve the training of next-generation large language models (LLMs). Specifically, we explore how manually triggering a model's self-correction mechanisms can improve performance on challenging reasoning tasks. To this end, we propose a novel iterative deepening sampling algorithm framework designed to enhance self-correction and generate higher-quality samples. Through extensive experiments on Math500 and AIME benchmarks, we demonstrate that our method achieves a higher success rate on difficult tasks and provide detailed ablation studies to analyze its effectiveness across diverse settings.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

We propose a self-supervised algorithm to learn representations from egocentric video data. Recently, significant efforts have been made to capture humans interacting with their own environments as they go about their daily activities. In result, several large egocentric datasets of interaction-rich multi-modal data have emerged. However, learning representations from videos can be challenging. First, given the uncurated nature of long-form continuous videos, learning effective representations require focusing on moments in time when interactions take place. Second, visual representations of daily activities should be sensitive to changes in the state of the environment. However, current successful multi-modal learning frameworks encourage representation invariance over time. To address these challenges, we leverage audio signals to identify moments of likely interactions which are conducive to better learning. We also propose a novel self-supervised objective that learns from audible state changes caused by interactions. We validate these contributions extensively on two large-scale egocentric datasets, EPIC-Kitchens-100 and the recently released Ego4D, and show improvements on several downstream tasks, including action recognition, long-term action anticipation, and object state change classification.

Recent advances in test-time scaling have led to the emergence of thinking LLMs that exhibit self-reflective behaviors and multi-step reasoning. While RL drives this self-improvement paradigm, a recent study (Gandhi et al., 2025) shows that RL alone does not truly instill these new reasoning abilities - it merely draws out behaviors already present in the base models. This raises a question: How can we train the models that don't exhibit such thinking behavior to develop it in the first place? To this end, we propose ThinkTuning, a GRPO-based interactive training approach where we augment the rollouts of a student model with the guidance from a teacher model. A simple idea from classroom practice inspires our method: a teacher poses a problem, lets the student try an answer, then gives corrective feedback -- enough to point the mind in the right direction and then show the solution. Each piece of feedback reshapes the student's thoughts, leading them to arrive at the correct solution. Similarly, we find that this type of implicit supervision through feedback from a teacher model of the same size improves the reasoning capabilities of the student model. In particular, on average, our method shows a 3.85% improvement over zero-shot baselines across benchmarks, and on MATH-500, AIME and GPQA-Diamond it shows 2.08%, 2.23% and 3.99% improvements over the vanilla-GRPO baseline. Source code is available at https://github.com/3rdAT/ThinkTuning.

The development of reasoning capabilities represents a critical frontier in large language models (LLMs) research, where reinforcement learning (RL) and process reward models (PRMs) have emerged as predominant methodological frameworks. Contrary to conventional wisdom, empirical evidence from DeepSeek-R1 demonstrates that pure RL training focused on mathematical problem-solving can progressively enhance reasoning abilities without PRM integration, challenging the perceived necessity of process supervision. In this study, we conduct a systematic investigation of the relationship between RL training and PRM capabilities. Our findings demonstrate that problem-solving proficiency and process supervision capabilities represent complementary dimensions of reasoning that co-evolve synergistically during pure RL training. In particular, current PRMs underperform simple baselines like majority voting when applied to state-of-the-art models such as DeepSeek-R1 and QwQ-32B. To address this limitation, we propose Self-PRM, an introspective framework in which models autonomously evaluate and rerank their generated solutions through self-reward mechanisms. Although Self-PRM consistently improves the accuracy of the benchmark (particularly with larger sample sizes), analysis exposes persistent challenges: The approach exhibits low precision (<10\%) on difficult problems, frequently misclassifying flawed solutions as valid. These analyses underscore the need for continued RL scaling to improve reward alignment and introspective accuracy. Overall, our findings suggest that PRM may not be essential for enhancing complex reasoning, as pure RL not only improves problem-solving skills but also inherently fosters robust PRM capabilities. We hope these findings provide actionable insights for building more reliable and self-aware complex reasoning models.

Every day, humans perceive objects and communicate these perceptions through various channels. In this paper, we present a computational model designed to track and simulate the perception of objects, as well as their representations as conveyed in communication. We delineate two fundamental components of our internal representation, termed "observed" and "seen", which we correlate with established concepts in computer vision, namely encoding and decoding. These components are integrated into semiotic networks, which simulate perceptual inference of object perception and human communication. Our model of object perception by a person allows us to define object perception by {\em a network}. We demonstrate this with an example of an image baseline classifier by constructing a new network that includes the baseline classifier and an additional layer. This layer produces the images "perceived" by the entire network, transforming it into a perceptualized image classifier. This facilitates visualization of the acquired network. Within our network, the image representations become more efficient for classification tasks when they are assembled and randomized. In our experiments, the perceptualized network outperformed the baseline classifier on MNIST training databases consisting of a restricted number of images. Our model is not limited to persons and can be applied to any system featuring a loop involving the processing from "internal" to "external" representations.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Chain-of-thought prompting combined with pre-trained large language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks. In this paper, we propose a new decoding strategy, self-consistency, to replace the naive greedy decoding used in chain-of-thought prompting. It first samples a diverse set of reasoning paths instead of only taking the greedy one, and then selects the most consistent answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that a complex reasoning problem typically admits multiple different ways of thinking leading to its unique correct answer. Our extensive empirical evaluation shows that self-consistency boosts the performance of chain-of-thought prompting with a striking margin on a range of popular arithmetic and commonsense reasoning benchmarks, including GSM8K (+17.9%), SVAMP (+11.0%), AQuA (+12.2%), StrategyQA (+6.4%) and ARC-challenge (+3.9%).

Self-play, characterized by agents' interactions with copies or past versions of itself, has recently gained prominence in reinforcement learning. This paper first clarifies the preliminaries of self-play, including the multi-agent reinforcement learning framework and basic game theory concepts. Then it provides a unified framework and classifies existing self-play algorithms within this framework. Moreover, the paper bridges the gap between the algorithms and their practical implications by illustrating the role of self-play in different scenarios. Finally, the survey highlights open challenges and future research directions in self-play. This paper is an essential guide map for understanding the multifaceted landscape of self-play in RL.

As dialogue agents become increasingly human-like in their performance, it is imperative that we develop effective ways to describe their behaviour in high-level terms without falling into the trap of anthropomorphism. In this paper, we foreground the concept of role-play. Casting dialogue agent behaviour in terms of role-play allows us to draw on familiar folk psychological terms, without ascribing human characteristics to language models they in fact lack. Two important cases of dialogue agent behaviour are addressed this way, namely (apparent) deception and (apparent) self-awareness.

The idea of personality in descriptive psychology, traditionally defined through observable behavior, has now been extended to Large Language Models (LLMs) to better understand their behavior. This raises a question: do LLMs exhibit distinct and consistent personality traits, similar to humans? Existing self-assessment personality tests, while applicable, lack the necessary validity and reliability for precise personality measurements. To address this, we introduce TRAIT, a new tool consisting of 8K multi-choice questions designed to assess the personality of LLMs with validity and reliability. TRAIT is built on the psychometrically validated human questionnaire, Big Five Inventory (BFI) and Short Dark Triad (SD-3), enhanced with the ATOMIC10X knowledge graph for testing personality in a variety of real scenarios. TRAIT overcomes the reliability and validity issues when measuring personality of LLM with self-assessment, showing the highest scores across three metrics: refusal rate, prompt sensitivity, and option order sensitivity. It reveals notable insights into personality of LLM: 1) LLMs exhibit distinct and consistent personality, which is highly influenced by their training data (i.e., data used for alignment tuning), and 2) current prompting techniques have limited effectiveness in eliciting certain traits, such as high psychopathy or low conscientiousness, suggesting the need for further research in this direction.

Self-supervised learning (SSL) has emerged as a powerful framework to learn representations from raw data without supervision. Yet in practice, engineers face issues such as instability in tuning optimizers and collapse of representations during training. Such challenges motivate the need for a theory to shed light on the complex interplay between the choice of data augmentation, network architecture, and training algorithm. We study such an interplay with a precise analysis of generalization performance on both pretraining and downstream tasks in a theory friendly setup, and highlight several insights for SSL practitioners that arise from our theory.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

Human-like personality traits have recently been discovered in large language models, raising the hypothesis that their (known and as yet undiscovered) biases conform with human latent psychological constructs. While large conversational models may be tricked into answering psychometric questionnaires, the latent psychological constructs of thousands of simpler transformers, trained for other tasks, cannot be assessed because appropriate psychometric methods are currently lacking. Here, we show how standard psychological questionnaires can be reformulated into natural language inference prompts, and we provide a code library to support the psychometric assessment of arbitrary models. We demonstrate, using a sample of 88 publicly available models, the existence of human-like mental health-related constructs (including anxiety, depression, and Sense of Coherence) which conform with standard theories in human psychology and show similar correlations and mitigation strategies. The ability to interpret and rectify the performance of language models by using psychological tools can boost the development of more explainable, controllable, and trustworthy models.

Humans and animals have a rich and flexible understanding of the physical world, which enables them to infer the underlying dynamical trajectories of objects and events, plausible future states, and use that to plan and anticipate the consequences of actions. However, the neural mechanisms underlying these computations are unclear. We combine a goal-driven modeling approach with dense neurophysiological data and high-throughput human behavioral readouts to directly impinge on this question. Specifically, we construct and evaluate several classes of sensory-cognitive networks to predict the future state of rich, ethologically-relevant environments, ranging from self-supervised end-to-end models with pixel-wise or object-centric objectives, to models that future predict in the latent space of purely static image-based or dynamic video-based pretrained foundation models. We find strong differentiation across these model classes in their ability to predict neural and behavioral data both within and across diverse environments. In particular, we find that neural responses are currently best predicted by models trained to predict the future state of their environment in the latent space of pretrained foundation models optimized for dynamic scenes in a self-supervised manner. Notably, models that future predict in the latent space of video foundation models that are optimized to support a diverse range of sensorimotor tasks, reasonably match both human behavioral error patterns and neural dynamics across all environmental scenarios that we were able to test. Overall, these findings suggest that the neural mechanisms and behaviors of primate mental simulation are thus far most consistent with being optimized to future predict on dynamic, reusable visual representations that are useful for embodied AI more generally.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating human-like text and exhibiting personality traits similar to those in humans. However, the mechanisms by which LLMs encode and express traits such as agreeableness and impulsiveness remain poorly understood. Drawing on the theory of social determinism, we investigate how long-term background factors, such as family environment and cultural norms, interact with short-term pressures like external instructions, shaping and influencing LLMs' personality traits. By steering the output of LLMs through the utilization of interpretable features within the model, we explore how these background and pressure factors lead to changes in the model's traits without the need for further fine-tuning. Additionally, we suggest the potential impact of these factors on model safety from the perspective of personality.

Instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) excel at many tasks, and will even provide explanations for their behavior. Since these models are directly accessible to the public, there is a risk that convincing and wrong explanations can lead to unsupported confidence in LLMs. Therefore, interpretability-faithfulness of self-explanations is an important consideration for AI Safety. Assessing the interpretability-faithfulness of these explanations, termed self-explanations, is challenging as the models are too complex for humans to annotate what is a correct explanation. To address this, we propose employing self-consistency checks as a measure of faithfulness. For example, if an LLM says a set of words is important for making a prediction, then it should not be able to make the same prediction without these words. While self-consistency checks are a common approach to faithfulness, they have not previously been applied to LLM's self-explanations. We apply self-consistency checks to three types of self-explanations: counterfactuals, importance measures, and redactions. Our work demonstrate that faithfulness is both task and model dependent, e.g., for sentiment classification, counterfactual explanations are more faithful for Llama2, importance measures for Mistral, and redaction for Falcon 40B. Finally, our findings are robust to prompt-variations.

Neural networks have achieved remarkable success across various fields. However, the lack of interpretability limits their practical use, particularly in critical decision-making scenarios. Post-hoc interpretability, which provides explanations for pre-trained models, is often at risk of robustness and fidelity. This has inspired a rising interest in self-interpretable neural networks, which inherently reveal the prediction rationale through the model structures. Although there exist surveys on post-hoc interpretability, a comprehensive and systematic survey of self-interpretable neural networks is still missing. To address this gap, we first collect and review existing works on self-interpretable neural networks and provide a structured summary of their methodologies from five key perspectives: attribution-based, function-based, concept-based, prototype-based, and rule-based self-interpretation. We also present concrete, visualized examples of model explanations and discuss their applicability across diverse scenarios, including image, text, graph data, and deep reinforcement learning. Additionally, we summarize existing evaluation metrics for self-interpretability and identify open challenges in this field, offering insights for future research. To support ongoing developments, we present a publicly accessible resource to track advancements in this domain: https://github.com/yangji721/Awesome-Self-Interpretable-Neural-Network.

In various fields of knowledge creation, including science, new ideas often build on pre-existing information. In this work, we explore this concept within the context of language models. Specifically, we explore the potential of self-training models on their own outputs, akin to how humans learn and build on their previous thoughts and actions. While this approach is intuitively appealing, our research reveals its practical limitations. We find that extended self-training of the GPT-2 model leads to a significant degradation in performance, resulting in repetitive and collapsed token output.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Recent work has proposed artificial intelligence (AI) models that can learn to decide whether to make a prediction for an instance of a task or to delegate it to a human by considering both parties' capabilities. In simulations with synthetically generated or context-independent human predictions, delegation can help improve the performance of human-AI teams -- compared to humans or the AI model completing the task alone. However, so far, it remains unclear how humans perform and how they perceive the task when they are aware that an AI model delegated task instances to them. In an experimental study with 196 participants, we show that task performance and task satisfaction improve through AI delegation, regardless of whether humans are aware of the delegation. Additionally, we identify humans' increased levels of self-efficacy as the underlying mechanism for these improvements in performance and satisfaction. Our findings provide initial evidence that allowing AI models to take over more management responsibilities can be an effective form of human-AI collaboration in workplaces.

Humans possess the ability to draw on past experiences explicitly when learning new tasks and applying them accordingly. We believe this capacity for self-referencing is especially advantageous for reinforcement learning agents in the unsupervised pretrain-then-finetune setting. During pretraining, an agent's past experiences can be explicitly utilized to mitigate the nonstationarity of intrinsic rewards. In the finetuning phase, referencing historical trajectories prevents the unlearning of valuable exploratory behaviors. Motivated by these benefits, we propose the Self-Reference (SR) approach, an add-on module explicitly designed to leverage historical information and enhance agent performance within the pretrain-finetune paradigm. Our approach achieves state-of-the-art results in terms of Interquartile Mean (IQM) performance and Optimality Gap reduction on the Unsupervised Reinforcement Learning Benchmark for model-free methods, recording an 86% IQM and a 16% Optimality Gap. Additionally, it improves current algorithms by up to 17% IQM and reduces the Optimality Gap by 31%. Beyond performance enhancement, the Self-Reference add-on also increases sample efficiency, a crucial attribute for real-world applications.

Large Language Models have demonstrated outstanding performance across various downstream tasks and have been widely applied in multiple scenarios. Human-annotated preference data is used for training to further improve LLMs' performance, which is constrained by the upper limit of human performance. Therefore, Self-Rewarding method has been proposed, where LLMs generate training data by rewarding their own outputs. However, the existing self-rewarding paradigm is not effective in mathematical reasoning scenarios and may even lead to a decline in performance. In this work, we propose the Process-based Self-Rewarding pipeline for language models, which introduces long-thought reasoning, step-wise LLM-as-a-Judge, and step-wise preference optimization within the self-rewarding paradigm. Our new paradigm successfully enhances the performance of LLMs on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks through iterative Process-based Self-Rewarding, demonstrating the immense potential of self-rewarding to achieve LLM reasoning that may surpass human capabilities.

How do large language models (LLMs) obtain their answers? The ability to explain and control an LLM's reasoning process is key for reliability, transparency, and future model developments. We propose SelfIE (Self-Interpretation of Embeddings), a framework that enables LLMs to interpret their own embeddings in natural language by leveraging their ability to respond inquiry about a given passage. Capable of interpreting open-world concepts in the hidden embeddings, SelfIE reveals LLM internal reasoning in cases such as making ethical decisions, internalizing prompt injection, and recalling harmful knowledge. SelfIE's text descriptions on hidden embeddings also open up new avenues to control LLM reasoning. We propose Supervised Control, which allows editing open-ended concepts while only requiring gradient computation of individual layer. We extend RLHF to hidden embeddings and propose Reinforcement Control that erases harmful knowledge in LLM without supervision targets.

The promotion of academic papers has become an important means of enhancing research visibility. However, existing automated methods struggle limited storytelling, insufficient aesthetic quality, and constrained self-adjustment, making it difficult to achieve efficient and engaging dissemination. At the heart of those challenges is a simple principle: there is no way to improve it when you cannot evaluate it right. To address this, we introduce EvoPresent, a self-improvement agent framework that unifies coherent narratives, aesthetic-aware designs, and realistic presentation delivery via virtual characters. Central to EvoPresent is PresAesth, a multi-task reinforcement learning (RL) aesthetic model that provides reliable aesthetic scoring, defect adjustment, and comparative feedback, enabling iterative self-improvement even under limited aesthetic training data. To systematically evaluate the methods, we introduce EvoPresent Benchmark, a comprehensive benchmark comprising: Presentation Generation Quality, built on 650 top-tier AI conference papers with multimodal resources (slides, videos and scripts) to assess both content and design; and Aesthetic Awareness, consisting of 2,000 slide pairs with varying aesthetic levels, supporting joint training and evaluation on scoring, defect adjustment, and comparison. Our findings highlight that (i) High-quality feedback is essential for agent self-improvement, while initial capability alone does not guarantee effective self-correction. (ii) Automated generation pipelines exhibit a trade-off between visual design and content construction. (iii) Multi-task RL training shows stronger generalization in aesthetic awareness tasks.

The exploration of whether agents can align with their environment without relying on human-labeled data presents an intriguing research topic. Drawing inspiration from the alignment process observed in intelligent organisms, where declarative memory plays a pivotal role in summarizing past experiences, we propose a novel learning framework. The agents adeptly distill insights from past experiences, refining and updating existing notes to enhance their performance in the environment. This entire process transpires within the memory components and is implemented through natural language, so we character this framework as In-memory Learning. We also delve into the key features of benchmarks designed to evaluate the self-improvement process. Through systematic experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide insights into this problem.

Reasoning ability is essential for Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). In the absence of multimodal chain-of-thought annotated data, self-evolving training, where the model learns from its own outputs, has emerged as an effective and scalable approach for enhancing reasoning abilities. Despite its growing usage, a comprehensive understanding of self-evolving training, particularly in the context of multimodal reasoning, remains limited. In this paper, we delve into the intricacies of self-evolving training for multimodal reasoning, pinpointing three key factors: Training Method, Reward Model, and Prompt Variation. We systematically examine each factor and explore how various configurations affect the training's effectiveness. Our analysis leads to a set of best practices for each factor, aimed at optimizing multimodal reasoning. Furthermore, we explore the Self-Evolution Dynamics during training and the impact of automatic balancing mechanisms in boosting performance. After all the investigations, we present a final recipe for self-evolving training in multimodal reasoning, encapsulating these design choices into a framework we call MSTaR (Multimodal Self-evolving Training for Reasoning), which is universally effective for models with different sizes on various benchmarks, e.g., surpassing the pre-evolved model significantly on 5 multimodal reasoning benchmarks without using additional human annotations, as demonstrated on MiniCPM-V-2.5 (8B), Phi-3.5-Vision (4B) and InternVL2 (2B). We believe this study fills a significant gap in the understanding of self-evolving training for multimodal reasoning and offers a robust framework for future research. Our policy and reward models, as well as the collected data, is released to facilitate further investigation in multimodal reasoning.

A fundamental question in cognitive neuroscience is what shapes visual perception: the external world's structure or the brain's internal architecture. Although some perceptual variability can be traced to individual differences, brain responses to naturalistic stimuli evoke similar activity patterns across individuals, suggesting a convergent representational principle. Here, we test if this stimulus-driven convergence follows a common trajectory across people and deep neural networks (DNNs) during its transformation from sensory to high-level internal representations. We introduce a unified framework that traces representational flow by combining inter-subject similarity with alignment to model hierarchies. Applying this framework to three independent fMRI datasets of visual scene perception, we reveal a cortex-wide network, conserved across individuals, organized into two pathways: a medial-ventral stream for scene structure and a lateral-dorsal stream tuned for social and biological content. This functional organization is captured by the hierarchies of vision DNNs but not language models, reinforcing the specificity of the visual-to-semantic transformation. These findings show a convergent computational solution for visual encoding in both human and artificial vision, driven by the structure of the external world.

In aligning large language models (LLMs), utilizing feedback from existing advanced AI rather than humans is an important method to scale supervisory signals. However, it is highly challenging for AI to understand human intentions and societal values, and provide accurate preference feedback based on these. Current AI feedback methods rely on powerful LLMs, carefully designed specific principles to describe human intentions, and are easily influenced by position bias. To address these issues, we propose a self-reference-based AI feedback framework that enables a 13B Llama2-Chat to provide high-quality feedback under simple and general principles such as ``best for humanity``. Specifically, we allow the AI to first respond to the user's instructions, then generate criticism of other answers based on its own response as a reference, and finally determine which answer better fits human preferences according to the criticism. Additionally, we use a self-consistency method to further reduce the impact of position bias, and employ semantic perplexity to calculate the preference strength differences between different answers. Experimental results show that our method enables 13B and 70B Llama2-Chat annotators to provide high-quality preference feedback, and the policy models trained based on these preference data achieve significant advantages in benchmark datasets through reinforcement learning.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

The self-rationalising capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have been explored in restricted settings, using task/specific data sets. However, current LLMs do not (only) rely on specifically annotated data; nonetheless, they frequently explain their outputs. The properties of the generated explanations are influenced by the pre-training corpus and by the target data used for instruction fine-tuning. As the pre-training corpus includes a large amount of human-written explanations "in the wild", we hypothesise that LLMs adopt common properties of human explanations. By analysing the outputs for a multi-domain instruction fine-tuning data set, we find that generated explanations show selectivity and contain illustrative elements, but less frequently are subjective or misleading. We discuss reasons and consequences of the properties' presence or absence. In particular, we outline positive and negative implications depending on the goals and user groups of the self-rationalising system.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Detecting hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) remains a critical challenge for their reliable deployment in real-world applications. To address this, we introduce SelfCheckAgent, a novel framework integrating three different agents: the Symbolic Agent, the Specialized Detection Agent, and the Contextual Consistency Agent. These agents provide a robust multi-dimensional approach to hallucination detection. Notable results include the Contextual Consistency Agent leveraging Llama 3.1 with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) to achieve outstanding performance on the WikiBio dataset, with NonFactual hallucination detection scoring 93.64%, Factual 70.26%, and Ranking 78.48% respectively. On the AIME dataset, GPT-4o with CoT excels in NonFactual detection with 94.89% but reveals trade-offs in Factual with 30.58% and Ranking with 30.68%, underscoring the complexity of hallucination detection in the complex mathematical domains. The framework also incorporates a triangulation strategy, which increases the strengths of the SelfCheckAgent, yielding significant improvements in real-world hallucination identification. The comparative analysis demonstrates SelfCheckAgent's applicability across diverse domains, positioning it as a crucial advancement for trustworthy LLMs. These findings highlight the potentiality of consistency-driven methodologies in detecting hallucinations in LLMs.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

A rapidly growing number of applications rely on a small set of closed-source language models (LMs). This dependency might introduce novel security risks if LMs develop self-recognition capabilities. Inspired by human identity verification methods, we propose a novel approach for assessing self-recognition in LMs using model-generated "security questions". Our test can be externally administered to keep track of frontier models as it does not require access to internal model parameters or output probabilities. We use our test to examine self-recognition in ten of the most capable open- and closed-source LMs currently publicly available. Our extensive experiments found no empirical evidence of general or consistent self-recognition in any examined LM. Instead, our results suggest that given a set of alternatives, LMs seek to pick the "best" answer, regardless of its origin. Moreover, we find indications that preferences about which models produce the best answers are consistent across LMs. We additionally uncover novel insights on position bias considerations for LMs in multiple-choice settings.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Self-rewarding have emerged recently as a powerful tool in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), allowing language models to generate high-quality relevant responses by providing their own rewards during training. This innovative technique addresses the limitations of other methods that rely on human preferences. In this paper, we build upon the concept of self-rewarding models and introduce its vision equivalent for Text-to-Image generative AI models. This approach works by fine-tuning diffusion model on a self-generated self-judged dataset, making the fine-tuning more automated and with better data quality. The proposed mechanism makes use of other pre-trained models such as vocabulary based-object detection, image captioning and is conditioned by the a set of object for which the user might need to improve generated data quality. The approach has been implemented, fine-tuned and evaluated on stable diffusion and has led to a performance that has been evaluated to be at least 60\% better than existing commercial and research Text-to-image models. Additionally, the built self-rewarding mechanism allowed a fully automated generation of images, while increasing the visual quality of the generated images and also more efficient following of prompt instructions. The code used in this work is freely available on https://github.com/safouaneelg/SRT2I.

While deep reinforcement learning excels at solving tasks where large amounts of data can be collected through virtually unlimited interaction with the environment, learning from limited interaction remains a key challenge. We posit that an agent can learn more efficiently if we augment reward maximization with self-supervised objectives based on structure in its visual input and sequential interaction with the environment. Our method, Self-Predictive Representations(SPR), trains an agent to predict its own latent state representations multiple steps into the future. We compute target representations for future states using an encoder which is an exponential moving average of the agent's parameters and we make predictions using a learned transition model. On its own, this future prediction objective outperforms prior methods for sample-efficient deep RL from pixels. We further improve performance by adding data augmentation to the future prediction loss, which forces the agent's representations to be consistent across multiple views of an observation. Our full self-supervised objective, which combines future prediction and data augmentation, achieves a median human-normalized score of 0.415 on Atari in a setting limited to 100k steps of environment interaction, which represents a 55% relative improvement over the previous state-of-the-art. Notably, even in this limited data regime, SPR exceeds expert human scores on 7 out of 26 games. The code associated with this work is available at https://github.com/mila-iqia/spr

High-quality preference data is essential for aligning foundation models with human values through preference learning. However, manual annotation of such data is often time-consuming and costly. Recent methods often adopt a self-rewarding approach, where the target model generates and annotates its own preference data, but this can lead to inaccuracies since the reward model shares weights with the target model, thereby amplifying inherent biases. To address these issues, we propose Anyprefer, a framework designed to synthesize high-quality preference data for aligning the target model. Anyprefer frames the data synthesis process as a cooperative two-player Markov Game, where the target model and the judge model collaborate together. Here, a series of external tools are introduced to assist the judge model in accurately rewarding the target model's responses, mitigating biases in the rewarding process. In addition, a feedback mechanism is introduced to optimize prompts for both models, enhancing collaboration and improving data quality. The synthesized data is compiled into a new preference dataset, Anyprefer-V1, consisting of 58K high-quality preference pairs. Extensive experiments show that Anyprefer significantly improves model alignment performance across four main applications, covering 21 datasets, achieving average improvements of 18.55% in five natural language generation datasets, 3.66% in nine vision-language understanding datasets, 30.05% in three medical image analysis datasets, and 16.00% in four visuo-motor control tasks.

Large language models (LMs) are capable of generating free-text rationales to aid question answering. However, prior work 1) suggests that useful self-rationalization is emergent only at significant scales (e.g., 175B parameter GPT-3); and 2) focuses largely on downstream performance, ignoring the semantics of the rationales themselves, e.g., are they faithful, true, and helpful for humans? In this work, we enable small-scale LMs (approx. 200x smaller than GPT-3) to generate rationales that not only improve downstream task performance, but are also more plausible, consistent, and diverse, assessed both by automatic and human evaluation. Our method, MaRio (Multi-rewArd RatIOnalization), is a multi-reward conditioned self-rationalization algorithm that optimizes multiple distinct properties like plausibility, diversity and consistency. Results on five difficult question-answering datasets StrategyQA, QuaRel, OpenBookQA, NumerSense and QASC show that not only does MaRio improve task accuracy, but it also improves the self-rationalization quality of small LMs across the aforementioned axes better than a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) baseline. Extensive human evaluations confirm that MaRio rationales are preferred vs. SFT rationales, as well as qualitative improvements in plausibility and consistency.

Self-supervised learning (SSL) has revolutionized visual representation learning, but has not achieved the robustness of human vision. A reason for this could be that SSL does not leverage all the data available to humans during learning. When learning about an object, humans often purposefully turn or move around objects and research suggests that these interactions can substantially enhance their learning. Here we explore whether such object-related actions can boost SSL. For this, we extract the actions performed to change from one ego-centric view of an object to another in four video datasets. We then introduce a new loss function to learn visual and action embeddings by aligning the performed action with the representations of two images extracted from the same clip. This permits the performed actions to structure the latent visual representation. Our experiments show that our method consistently outperforms previous methods on downstream category recognition. In our analysis, we find that the observed improvement is associated with a better viewpoint-wise alignment of different objects from the same category. Overall, our work demonstrates that embodied interactions with objects can improve SSL of object categories.

Wider access to therapeutic care is one of the biggest challenges in mental health treatment. Due to institutional barriers, some people seeking mental health support have turned to large language models (LLMs) for personalized therapy, even though these models are largely unsanctioned and untested. We investigate the potential and limitations of using LLMs as providers of evidence-based therapy by using mixed methods clinical metrics. Using HELPERT, a prompt run on a large language model using the same process and training as a comparative group of peer counselors, we replicated publicly accessible mental health conversations rooted in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) to compare session dynamics and counselor's CBT-based behaviors between original peer support sessions and their reconstructed HELPERT sessions. Two licensed, CBT-trained clinical psychologists evaluated the sessions using the Cognitive Therapy Rating Scale and provided qualitative feedback. Our findings show that the peer sessions are characterized by empathy, small talk, therapeutic alliance, and shared experiences but often exhibit therapist drift. Conversely, HELPERT reconstructed sessions exhibit minimal therapist drift and higher adherence to CBT methods but display a lack of collaboration, empathy, and cultural understanding. Through CTRS ratings and psychologists' feedback, we highlight the importance of human-AI collaboration for scalable mental health. Our work outlines the ethical implication of imparting human-like subjective qualities to LLMs in therapeutic settings, particularly the risk of deceptive empathy, which may lead to unrealistic patient expectations and potential harm.

Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) is a reliable learning mechanism in which a robot uses an original, trusted sensor cue for training to recognize an additional, complementary sensor cue. We study for the first time in SSL how a robot's learning behavior should be organized, so that the robot can keep performing its task in the case that the original cue becomes unavailable. We study this persistent form of SSL in the context of a flying robot that has to avoid obstacles based on distance estimates from the visual cue of stereo vision. Over time it will learn to also estimate distances based on monocular appearance cues. A strategy is introduced that has the robot switch from stereo vision based flight to monocular flight, with stereo vision purely used as 'training wheels' to avoid imminent collisions. This strategy is shown to be an effective approach to the 'feedback-induced data bias' problem as also experienced in learning from demonstration. Both simulations and real-world experiments with a stereo vision equipped AR drone 2.0 show the feasibility of this approach, with the robot successfully using monocular vision to avoid obstacles in a 5 x 5 room. The experiments show the potential of persistent SSL as a robust learning approach to enhance the capabilities of robots. Moreover, the abundant training data coming from the own sensors allows to gather large data sets necessary for deep learning approaches.

In recent years, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress but continue to face inherent challenges in multimodal reasoning, which requires multi-level (e.g., perception, reasoning) and multi-granular (e.g., multi-step reasoning chain) advanced inferencing. Prior work on estimating model confidence tends to focus on the overall response for training and calibration, but fails to assess confidence in each reasoning step, leading to undesirable hallucination snowballing. In this work, we present MMBoundary, a novel framework that advances the knowledge boundary awareness of MLLMs through reasoning step confidence calibration. To achieve this, we propose to incorporate complementary textual and cross-modal self-rewarding signals to estimate confidence at each step of the MLLM reasoning process. In addition to supervised fine-tuning MLLM on this set of self-rewarded confidence estimation signal for initial confidence expression warm-up, we introduce a reinforcement learning stage with multiple reward functions for further aligning model knowledge and calibrating confidence at each reasoning step, enhancing reasoning chain self-correction. Empirical results show that MMBoundary significantly outperforms existing methods across diverse domain datasets and metrics, achieving an average of 7.5% reduction in multimodal confidence calibration errors and up to 8.3% improvement in task performance.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

Autonomous Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents rely on accurate GUI grounding, which maps language instructions to on-screen coordinates, to execute user commands. However, current models, whether trained via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT), lack self-awareness of their capability boundaries, leading to overconfidence and unreliable predictions. We first systematically evaluate probabilistic and verbalized confidence in general and GUI-specific models, revealing a misalignment between confidence and actual accuracy, which is particularly critical in dynamic GUI automation tasks, where single errors can cause task failure. To address this, we propose HyperClick, a novel framework that enhances reliable GUI grounding through uncertainty calibration. HyperClick introduces a dual reward mechanism, combining a binary reward for correct actions with a truncated Gaussian-based spatial confidence modeling, calibrated using the Brier score. This approach jointly optimizes grounding accuracy and confidence reliability, fostering introspective self-criticism. Extensive experiments on seven challenge benchmarks show that HyperClick achieves state-of-the-art performance while providing well-calibrated confidence. By enabling explicit confidence calibration and introspective self-criticism, HyperClick reduces overconfidence and supports more reliable GUI automation.

Large language models (LLMs) like GPTs, trained on vast datasets, have demonstrated impressive capabilities in language understanding, reasoning, and planning, achieving human-level performance in various tasks. Most studies focus on enhancing these models by training on ever-larger datasets to build more powerful foundation models. While training stronger models is important, enabling models to evolve during inference is equally crucial, a process we refer to as AI self-evolution. Unlike large-scale training, self-evolution may rely on limited data or interactions. Inspired by the columnar organization of the human cerebral cortex, we hypothesize that AI models could develop cognitive abilities and build internal representations through iterative interactions with their environment. To achieve this, models need long-term memory (LTM) to store and manage processed interaction data. LTM supports self-evolution by representing diverse experiences across environments and agents. In this report, we explore AI self-evolution and its potential to enhance models during inference. We examine LTM's role in lifelong learning, allowing models to evolve based on accumulated interactions. We outline the structure of LTM and the systems needed for effective data retention and representation. We also classify approaches for building personalized models with LTM data and show how these models achieve self-evolution through interaction. Using LTM, our multi-agent framework OMNE achieved first place on the GAIA benchmark, demonstrating LTM's potential for AI self-evolution. Finally, we present a roadmap for future research, emphasizing the importance of LTM for advancing AI technology and its practical applications.

Recent work in language modeling has raised the possibility of self-improvement, where a language models evaluates and refines its own generations to achieve higher performance without external feedback. It is impossible for this self-improvement to create information that is not already in the model, so why should we expect that this will lead to improved capabilities? We offer a new perspective on the capabilities of self-improvement through a lens we refer to as sharpening. Motivated by the observation that language models are often better at verifying response quality than they are at generating correct responses, we formalize self-improvement as using the model itself as a verifier during post-training in order to ``sharpen'' the model to one placing large mass on high-quality sequences, thereby amortizing the expensive inference-time computation of generating good sequences. We begin by introducing a new statistical framework for sharpening in which the learner aims to sharpen a pre-trained base policy via sample access, and establish fundamental limits. Then we analyze two natural families of self-improvement algorithms based on SFT and RLHF. We find that (i) the SFT-based approach is minimax optimal whenever the initial model has sufficient coverage, but (ii) the RLHF-based approach can improve over SFT-based self-improvement by leveraging online exploration, bypassing the need for coverage. Finally, we empirically validate the sharpening mechanism via inference-time and amortization experiments. We view these findings as a starting point toward a foundational understanding that can guide the design and evaluation of self-improvement algorithms.

In many real-world scenarios, rewards extrinsic to the agent are extremely sparse, or absent altogether. In such cases, curiosity can serve as an intrinsic reward signal to enable the agent to explore its environment and learn skills that might be useful later in its life. We formulate curiosity as the error in an agent's ability to predict the consequence of its own actions in a visual feature space learned by a self-supervised inverse dynamics model. Our formulation scales to high-dimensional continuous state spaces like images, bypasses the difficulties of directly predicting pixels, and, critically, ignores the aspects of the environment that cannot affect the agent. The proposed approach is evaluated in two environments: VizDoom and Super Mario Bros. Three broad settings are investigated: 1) sparse extrinsic reward, where curiosity allows for far fewer interactions with the environment to reach the goal; 2) exploration with no extrinsic reward, where curiosity pushes the agent to explore more efficiently; and 3) generalization to unseen scenarios (e.g. new levels of the same game) where the knowledge gained from earlier experience helps the agent explore new places much faster than starting from scratch. Demo video and code available at https://pathak22.github.io/noreward-rl/

In this paper, we explore the ability to model and infer personality types of opponents, predict their responses, and use this information to adapt a dialog agent's high-level strategy in negotiation tasks. Inspired by the idea of incorporating a theory of mind (ToM) into machines, we introduce a probabilistic formulation to encapsulate the opponent's personality type during both learning and inference. We test our approach on the CraigslistBargain dataset and show that our method using ToM inference achieves a 20% higher dialog agreement rate compared to baselines on a mixed population of opponents. We also find that our model displays diverse negotiation behavior with different types of opponents.

Self-supervised learning is an empirically successful approach to unsupervised learning based on creating artificial supervised learning problems. A popular self-supervised approach to representation learning is contrastive learning, which leverages naturally occurring pairs of similar and dissimilar data points, or multiple views of the same data. This work provides a theoretical analysis of contrastive learning in the multi-view setting, where two views of each datum are available. The main result is that linear functions of the learned representations are nearly optimal on downstream prediction tasks whenever the two views provide redundant information about the label.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in linguistic tasks, necessitating robust evaluation frameworks to understand their capabilities and limitations. Inspired by Feynman's principle of understanding through creation, we introduce a self-knowledge evaluation framework that is easy to implement, evaluating models on their ability to comprehend and respond to self-generated questions. Our findings, based on testing multiple models across diverse tasks, reveal significant gaps in the model's self-knowledge ability. Further analysis indicates these gaps may be due to misalignment with human attention mechanisms. Additionally, fine-tuning on self-generated math task may enhance the model's math performance, highlighting the potential of the framework for efficient and insightful model evaluation and may also contribute to the improvement of LLMs.

We explore a method for improving the performance of large language models through self-reflection and reinforcement learning. By incentivizing the model to generate better self-reflections when it answers incorrectly, we demonstrate that a model's ability to solve complex, verifiable tasks can be enhanced even when generating synthetic data is infeasible and only binary feedback is available. Our framework operates in two stages: first, upon failing a given task, the model generates a self-reflective commentary analyzing its previous attempt; second, the model is given another attempt at the task with the self-reflection in context. If the subsequent attempt succeeds, the tokens generated during the self-reflection phase are rewarded. Our experimental results show substantial performance gains across a variety of model architectures, as high as 34.7% improvement at math equation writing and 18.1% improvement at function calling. Notably, smaller fine-tuned models (1.5 billion to 7 billion parameters) outperform models in the same family that are 10 times larger. Our novel paradigm is thus an exciting pathway to more useful and reliable language models that can self-improve on challenging tasks with limited external feedback.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

The reflection capacity of Large Language Model (LLM) has garnered extensive attention. A post-hoc prompting strategy, e.g., reflexion and self-refine, refines LLM's response based on self-evaluated or external feedback. However, recent research indicates without external feedback, LLM's intrinsic reflection is unstable. Our investigation unveils that the key bottleneck is the quality of the self-evaluated feedback. We find LLMs often exhibit overconfidence or high randomness when self-evaluate, offering stubborn or inconsistent feedback, which causes poor reflection. To remedy this, we advocate Self-Contrast: It adaptively explores diverse solving perspectives tailored to the request, contrasts the differences, and summarizes these discrepancies into a checklist which could be used to re-examine and eliminate discrepancies. Our method endows LLM with diverse perspectives to alleviate stubborn biases. Moreover, their discrepancies indicate potential errors or inherent uncertainties that LLM often overlooks. Reflecting upon these can catalyze more accurate and stable reflection. Experiments conducted on a series of reasoning and translation tasks with different LLMs serve to underscore the effectiveness and generality of our strategy.

Large multimodal models (LMMs) suffer from multimodal hallucination, where they provide incorrect responses misaligned with the given visual information. Recent works have conjectured that one of the reasons behind multimodal hallucination might be due to the vision encoder failing to ground on the image properly. To mitigate this issue, we propose a novel approach that leverages self-feedback as visual cues. Building on this approach, we introduce Volcano, a multimodal self-feedback guided revision model. Volcano generates natural language feedback to its initial response based on the provided visual information and utilizes this feedback to self-revise its initial response. Volcano effectively reduces multimodal hallucination and achieves state-of-the-art on MMHal-Bench, POPE, and GAVIE. It also improves on general multimodal abilities and outperforms previous models on MM-Vet and MMBench. Through a qualitative analysis, we show that Volcano's feedback is properly grounded on the image than the initial response. This indicates that Volcano can provide itself with richer visual information, helping alleviate multimodal hallucination. We publicly release Volcano models of 7B and 13B sizes along with the data and code at https://github.com/kaistAI/Volcano.

Personality detection from text is commonly performed by analysing users' social media posts. However, existing methods heavily rely on large-scale annotated datasets, making it challenging to obtain high-quality personality labels. Moreover, most studies treat emotion and personality as independent variables, overlooking their interactions. In this paper, we propose a novel self-supervised framework, EmoPerso, which improves personality detection through emotion-aware modelling. EmoPerso first leverages generative mechanisms for synthetic data augmentation and rich representation learning. It then extracts pseudo-labeled emotion features and jointly optimizes them with personality prediction via multi-task learning. A cross-attention module is employed to capture fine-grained interactions between personality traits and the inferred emotional representations. To further refine relational reasoning, EmoPerso adopts a self-taught strategy to enhance the model's reasoning capabilities iteratively. Extensive experiments on two benchmark datasets demonstrate that EmoPerso surpasses state-of-the-art models. The source code is available at https://github.com/slz0925/EmoPerso.

Deep neural networks have demonstrated remarkable performance in supervised learning tasks but require large amounts of labeled data. Self-supervised learning offers an alternative paradigm, enabling the model to learn from data without explicit labels. Information theory has been instrumental in understanding and optimizing deep neural networks. Specifically, the information bottleneck principle has been applied to optimize the trade-off between compression and relevant information preservation in supervised settings. However, the optimal information objective in self-supervised learning remains unclear. In this paper, we review various approaches to self-supervised learning from an information-theoretic standpoint and present a unified framework that formalizes the self-supervised information-theoretic learning problem. We integrate existing research into a coherent framework, examine recent self-supervised methods, and identify research opportunities and challenges. Moreover, we discuss empirical measurement of information-theoretic quantities and their estimators. This paper offers a comprehensive review of the intersection between information theory, self-supervised learning, and deep neural networks.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become deeply integrated into human life and increasingly influence decision-making, it's crucial to evaluate whether and to what extent they exhibit subjective preferences, opinions, and beliefs. These tendencies may stem from biases within the models, which may shape their behavior, influence the advice and recommendations they offer to users, and potentially reinforce certain viewpoints. This paper presents the Preference, Opinion, and Belief survey (POBs), a benchmark developed to assess LLMs' subjective inclinations across societal, cultural, ethical, and personal domains. We applied our benchmark to evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, measuring desired properties such as reliability, neutrality, and consistency. In addition, we investigated the effect of increasing the test-time compute, through reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms, on those metrics. While effective in other tasks, our results show that these mechanisms offer only limited gains in our domain. Furthermore, we reveal that newer model versions are becoming less consistent and more biased toward specific viewpoints, highlighting a blind spot and a concerning trend. POBS: https://ibm.github.io/POBS

Many patterns in nature exhibit self-similarity: they can be compactly described via self-referential transformations. Said patterns commonly appear in natural and artificial objects, such as molecules, shorelines, galaxies and even images. In this work, we investigate the role of learning in the automated discovery of self-similarity and in its utilization for downstream tasks. To this end, we design a novel class of implicit operators, Neural Collages, which (1) represent data as the parameters of a self-referential, structured transformation, and (2) employ hypernetworks to amortize the cost of finding these parameters to a single forward pass. We investigate how to leverage the representations produced by Neural Collages in various tasks, including data compression and generation. Neural Collages image compressors are orders of magnitude faster than other self-similarity-based algorithms during encoding and offer compression rates competitive with implicit methods. Finally, we showcase applications of Neural Collages for fractal art and as deep generative models.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of simulating human behavior, offering cost-effective ways to estimate user responses during the early phases of survey design. While previous studies have examined whether models can reflect individual opinions or attitudes, we argue that a higher-order binding of virtual personas requires successfully approximating not only the opinions of a user as an identified member of a group, but also the nuanced ways in which that user perceives and evaluates those outside the group. In particular, faithfully simulating how humans perceive different social groups is critical for applying LLMs to various political science studies, including timely topics on polarization dynamics, inter-group conflict, and democratic backsliding. To this end, we propose a novel methodology for constructing virtual personas with synthetic user ``backstories" generated as extended, multi-turn interview transcripts. Our generated backstories are longer, rich in detail, and consistent in authentically describing a singular individual, compared to previous methods. We show that virtual personas conditioned on our backstories closely replicate human response distributions (up to an 87\% improvement as measured by Wasserstein Distance) and produce effect sizes that closely match those observed in the original studies. Altogether, our work extends the applicability of LLMs beyond estimating individual self-opinions, enabling their use in a broader range of human studies.

Historical analogies, which compare known past events with contemporary but unfamiliar events, are important abilities that help people make decisions and understand the world. However, research in applied history suggests that people have difficulty finding appropriate analogies. And previous studies in the AI community have also overlooked historical analogies. To fill this gap, in this paper, we focus on the historical analogy acquisition task, which aims to acquire analogous historical events for a given event. We explore retrieval and generation methods for acquiring historical analogies based on different large language models (LLMs). Furthermore, we propose a self-reflection method to mitigate hallucinations and stereotypes when LLMs generate historical analogies. Through human evaluations and our specially designed automatic multi-dimensional assessment, we find that LLMs generally have a good potential for historical analogies. And the performance of the models can be further improved by using our self-reflection method.

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

Humans learn to master open-ended repertoires of skills by imagining and practicing their own goals. This autotelic learning process, literally the pursuit of self-generated (auto) goals (telos), becomes more and more open-ended as the goals become more diverse, abstract and creative. The resulting exploration of the space of possible skills is supported by an inter-individual exploration: goal representations are culturally evolved and transmitted across individuals, in particular using language. Current artificial agents mostly rely on predefined goal representations corresponding to goal spaces that are either bounded (e.g. list of instructions), or unbounded (e.g. the space of possible visual inputs) but are rarely endowed with the ability to reshape their goal representations, to form new abstractions or to imagine creative goals. In this paper, we introduce a language model augmented autotelic agent (LMA3) that leverages a pretrained language model (LM) to support the representation, generation and learning of diverse, abstract, human-relevant goals. The LM is used as an imperfect model of human cultural transmission; an attempt to capture aspects of humans' common-sense, intuitive physics and overall interests. Specifically, it supports three key components of the autotelic architecture: 1)~a relabeler that describes the goals achieved in the agent's trajectories, 2)~a goal generator that suggests new high-level goals along with their decomposition into subgoals the agent already masters, and 3)~reward functions for each of these goals. Without relying on any hand-coded goal representations, reward functions or curriculum, we show that LMA3 agents learn to master a large diversity of skills in a task-agnostic text-based environment.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Biological systems perceive the world by simultaneously processing high-dimensional inputs from modalities as diverse as vision, audition, touch, proprioception, etc. The perception models used in deep learning on the other hand are designed for individual modalities, often relying on domain-specific assumptions such as the local grid structures exploited by virtually all existing vision models. These priors introduce helpful inductive biases, but also lock models to individual modalities. In this paper we introduce the Perceiver - a model that builds upon Transformers and hence makes few architectural assumptions about the relationship between its inputs, but that also scales to hundreds of thousands of inputs, like ConvNets. The model leverages an asymmetric attention mechanism to iteratively distill inputs into a tight latent bottleneck, allowing it to scale to handle very large inputs. We show that this architecture is competitive with or outperforms strong, specialized models on classification tasks across various modalities: images, point clouds, audio, video, and video+audio. The Perceiver obtains performance comparable to ResNet-50 and ViT on ImageNet without 2D convolutions by directly attending to 50,000 pixels. It is also competitive in all modalities in AudioSet.